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                                                    SUMMARY 
 
This legal study identifies through a case-study of Zimbabwe the range of essential 
legal reforms an emerging market should implement to establish financial 
infrastructure that enables the structuring of securitization transactions and the 
prevention and management of risks – such as those highlighted by the 2007 global 
financial crisis – that can arise from securitization transactions.  
 
The study analyses: (i) laws regulating or relating to prudentially regulated firms that 
typically use securitization to refinance; (ii) corporate and trust laws to identify legal 
structures which can be utilised as securitization special purpose vehicles; (iii) the 
Roman-Dutch law of sale to determine whether it permits the true-sale of financial 
assets; (iv) various legal risks, including substantive-consolidation, veil-piercing, 
foreclosure, insolvency and tax risks; (v) the dispute resolution framework; and (vi) 
the structured finance risk mitigation properties of Zimbabwe‘s financial market 
regulatory framework. 
 
The study concludes that Zimbabwe‘s legal system permits most of the contractual 
arrangements that constitute a basic securitization transaction. However, its financial 
services regulatory and gatekeeping framework - which must be reformed - is 
rudimentary and ill-suited to preventing and managing systemic risks that can arise 
from securitization.  
 
This is the first comprehensive academic study which investigates the extent to which 
the Roman-Dutch legal system enables the various contractual arrangements that 
constitute a securitization transaction. It also presents an analytical model for 
reviewing the securitization-enabling characteristics of emerging markets‘ legal 
systems and the securitization risk mitigation properties of their financial 
infrastructures.   
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1                                   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Through a case-study of Zimbabwe this study presents an analytical model for 
reviewing the securitization-enabling characteristics of emerging markets‘ legal 
systems,
1
 and the securitization risk mitigation properties of their financial 
infrastructures. This study analyses: (i) laws regulating or relating to financial 
institutions and other entities likely to engage in securitization transactions as 
originators, providers of securitization transaction services and investors; (ii) 
corporate and trust laws to identify legal structures which can be utilised as 
securitization special purpose vehicles; (iii) whether the Roman-Dutch law of sale 
permits the effective and secure transfer of financial assets to be securitized from an 
originating firm to a special purpose vehicle; and (iv) legal risks, including re-
characterization, substantive-consolidation, veil-piercing, foreclosure, insolvency and 
tax risks. Given the systemic risks that can be spawned through securitization, this 
study also evaluates: (a) through a literature analysis, the risks and benefits of 
securitization; (b) Zimbabwe‘s financial markets regulatory framework and its 
gatekeeping liability and regulatory framework; and (c) Zimbabwe‘s dispute 
                                                 
1
 Zimbabwe is one of the several countries described by Standard and Poor as an emerging market. 
Standards and Poor (2007) ‗Emerging Markets Index‘, at p. 13. Available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SP_Emerging_Markets_Indices_Methodology_Web.
pdf  The phrase 2007 global financial crisis is used as shorthand to refer to the credit crisis that started 
in July 2007 over investor concerns relating to U.S. mortgage backed securities, resulting in a liquidity 
crisis, which later deteriorated into a full blown global financial crisis.  
2 
resolution framework. This study concludes that Zimbabwe‘s legal system permits 
most of the contractual arrangements that constitute a basic securitization transaction; 
but its financial services regulatory and gatekeeping framework must be reformed to 
enable it to effectively prevent and manage systemic risks that can arise from 
securitization. The legal analysis contained herein is correct as of 30 August 2009.  
 
1.2. Securitization: definition 
There does not exist a universal or standard definition of asset securitization.
2
 
Most definitions of securitization, including that provided by Zimbabwe‘s central 
bank are transactional in nature.
3
 Sometimes referred to as structured finance,
4
 the 
term securitization refers to a series of transactions and contractual relationships, 
involving the use by an income-generating entity of its financial assets to raise finance 
on the capital markets through the issuance of securities backed by periodic cash-
flows generated by the financial assets.
5
 The financial assets are securitized by their 
conversion into standardized tradable instruments.
6
 Shenker et al aptly define 
securitization as: ―[T]he sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership 
interests in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a 
                                                 
2
 This is largely due to the fact that securitization is structured as a series of contractual arrangements 
between various parties to the transaction.  
3
 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe defines securitisation as: ―…a process whereby financial promises or 
assets are packaged into marketable securities that can be freely traded on the capital and financial 
markets. It has the effect of transforming a pool of relatively illiquid assets into tradable liquid assets. 
There are generally two types of securitisation, namely traditional schemes and synthetic securitisation 
schemes.‖ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Guideline No. 01-2007/BSD: Special Purpose Vehicles, 
Securitization and Structured Finance, at p. 4. Available at 
http://www.rbz.co.zw/pdfs/2007mid/Bank_lic_sup1.pdf  
4
 Numerous commentators refer to securitization as structured finance. See for instance Steven L. 
Schwarcz who states: ―The terms ‗securitization,‘ ‗asset securitization,‘ and ‗structured finance‘ are 
used interchangeably. Each refers to a company‘s use of cash flows from its assets to raise funding. 
The term ‗securitization‘ specifically refers to the issuance of securities backed by such cash flows.‖ 
Steven L. Schwarcz (1994) ‗The Alchemy of Asset Securitization‘, Stanford Journal of Law, Business 
and Finance, vol 1:133, 136. See also Christopher W. Frost (1997) ‗Asset Backed Securitization and 
Corporate Risk Allocation‘, Tulane Law Review, vol. 72, 1997, 101, at p. 103.  
5
 Jeremy Shapiro (1999) ‗Innovation in Financial Services: Case Study, Asset Backed Securitization‘, 
MIT, IPC, Working Paper No. 99-003, Feb 1999, at p. 5. 
6
 Frost (1997) (note 4, supra), at p. 103. 
3 
transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or 
lending against underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily 
marketable and, thus more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the 
underlying assets.‖7 According to Jobst, ―securitization describes the process and the 
result of converting regular and classifiable cash flows from a diversified pool of 
illiquid existing or future assets of similar type, size and risk category into tradable 
debt and equity obligations (liquidity transformation and asset diversification 
process).‖8 
Securitization transactions can be classified into several categories, including asset 
backed securitization (receivables securitization) and future-flow securitization. The 
essential difference between these two categories lies in the nature of assets to be 
securitized.
9
 Receivables securitization refers to the securitization of financial assets 
which are in existence at the time a securitization transaction is structured. Assets in a 
future-flow securitization are, on the other hand, not in existence at the time a 
transaction is structured but are generated at a future date. Typical examples of 
securitization transactions include residential mortgage-backed securitization 
(RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securitization (CMBS), collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs), and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Most financial 
                                                 
7
 Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta (1991), ‗Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues 
and New Frontiers‘, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1374-75. 
8
 Andreas A. Jobst (2006) ‗Asset Securitization as a Risk Management and Funding Tool: What Small 
Firms Should Know‘. Managerial Finance, Vol. 32, No. 9, 2006, at pp. 731-760. In the U.S., a 
definition of securitization has now been codified. See Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1508 (7
th
 
Jan, 2005). See also Douglas Arner (2002) ‗Emerging Market Economies and Governmental Promotion 
of Securitization‘, 12 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 505, at p. 505. 
9
 Raines and Wong state: ―Whereas securitization of receivables usually involves the sale of cash flows 
generated by a company's existing pool of assets, "future flow" transactions are backed by income to be 
derived in the future by an operating company (the originator).‖ Mark Raines and Gabriele Wong 
(2002) ‗Aspects of Securitization of Future Flows under English and New York Law‘, 12 Duke J. of 
Comp. & Int’l L. 453, at p. 453.   
4 
claims can be securitized, including tax, trade, electricity, telephone and toll road 
receivables,
10
 as well as debts such as mortgage, corporate, retail debts.   
 
1.3. Context 
Although securitization hit the doldrums in 2007 it was for over two decades the 
dominant means of enterprise financing in international capital markets.
11
 
Securitization issuances rose from to an estimated US$12 trillion at its height,
12
 
dwarfing other forms of financing. Described in hyperbolic terms as ―alchemy that 
really works,‖13 and ―a boon to every participant in the capital markets,‖14 modern 
securitization was pioneered in the U.S., where most of the world‘s issuances took 
place.
15
 Most regions of the world, the European Union, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Middle East embarked on programmes to create securitization 
                                                 
10
 Sudipto Basu (2005) ‗Securitization and Challenges Faced in Micro Finance‘, Available at 
http://ifmr.ac.in/pdf/workingpapers/2/Securitization.pdf  
11
 Edward M. Iacobucci and Ralph A. Winter (2005) ‗Asset Securitization and Asymmetric 
Information‘, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 34 (1), Jan 2005, at p. 2.   
12
 Ethan Penner (2008) ‗Securitization and the Future of Finance‘, Available at 
www.livinglies.wordpress.com/2008/07/11/securitization-and-the-future-of-finance 
13
Schwarcz (1994) (note 4, supra), at p. 133.  
14
 Frost (1997) (note 4, supra), at p. 104. 
15
  A form of securitization called Pfandbriefe was created by Frederick the Great in 1769, though 
modern securitization is a product of American innovation. See Claire A. Hill (1996) ‗Securitization: A 
Low Cost Sweetener for Lemons‘, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 1061, at p. 1065. In the US, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) was established in the 1930s to insure against default, mortgage loans made to 
lower-income earners. In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was 
established to buy and sell mortgage loans insured by the FHA. The Veterans Association (VA), an 
entity similar to the FHA was established by American war veterans to insure against default, mortgage 
loans made to those that had served in the US armed forces. In 1968, the government created another 
institution; the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) whose objective was to 
develop a secondary mortgages market for FHA and VA insured mortgage loans. In 1970, Ginnie Mae 
issued the first mortgage-backed securities. To further deepen housing finance liquidity and expand the 
reach of the benefits of securitizing mortgage loans, the government created another agency, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for privately issued and financed mortgage 
loans. Freddie Mac made its debut mortgage backed securitization issuance in 1971. See Scott, S. Hal 
and Wellons, A. Philip (2001) International Finance: Transactions, Policy and Regulation, 8
th
 ed, 
Foundation Press, at pp. 777-782. For a discussion of the development and structure of the US 
secondary mortgages market see, Robert van Order (2003) ‗Public Policy and Secondary Mortgage 
Market‘, at pp. 9-11. Available at 
www.infor.worldbank.org/ctools/docs/library/156603/housing/pdf/VanOrder_StateSupport.doc   
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markets.
16
 In Africa - a region with the world‘s least access to cost-effective 
entrepreneurial capital
17
 - only South Africa has an active securitization market.  
Securitization has historically benefited originating firms by: (i) reducing agency 
costs;
18
 (ii) enabling lower-cost financing; (iii) liquidity creation and efficient risk 
allocation;
19
 and (iv) by diversifying refinancing and risk management options,
20
 
including regulatory capital arbitrage.
21
 These benefits notwithstanding, the 
securitization of mispriced U.S. subprime mortgages, compounded by financial 
market regulatory failures, is blamed for precipitating the 2007 global financial 
crisis.
22
 Financial institutions‘ exposures to the mispriced subprime mortgage-backed 
securities created a crisis of confidence in structured finance securities generally and 
resulted in a catastrophic loss of liquidity and a full-scale global financial crisis.
23
 The 
mispriced U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities were sold worldwide, due in 
large part to technological innovations, globalization and the interconnectedness of 
the world‘s financial markets.  
                                                 
16
 Arner (2002) (note 8, supra), at p. 506.  
17
 Milken Institute (2005) ‗Best Markets for Entrepreneurial Finance: 2005‘, Capital Access Index, at p. 
6. 
18
 Iacobucci and Winter (2005) (note 11, supra), at pp. 171-180. But conversely, as shown by the 2007 
global financial crisis, securitization increased moral hazard and agency costs. This is discussed in 
detail in chapter 2 and chapter 8.  
19
 The reasoning goes: because securitization results in disintermediation, firms have direct access to 
capital markets, resulting in lower cost of capital. It ought to be said however that while securitization 
does result in bank disintermediation, it in fact replaces one middleman (the bank) with several, 
including the originator, the arranger, the servicer, rating agencies and insurers. These hypotheses have 
been challenged by the 2007 global financial crisis which saw the evaporation of liquidity and systemic 
risks in securitization, as a result of the securitization of U.S. subprime and other faulty financial assets.  
20
 See for instance Jobst (2006) (note 8, supra), at p. 1.   
21
 Steven L. Schwarcz (1990) ‗Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets‘, 11 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 607, 1990, at p. 608.  
22
 The phrase 2007 global financial crisis is used as shorthand to refer to the U.S. subprime induced 
global financial crisis that started in 2007 in the U.S. before spreading globally. Calomiris argues for 
instance that: ―Securitization of subprime and CDO conduits have given securitization a bad name and 
the long-term future of securitization remains uncertain. But already we are seeing that the negative 
impact on securitization depends on the product line. For example, on the one hand, credit card 
securitizations seem to holding their own.‖ Charles Calomiris (2008) ‗The Subprime Turmoil: What‘s 
Old, What‘s New and What‘s Next?‘, at p. 80. Available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081002_TheSubprimeTurmoil.pdf 
23
 For an apt description of the events that led to and characterized the 2007 global financial crisis refer 
to Markus K. Brunnermier (2008) ‗Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008‘. Available 
at www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/liquidity_credit_crunch.pdf  
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This notwithstanding, this study is predicated on the assumption,
24
 and agrees 
with commentators who argue, that securitization is an efficient risk management tool, 
if inherent risks are effectively mitigated. Securitization generates benefits and it will 
remain - possibly in an altered form and in a more regulated environment - an 
important although possibly not as dominant a refinancing mechanism.
25
 This study 
also argues that because credit risk transfer technologies are a feature of the modern 
international financial landscape, emerging markets‘ financial infrastructure must 
accommodate the numerous arrangements that constitute securitization transactions; if 
not to facilitate the structuring of domestic securitization transactions, then at the very 
least to prevent and manage inherent risks.
26
 By mid 2009, governments are still 
addressing the consequences of the fall out from the securitization and worldwide sale 
of U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities. With globalization, no country or 
financial jurisdiction is an island. The search for entrepreneurial capital is not 
restricted by borders and financial engineering technologies keep evolving. Structured 
finance products, such as securitization, are one such example. This requires countries 
to put in place financial stability frameworks that enable them to prevent and/or 
manage risks which pose systemic threats. Financial services regulatory systems and 
capital markets gatekeeping frameworks – regulating among others credit rating 
agencies, structured finance lawyers, public auditors – must be enabled to prevent and 
manage risks that arise from, inter alia, credit risk transfer technologies. The risks 
include those highlighted by the 2007 global financial crisis.  
                                                 
24
 The benefits of securitization are assumed in this study. This is because this study is legal in nature. 
It does not engage in the econometric measurement of the various benefits commentators credit 
securitization with.   
25
 Steven L. Schwarcz (2008) ‗The Future of Securitization‘, at p. 1. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300928  See also Calomiris (2008) (note 22, supra), at p. 3. 
26
 Caprio et al make the point that although developing countries have not been as adversely affected 
by securitization as have developed countries; there are lessons to be learnt by regulators and 
supervisors in developing countries. Gerard Caprio., Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Edward J. Kane (2008) 
‗The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons, Not Scapegoats‘. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series, at p. 45. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1293169  
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Most emerging markets‘ financial infrastructure cannot easily sustain the 
numerous legal arrangements that constitute a basic securitization transaction. The 
problems countries face range from their unfamiliarity with, the complexity of, and 
the high cost of securitization transactions;
27
 to underdeveloped capital markets, 
hyperinflationary economies, lack of quality financial assets, and lack of a robust 
supporting legal and regulatory infrastructure.
28
 Indeed, an enabling financial 
infrastructure - encompassing the legal, regulatory, tax, securities issuance and 
financial asset transfer framework - is essential for the propagation of securitization.
29
 
It is this predominant factor - a securitization-enabling financial infrastructure - that is 
the subject of, and evaluated in this study and in relation only to Zimbabwe.
30
 This 
Zimbabwe context-specific legal analysis is essential because securitization is a 
sophisticated financing technique that rests on a complex matrix of legal relationships; 
and which technique cannot, without more, be morphed into different financial 
systems.
31
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 Ketkar Suhas and Dilip Ratha (2001) ‗Securitization of Future Flow Receivables: A Useful Tool for 
Developing Countries‘, IMF Finance and Development, March 2001, vol. 38, No. 1., at p. 8. See also 
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supporting elements, all of which have a significant legal element. Arner (2002) (note 8, supra), at p. 
506. 
28
 Many commentators agree that the legal systems of most developing countries do not allow the 
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and Michael Lea  (2004) ‗Mortgage Securities in Emerging Markets‘, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3370, p. 2. Available at:  http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/26/000160016_20040826171659/R
endered/PDF/wps3370.pdf  
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Emerging Markets‘, at p. 14. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929568  
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Working Paper 008. Available at: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/workingpapers/2000/twp00-8.pdf   
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 Lakshman Alles notes: ―One of the biggest obstacles to securitization in developing countries is that 
the legal framework within the jurisdiction of the country is not capable of accommodating the 
numerous legal relationships that need to be established in order to make the securitization process 
successful.‖ Lakshman Alles (2001) ‗Asset Securitization and Structured Financing: Future Prospects 
and Challenges for Emerging Market Countries‘, IMF Working Paper No. WP/01/147, at p. 9. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=879953. 
31
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1.3.1. Securitization in Zimbabwe 
There has been a demonstrable interest in harnessing securitization in Zimbabwe 
by both the private and public sector.
32
 The major impediment, it was argued, was the 
country‘s high inflationary economy.33 Between 1998 and 2001 at least four 
securitization transactions were reportedly structured in Zimbabwe.
34
 During the same 
period, with the assistance of the building society and banking industry and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the government moved to 
create a secondary housing mortgage backed securitization market.
35
 In 2000 the 
government commissioned research on the introduction of a secondary housing 
finance market.
36
 In 2000, the Ministry of Finance, with the objective of facilitating 
the secondary housing finance market, amended its tax legislation to remove stamp 
                                                 
32
 In a 1998 report, the Association of Building Societies of Zimbabwe (ABSZ) states that it first raised 
the concept of establishing a secondary mortgages market with the monetary authorities in the mid 
1980s, but was rebuffed.  Association of Building Societies in Zimbabwe (1998) ‗Establishment of a 
Secondary Mortgage Market in Zimbabwe: Economic, Legal and Fiscal Issues‘, at p. 3. (Copy in 
author’s possession).  
33
 Claud Bovet., Richard Wilde., Alphious Ncube., Albert M. Rosettenstein and Michael J. Kimberly 
(2000) ‗Legal Analysis of the Housing and Mortgage System in Zimbabwe‘, at paragraph 1.1. (Copy in 
possession of author); See also Association of Building Societies of Zimbabwe (2000) ‗Mortgage 
Securitization: Legal and Regulatory Environment‘, at p. 3. (Copy in author’s possession).  
34
 The word reportedly is used advisedly as the author has not been able to verify these transactions. 
Loita Capital Partners International states that it assisted two Zimbabwe domiciled firms originate two 
asset receivables securitization transactions. The first US$5 million transaction in 1998 involved a now 
defunct domestic airline company, Zimbabwe Express Airlines on its foreign currency denominated 
International Air Ticket Association (IATA) ticket receivables. LOITA also reports that in 1999 it 
structured a US$30 million export receivables transaction for the Zimbabwe Steel Company (ZISCO); 
Zimbabwe‘s largest and Africa‘s second largest steel company. LOITA Capital Partners International is 
an investment banking firm that specialises on Africa. LOITA (2009) ‗Transactions‘, Available at  
www.loita.com/transactions.htm   In 1999 First National Building Society structured a mortgage 
backed securitization transaction utilising a trust entity which issued pass-through certificates privately-
placed with institutional investors. Another company, Houses for Africa completed by 1999 two 
privately placed mortgage-backed securitization transactions. In addition, a company called Mortgage 
Bond Corporation was established as a multi-issuer mortgage-backed securitization conduit. However 
due to a variety of reasons, including hyper-inflation, it never commenced operations. Public-Private 
Sector Working Group on Establishing a Secondary Mortgage Market System in Zimbabwe (1999) 
‗Minutes of Meeting of 23 November 1999‘. (Copy in author’s possession)  
35
 USAID stated: ―…In the policy arena, the program achieved major breakthroughs. For example, it 
assisted in the establishment of the nation's first mortgage securitization mechanism, successfully 
argued for the removal of burdensome taxes on mortgage holders, and leveraged the first ever privately 
financed urban sewer and water development program in Zimbabwe. The program has funded an urban 
credit rating program that has resulted in Zimbabwean cities being rated for credit-worthiness--the first 
step required to obtain private capital for urban infrastructure development.‖ United States Agency for 
International Development (2002) ‗Zimbabwe: Activity Data Sheet‘, at p. 3. Available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/zw/613-002.html  
36
 Bovet., Wilde., Ncube., Rosettenstein., and Kimberly (2000), (note 33, supra).   
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duty on the cession of mortgage bonds.
37
 In 2007, Zimbabwe‘s central bank, the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) introduced securitization guidelines.
38
  This 
research is therefore premised within an overall context of active stakeholder interest 
in the use of securitization.    
However, the decade-long political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe makes the 
practical structuring of securitization challenging. On-going land expropriations have 
given rise to reasonable apprehensions over the sanctity of private property rights. In 
addition, the land expropriation-marred political crisis has given rise to legitimate 
concerns about the independence of the judiciary and its ability to safeguard private 
property rights and interests, especially where perceived foreign interests are 
implicated. Although, there is no evidence to establish that commercial disputes, 
unrelated to land expropriations have been affected, there exists a perception that the 
country is afflicted by high political risk. These perceptions must have an adverse 
impact on investor confidence. However, this study being legal in nature, it is 
restricted to analysing whether Zimbabwe‘s legal system enables the numerous legal 
arrangements that constitutes a securitization transaction, and whether its financial 
services regulatory and gatekeeping framework can be used to prevent and manage 
risks that can arise from the propagation of securitization. 
 
1.3.2. Study’s contribution to research 
The constituent parts of this research and especially the research questions 
represent a research methodology model, which can be used for evaluating the 
securitization-enabling characteristics of emerging markets‘ legal systems and the 
securitization risk mitigation properties of their financial infrastructures. Apart from 
                                                 
37
 The Association of Building Societies of Zimbabwe (2000) (note 32, supra), at p. 3.  
38
 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra). 
10 
the report commissioned by the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and USAID in 2000 
on the feasibility of establishing a secondary housing finance market in Zimbabwe,
39
 
there is a dearth of Zimbabwean securitization literature. The GOZ/USAID research 
assumes that: (i) Zimbabwe-domiciled financial institutions can engage in 
securitization transactions without legal difficulty; (ii) SPVs can be established, but 
without analysing which legal entities are best suited for these transactions; and (iii) 
financial assets can be transferred from an originating firm to an SPV, but without an 
analysis of the appropriate asset transfer methods, the true-sale concept,
40
 and the 
risks that typically afflict securitization asset transfers which have to be mitigated 
such as tax, re-characterization, substantive consolidation, veil-piercing, insolvency 
and foreclosure risk. The GOZ/USAID study assessed the tax framework and 
concluded that it represented a barrier to structuring securitization transactions but did 
not analyse in detail stamp duty, value added tax and income tax liabilities on 
securitization transactions. In addition, the study did not analyse the extant capital 
markets regulatory and gatekeeping framework or the dispute resolution framework. 
This research addresses these omissions and represents a comprehensive study on the 
securitization-enabling status of Zimbabwe‘s financial infrastructure, in addition to 
making proposals for reform.   
This research evaluates securitization risk issues which were not addressed in the 
2000 government-commissioned report, and some - such as the Enron fall-out
41
 and 
the 2007 global financial crisis - that arose after its publication. By adopting a 
comparative methodology, this study aims to inform lawmakers so that Zimbabwe can 
avoid some of the ill-effects experienced by pioneers of the technique.  
                                                 
39
 Bovet., Wilde., Ncube., Rosettenstein., and Kimberly (2000), (note 33, supra).  
40
 The concept of true-sale is discussed below in Chapter 6 at paragraph 6.3.1.  
41
 This refers to the collapse of the US energy company, which is alleged to have manipulated its 
financial reports by a complicated arrangement of pseudo-securitizations. This is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8 and 9.  
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Zimbabwe is currently in the throes of an acute economic recession fuelled in part 
by poor economic and governance policies and stymied access to international 
financial markets.
42
 Domestic intermediated financing, although limited in scope and 
capacity dominates Zimbabwe‘s sources of finance. Its equities market remains an 
active means of channelling funds to productive sectors of the economy.
43
 This study 
is intended to be a diagnostic toolkit, which can assist in the diversification of 
Zimbabwean firms‘ financing options through the introduction of a securitization-
enabling infrastructure, and contributory to a post economic crisis financial services 
sector reform strategy.  
There is scarce literature on securitization in Zimbabwe. Reference materials 
available on the subject are the several articles and letters written by the Building 
Societies Association of Zimbabwe, and the legal analysis conducted by the 
GOZ/USAID. To this extent, it is one of the objectives of this study to pioneer 
academic study on securitization that focuses both on legal and policy issues and 
identifies measures necessary for the creation of a securitization-enabling and risk 
mitigating financial framework. It also contributes to literature on the possibilities of 
using law to reform African emerging markets as part of their financial and economic 
development strategies.   
Zimbabwe is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
whose countries share with Zimbabwe, broadly similar commercial legislation and a 
                                                 
42
 One of the main reasons explaining Zimbabwe‘s inability to raise hard currency on the international 
capital markets is the United States enactment, Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 
2001, Statute 494. Section 4 (2) (c) obliges United States representatives on any multilateral lending 
agency in the world to vote against (1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or 
guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed 
by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution. In this 
regard the freezing out of Zimbabwe from the international intermediated lending market also 
effectively freezes the country from effectively accessing debt and equity capital markets. In short, 
financial sanctions imposed by the US against Zimbabwe constitute part of the puzzle behind 
Zimbabwe‘s economic crisis.  
43
 There exits a significant range of asset based financing in Zimbabwe such as leasing, factoring, hire 
purchase and other project based financing.  
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common desire for entrepreneurial capital. This study provides a comparator research 
model for other SADC countries seeking to diversify their financing options through 
securitization. This study is also intended to enhance both Zimbabwean and SADC 
policy-makers‘ knowledge of, and familiarity with securitization. It aims to achieve 
this by focusing on Zimbabwe – a member state - by drawing together and analysing 
the various laws and practices relevant to securitization.  
 
1.4. Hypothesis 
This study argues that Zimbabwe‘s Roman-Dutch common law enables financial 
enterprises and other entities to engage in the majority of the numerous legal 
arrangements that constitute a basic securitization transaction. To test this hypothesis, 
the study evaluates laws regulating firms which would be the main securitization 
participants in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe‘s law of persons, law of sale, various legal 
risks, which include tax, and insolvency risks. South Africa, which shares the same 
unique Roman-Dutch common law with Zimbabwe, is an example of a country that 
required little statutory intervention to establish a viable securitization industry.
44
 As 
noted above, between 1997 and 2001 at least four securitization transactions were 
reportedly structured in Zimbabwe. Arguendo, these transactions and South Africa‘s 
securitization experience suggest that Zimbabwe‘s financial infrastructure permits 
securitization transactions. This study critically examines this argument, and 
interrogates whether this conclusion obfuscates real legal securitization risks peculiar 
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 Section 89 of the Zimbabwe Constitution states: ―…the law to be applied by the Supreme Court, the 
High Court and by any courts in Zimbabwe subordinate to the High Court shall be the law in force in 
the Colony of Good Hope on 10
th
 June 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation having in 
Zimbabwe the force of law.‖ Standard and Poors‘ notes that the securitization transactions that took 
place in South Africa prior to 2004 were legally predicated on the common law and statutes 
promulgated under the Banks Act of 1990.  Standard and Poor‘s (2006) ‗Introduction of National 
Rating Opens Door to Rating South African Structured Finance Transactions by Standard and Poor‘s: 
A commentary‘, at p. 4. Available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp/SouthAfrica_30Mar06.pdf   
13 
to Zimbabwe. To kick-start securitization transactions, South Africa introduced 
securitization regulations in 1992.
45
 Similarly, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
promulgated securitization guidelines in 2007.  
This study argues that through the use of law as a tool of financial engineering - 
economic, political, and other factors permitting - Zimbabwe can establish a 
functional and risk mitigating securitization-enabling financial framework. The thesis 
that law can be used as a tool of financial engineering is not novel. It‘s the argument 
Hernando De Soto makes in his book: The Mystery of Capital,
46
 regarding capital 
creation. De Soto argues for the use of law to create a system that captures, registers 
and recognises the value of poor people‘s property in developing countries;47 which 
operates to evidence and commoditize illiquid assets. He refers to mortgage backed 
securitization as but one method through which the industrialised world ―injects life 
into assets and makes them generate capital.‖48 This research applies this theory, 
through an analysis of Zimbabwe‘s legal framework and identifies legal reforms 
required for the establishment of a viable, risk-mitigating securitization-enabling 
financial infrastructure. In a sense this study agrees with Norton‘s ―law-based 
financial sector reform‖ thesis as being a prerequisite and prelude to sustained 
financial and economic development.
49
  
                                                 
45
 Securitization Schemes Schedule (GN 153, GG 13723 of 3
rd
 January 1992) and the Commercial 
Paper Schedule (GN 2172, GG 16167 of 14
th
 December 1994) both of which were promulgated under 
the Banks Act (Act No. 94 of 1990).  
46
 Hernando De Soto (2000) The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, Basic Books. Hernando De Soto‘s thesis was not about the mechanics of mortgage 
backed securitization, but about creating a system of land registration that evidences ownership to 
unlock idle capital. See also Arner (2002) (note 8, supra) at p. 507, where he refers to Hernando De 
Soto and states that he proposes reform of legal systems in developing countries to help activate idle 
capital.  
47
 De Rivero argues that it is a misnomer to suggest that so-called developing countries are actually 
developing. He prefers to call them Non-viable national economies. Oswaldo De Rivero (2001) The 
Myth of Development: The Non-Viable Economies of the 21
st
 Century, Halifax: Fernwood. 
48
 De Soto (supra, note 46) at p. 7.  
49
 Norton makes an interesting argument about a law based-approach to financial sector reform. He 
states: ―Financial sector reform invariably entails a broad, rule-oriented framework to which unfettered 
discretion, non-transparency and cronyism must give way.‖ He proceeds to say: ―Financial law reform 
14 
As noted above, this study assumes that the 2007 global financial crisis, which 
was caused in part by the securitization of U.S. subprime mortgages and compounded 
by regulatory and gatekeeping failures is transient; and that the challenges posed by 
securitization will lead, not to the prohibition or imposition of wholesale restrictions 
on securitization, but rather to greater appreciation of securitization transaction-
attendant risks, better risk management mechanisms and enhanced financial services 
sector regulation.
50
  
 
1.5. Scope of study and methodology 
Transactional and comparative in nature, this study narrowly focuses on 
Zimbabwe as a case-study and uses, in part, a basic securitization model as a prism to 
audit Zimbabwe‘s financial infrastructure and make recommendations for legal 
reform. This approach permits an intensive and critical analysis of relevant 
securitization issues as they would arise in an emerging market using Roman-Dutch 
law as its common law. This research does not seek to establish the econometric 
benefits of securitization, analyse the extant domestic economic conditions, determine 
the optimum economic conditions necessary for effective securitization propagation, 
or subject securitizable assets available in Zimbabwe to an econometric modelling 
analysis. These issues are beyond the scope of this study. Instead this research focuses 
                                                                                                                                            
in developing countries is not about the adoption of individual financial laws, but the creation of a 
viable and coherent financial legal infrastructure suitable for the development of well-functioning 
financial markets and a sound business environment. In addition to good central and commercial 
banking laws, securities and securities market laws, a wide range of interconnected and supporting laws 
are needed. These include modern laws in the areas of contracts, property, property security rights, 
commercial and finance law, insolvency, corporations (including partnerships and joint ventures), 
corporate governance, foreign investment, licensing, intellectual property and taxation.‖ Joseph J. 
Norton (2007) ‗Taking Stock of the First Generation of Financial Sector Legal Reform‘, at p. 32. SMU 
Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 9. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=981226 See also Joseph J. Norton (1998) ‗Financial Sector Reform and 
International Financial Crises: The Legal Challenges‘, Essays in International Financial and Economic 
Law, No. 16, 1998.  
50
 See the main argument in, Knowledge@Wharton (2008) ‗Coming Soon…Securitization with a New, 
Improved (and Perhaps Safer) Face‘. Available at: 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1933 
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on the legal aspects of Zimbabwe‘s financial infrastructure; subjecting it to a rigorous 
analysis, assessing whether it is securitization-enabling; and where relevant, it 
identifies legal reforms required to establish a functional and risk-mitigating 
securitization-enabling financial framework. 
Most of the literature and jurisprudence available on securitization is drawn from 
the United States. This is hardly surprising given that the United States pioneered 
modern securitization in the 1970s and accounts for the bulk of securitization 
securities issues. Reference is therefore made in this study to relevant United States 
literature, statute law and stare decisis, as well selective English and Canadian 
jurisprudence. Extensive reference is made to Roman-Dutch law as it applies in South 
Africa, as well as South Africa‘s securitization experience.51 As noted above, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa share a unique legal system – a fusion of Roman and 
Dutch law with influences of English law. In addition, South Africa has the only 
active securitization market in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Due to the nature of the research subject, a desk research based methodology is 
utilised. Doctrinal issues arising from or relating to securitization are not separately 
analysed; rather they are considered where relevant in each chapter of the research. 
Through a literature analysis, most of the doctrinal issues surrounding the social 
usefulness of securitization are evaluated in chapter 2.  
   
 
                                                 
51
 Both South Africa and Zimbabwe belong to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 
an economic bloc, one of whose treaty objectives is the promotion of sustainable and equitable 
economic growth.  Refer to article 5 (1) (a) of the ―Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community.‖  South Africa pioneered and has the only active domestic asset securitization market in 
Africa and SADC. By 2005 it provided 85% of the volume of the EEMEA region‘s securitization 
issuances. Standard and Poor‘s (2006) ‗EEMEA ABS Issuance Expected to Rise in 2006 As New 
Assets and Structures Emerge‘ (4th January 2006), at pp. 2-3. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) is made up of fourteen States:  (1) Angola (2) Botswana (3) Democratic Republic 
of Congo, (4) Lesotho (5) Madagascar (membership pending) (6) Malawi (7) Mauritius (8) 
Mozambique (9) Namibia (10) South Africa (11) Swaziland (12) Tanzania (13) Zambia (14) Zimbabwe 
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1.6. Basic securitization transaction model: An illustration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above diagram is a simplified illustration of a basic securitization model. 
Securitization transactions differ in structure, nature of participants, form and 
complexity from one to the other. The individual characteristics of different 
transactions depend on factors such as the originator‘s investment rating and its 
finance requirements; the nature and quality of assets to be securitized, the extant 
legal and regulatory environment, and transaction cost issues such as taxation and 
bankruptcy proofing considerations. There are numerous distinct participants to a 
basic securitization transaction: an originator, the special purpose vehicle, the 
servicer, credit rating agency, credit and liquidity enhancers and investors in 
securitization securities.    
          Investors 
Trustees 
Credit Enhancers 
Rating 
Agencies 
Dealers 
Liquidity 
Enhancement 
             SPV 
Underwriters 
Manager 
Servicer 
Arrangers 
         Originator 
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Originator: An entity in possession of financial assets, which refinances using 
securitization, is known as an originator
52
 or a seller. Typical originators include 
financial institutions such as banks, building societies, insurance companies, and any 
other entities that receive statistically predictable income streams.
53
 Historically, it 
was argued that firms could securitize almost anything that accrues cash,
54
 had a 
diversified credit risk profile; and that produced statistically computable and 
predictable cash-flows, the rights to which could be sold.
55
 Given the credit risks 
exposed in sub-prime mortgage securities and CDOs, following the 2007 global 
financial crisis, this statement is obviously subject to a caveat.  Financial assets to be 
securitized are generally referred to as receivables. Those who are obliged to make 
payments that are the source of the asset‘s cash-flow are known as obligors.56 Typical 
obligors include mortgage or credit card holders, debtors, etc. Obligors are rarely 
actively party to a securitization transaction, unless if their consent to the asset 
transfer,
57
 or diversion of the contract payment from the originator to a third party or 
an escrow account is necessary.  
The originator identifies and isolates a pool of financial assets, either existing 
assets or future-flow financial receivables with a statistically quantifiable and 
                                                 
52
 The RBZ defines an originator as ―…an institution that, whether at the commencement or during the 
life of the scheme, transfers assets from its balance sheet or in a synthetic securitization scheme, uses a 
credit derivative instrument to transfer the risk associated with a specified pool of assets to investors 
without actually selling the assets. RBZ (2007), (note 3, supra) at p. 3.  
53
 David J. Cummins (2004) ‗Securitization of Life Insurance Assets and Liabilities‘ The Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center,  at p. 4. Available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/04/0403.pdf   
54
 See Marcia Myberg for instance who stated: ―…one can expect virtually anything that has cash flow 
to be a candidate for securitization.‖ Marcia Myerberg (2000) ‗The Use of Securitization by Investors 
and Issuers in International Markets‘, Chapter 12 in Kendall L. and Fishman M, ed, (2000) A Primer on 
Securitization. In 1997 Kim Clark stated that Wall Street could securitize almost anything. Kim Clark 
(1997) ‗On the Frontier of Creative Finance: How Wall Street can Securitize Anything‘, Fortune, April 
1997, at p. 50. Available at www.netcopters.com/secany.html  
55
 Anthony Raikes (1999) ‗The Management of Special Purpose Companies‘, at p.1. Available at 
http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/spv/mgmt_spvml.asp    
56
 FitchRatings (2001) ‗Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Explained‘, at p. 7. Available at 
www.fitchratings.com In its securitization guidelines, the RBZ defines an Obligor as ―a debtor from 
whom the originator has right to receivables.‖ RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra) at p. 3. 
57
 For instance, where the asset transfer method is a novation, in which case the consent of the obligor 
is required to perfect the asset transfer.  
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predictable cash-flow.
58
 The pooling of assets is intended to mitigate, among others, 
non- and pre-payment risk. The income stream from the underlying assets is 
structured to service principle and interest payments to holders of issued securities.
59
  
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): an SPV receives assets to be securitized from an 
originator and pays for them by issuing securities. Typically, an SPV is a separate 
legal structure and can be established as an incorporated company or a trust.
60
 
Arguably, the characteristics of SPVs that can be used are limited only by the 
imagination of the professionals involved.
61
 Originators can create and use ―one-off‖ 
or a ―multi-issuer‖ SPVs.62 Further SPV can either be pass-through63 or pay-through 
structures.
64
 In addition, transactions may be structured with at least two SPVs, not 
necessarily sharing the same legal status. Such structures are referred to as multi-tier 
structures.
65
    
Financial assets can either be sold to an SPV or transferred as security for a loan 
advance by the SPV. Where the transfer is a sale, this is known as a ―true-sale.‖66 In 
theory, a true-sale severs an originating firm‘s rights, title and interests in the financial 
                                                 
58
 Steven L. Schwarcz (1993) Structured Finance, A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization, 2
nd
 
ed, Practicing Law Institute, at pp. 5-7.  
59
 Kenneth N. Klee and Brendt C. Butler (2002) ‗Asset-Backed Securitization, Special Purpose 
Vehicles and Other Securitization Issues‘, at p. 3. Available at 
www.ktbslaw.com/publications/asset_backed_securit.pdf   
60
 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Souleles (2005) ‗Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization‘, 
NBER Working Paper W11190, at p.2. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=684716   
61
 Schwarcz (1994) (note 4, supra), at p. 138.  
62
 A ―one-off‖ SPV is created by an originator for a particular transaction after which it is wound up. 
On the other hand, a multi-issuer enables multiple originators to use a pre-existing conduit for a series 
of securitization issuances. Schwarcz (1994) (note 4, supra) at pp. 138-141  
63
 A pass-through structure issues equity securities which represent undivided pro-rate interests in the 
assets‘ cash-flow, which is passed through the SPV.  
64
 A pay-through structure issues debt, equity or hybrid securities that reconfigure the cash-flows from 
the underlying assets, creating two or more classes of security.  
65
 The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganisation of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, (1995) ‗Structured Financing Techniques‘, 50 Bus. Law 527 (1995) at p. 573. For a 
general discussion of the multi-tier structure, refer to Petrina R. Dawson (1998) ‗Rating Games with 
Contingent Transfer: A Structured Finance Illusion‘, Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law, Vol. 8:381, 1998, at p. 388.  
66
  A true sale has been defined as a sale that severs the originator‘s legal and beneficial interests to a 
pool of assets and should be sufficient under bankruptcy law to remove the receivables from the 
originator‘s bankruptcy‘s estate. See Yuliya A. Dvorak (2001) ‗Transplanting Asset Securitization: Is 
the Grass Green Enough on the Other Side?’ Houston Law Review, vol. 38, 2001, 541, at p. 560.  
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assets, including rights of ownership, and transfers these to the SPV. In Roman-Dutch 
law, this is achieved through an absolute cession. If the assets are transferred as 
security for a loan made by an SPV to an originator, this is known as a non-true-sale 
transaction. In Roman-Dutch law, this would be referred to as a cession in securitatem 
debiti.  
Securities: The type of securities issued by an SPV depend on several factors such 
as existing market conditions, the prevailing legal and regulatory framework, tax 
incentives/considerations, the legal status and structure of an SPV, the nature and 
quality of the securitized assets, whether the securities are to be privately placed or 
publicly issued and various other cost considerations. Securitization SPVs may issue 
debt, equity,
67
 or hybrid securities which will typically provide for varying internal 
priorities, maturities and rates of return; each designed to cater for different investors‘ 
risk appetites. Further, short term securities are classified as ―conduits‖ and long term 
securities are referred to as ―term deals.‖68  
Bankruptcy Remoteness: The concept of bankruptcy-remoteness is a creation of 
structured finance methodology. Securitization SPV are in theory structured to be 
bankruptcy remote, i.e. insulated from an originator‘s bankruptcy estate. An SPV is 
typically bankruptcy-proofed through a series of measures, including the restriction of 
its: (i) power, objectives and purposes; (ii) ability to file for voluntary bankruptcy, 
winding up or liquidation; (iii) ability to incur debt, grant liens or security interests or 
engage in mergers; and (iv) ability to merge with other entities.
69
 
                                                 
67
 In securitization, the equity securities have debt-like characteristics, and this is because they derive 
their value from the specific financial assets sold to the SPV by the originator. See Iacobucci and 
Winter (note 11, supra), at p. 164.  
68
 Olivier Melennec (2000) ‗Asset Backed Securities: A Practical guide for Investors‘, The 
Securitization Conduit, Vol. 3, No. 1/2, 2000, at p.1. Available at http://www.asset-backed.com  
69
 Gorton and Souleles (2005), (note 60, supra), at p.10. For a general discussion of the concept of 
bankruptcy remoteness and bankruptcy-proofing techniques, refer to Dawson (note 65, supra), at pp. 
392-394. 
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Credit and Liquidity Enhancers: securities issued by an SPV are always credit 
and liquidity enhanced.
70
 Liquidity enhancers provide facilities which mitigate the 
risk that an SPV will have insufficient funds to pay scheduled principal and interest 
payments.
71
 An originator may use, among others, one or more of the following 
techniques to credit and liquidity enhance a transaction: credit default risk insurance, 
guarantees, letters of credit, irrevocable credit lines, internal reserve funds, over-
collateralisation, agreements to purchase defaulted receivables, early amortization, or 
a senior debt/subordinated debt structure.
72
 Such measures to mitigate default risk 
enable the securities to be ascribed investment-grade ratings and consequently attract 
comparatively lower coupon rates.
73
  
Servicer: A servicer is typically engaged to enable an originator to achieve off-
balance sheet financing through severing any connection in ownership and 
management between an originator and an SPV.
74
 In certain instances, it is necessary 
for the originator to service the receivables. Typically, the servicer will, in terms of an 
Administration agreement, be obliged to monitor the underlying assets and cash-flow; 
enforce the underlying contracts, collect cash generated by the assets and ensure that 
the cash is distributed in accordance with the finance arrangement.
75
 In addition, the 
servicer typically accumulates the cash receivables in a trust account which is then 
periodically drawn down by the SPV.
76
 Sometimes, for a fee, a backup servicer is 
                                                 
70
 Kotecha argues that securitization securities have become safe, liquid and high yielding investments 
because of the widespread availability and investor acceptance of third party credit enhancement. 
Mohesh K. Kotecha (2000) ‗The Role of Insurance in Asset-Backed Securities‘, at p.1. Available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu~igiddy/ABS/guarantees.pdf  
71
 Klee and Butler, (2002), (note 59, supra) at p.28.  
72
 See Dvorak (2001), (note 67, supra) at p. 560.  
73
 Shwarcz notes: ―Companies whose debt securities are rated ―investment grade‖ can usually issue 
securities in the capital markets at interest rates competitive with, or even lower than, other generally 
available sources of funds, such as bank loans.‖ Schwarcz (1994) (note 4. supra), at p. 137.  
74
 Raikes (1999), (note 56, supra) at p. 1.  
75
 Klee and Butler (2002) (note 59, supra), p. 4.  
76
 Pelma J. Rajapakse (2005) ‗Residential Mortgage Securitization: The Australian Perspective‘, Global 
Jurist Topics, vol. 5., Issue 3, 2005, at p. 8 
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retained in case the primary servicer fails to perform as per the terms of the contract. 
The SPV may, pursuant to a Trust Agreement, use a bank or other entity as a trustee 
to fulfil most or all of the servicer obligations described above. Further, depending on 
its legal status, the SPV may be administered by a manager and/or trustees. To 
minimise transaction costs, the actual day to day management of the SPV‘s operations 
may in practice be outsourced to a professional SPV management company.  
Arranger: An arranger is typically a third party professional services firm that is 
engaged - for a fee - to structure a securitization transaction. The arranger may 
purchase the receivables from an originating firm or establish an SPV. It consults with 
CRAs, lodges all the necessary compliance papers with the securities exchange and 
other authorities.
77
  
Rating agencies: To reduce agency and transaction costs and to provide securities 
price guidelines securitization issuances are typically rated by recognised CRAs.
78
 
CRAs have traditionally been involved in the structural designing of securitization 
products, especially where particular investment-grade ratings are sought.
79
 If 
tranched, a securitization transaction will receive multiple ratings. Credit rating 
measures default risk. The rating is based on numerous factors considered by the 
respective rating agency and represents an opinion on the issuer‘s likelihood of full 
and timely interest and principal repayment in accordance with the instrument‘s 
                                                 
77
 Adam B. Ashcraft and Til Schuermann (2008) ‗Understanding the Securitization of Subprime 
Mortgage Credit‘. Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 07-43, at p. 5. Available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071189  
78
 Usually, one of the international credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor‘s Rating Services, 
Fitch Investors Services, Moody‘s Investors Services is used to rate the transaction.  
79
 Authorite des Marches Financiers argue: ―Rating is an integral part of structuring securitization 
products. The agency is involved at an early stage, and the rating is not an outcome but a target for the 
arranger, with the agency indicating the factors that need to be addressed to obtain the desired rating. In 
particular, the agency has an indirect influence on how the tranches are configured to ensure that the 
senior issue obtains the highest possible rating.‖ Authorite des Marches Financiers, Research 
Department (2007) ‗Is Rating an Efficient Response to the Challenges of the Structured Finance 
Market?‘(March 2007), at p. 6. Available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7693_1.pdf  
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terms.
80
 The factors considered by rating agencies include the structure of the 
transaction, the quality and characteristics of the securitized assets, the credit quality 
of the underlying obligors, credit and liquidity enhancement measures, sovereign risk 
issues; and the legal framework, including corporate transparency and disclosure 
regulations.  
Investors: although traditionally institutional in nature, securitization securities in 
their various forms, including mortgage backed securities and the derivative products 
are bought by different types of investors.  
 
1.7. Chapter structure: Research issues in detail 
The legal questions raised in each chapter of this study are in effect a subset of the 
twin-research questions above, which are: (i) to what extent does Zimbabwe‘s legal 
system enable income generating enterprises and other entities to engage in the 
numerous legal arrangements that constitute a basic securitization transaction; and (ii) 
which legal reforms ought to be implemented to create a functional and risk-
mitigating securitization-enabling financial infrastructure? Chapter 2 discusses, 
through a literature analysis, and in light of the 2007 global financial crisis, the risks 
and benefits of securitization. Chapter 3 provides a snapshot of Zimbabwe‘s financial 
services industry, sources of finance, its money and bond markets as well as its capital 
markets. Chapter 4 analyses laws governing prudentially regulated institutions in 
Zimbabwe, which are likely to engage in securitization, such as banking institutions, 
building societies and insurance firms. The chapter assesses whether laws governing 
or relating to these institutions enable them to (i) engage in securitization transactions; 
(ii) incorporate or establish securitization SPVs; (iii) provide securitization 
                                                 
80
 Dvorak (2001) (note 67, supra) at p. 570.  
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transaction-related services; and (iv) invest in securitization issuances. Chapter 5 
evaluates whether juristic entities that are traditionally used as business vehicles in 
Zimbabwe such as corporate, partnership and trust structures can be utilised as SPVs 
in securitization transactions. Chapter 6 considers several legal issues that typically 
arise on the transfer of assets from an originating firm to an SPV. It evaluates the 
question: to what extent does Zimbabwe‘s legal system permit the effective and 
secure transfer of financial assets from an originating firm to an SPV? The chapter 
analyses: (i) the different asset transfer methods - and their bankruptcy risk 
characteristics - that originating firms in Zimbabwe can use when structuring 
securitization transactions; and (ii) the structured finance-idiosyncratic true-sale 
concept, indicia for true-sale transactions, and the applicability of the concept to 
securitization asset transfers arranged in Zimbabwe. It also evaluates re-
characterization risk, substantive consolidation risk, the theory and practice of 
piercing the corporate veil - which has implications for the sanctity of an asset transfer 
- and foreclosure risk. Chapter 7 analyses whether Zimbabwe‘s tax laws permit the 
cost-effective structuring of securitization transactions. It analyses the likely tax 
treatment of the various contractual arrangements that constitute a securitization 
transaction, considering income tax, value added tax and stamp duty liabilities. 
Chapter 8 assesses whether Zimbabwe‘s dispute resolution framework enables the 
cost-effective and expeditious resolution of disputes likely to arise from securitization 
transactions. It identifies the court with jurisdiction over typical securitization 
transaction disputes, whether contractual parties can use arbitration, opt for a foreign 
law or forum to resolve and adjudicate disputes arising from securitization. Chapter 9 
analyses the risk prevention and management properties of Zimbabwe‘s financial 
markets regulatory and gatekeeping framework. Structured finance transactions, 
24 
including securitizations, are not risk free; as illustrated by the global financial crisis. 
The harnessing of this sophisticated technique requires a robust regulatory and 
corporate gatekeeping framework. Chapter 9 analyses the regulatory jurisdiction and 
risk management powers of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), the Insurance and 
Pensions Commission (IPC) and the Securities Commission (SC). Each of these 
regulates banking institutions, insurance firms and public securities exchanges and 
related entities, respectively. Chapter 10 evaluates the law regulating key capital 
markets gatekeepers such as structured finance lawyers, public auditors and CRAs. 
Chapter 11 concludes the research by restating findings and recommendations made 
in each chapter.  
 
1.8. Summary 
This chapter introduced and described the concept of securitization, the research 
problem and hypothesis. It defined the scope and methodology of the study, provided 
the context that both motivates and influences the research subject matter. It restated 
that the global financial crisis notwithstanding, it is likely that securitization will 
remain, including possibly in an altered form, as a significant means of financing 
profitable enterprises in the world and that emerging markets, such as Zimbabwe, in 
creating securitization-enabling financial infrastructure should simultaneously create 
robust risk mitigating frameworks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
         RISKS AND BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
For close to two decades securitization has been the predominant means of global 
enterprise financing. It is not however risk free as illustrated by corporate failures and 
financial crisis from Enron to the 2007 global financial crisis in which securitization 
was implicated. Through a literature analysis, this chapter provides an historical 
assessment of the benefits and risks of securitization. The 2007 global financial crisis 
has cast doubt on some of the touted benefits of securitization. However, the risks 
spawned by the securitization of U.S. subprime mortgages notwithstanding, notable 
academic and financial services industry opinion posits that securitization will remain 
as an integral refinancing measure. This study argues that the risks associated with 
securitization transactions can and should be mitigated through the creation of robust 
financial markets regulatory and gatekeeping regulatory and liability frameworks. The 
legal nature and scope of this research obliges the risk-benefit analysis to be industry-
general, non-empirical and to waive the use of industry and country specific 
econometric arguments and data. Below is a non-exhaustive literature analysis of the 
risks and benefits of securitization.   
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2.2. Originator: Risks and benefits 
Properly functioning, securitization is liquidity enhancing, constitutes an 
alternative and cost-effective capital market-based refinancing, risk management, and 
balance sheet management technique. Securitization, it has been argued, enables firms 
to attain net cost efficiency benefits by reducing information asymmetries, agency 
costs, lowering firms‘ weighted-average cost of capital and by improving asset-
liability management. However the extent to which these benefits accrue to 
originating firms depends on numerous variables.  
 
2.2.1. Increased liquidity  
Properly functioning securitization is both a balance-sheet management tool and a 
liquidity creating technique.
81
 Securitization enabled liquidity-seeking financial 
entities to evolve their business models, from the originate-to-hold to the originate-to-
distribute business model. Securitization benefits firms holding illiquid assets such as 
mortgages, term loans, or other receivables, which can be discounted for cash. Jobst 
noted that securitization: (i) enabled the partial or full de-recognition of assets – off 
balance-sheet – thereby allowing favourable accounting; (ii) ―reduced economic cost 
of capital as a proportion of asset exposure associated with asset funding‖; (iii) 
reduced regulatory capital requirements; (iv) enabled firms to access lower cost 
capital market financing in lieu of intermediated financing; and (v) enabled firms to 
overcome agency costs of asymmetric information.
82
 However the theory that 
securitization is as a general rule liquidity-creating was undermined by its role in the 
2007 global financial crisis. The 2007 global financial crisis has been characterized by 
                                                 
81
 Brent B. Ambrose., Michael LaCour-Little and Anthony B. Sanders (2003) ‗Does Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?‘ at p. 4.  Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=557223  
82
 Jobst (2006) (note 8, supra), at p. 4.  
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illiquidity,
83
 high cost of capital, insolvencies, and the nationalisation mostly of 
financial institutions.
84
 Allen suggests that the liquidity crisis that ensued may in 
effect not be a problem because it is the result of liquidity hoarding by banks hedging 
against uncertain aggregate market liquidity.
85
  It has also been argued that it is the 
securitization of mispriced subprime mortgages and the structuring of complex 
products, such as CDOs that adversely affected the liquidity-creating attributes of 
securitization.
86
 In other words, securitization as an engineering technique is liquidity-
unlocking, but not when the assets securitized, and the risk calculation methodologies 
utilised are fundamentally flawed. In support of this argument, commentators have 
pointed out that traditional securitization securities have not suffered as much 
delinquency compared to mortgage backed securities, which were tainted by subprime 
lending.
87
 To ensure that securitization retains its liquidity-unlocking qualities, 
commentators have suggested excluding complex and difficult to price assets from 
transactions or reflecting better – in the ratings – the risks attendant to such assets.88 
In practice, it is unlikely, but time will tell whether, subprime loans will continue 
being securitized.
89
   
 
2.2.2. Lower cost financing 
Historically, securitization has enabled originating firms to raise lower-cost 
finance. It is argued that by raising capital market funds through the issuance of 
securities backed by segregated assets as opposed to its overall credit rating, an 
                                                 
83
 For a discussion on the liquidity sapping effects that securitization played in the 2007 global 
financial crisis, see Franklin Allen and Elena Carlletti (2008) ‗The Role of Liquidity in Financial 
Crises‘. Available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/08/0833.pdf  
84
 See generally, Franke, G., Krahnen J.P. (2008) ‗Securitization and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy‘. 
Available at www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/08_31.pdf  
85
 Allen and Carlletti (2008) (note 83, supra), at p. 22.  
86
 Schwarcz (2008) (note 25, supra), at p. 3. 
87
 Calomiris (2008) (note 22, supra) at p. 80.  
88
 Schwarcz (2008) (note 25, supra), at p. 4.  
89
 Kravitt (2008) (note 3, supra), at pp. 25- 28.  
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originating firm can reduce its overall cost of finance.
90
 Integral to this theory is the 
argument that appropriately structured; the issuing SPV should be bankruptcy remote. 
And supported by appropriate credit and liquidity enhancement measures, the 
consequential cost of capital should in theory be lower relative to intermediated forms 
of financing or funds raised and backed by the originator‘s own credit rating. 
However, given the number of variables that influence the cost of finance this 
argument is obviously subject to several caveats.  
Iacobucci et al dismissed the lower-cost finance theory as a fallacy, opining 
correctly, as did Schwarcz that lower rates of interest did not necessarily equate with 
lower cost finance as securitization transactions generally attracted higher transaction 
costs.
91
 On the basis of the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevance 
theorem, Iacobucci et al argue that apparent gains from securitization should in theory 
be offset by loses in the quality of other securities.
92
 But because of the existence of 
imperfect capital markets and in support of securitization, most commentators argue 
that the technique results in tangible net-cost efficiency benefits to originating firms.  
It has also been argued that properly structured, cross-border future-flow 
securitization enable emerging market structured transactions to obtain higher ratings 
relative to the relevant sovereign rating. This enables the piercing of the sovereign 
risk ceiling and can reduce refinancing costs. This is particularly important for firms 
domiciled in below investment-grade emerging markets.
93
 It was is argued that 
securitization of future-flow receivables allows firms domiciled in emerging markets 
                                                 
90
 Schwarcz states: ―securitization debt often has a lower interest-rate cost than corporate debt because 
it provides a new source of financing, the capital markets, whose rates are systematically lower than the 
rates at which many companies commonly borrow.‖ Steven L. Schwarcz (2003) Securitization Post-
Enron, at p. 18. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=386601   
91
 The following costs are usually incurred in asset securitization transactions: SPV set up costs, legal 
fees, asset review costs, and rating agency fees, credit enhancement costs, administrative fees, trustee 
fees, and issuing and paying agent fees. Cummins (2004), (note 53, supra), at p. 14.   
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 Iacobucci and Winter (note 11, supra), at p. 169.  
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 Dvorak (2001) (note 67, supra), at p. 551.  
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to raise comparative lower-cost finance from international capital markets even during 
crisis.
94
 And that it may be the only way of accessing capital markets for firms 
domiciled in countries with very low GDP per capita.
95
 This theory may arguably 
have been accurate in the golden heydays of securitization and has been undermined 
by the 2007 global financial crisis.  
 
2.2.3. Net-cost benefits 
Some commentators argue that securitization‘s disintermediation effect results in 
net-cost benefits accruing to originating firms.
96
 With regards to emerging market 
economies, it has been argued that high capital cost is partly caused by an inefficient 
intermediated credit finance sector. And that the disintermediation effect of 
securitization can, in certain instances and for particular originators, reduce 
refinancing costs.
97
 Drawing on empirical data, some commentators argue that capital 
markets rates were generally lower than intermediated credit market rates.
98
 In other 
words, by changing banking institutions‘ traditional intermediary function, 
securitization enabled firms to reduce their cost of refinancing.  
Securitization arguably reduces information asymmetries, which result in net-cost 
benefits to originating firms. Securitization can enhance market participants‘ 
knowledge of originating firms‘ securitized assets through asset partitioning and risk 
segregation. Claire Hill argued for instance that securitization enabled originating 
firms to signal to the market that the securitized receivables were not lemons, which 
created benefits for originating firms as this signalling effect enabled them to avoid 
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 Suhas and Dilip (2001) (note 27, supra), at p. 7.  
95
 See generally, Nigel Chalk (2002) ‗The Potential Role for Securitizing Public Sector Revenue Flows: 
An application to the Philippines‘, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/10. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=879683  
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 Frost (note 4, supra), at p. 106.  
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 Lakshman (2001) (note 30, supra) at p. 4.  
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 Schwarcz (2003) (note 90, supra) at p. 18. 
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the lemons market premium levied on originating firms‘ general security issuances.99 
Iacobucci et al concur with Hill‘s lemons theory and in a seminal article expanded on 
the net-cost benefits argument.
100
 They argued that securitized assets were relatively 
insensitive to managerial effort in comparison with a firm‘s other general assets. 
Because securitization partitions securitized assets from the firm, the technique 
focuses attention on the performance of a firm‘s other assets which are sensitive to 
managerial effort. This, Iacobucci et al argued, facilitated asset monitoring and led to 
a reduction of five agency costs;
101
 leading consequentially to an increase in net firm 
value.
102
 Expanding on the signalling theory, which is in essence similar to Hill‘s 
lemons theory, Iacobucci et al in addition, argued that securitization enables 
originators to signal to investors not only the investment-grade rating attained but also 
that the management team of the originating firm was capable.
103
 They argue that this 
signalling has positive net cost benefits for the originating firm. These theories have 
arguably been undermined by the 2007 global financial crisis, which revealed that 
credit risk was mispriced for some assets, especially U.S. subprime mortgage-backed 
securities.   
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2.2.4. Diversification of funding sources 
Securitization broadens the range of financing and risk management techniques 
available to originators. It can also enable small to medium enterprises through ABCP 
programmes to access cost-competitive capital market funding.
104
   
 
2.2.5. Risk management and value creation  
Some commentators have argued that securitization‘s risk transfer characteristics 
create net-value for originating firms. Securitization enables regulatory capital 
arbitrage. By reducing the amount of risk-weighted capital they would otherwise be 
obliged to keep in reserve; prudentially regulated financial institutions are able to 
mitigate regulatory capital costs.
105
 In rebuttal, while securitization enabled off-
balance sheet financing, banking and other financial institutions remained exposed to 
credit risks associated with securitization, as discovered in the aftermath of the 2007 
global financial crisis. Their exposures were due to ―contingent credit lines, 
reputational risks, revenue risks and counter-party credit exposures.‖106  
Hill and Iacobucci et al downplayed the significance of regulation avoidance.
107
 
They argue that by reducing information asymmetries, securitization provides 
significant net cost benefits to originating firms. Other commentators argued that 
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securitization‘s risk management characteristics explained its net-cost benefits to 
originating firms.
108
 Jobst argued that securitization acts as an ―operational means of 
risk management, which allows issuers to reallocate, commoditize and transfer 
different types of risks (e.g. credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, or pricing risk) 
to capital market investors at a fair market price.‖109 Benston stated that securitization 
created value by enabling originating firms to better estimate and control risk, lower 
the concentration of credit risks and reduce both interest and prepayment risks.
110
 But 
it is precisely this credit risk transfer characteristic, which resulted in the unchecked 
transmission of systemic risk within global financial markets. It is likely that changes, 
especially pertaining to disclosure, will be introduced as part of a new-look 
securitization system to mitigate risks inherent in securitization.  
In the context of U.S. some critics argued that firms could use securitization to 
mitigate bankruptcy costs.
111
 Iacobucci et al acknowledge this; but in rebuttal argue 
that securitization, by leaving the firm with fewer assets, created value by avoiding 
the inefficiencies brought about by bankruptcy reorganisation.
112
 An opposing school 
of thought to which LoPucki has been the most prominent, challenged these claimed 
efficiency benefits.
113
 Critics contended that securitization is inefficient because it is a 
bankruptcy-proofing technique, which hurts unsecured creditors and other non-
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adjusting economic participants.
114
 Schwarcz and Iacobucci et al disputed this 
contention stating that the disposal of assets in a securitization transaction did not of 
itself diminish the assets available to a firm‘s non-secured creditors in bankruptcy.115 
It is only when an originator disposes of the proceeds of the securitization transaction 
that judgment proofing occurs.
116
 In other words, ―securitization in and of itself is not 
a judgment-proofing technique.‖117 
The foregoing review illustrates that no single economic theory explains the use 
and phenomenon of securitization, or the benefits that may accrue to any particular 
institution.
118
 It also confirms the tension between the benefits that accrue to 
originating firms and the consequences of such transactions on overall macro 
economic efficiency.  
 
2.3. Investors: Risks and benefits 
Although the securitization market is dominated by institutional investors, 
securities are typically tranched, which appeals to different investors‘ risk appetites.119 
Securitization increased the range of triple-A rated securities, which appealed to 
prudentially-regulated institutional investors required by law to invest only in 
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investment-grade securities. The risk distribution and value enhancing effect of 
tranching
120
 benefits specialised investors.
121
   
On the other hand however, securitization issuances are comparatively more 
complex and latterly have proved to be less liquid than other types of securities. CRAs 
and insurance firms mispriced the risks in U.S. subprime mortgage securities and 
CDOs, especially the triple-A rated issuances. It was the securitization of U.S. 
subprime mortgage loans that brought a hiatus to the securitization market and 
occasioned massive losses to many institutional investors. The same financial 
institutions that securitized their receivables were also the same ones investing in 
securitized products and the ones that suffered when liquidity evaporated and the 
value of their investment holdings plummeted, with the result that some entities went 
bankrupt or had to be bailed out by governments.  
 
2.4. Economy: Risks and benefits 
Up until the start of the 2007 global financial crisis, it is indisputable that 
countries, which had securitization markets reaped substantial benefits. Because of its 
liquidity creating attributes, securitization has been an engine for economic growth. It 
                                                 
120
 The profile of expected cash flows from securitized assets is often reconfigured into different types 
of securities (different tranches), which have different risk, maturity rates and periods, etc. See Maciej 
Firla-Cuchra and Tim Jenkinson (2006) ‗Why are Securitization Issues Tranched?‘, at p. 2. Available at 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/NR/rdonylres/7C2DEAD7-C605-4F9F-B23B-
D57DC83D9AF2/1242/Tranching-jan06.pdf  
121
 Cummins notes: ―By structuring an asset-backed transaction into tranches with varying degrees of 
seniority and informational complexity, securitization allows investors with relatively low levels of 
expertise to take positions in the more senior securities offered by the SPV, leaving the more 
complicated and risky tranches to be evaluated by specialists who can exploit informational economies 
of scale and recover their investment in information over a range of transactions.‖ Cummins (2004) 
(note 54, supra) at pp. 13-14.  
35 
enabled broad-based home ownership, especially in the U.S., although, perversely, 
U.S. subprime mortgage securities contributed to the 2007 global financial crisis.
122
  
 
2.4.1. Benefits 
At its height, securitization enabled the convergence of financial and capital 
markets with the conversion of illiquid financial assets into marketable securities. 
Properly functioning, a securitization-enabling financial infrastructure contributes to 
national capital markets development through the introduction of new and efficient 
risk management and modelling techniques as well as expanded sources of 
financing.
123
 Securitization also leads to specialization in intermediation functions, 
which can lead to cost-savings and efficiency benefits.
124
 Some commentators argue 
that innovative financial engineering technologies such as securitization nurture the 
emergence process of developing countries‘ capital markets by bringing about a lower 
national cost of capital which in turn enhances national wealth,
125
 and is therefore 
welfare enhancing. It can lead to the improvement of living standards as well as 
making domestic enterprises more competitive in the global market place.
126
 
Tranching, which is typical of securitization issuances, attracts a wider class of 
investors, which potentially increases overall financial depth. The securitization of 
future-flow receivables enabled small-to-medium scale business enterprises in 
emerging market economies to access capital market financing. Securitization did 
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enable investment-grade firms domiciled in below-investment grade sovereigns to 
access international capital markets.
127
 In addition, some commentators argued that: 
(i) the due diligence processes intrinsic to securitization structuring can produce 
benefits by making available to international investors valuable information pertaining 
to emerging markets‘ domestic financial infrastructure; and (ii) that it also involves 
reform of the domestic legal and institutional architecture.
128
 Economists caution 
however, that the securitization of future-flow receivables, particularly future export 
receivables, future tax revenue, and other similar future-flow assets can increase a 
country‘s overall inflexible debt, potentially undermining the respective country‘s 
creditworthiness as well as precluding the use of securitized assets as future 
collateral.
129
 In addition, it is notable that securitization subordinates existing and 
future creditors and can therefore increase the cost of future borrowing.  
 
2.4.2. Risks 
Since the onset of the 2007 global financial crisis, securitization has been 
pilloried, especially the securitization of mispriced U.S. sub-prime mortgages.
130
 The 
extent to which securitization as a financial engineering technique - as opposed to its 
abuse - is liable for the global financial crisis is contested and subject to on-going 
debates.
131
 Opinions vary, with some commentators arguing that the global financial 
crisis that started in 2007 is the result of an asset price and/or a liquidity bubble, 
catalysed by the abuse of securitization (through exploitative risk shifting at every 
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stage of the securitization chain),
132
 human greed, pro-cyclical economic policies, and 
financial markets regulatory and supervisory failures.
133
 Regulatory authorities are 
blamed for failing to stop adverse risk peddling market practices.
134
 Some 
commentators blame U.S. government policies requiring mortgage providers to 
provide finance to low-income groups, from which emerged subprime mortgages and 
derivative products.
135
 It is variously argued that the securitization of U.S. subprime 
mortgages was exacerbated by: (i) increased predatory lending;
136
 (ii) the perversion 
of the originate-to-distribute business model, resulting in the origination, 
securitization and world-wide distribution of mispriced securities;
137
 (iii) the creation 
of problem opaque, difficult to price, complex securities, such as subprime mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs;
138
 (iv) commercial practices beset by moral hazard, with 
originating firms inappropriately slackening their lending conditions and practices;
139
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(vi) the erosion of underwriting standards and fraud;
140
 (vii) the increased provision of 
compromised fee-driven securitization-related services such those provided by CRAs, 
underwriters, etc;
141
 (viii) financial services industry compensation schemes, which 
encouraged irrational risk-taking, including the pursuit of short-term profit over long 
term performance;
142
 (ix) the abdication of due diligence by most market participants 
and misplaced over-reliance on ratings issued by CRAs - institutions riven by 
conflicts of interest;
143
 (x) the mispricing by CRAs and insurance firms of structured 
finance securities credit risks; and (xi) regulatory and gatekeeping failures.   
As noted above, defaults on underlying U.S. subprime loans caused wholesale-
value write-downs on mortgage backed securities, CDOs and other structured finance 
products. The defaults undermined confidence in structured finance markets, leading 
to a hiatus in inter-bank lending and the onset of a global financial crisis. In response, 
governments, especially in the OECD – in addition to interest rate adjustments - were 
forced to inject capital into distressed financial institutions, effectively part 
nationalising their financial systems.
144
 In some instances, affected institutions went 
bankrupt. Many countries sought emergency funding from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to alleviate the effects of the global recession.  
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Kaufman argued that securitization creates a liquidity illusion, increases systemic 
risk,
145
 undermines monetary policy and fuels an explosion of debt.
146
 He also argued 
that off-balance sheet financing leads to a decline in the total capital employed in the 
banking system, which increases the risk of financial instability of domestic and 
international financial systems.
147
 In light of the 2007 global financial crisis, such 
criticism appears justified.  
LoPucki, Kenji Yamazaki et al argued that securitization is inefficient because it 
abuses the law of incorporation by transferring a portion of a firm‘s assets to a third 
party SPV.
148
 The transfer, if structured as a true-sale places financial assets outside 
an originating firm‘s bankruptcy estate; and hence beyond the reach of the firm‘s non-
adjusting creditors such as employees, tort claimants, tax authorities, unsecured 
creditors, etc. In other words it is argued that securitization is not welfare-enhancing 
because it hurts non-adjusting third parties. LoPucki argued that firms in financial 
distress can use securitization to dissipate their assets, effectively making themselves 
bankruptcy-proof. LoPucki‘s argument is contested by pro-securitization 
commentators such as Schwarcz and Iacobucci et al, who argue that securitization is 
actually efficiency enhancing.
149
  As noted above, this latter school of thought argued 
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that securitization creates net value for unsecured creditors because it replaces one 
type of asset with another, cash.
150
 And that absence malfeasance or over-investment 
on the part of an originating firm, no prejudice should be occasioned to unsecured 
creditors.
 151
 Schwarcz, rightly, did not dispute that the mechanics of securitization are 
intended to place assets outside an originating firm‘s bankruptcy estate. Instead, he 
argued that securitization is rarely used by firms on the brink of insolvency. He 
argued in addition that directors‘ fiduciary duties, fraudulent conveyance laws and 
preference in bankruptcy are remedies available in the event of malfeasance or over-
investment.
152
  
Originating firms in financial distress may engage in risk-shifting and over-
investment behaviour, which while creating net positive value to a firm‘s 
shareholders, can adversely affect unsecured creditors rights.
153
 Schwarcz rebuttal is 
that securitization is rarely used by firms in financial distress, reducing the risk of 
over-investment. Yamazaki counters Schwarcz‘s proposition citing empirical data 
showing an increase in the U.S. of low-rated securitization issuances.
154
  It has been 
argued that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing because it fosters 
fraudulent transactions.
155
 Indeed the collapse of Enron and the 2007 global financial 
crisis are testament to this. Enron also illustrated the increased principal/agency risks 
inherent in securitization transactions.
156
 Several commentators however defend 
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securitization by finding fault, rightly, with gatekeepers who allowed Enron to engage 
in fraudulent transactions and also with the complexity of the transactions themselves. 
As appears in more detail in chapter 9 and 10, this thesis argues that these risks can 
and should be prevented and managed through the strengthening of financial services 
regulatory and gatekeeping frameworks.  
 
2.5. Summary 
Through a literature analysis, this chapter evaluated the various theories advanced 
to explain the benefits and risks of securitization. As with any refinancing method 
securitization generates benefits, as well as risks, to originating firms, investors and to 
national economies. The risks of securitization have been thrown into sharp focus by 
the 2007 global financial crisis, buttressing the need for robust financial stability 
frameworks.  
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CHAPTER 3 
                         ZIMBABWE’S FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a snapshot of Zimbabwe‘s financial services sector. It 
identifies, as background to the study, the nature of enterprise financing available, the 
range of institutions that act as providers of finance and other financial services, and 
which are likely to be active securitization participants as: (i) originators; (ii) 
investors, and (iii) providers of essential securitization services such as arrangers, 
SPV management or trustee services, underwriting, and liquidity and credit 
enhancement.  
 
3.2. The financial services industry 
Zimbabwe has a relatively sophisticated and well developed financial services 
industry, which offers most of the financial services traditionally found in developed 
economies. The financial services sector is characterised by a range of banking 
services and products, insurance firms, managed funds, investment and other financial 
services.
157
 The financial services industry has active money, bond, equity markets, as 
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well as foreign exchange and commodities markets. Most of the aforementioned 
financial institutions are active participants on the country‘s main securities exchange; 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE).
158
  
Zimbabwe‘s banking industry provides traditional banking services, including 
providing short and long term finance products, securities investments advice, 
including trustee services, a range of structured finance transactions such as project 
finance, factoring, and leasing. Zimbabwe‘s financial services industry also comprises 
several types of non-bank financial institutions, including asset management 
companies, unit trusts, micro-finance institutions, insurance companies, pension and 
provident funds. Some of these institutions also act as primary dealers in government 
treasury bills and other securities.  
Table 1 below lists the type and number of Zimbabwe‘s financial institutions.159 
CATEGORY  No/ SERVICES 
Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe 
[this is the 
central bank 
in Zimbabwe] 
 
1 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) is the ultimate 
regulatory authority of the banking industry in Zimbabwe. For 
a full list of banking institutions refer to the RBZ website: 
http://www.rbz.co.zw/publications/banksurveillance.asp#guide  
 
Discount 
Houses 
6 Almost all discount houses in Zimbabwe operate as and 
provide much the same services as commercial banks. 
However, they still engage in discounting and holding bills 
with funds on call from other deposit taking institutions. They 
specialise in providing the capital market with call money and 
short term paper by channelling surplus funds into government 
and municipal stock, treasury bills and acceptances and 
negotiable certificates of deposit. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Fafchamps., John Pender., and Elizabeth Robinson (1995) Enterprise Finance in Zimbabwe. Available 
at www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/marcel.fafchamps/homepage/zimba.pdf   See also Mila Freire., 
John Petersen., Marcela Huertas., and Miguel Valadez (2004) ‗Subnational Capital Markets in 
Developing Countries: From Theory to Practice‘, at p. 339. Available at 
www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPURBDEV/FeaturedTopics/20860291/TheorytoPr
actice.pdf 
158
 For a brief historical description of Zimbabwe‘s financial services sector, See Martin Brownbridge 
and Charles Harvey (1998) The Limited Impact of Financial Sector Reforms in Zimbabwe in Banking 
in Africa. Africa World Press. 
159
 The information contained in this table is correct as of the 31
st
 December 2008.  
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Commercial 
Banks 
17 Commercial banks offer a wide range of financial services 
including the provision of loans and overdrafts, operating 
foreign exchange accounts, providing financial advice and 
facilities to purchase and sale investments. Of the 17 
institutions, the government has substantial interest in at least 
3 of these banking institutions.  
 
Merchant 
Banks 
5 With deregulation, merchant banks offer the same services as 
commercial banks. However they also specialize in providing 
wholesale banking services, in the money and capital markets. 
They also offer fee-based services such as corporate advisory 
services, underwriting of securities and portfolio management. 
They also provide finance through credit facilities, short and 
medium term credit, negotiable off-shore financing facilities 
and foreign exchange facilities.  
 
Finance 
Houses 
3 Apart from general investment advice and factoring, these 
institutions offer predominantly, asset based instruments such 
as hire purchase and lease hire advice and advances to the 
individual and corporate sectors.  
 
Building 
Societies 
5 With deregulation, Building Societies now offer much the 
same services as do commercial banks. However generally 
speaking, Building Societies offer savings, fixed deposits, 
share deposits and mortgage lending services. 
 
People‘s Own 
Savings Bank 
1 Formerly the Post Office Savings Bank, this institution has 
the largest branch network of any deposit taking institution in 
Zimbabwe. It operates savings and fixed deposit facilities.   
 
Asset 
Management 
Companies 
17 These are either independent or subsidiaries of banking 
institutions. They provide investment advice to retail and 
wholesale investors. 
Micro-finance 
Institutions 
213 These specialise in the low-income sector providing finance to 
small scale entrepreneurs.  
Insurance 
(life, funeral, 
general and 
re-insurance) 
50 Insurance firms in Zimbabwe provide a wide range of 
services, including credit guarantees, insurance against the risk 
of default by both domestic and off-shore obligers.  
Pension and 
Provident 
Funds 
2300 Zimbabwe has an established pensions and provident funds 
industry. This number obviously fluctuates depending on the 
pensions and provident funds current at any given time.   
 
3.3. Money and equities markets 
The banking sector and the securities markets provide the main channels of 
financing in the country. Zimbabwe‘s fixed-income markets can be split into two: i.e. 
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the money market and the bond market. The term money market is used in this 
context to refer to fixed-interest rate securities with a maturity of one year or less, 
while securities with a maturity in excess of a year are referred to as bonds. The major 
participants in Zimbabwe‘s money market include both deposit and non-deposit 
taking financial institutions. The deposit taking institutions, which also make up the 
inter-bank market, include commercial and merchant banks, discount houses, 
development finance banking institutions, non-demutualized and demutualized 
building societies and statutory banking institutions.  
Zimbabwe has a bond market, but does not have a corporate bond market. Bonds 
traded include municipal bonds issued by local government authorities and treasury 
bonds issued by the RBZ. The typical and major money market instruments used in 
the country are: treasury bills, including special treasury bills, open market operations 
(OMO) bills, negotiable certificates of deposits, bankers‘ acceptances, foreign 
currency denominated bills, quasi-government bills and bonds and municipal 
bonds.
160
 The raising of equity, as opposed to debt finance constitutes an important 
method of raising finance in Zimbabwe. Equity finance can be raised through the 
issuance of equity securities (shares/stocks) of various classes. Equity can be raised 
through the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, or through a private placement.
161
   
 
3.4. Sources of finance 
Although obviously limited in value, business enterprises in Zimbabwe have 
several finance raising sources. The most common forms of finance for businesses 
                                                 
160
 According to Fafchamps, et al, ―The range of financial instruments available to Zimbabwean 
manufacturers is no less impressive than the list of financial institutions. Short-term finance is 
organized primarily around overdraft facilities and banker‘s acceptances, which taken together 
represent the bulk of lending by commercial banks to the manufacturing sector.‖ Fafchamps., Pender., 
and Robinson (1995) (note 157, supra), at p. 26.  
161
 Ibid., at p. 27.  
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include retained profit, trade credit, bank loans - including overdrafts - some although 
limited foreign direct investment, debt and equity capital, venture capital, leasing, 
hire-purchase agreements, and remittances etc. The following is a short description of 
the various financing options.  
 
3.4.1. Short and long-term capital 
Commercial banks provide the bulk of short and long term capital. Short term 
capital is provided usually on an overdraft or loan basis. Where the borrower is a 
financial institution, short-term borrowing is achieved through the issuance of money 
market instruments. It is also noteworthy that some of these money market 
instruments can be securitized through Asset Backed Commercial Paper Programmes 
(ABCP). Supplier-credit is a form of financing available to firms in Zimbabwe. Long-
term financing is available from banking institutions, including the major 
developmental banks such as Infrastructure Development Bank and Agribank.
162
  
 
3.4.2. Leasing 
Finance houses and commercial banks provide leasing and hire purchase facilities. 
Finance houses tend to be adjuncts of commercial banks or other financial institutions. 
The purchasing of movable goods can be achieved through hire-purchase contracts. 
This sort of financing is provided to consumers either through an arrangement with a 
supplier, or through a financial institution. It is noteworthy that income streams from 
hire-purchase arrangements can be securitized.  
 
 
                                                 
162
 Ibid., at p. 26.   
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3.4.3. Residential and commercial property finance 
Zimbabwe has a well developed residential and commercial property mortgage 
system. Building societies and commercial banks form the backbone of this primary 
housing finance system. Local councils have also traditionally provided housing 
finance through rent-to-buy housing finance schemes, with or without the 
intermediation of financial institutions. Although trialled, then shelved, in the late 
1990s and early 2000, there is at present no secondary market for mortgages in 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe does possess however a small municipal credit market. Local 
councils can issue municipal bonds to raise finance.   
 
3.4.4. Commercial paper 
Commercial paper is used in the inter-bank market by institutions seeking 
liquidity. In this market, merchant banks, discount houses, and some commercial 
banks accept and discount bills of exchange, promissory notes and negotiable 
certificates of deposits, and trade them in the money market.
163
 As noted above, 
commercial paper can be used as an asset base for ABCP programmes.  
 
3.4.5. Agricultural finance 
Finance for agricultural purposes is provided by most financial institutions in 
Zimbabwe. However the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (also known as Agribank, 
and formerly the Agriculture Finance Corporation), which is wholly government-
owned, specialises in providing medium to long term finance for agricultural 
purposes. Agribank also provides hire purchase and leasing financing, as well as long 
term finance for general farm purchases, capital intensive farming inputs and farm 
                                                 
163
 Ibid., at p. 25. 
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infrastructure. It is noteworthy that the contracts that underpin this form of financing 
can also be packaged and used as collateral in asset securitization transactions.   
 
3.4.6. Development finance 
Development finance is offered by most financial institutions. Zimbabwe also has 
specialist financial and non-financial institutions that provide development or project 
linked finance, such as the Venture Capital Company of Zimbabwe,
164
 the Industrial 
Development Corporation, Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (ZDB),
165
 
the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO),
166
 as well as commercial 
banks. Multilateral lending agencies such as the Africa Development Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation have at various times and stages been actively 
involved in project and development finance in Zimbabwe.
167
 
 
3.5. Insurance 
As reflected in the table above, Zimbabwe has an insurance industry that provides 
a range of insurance and re-insurance cover. Insurance, especially credit default risk 
insurance, is an important component of securitization structuring, especially where it 
is used as a credit enhancement measure. In Zimbabwe, credit default risk insurance is 
available from most insurance firms, but especially through the firm Credit Insurance 
Zimbabwe. Despite its name, the Credit Insurance Zimbabwe is not a monoline 
                                                 
164
 In addition to the Venture Capital Company of Zimbabwe, other institutions that provide venture 
capital to firms in Zimbabwe include the Zimbabwe Development Corporation, the African Enterprise 
Fund, the Manna Corporation, and Hawk Ventures Ltd.  
165
 The Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe was formerly known as the Zimbabwe 
Development Bank. The bank is created under the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe Act 
[Chap 24:14]. 
166
 The Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) is a development finance institution set 
up in 1983 under the Small Enterprises Development Corporation Act [Chap 24:12] to provide start-up 
capital (finance) business management skills and advice and other related support services, to small and 
medium scale enterprises in the country.  
167
 Fafchamps., Pender., and Robinson (1995) (note 157, supra), at p. 25.  
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insurer. Zimbabwe does not have monoline insurance firms. The Credit Insurance 
Zimbabwe insures against two principle risks; (i) the risk of commercial non-payment 
of money due under a contract by domestic obligers, and (ii) the political and 
commercial risk of non-payment of money due under a contract by off-shore 
obligers.
168
 In addition, insurance companies including the Credit Guarantee 
Company and the Credit Insurance of Zimbabwe provide credit guarantees, primarily 
to bankers.
169
  
 
3.6. Credit ratings services 
Several firms specialise in assessing and issuing credit ratings on companies and 
individuals. Of the domestic firms, the largest is Dun and Bradstreet.
170
 The several 
stock broking firms and local and international CRAs also provide similar services. 
The major international credit rating agency operating in, and that provides ratings on, 
firms operating in Zimbabwe is Global Credit Rating Company, which is a subsidiary 
of Duffs and Phelps Credit Rating Company. CRAs are regulated by the SC. This is 
because the law considers that they are in the business of issuing or publishing 
analyses or reports on securities; which is a licensable activity.
171
  
 
3.7.  Summary 
The above provided a brief description of Zimbabwe‘s financial services industry, 
reflecting especially on the range of enterprise financing available in the country. 
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 Ibid., at p. 27.  
169
 Ibid., at p. 27.  
170
 According to Fafchamps, M., Pender, J., Robinson, E: ―Dun and Bradstreet disseminates credit 
reference information about Zimbabwean firms and individuals. Its publications include new 
registrations of firms with the Registrar of Companies, court judgements passed against firms and 
individuals, and credit ratings based partly on publicly available information and partly on information 
collected and held in confidentiality by D&B. Debt collection services are available through D&B and 
various lawyers offices. Assistance in drawing loan applications is available through SEDCO and the 
Small Business Units opened recently by the main Commercial banks‖ Ibid., at p. 27.   
171
 Refer to section 2 of the Securities Act as read with section 38 of the same.  
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Although Zimbabwe does not have a corporate bond market, market participants can 
obviously draw on experience gained from trading and dealing in municipal, treasury 
bonds and money market instruments when dealing with securitization issuances. 
Financing of enterprises is dominated by intermediated forms of financing. 
Securitization offers financial institutions the option of creating secondary markets for 
their income producing assets, such as mortgages, loans and other time receivables. 
The country has a broad range of financial institutions and capital market participants 
that can benefit from and can form the basis for a securitization market. Prudentially 
regulated financial institutions can draw on the liquidity enhancing and regulatory 
capital management characteristics arising from the use of securitization. Insurance 
companies can act as insurance providers, and where relevant acting as originators 
themselves. CRAs can provide rating information. Investment banks can provide 
essential investment services, including being involved in underwritings, securities 
issuances, provision of opinions on securities issuances, etc. Admittedly however, the 
ability of these institutions and financial industry players to take advantage of 
securitization is currently hindered by the extant economic conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
                 ORIGINATING INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses legislation regulating or relating to firms and statutory 
entities, which would be the main securitization participants in Zimbabwe as 
originators, providers of securitization transaction services and as investors. It 
analyses laws used to regulate: (i) building societies; (ii) banking institutions; (iii) 
specialised banking institutions such as the Infrastructure Development Bank of 
Zimbabwe and the People‘s Own Savings Bank; (iv) local government authorities; (v) 
insurance firms; and (vi) companies incorporated under the Companies Act [Chapter 
24:03]. These and other entities would form the backbone of a securitization industry 
in Zimbabwe. The chapter assesses, as relevant, whether laws used to regulate these 
entities enable them to: (a) engage in securitization transactions as originators; (b) 
incorporate or establish securitization SPVs; (c) provide securitization-related 
services; and (d) invest in securitization issuances. 
 
4.2. Building Societies 
Zimbabwe‘s main regulatory enactment for building societies is the Building 
Societies Act [Chapter 24:02]. Building societies offer banking and other financial 
services, including primarily, mortgage lending. Typically, mortgage loans constitute 
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the bulk of building societies assets, although with de-mutualisation and liberalisation, 
most building societies have a varied loan-book portfolio. Although building societies 
are no longer exclusive providers of mortgage finance in Zimbabwe, they hold the 
vast majority of outstanding mortgages and would therefore constitute the bedrock of 
any secondary mortgage market in the country. World-wide, mortgage-backed 
securitization constitutes a significant portion of structured finance products.  The 
Association of Building Societies of Zimbabwe, (ABSZ) states that in the 1980s, it 
formally mooted, but failed in its effort to create a secondary housing finance 
market.
172
 The introduction would have assisted building societies to: (i) dispose of 
illiquid mortgage assets; (ii) better manage regulatory capital costs; and (iii) change 
from the originate-and-hold to the originate-and-distribute business model. In the 
1990s the efforts of the ABSZ bore fruit, as it obtained the support of the RBZ, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing as well 
as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in its attempt to 
create a secondary housing finance market.
173
 As a result, the first exploratory 
mortgage-backed securitization issuance in Zimbabwe was structured by First 
National Building Society in 1999.
174
 The deteriorating economic conditions however 
stalled the efforts to create a fully-fledged secondary housing finance market.  
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 Association of Building Societies of Zimbabwe (14 March 2000) Mortgage Securitization: Legal 
and Regulatory Environment, at p. 2. (Copy of document in author’s possession).  
173
 In its activity report for 2001, USAID reports that ―it assisted in the establishment of the nation‘s 
first mortgage securitization mechanism, successfully argued for the removal of burdensome taxes on 
mortgage holders, and leveraged the first ever privately financed urban sewer and water development 
program in Zimbabwe‖. USAID (2002) (note 35, supra).  
174
 Public-Private Sector Working Group on Establishing a Secondary Mortgage Market System in 
Zimbabwe (1999) Minutes of Meeting, November 23, 1999, at p. 2. (Copy of document in author’s 
possession).   
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4.2.1. Building societies as originators  
Does the Building Societies Act enable building societies to engage in 
securitization transactions as originators? It is arguable that the Building Societies Act 
permits building societies to refinance using securitization. Prima facie, First National 
Building Society‘s reported mortgage-backed securitization transaction suggests that 
the extant legal framework permits such transactions.
175
 Also, it is notable that the 
RBZ-promulgated securitization guidelines, which provide for the structuring of 
securitization transactions by banking institutions, also apply to building societies.  
The powers of building societies are contained in section 17 of the Building 
Societies Act. This provision authorises building societies to raise finance through 
deposit taking, loans and overdraft facilities provided by commercial banks, issuing 
shares, lending money at interest, investing in money and capital market instruments 
and through offering specified fee based financial services. However, whether the 
section permits building societies to engage in securitization is a matter of 
interpretation. 
 
4.2.1.1. Non true-sale securitization 
Section 17(g) of the Building Societies Act states: ―…a Society shall the power – 
to borrow money at interest, other than in the form of [a] deposit, from a registered 
commercial bank or, if the terms are approved by the Registrar, from any other person 
and to arrange overdraft facilities with a registered commercial bank and for this 
purpose to pledge its assets.‖ [Emphasis added]. Clearly, section 17(g) permits 
building societies to engage in non true-sale securitization transactions. A non true-
sale securitization transaction is essentially a secured loan transaction where an 
                                                 
175
 It has not been possible however to obtain and analyse the structuring documents for the First 
National Building Society‘s mortgage-backed securitization transaction. 
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originating firm pledges its financial receivables, such as mortgage bonds to an SPV 
for money lent and advanced. Section 17(g) therefore permits building societies to 
pledge their assets in non true-sale mortgage-backed securitization transactions, 
subject obviously to the Registrar of Building Societies authorising the transactions in 
question.
176
  
 
4.2.1.2. True-sale securitization 
The position with regards true-sale securitization is less clear. Section 17(g) does 
not enable building societies to engage in true-sale securitization transactions. 
Authority has to be obtained elsewhere in the enactment. Section 17(r) of the Building 
Society Act states that a building society shall have the power ―to do all lawful things 
incidental or conducive to the powers conferred upon it in terms of this section.‖ It is 
arguable that this section as read with section 17(j) of the Building Societies Act 
permits building societies to engage in all forms of structured finance transactions 
including true-sale securitization transactions. The raison d’étre for building societies, 
as contained in section 17(j) is the provision of financial services including housing 
finance.
177
 Securitization is not unlawful in Zimbabwe. The securitization of 
mortgages enables the creation of a secondary housing finance market and unlocks 
liquidity. The Zimbabwe government, building society and banking industry 
members, and the RBZ acknowledged the importance of creating a secondary housing 
finance market as a way of boosting affordable housing provision in Zimbabwe hence 
the creation of a commission to investigate the possibility of creating such a 
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra), at section 2.  
177
 ―Section 17(j) of the Building Societies Act states: ―Subject to this Act, a society shall have the 
power – to lend or advance money at interest to members and others on the security or mortgages or 
hypothecations, and to negotiate the purchase or sale and the hiring or letting by members or others of 
immovable property mortgaged or to be mortgaged to the society.‖ 
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market.
178
 Arguably therefore, section 17(r) permits building societies to engage in 
true-sale securitization.    
This argument notwithstanding, this study proposes that section 17 of the Building 
Societies Act should be amended to expressly stipulate that building societies have the 
power to refinance through the sale, cession, or pledge of their assets including 
mortgage bonds and other financial assets. As section 17 of the Building Societies Act 
currently stands, it does not expressly permit building societies to sell and cede 
mortgage debts. This power is implied from section 17(r), as above. The power of 
building societies to refinance through the use of securitization can be contrasted with 
the power granted to the Infrastructural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (hereafter 
IDBZ). The enabling Act, the Infrastructural Development Bank of Zimbabwe Act 
(hereafter IDBZ Act) states in Clause 5 of the Schedule to the IDBZ Act that the 
IDBZ has power: ―to acquire, take possession of or dispose of any property in respect 
of which it has any interest by way of mortgage, pledge or otherwise.‖ The provision 
clearly enables the IDBZ to engage in securitization.  
In addition to the above, this study proposes that building societies should be 
expressly granted power to repurchase mortgage debts, relevant bonds, security 
documents and collateral from a mortgage conduit entity, SPV or banking institution – 
all powers not specifically provided for under the Building Societies Act, but essential 
if building societies are to fully take advantage of the financial engineering technique. 
To its credit, the RBZ has signalled to the financial markets that securitization is 
permissible, if not encouraged, by producing prudential guidelines.
179
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 Bovet., Wilde., Ncube., Rosettenstein and Kimberely (2000) (note 33, supra).  
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra).  
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4.2.2. Establishing securitization SPVs 
Where it is not cost-effective or convenient to create a securitization SPV through 
an independent third party, originating firms will, in practice, often do so using their 
own in-house professionals. Does the Building Societies Act permit building societies 
to establish SPVs for use in securitization transactions? Section 17 does not expressly 
permit building societies to incorporate SPV entities. As above, an argument can be 
made that section 17(r) as read with section 17(g) and (j) permit building societies to 
set-up SPVs. Section 17(r) permits building societies to do all lawful things incidental 
or conducive to the powers contained in the Act. Section 17(g) permits building 
societies to borrow money on interest, and section 17(j) permits building societies to 
lend or advance money to its customers. Arguably, in order to fulfil these objectives 
and responsibilities, building societies should be assumed to have the power to create 
SPVs to be used in transactions whose purpose is to refinance and/or mitigate a 
defined risk factor. The above notwithstanding, for purposes of legal certainty, this 
study argues that the Building Societies Act should be amended and grant building 
societies express power to establish or incorporate SPVs (trust or corporate), which 
can be used for structured finance transactions such as securitization. 
 
4.2.3. Provision of securitization transaction-related services 
Traditionally, building societies, among other financial institutions, typically 
provide securitization-related services to originating firms, arrangers or investors. 
Such services include the provision of liquidity and credit enhancement facilities, 
underwriting, management services for SPVs or – in the case of mortgage-backed 
securitization – the provision of mortgage administration services. Section 17 of the 
Building Societies Act does not expressly permit building societies to provide such 
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services.  On the other hand however, section 6 and 7 of the RBZ securitization 
guidelines stipulate that regulated institutions may provide securitization transaction-
related services. This suggests that the RBZ, as the regulatory authority is of the view 
that building societies, among other regulated financial institutions are and/or should 
be permitted to provide these services. This study recommends that the Building 
Societies Act should be amended and expressly grant building societies the following 
powers: i.e. the power to provide mortgage administration services to third parties 
including the power to service mortgage loans which may have been sold to a 
mortgage conduit company, an SPV, or banking institution in terms of a servicing 
agreement relating to securitization and to raise a servicing fee.
180
 In addition, they 
should be permitted to set up third party SPVs as part of a range of permissible 
financial services, including providing underwriting services, etc.  
 
4.2.4. Investing in securitization securities 
Section 17(n) of the Building Societies Act places no restrictions on investments 
that building societies can make, apart from requiring as a condition precedent that 
Ministerial approval has to be obtained.
181
 It is also notable that clause 5:15 of the 
RBZ securitization guidelines stipulates that regulated institutions may invest in 
securities issued by securitization SPVs. The draw-back with section 17(n) is that 
Ministerial approval is required for every securities investment decision taken by a 
building society. This caveat to building societies‘ power to invest in securities is 
unduly restrictive and prescriptive. It subjects securities investment decisions, which 
ideally should be left to the management of building society institutions, to 
unnecessary political interference. The nature and risk profile of securities that 
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 These proposals are drawn from those made in 2000 by Bovet., Wilde., Ncube., Rosettenstein and 
Kimberely (2000) (note 33, supra).  
181
 Section 17(n) of the Building Societies Act.  
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building societies can invest in are, for prudential reasons, determined by the RBZ 
anyway – in consultation with the Minister of Finance - including the amount of risk 
capital that ought to be set aside.
182
 It is recommended that section 17(n) should be 
amended to remove the ministerial caveat.  
 
4.3. Banking institutions 
Zimbabwe‘s banking industry as shown above is made up of different types of 
banking institutions, comprising commercial, merchant and investment banks, 
discount and other types of finance houses. Obviously, these banking institutions 
possess financial assets which can be securitized. These assets include retail and 
wholesale loans portfolios - car loans, student loans, credit card receivables, 
mortgages and other receivables. Banking institutions operating in Zimbabwe are 
regulated by the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20]. The Act defines banking institutions as 
any ―company that is registered or required to be registered in terms of [the Banking 
Act] to conduct any class of banking business in Zimbabwe.‖ [Emphasis added]. 
From the definition, it is clear that only a company, incorporated in terms of the 
Companies Act, can be established and be licensed to operate as a banking institution. 
The Banking Act defines banking business as ―the business of accepting deposits 
withdrawable or repayable on demand or after a fixed period or after notice and the 
employment of those deposits, in whole or in part, by lending or any other means for 
the account and the risk of the person accepting those deposits.‖183  
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra), at paragraph 5.15. – 5.26.  
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 Section 2 of the Banking Act. 
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4.3.1. Banking institutions as originators 
Does the Banking Act enable banking institutions to engage in securitization 
transactions as originators? Section 7 of the Banking Act stipulates the range of 
activities classified as banking activities, i.e. activities that banking institutions are 
permitted to engage in. The list is expansive, but not exhaustive. As a general rule, the 
activities that a banking institution can engage in must be contained in its registration 
certificate.
184
 Although section 7 does not specifically refer to securitization, the 
structuring of the financial engineering technique is arguably permissible because 
section 7(2) permits banking institutions to engage in ―any activity‖, including an 
activity which has not been prescribed as a banking activity in terms of section 7(1) 
(n).
185
 For this reason, this study concludes that banking institutions may legally 
engage in securitization transactions; notwithstanding that the technique is not 
specified in section 7 of the Banking Act, as one of the banking activities a banking 
institution may engage in. In addition, as noted above, the RBZ securitization 
guidelines stipulate that banking institutions may engage in securitization transactions 
but after obtaining approval from the RBZ.
186
 
 
4.3.2. Establishing securitization SPVs 
Does the Banking Act permit banking institutions to incorporate SPV structures 
under the Companies Act or set up trust structures? The short answer is yes. This 
power is not derived from section 7 of the Banking Act. Rather, banking institutions 
derive this power from section 9 of the Companies Act, which imbues companies with 
the ―capacity and powers of a natural person of full capacity in so far as a body 
corporate is capable of exercising such powers.‖ As noted above, banking institutions 
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 Ibid., section 6 and 7. 
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 Ibid., section 7(1) and (2).  
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra), at section 2.  
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are companies incorporated under the Companies Act. As a result, banking 
institutions in Zimbabwe can incorporate SPV structures under the Companies Act 
and can settle trusts under the common law. 
 
4.3.3. Provision of securitization transaction-related services 
As noted in the RBZ-promulgated securitization guidelines, banking institutions 
traditionally provide a range of securitization related services.
187
 Banking institutions 
typically provide, inter alia: (i) underwriting services; (ii) credit and liquidity 
enhancement services; (iii) credit reference services; (iv) management services for 
SPVs; (vi) independent directors or trustees to SPVs; and (vii) they also can act as 
servicers. The Banking Act and the RBZ securitization guidelines permit banking 
institutions in Zimbabwe to provide securitization-related services.
188
  
 
4.3.4. Investing in securitization securities 
Internationally, the market for securitization issuances is predominantly 
institutional; with banking and other financial institutions being the main investors in 
structured securities products. The Banking Act does not restrict the type of securities 
that a banking institution may invest in. Section 7(1) of the Banking Act states that: 
―the banking activities that may be specified in a registration certificate are – (c) 
buying and selling instruments, whether for the account of the banking institution 
concerned or for the account of its customers…‖  There is no legal impediment 
therefore to banking institutions trading or dealing in securitization issuances, save for 
capital adequacy purposes, where exposures are risk-weighted.
189
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4.4.  State-owned financial institutions 
Zimbabwe has several state-owned financial institutions, such as the IDBZ, the 
Peoples Own Savings Bank [POSB], and the Agriculture Bank of Zimbabwe 
[Agribank]. The IDBZ, which used to be known as the Zimbabwe Development Bank 
was established by the government with the primary objective of financing 
infrastructural projects,
190
 and is regulated by the IDBZ Act. Agribank used to be 
known as the Agricultural Finance Corporation and is the main agricultural bank in 
Zimbabwe, providing both long and short term finance to the agricultural sector. It is 
regulated under the Banking Act, and so the arguments made above with regards 
ordinary banking institutions apply equally to Agribank. The POSB is a state owned 
banking institution established on 1 January 1905.
191
 The POSB is essentially a 
savings bank, drawing deposits initially from the lower-income groups, but has since 
expanded to cater for high income and corporate clients. It also offers a range of 
commercial banking and related services, including loan provision. As with building 
societies and the IDBZ, the POSB is specially regulated under its own Act of 
parliament; the Peoples Own Savings Bank Act [Chap 24:22] (hereafter, the POSB 
Act). These institutions, among several other financial institutions established by Acts 
of parliament possess assets that can be securitized. Because the Agribank is regulated 
by and under the Banking Act, this section of the study will analyse the IDBZ and the 
POSB Act only.  
 
4.4.1. IDBZ and POSB as originators  
The IDBZ Act and the POSB Act enable both financial institutions to engage in 
securitization as originators. Unlike all the other banking institutions established by 
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 The Peoples Own Saving Bank used to be known as the Post Office Savings Bank. The acronym – 
POSB - by which the banking institution has always been known by, has not changed.  
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and under an act of parliament, the powers of the IDBZ, as contained in section 17 (2) 
as read with clause 5 of the schedule to the IDBZ Act, are broad enough to enable it to 
engage in structured finance transactions. Section 17(2) of the IDBZ Act states: 
―…the Bank shall…have the power to do…all or any of the things, specified in the 
Schedule, either absolutely or conditionally and either solely or jointly with others. 
Clause 5 of the Schedule to the IDBZ Act states that the IDBZ has power: ―to acquire, 
take possession of or dispose of any property in respect of which it has any interest by 
way of mortgage, pledge or otherwise.‖ Read together, it is clear that the IDBZ has 
power to securitize its financial assets. These provisions are broad enough to envisage 
true-sale and non true-sale securitization transactions. Further, section 17(d) states 
that the IDBZ ―shall have power – to seek other specialised credit facilities including 
euro-dollar credits.‖ Structured finance transactions, including securitization can 
arguably fall under the broad category of specialised credit facilities.  
Regarding the POSB, section 4(2) of the POSB Act as read with clause 4 of the 
same Act permits the bank to refinance using securitization.
192
 Clause 4 to the 
Schedule states that the POSB has power to: ―mortgage, pledge any of its assets and, 
with the Minister‘s approval, to sell, exchange, let, dispose of, turn to account, or 
otherwise deal with any assets which are not required for the exercise of its functions, 
for such consideration as the Board may determine.‖ [Emphasis added]. This 
provision reveals the following: the POSB may pledge its assets as part of a secured 
loan transaction, including a non true-sale securitization transaction. Of this, there 
admits little doubt. A strong argument can be made that the same provision also 
permits the POSB to engage in true-sale securitization transactions. The provision 
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 Section 4(2) of the POSB Act states: ―In the exercise of its functions, the Savings Bank shall have 
power, subject to this Act, to do or cause to be done, either by itself or through its agents, all or any of 
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states that the POSB may sell any of its assets, which obviously includes financial 
assets. This power is subject to: (i) the Minister of Finance approving the decision to 
sell the assets in question;
193
 and (ii) the assets to be sold not being required by the 
POSB for the exercise of its functions. Section 4(1) (b) and (c) of the POSB Act states 
as follows: ―[T]he functions of the Savings Bank shall be (a)…(b) to provide banking 
and financial services for the people of Zimbabwe; and (c) to grant loans and 
advances secured by investments held by the Savings Bank.‖ This means that if the 
bank has surplus assets or if the assets earmarked for securitization are not needed to 
grant loans or advances, then any such structured finance technique would be lawful. 
The POSB can therefore validly use its financial assets to refinance or mitigate risk 
using securitization. 
 
4.4.2. Establishing a securitization SPV 
Both the IDBZ and the POSB are authorized to incorporate or settle corporate 
SPVs and trust SPVs, respectively, which can be used for securitization purposes. The 
IDBZ draws this authority from section 3 of the IDBZ Act, which states: ―There is 
hereby established the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe which shall be 
a body corporate and which shall be capable of suing and being sued and, subject to 
this Act, of doing or performing all such acts or things as a body corporate may by 
law do or perform.‖ [Emphasis added]. This provision is broadly similar to section 9 
of the Companies Act. It imbues the IDBZ with the capacity and power of a natural 
person. This means the IDBZ can, if it so desires, legally establish or settle a 
corporate or trust SPV, respectively. 
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Remarkably, unlike the other Building Societies Act, the Banking Act, or even the 
IDBZ Act, the POSB Act expressly gives the POSB power, subject to approval by the 
Minister of Finance, to ―promote, establish or acquire companies, partnerships or 
other undertakings.‖194 In addition to this, section 3 of the POSB Act, as with the 
IDBZ Act, grants the POSB power and capacity of a natural person.
195
 Both of these 
provisions support the proposition that the POSB can incorporate SPV structures 
under the Companies Act, or settle trusts under the common law. The only criticism 
with this provision is with the power - which must be removed - exercised by the 
Minister of Finance over management decisions relating to the operations of the 
POSB.  
 
4.4.3. Provision of securitization transaction-related services 
Both the IDBZ Act and the POSB Act arguably permit the IDBZ and the POSB to 
provide securitization transaction-related services, such as, inter alia: (i) underwriting; 
(ii) credit and liquidity enhancement; (iii) credit references; (iv) servicer facilities; (v) 
SPV management; and (vi) the provision of independent directors or trustees to SPVs. 
The IDBZ derives this power from clause 20 of the schedule to the IDBZ Act, which 
provides that the IDBZ shall have power to: ―generally…do all such things as are 
calculated to facilitate or are incidental or conducive to the performance of the 
functions of the Bank or the exercise of its powers in terms of this Act or any other 
law.‖ Clause 20 of the schedule to the IDBZ Act is the catch-all provision; i.e. the 
provision that permits the banking institution to undertake all activities, which are not 
unlawful, which enhance its operations and enable it to attain its objectives of 
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financing infrastructural development in Zimbabwe. For clarity‘s sake, the schedule to 
the IDBZ Act should be amended to specifically refer to, and enable the institution to 
provide, securitization-related services.  
The POSB Act does not expressly stipulate that the POSB may engage in any of 
the above-mentioned services. What it states however in clause 21 of the schedule to 
the POSB Act is that: ―With the Minister‘s approval, [the POSB has power] to 
provide such services as the Board considers could properly be provided by the 
Savings Bank, and subject to regulations made in terms of section forty-six, to charge 
for those services such fees as the Board may determine from time to time.‖ In 
addition, clause 23 to the Schedule to the POSB Act also provides that the POSB may 
do ―anything that is calculated to facilitate or is incidental or conducive to the 
performance of its functions under [the POSB Act] or any other enactment.‖ From 
these two provisions, this study concludes that the POSB is given broad discretion, 
subject to Ministerial approval to engage in securitization-related services.  
 
4.4.4. Investing in securitization securities 
Does the IDBZ Act and the POSB Act permit the respective two institutions to 
invest in securitization issuances? Clause 5 of the schedule to the IDBZ Act and 
clause 5 to the schedule of the POSB Act are both similarly worded and both arguably 
grant the two institutions broad securities investment powers. Both sections state that 
the respective institutions have power: ―to draw, make, accept, endorse, discount, 
execute and issue for the purposes of its functions or duties promissory notes, bills of 
exchange, bills of lading, securities and other negotiable or transferable instruments.‖ 
[Emphasis added]. Put differently, both clauses permit the IDBZ and POSB to 
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―accept‖ securities, including structured finance securities, for investment or other 
purposes.  
 
4.5. Local government authorities/Councils 
Zimbabwe has a total of 16 urban local government authorities. Bulawayo, 
Gweru, Harare, Kwekwe, Mutare and Masvingo have city status and each of them is 
administered by a City Council. The rest, comprising Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Kadoma, 
Marondera, Masvingo, Redcliff, Bindura, Gwanda, Victoria Falls and Kariba have 
town status and each is administered by a Municipal Council. Both city and municipal 
councils are generally referred to as local government authorities. The law governing 
the establishment, powers and remit of local government authorities in Zimbabwe is 
known as the Councils Act [Chap: 29:15] (Councils Act hereafter). However each of 
the 6 local government authorities with city status is governed by a specific Act of 
parliament. In many countries, notably Latin American countries, cities have 
successfully used future-flow receivables such as tax revenues and other income-
generating assets to raise finance through securitization transactions. Zimbabwe‘s 
urban tax infrastructure is relatively developed with its local government authorities 
having structured and functional tax systems. A significant portion of local 
government authorities‘ income is derived from taxes and other levies. In addition, 
they also operate income generating projects; have investments in companies, 
hospitals, schools, and other interests which produce income.  
 
4.5.1. Local government authorities as originators  
The Councils Act arguably permits local government authorities to engage in 
securitization as originators. Section 198 of the Councils Act states that: ―a council 
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shall have power to undertake, carry out or carry on any or all of the acts and things 
set out in the Second Schedule.‖ Clause 54 of the Second Schedule states in the 
relevant part that Councils have the power ―generally to do all such things, whether or 
not involving the…disposal of any property or rights, as are calculated to facilitate or 
are incidental or conducive to the performance of the functions of the council…‖ 
Another provision of the Councils Act which supports this proposition is section 221, 
which states that Councils can undertake or have interests in, a variety of revenue 
raising activities.
196
 These provisions arguably enable councils to engage in 
securitization transactions. The foregoing notwithstanding, authority for the 
proposition that Councils have power to engage in non true-sale securitization 
transactions can also be found in section 290 of the Councils Act.
197
 Section 290(5) 
provides that if a council has the necessary borrowing power, it may resolve to raise 
money with the consent of the Minister from any source, including the issuance of 
bonds. These sections of the Councils Act permit Councils to engage in securitization 
transactions as originators.  
 
4.5.2. Establishing securitization SPVs 
The Councils Act does not expressly stipulate whether councils can establish 
corporate or trust SPV entities. This notwithstanding, it is arguable that clause 54 as 
read with section 198 of the Councils Act (both quoted above) are broad enough to 
enable Councils intending to set up their own SPVs for securitization purposes to do 
so. It is also noteworthy that section 221 of the Councils Act permits Councils to 
―engage in any commercial…or other activity for the purpose of raising revenue for 
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the council.‖ Therefore, it is arguable that where the intention of the Council is to 
raise revenue through securitization, it is likely that the establishment of an SPV will 
be regarded as a permissible activity. 
 
4.5.3. Investing in securitization securities 
Councils‘ securities investment discretion is prescribed by statute.198 Councils are 
permitted to purchase securities in any of the following situations, if: (i) the securities 
are locally registered and the issuer is a statutory corporation;
199
 (ii) the securities are 
locally registered and are guaranteed by the State;
200
 (iii) the institution issuing the 
securities is registered as a banking institution, or as a building society;
201
 or (iv) if 
express and specific approval from the Minister of local government and the Minister 
of Finance is obtained to invest in a particular securities issuance.
202
 From the 
foregoing, it is clear that it is unlikely that Councils will be able to invest in 
securitization issuances. Zimbabwe does not have the equivalent of the U.S. Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac-type institutions. Unless if the government establishes a statutory 
corporation whose role is to establish and be at the centre of the secondary housing 
finance market, for instance, it is unlikely that Councils will be able to rely on section 
302(1)(c)(ii) to invest in securitization securities. It is possible that the State may 
guarantee some securitization issuances, but in practice this is likely to be an 
uncommon or infrequent occurrence. It is also unlikely, although not impossible, that 
an SPV may be established and registered as a banking institution, and acting as a 
multi-seller issuer play a role in the ABCP market. From the foregoing, Councils are 
more likely to invest in structured finance securities if they obtain permission to do so 
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from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of local government. It is recommended 
that section 302 be expanded, subject to the necessary prudential caveats, to include 
structured finance issued securities.   
 
4.6. Insurance firms 
Internationally, although insurance firms have engaged in securitization as 
originators, their traditional role has been to provide credit default insurance and to 
act as institutional investors. Zimbabwe has a vibrant insurance industry, offering a 
broad range of insurance services. Through the National Social Security Authority, 
Zimbabwe has a compulsory employee National Pension Scheme and a Worker‘s 
Compensation Insurance Fund. The country also has a multitude of pension and 
provident funds. In Zimbabwe, insurance firms and pension and provident funds are 
regulated under the Insurance Act [Chap 24:07] and the Insurance and Pensions 
Commission Act [Chapter 24:14]. The National Social Security Authority is regulated 
under the National Social Security Act [Chapter 17:04] and prescribed regulations. 
Pension and provident funds are regulated under the Pension and Provident Funds Act 
[Chapter 24:09], and prescribed regulations. Under the provisions of the Insurance 
and Pensions Commission Act, all pension and provident funds and insurance firms 
are regulated by the Commissioner of Insurance. Due to space constraints, the 
analysis below will however focus only on insurance firms regulated under the 
Insurance Act.   
 
4.6.1. Insurance firms as originators  
This study argues that in Zimbabwe insurance firms can act as originators in 
securitization transactions. It is also noteworthy that the Insurance Act does not 
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prohibit insurance firms from disposing some of their assets or using their assets as 
security for funds lent and advanced. Where an insurance firm is a company, it 
derives its capacity and power to engage in securitization transactions from section 9 
of the Companies Act; which clocks it with the capacity and power of a natural 
person.
203
 Section 11(1) of the Insurance Act defines an insurance company as ―a 
company registered in terms of the Companies Act [Chapter 24:03] which is also a 
registered insurer.‖  Insurance companies therefore have power to engage in both non 
true-sale and true-sale securitization transactions. Section 15 of the Insurance Act 
states that where an insurance firm is a mutual society, on registration by the 
Commissioner, it ―shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered 
and shall, in its registered name, be capable of suing and being sued, acquiring 
property and disposing of it and, subject to its constitution and [the Insurance Act], of 
performing all such acts as bodies corporate may by law perform.‖ As above, this 
provision imbues mutual societies registered as insurers and carrying on insurance 
business with the same powers accorded to insurance companies incorporated under 
the Companies Act. Mutual societies carrying on insurance business can therefore 
refinance using securitization.  
 
4.6.2. Establishing securitization SPVs 
The Insurance Act places no restrictions on the power of insurance companies and 
mutual societies in Zimbabwe to either incorporate or establish corporate or trust SPV 
structures, respectively. By virtue of section 9 of the Companies Act insurance 
companies can incorporate a limited liability company under the Companies Act or 
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settle a trust and use either as an SPV. Section 15 of the Insurance Act – quoted above 
- enables mutual societies to do the same.  
 
4.6.3. Provision of securitization transaction-related services 
The Insurance Act does not stipulate, prescribe, or limit the range of insurance 
services that insurance firms may provide to customers. This means that insurance 
companies in Zimbabwe are not legally restricted from providing insurance to 
originating firms, arrangers or SPVs engaged in securitization transactions. And in 
fact, insurance firms in Zimbabwe provide credit default insurance. Zimbabwe does 
not however, as noted above, have monoline insurance firms.  
 
4.6.4. Investing in securitization securities 
Insurance firms in Zimbabwe are expected by law to create different accounts for 
each line of insurance business they engage in and to deposit all receipts into each 
such account as security for potential claims by policy holders.
204
 For example, an 
insurance company must mutatis mutandis, create a life assurance fund and account 
for its life assurance business; motor vehicle insurance fund and account for its motor 
vehicle insurance business. Section 26 of the Insurance Act stipulates that such funds 
can only be invested in prescribed securities; the breach of which constitutes a 
criminal offence.
205
 Put simply, Zimbabwe operates a prescribed securities regime for 
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some of its prudentially regulated institutions, of which insurance firms constitute a 
part. Prescribed securities have been defined to mean: ―(a) stocks, bonds or other like 
securities issued by the State, a statutory body, or a local authority, and includes, in 
relation to non-life insurers and the class of insurance business carried on by them, 
treasury bills, or similar short-term bills issued by a statutory body or local authority; 
and (b) investments approved or prescribed by the Minister from time to time for the 
purposes of this definition.‖ The definition of prescribed securities does not permit 
insurance firms to invest in securitization issuances, save where a specific request has 
been made to, and approval given by, the Minister of Finance for an insurance firm to 
invest in such structured finance securities.
206
 The prescribed securities regime should 
be reformed in favour of a deregulated system, which permits prudentially regulated 
institutions to invest in any type of securities considered appropriate by the 
management of the relevant institution, subject to risk-based formulae being used for 
purposes of determining capital and liquidity reserves to be set aside. The prescribed 
securities regime should be reformed to make it less restrictive, enabling insurance 
firms to invest in structured finance securities.  
 
4.7. Other firms/institutions 
Medium to large corporate firms operating in Zimbabwe may also use 
securitization. Most corporate firms operating in Zimbabwe are incorporated in terms 
of the Companies Act [Chap 23:03]. As noted above, section 9 of the Companies Act 
endows incorporated entities with the power and capacity of a natural person of full 
capacity. Therefore subject to the memorandum and articles of association, as a 
general rule, firms possessing requisite assets are not legally impeded from engaging 
                                                 
206
 Prescribed securities include ―investments approved or prescribed by the Minister from time to time 
for the purposes of this definition.‖ Ibid., section 3.  
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in securitization transactions. However, state owned corporations, known as 
parastatals in Zimbabwe, such as the Zimbabwe Steel Company (ZISCO), National 
Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Cold Storage Commission,
207
 Dairiboard Zimbabwe, 
Minerals Marketing Corporation,
208
 to name a few are established in terms of either 
the Companies Act or a statute of parliament, and their powers and mandates spelt out 
therein. When considering whether these institutions can engage in securitization 
transactions, principally as originators, reference should be made to the Acts of 
parliament under which they derive their statutory existence and power.  
As noted above, there also exists in Zimbabwe several thousand pension and 
provident funds. These institutions,
209
 regulated under the Pension and Provident 
Funds Act [Chap 24:09], can play a significant part as institutional investors in 
securitization issuances. But there is need to reform the prescribed securities regime, 
which restricts the investment discretion of boards/trustees of pension and provident 
funds.
210
 Another institution, which is one of the largest institutional investors in 
Zimbabwe, is the National Social Security Authority (NSSA). NSSA is established in 
terms of the National Social Security Act.
211
 Every taxpayer in Zimbabwe is obliged 
to make national social security contributions, which tax deduction is forwarded and 
administered by NSSA. But, as with insurance firms, councils, and pensions and 
provident funds, NSSA is also affected by the prescribed securities regime. It is 
suggested that this system should be reformed to permit NSSA, among others, to 
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invest in structured finance securities, without first seeking Ministerial approval, as is 
currently the case.  
 
4.8. Summary  
This chapter analysed legislation that regulates firms, which typically engage in 
securitization transactions as originators, service providers and investors. It assessed 
several Acts of parliament which regulate the operations of (i) building societies; (ii) 
banking institutions; (iii) specialised banking institutions such as the IDBZ and the 
POSB; (iv) local government authorities; and (v) insurance firms. It concluded that in 
general, most of the enabling enactments relating to these financial institutions and 
statutory bodies permit them to (i) engage in securitization transactions; (ii) 
incorporate or establish securitization SPVs; (iii) provide securitization related 
services; and (iv) to invest in securitization issuances. In addition, the RBZ, as one of 
the main regulatory agencies over the financial services sector also acknowledges in 
its guidelines that these financial institutions can engage in most of the above 
activities.
212
   
Although the RBZ guidelines imply that building societies can securitize their 
receivables, there is some ambiguity as to whether the Building Societies Act actually 
permits them to engage in securitization. The Building Societies Act should be 
amended to expressly permit building societies to refinance using securitization. The 
laws regulating banking institutions, including specialist banking institutions such as 
the IDBZ and the POSB, and insurance societies and companies (generally) permit 
them to refinance using securitization. However section 7 of the Banking Act should 
be amended to specifically refer to structured finance technology, including 
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securitization, as a permissible banking activity. In addition, consideration should be 
given to watering down the power of the Minister of Finance over operational 
decisions of the POSB and insurance firms. Building societies, banking institutions, 
including the IDBZ and the POSB, and insurance firms can, as a general rule, provide 
securitization-related services. In addition, these institutions have power to establish 
corporate and trust SPVs for use in securitization transactions, or to use a third party 
to do the same.   
This study recommends that Zimbabwe‘s prescribed assets regime should be 
reconsidered. Under this regime, most prudentially regulated institutions and local 
government authorities are prohibited from investing in securities other than those 
stipulated by statute, referred to as prescribed assets. The current prescribed assets do 
not include most debt and equity securities. This is an obvious anomaly, which unduly 
restricts the range of securities these institutions can lawfully invest in.   
It is unclear if local government authorities are permitted to engage in 
securitization transactions. This study recommends that the Councils Act should be 
amended to specifically refer to and enable local government authorities to use the 
technique to refinance, obviously subject to the necessary prudential controls.  
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                                                  CHAPTER 5 
                           SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter identifies entities used in business transactions in Zimbabwe that can 
be utilised as SPVs in securitization transactions. The chapter analyses laws 
regulating or relating to incorporated limited-liability companies, trusts and 
partnerships. It also analyses: (i) the types of securities different SPVs can issue; (ii) 
the role, responsibilities and fiduciary duties of SPV trustees and directors; and (iii) 
whether securitization SPVs that issue debt securities will be obliged to register as 
money-lending agencies under the Money Lending and Rates of Interest Act.
213
 This 
chapter concludes that trusts and public limited-liability companies are the only two 
types of SPV structures that can be used for securitization transactions. 
 
5.2.  SPVs: Basic characteristics 
SPVs are integral to securitization transactions. Originating firms use SPVs to 
isolate financial assets from their general business risks and to issue credit and 
liquidity-enhanced securities.
214
 The transfer of financial assets from an originating 
firm to an SPV facilitates off-balance sheet financing. If structured as a true-sale the 
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transferred assets will in theory fall outside an originator‘s insolvency estate.215 The 
SPV is at the centre of most of the contractual arrangements that constitute a 
securitization transaction, such as the Purchase and Sale agreement,
216
 the 
administration agreement,
217
 the underwriting agreement,
218
 the Security Trust 
Deed,
219
 the declaration of trust relating to the issued shares of the SPVs,
220
 and the 
prospectus.
221
  
The type of SPV used in a securitization transaction is determined by several 
factors. These include, inter alia, the nature of business vehicles permitted by a 
country‘ legal system, SPV entity-tax liability, the insolvency risk characteristics of 
different entity types, the types of securities which are intended to be issued, and 
whether the securities in question will be publicly issued or privately placed. In some 
jurisdictions the SPV can be an incorporated limited liability company - whose form 
and legal status is determined by the law under which it is created – or can be an 
unincorporated legal entity such as a trust.
222
 In other jurisdictions, particularly civil 
law countries, which do not recognize the concept of trusts, laws have been enacted 
enabling the incorporation of specific securitization SPVs.  
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professional independent institutions, and the contract document is referred to either as a administrative 
or servicing agreement.  
218
 This is the contract between the SPV and underwriters (banks and/or other financial entities) which 
contract to underwrite the securities issuance.  
219
 This document contains the procedures by which the SPV assigns the securitised assets to a security 
trustee for the benefit of investors to the securities issued by the SPV.  
220
 Where the shareholders of the SPV are corporate, to avoid the consolidation of their interests with 
the SPV, they enter into a declaration of trust in favour of a discretionary class of charities.  
221
 A prospectus is not a contract, but it contains and discloses information relating to the securities 
issued by the SPV to members of the public (investors). The International Comparative Legal Guide to 
Securitization 2005 uses the analogy of a wheel. It states: ―if the global securitization market is looked 
at like a bicycle wheel, an SPV is the hub; the originators, underwriters, investors and market 
professionals occupy various parts of the tyre; and the multitude of contracts that form the structure of 
a securitization transaction are represented by the spokes. The International Comparative Legal Guide 
to Securitization (2005) at p. 9. Available at  www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/345.pdf 
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 Gorton and Souleles (2005) (note 60, supra) at p. 2.  
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As a general rule, a securitization SPV should satisfy, inter alia, the following key 
criteria. It must be: (i) a separate legal entity, distinct from the originating firm, its 
sponsors, promoters and shareholders/beneficiaries; (ii) legally capable of acquiring, 
possessing and disposing financial assets; (iii) capable of being bankruptcy-
proofed;
223
 (iv) ideally tax neutral; (v) legally capable of issuing, and be permitted to 
issue public securities; and its (vi) objectives, powers and nature and range of 
activities must be capable of being legally constrained. 
 
5.3. Trust SPVs 
Trusts are common SPV structures in many countries that possess securitization 
markets; and in particular English common law jurisdictions. A trust, as a legal 
fiction, is an often used structure in Zimbabwe with different types of gratuitous and 
commercial trusts used for various purposes including estate planning, business and 
investment purposes.
224
 As with its company and partnership law, Zimbabwe‘s law of 
trusts is drawn from the English common law. There is sparse literature on the 
commercial use of trusts in Zimbabwe, with most focusing almost exclusively on 
gratuitous trusts. However, while it has not codified its laws of trusts, Zimbabwe has 
enacted legislation, whose provisions modify some aspects of trust law, especially as 
regards commercial uses of trusts. These enactments include the Collective 
Investments Schemes Act [Chap 24:19], the Companies and Associations Trustees 
Act [Chap 24:04], and the Deeds Registries Act [Chap 20:05]. These statutes 
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 That is, it must be capable of being insulated from possible third-party bankruptcy-inducing claims, 
including claims by the originating firm or its creditors, and neutered in its ability to file for voluntary 
bankruptcy. 
224
 Trusts are used fairly widely for business purposes in Zimbabwe. For instance, in 1997 Zimbabwe 
enacted a Collective Investment Schemes Act [Chap 24:19]. This Act provides, inter alia, for the 
creation of unit trusts, their management, the duties, qualifications and obligations of trustees.  
79 
notwithstanding, much of the legal jurisprudence relating to trusts in Zimbabwe 
borrows from English and South African jurisprudence.  
As under English law, in Roman-Dutch law, there is no settled single definition of 
a trust. A trust can be defined as a legal relationship that is formed when a person – 
the trustee - administers property in trust for the benefit of an identified person (the 
beneficiary) or impersonal object.
225
 Unlike in the USA where as a result of 
legislative intervention, some trusts are recognised as separate legal entities; in 
Zimbabwe, as in the UK, trusts are not recognised as separate legal entities.
226
 In the 
Crundall Bros (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus N.O. & Anor, the Supreme Court held: ―A trust is 
not a person. The trustee is the person to be considered for the purposes of the 
Regulations.‖227  
 
5.3.1. Establishing a trust SPV structure 
In Zimbabwe, the creation of a trust SPV structure is a relatively straight forward 
process, involving very little bureaucracy. Although a trust relationship can exist 
without the need for elaborate formalities; in practice, an originating firm will settle a 
trust or cause a third party such as an arranger to establish the trust. Where a third 
party is chosen to settle a trust, as a bankruptcy risk management measure, such party 
would in effect be the settlor/grantor of the trust and not the originating firm. The trust 
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 In Gold mining and Minerals Development Trust Makarau J refers to a trust as a ―as a legal 
relationship and not as a separate legal entity as a corporation or universitatis even though the trustees 
may together form a board akin to a board of a company or of a voluntary association.‖ Gold Mining 
and Minerals Development Trust v Zimbabwe Miners Federation HH-24-2006, at p. 3. The Judge also 
cites with approval the definition of trusts in T. Honore (1985) South African Law of Trusts, 3
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 ed. 
Cape Town, Juta & Co.  
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 Gold Mining and Minerals Development Trust v Zimbabwe Miners Federation (note 225, supra), at 
pp. 2-3. Crundall Bros (Pvt) Ltdv Lazarus N.O. & Anor 1990 (1) ZLR 290 (H) at 298 E, and 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie's Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A) at 840. 
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 Crundall Bros (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus N.O. & Anor (supra, note 226), at 128F. It should be noted 
however that the rules of the High Court of Zimbabwe permit, without granting trusts legal personality, 
trustees to sue or be sued in the name of a trust. Order 2A, rule 8 of the High Court Rules, 1971. See 
also and Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust and 2 Others v Dinah 
Mandaza and 6 Others HH-202-2003, at p. 19. 
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is created through the execution of a trust deed before a notary public and lodged at 
the Deeds Registry‘s office.228 The execution of the trust deed creates the trust, and 
the lodging of the deed with the registrar of deeds evidences the existence of the trust 
relationship. The trust deed will identify the trustees, which can be either natural 
persons or incorporated companies, the objectives of the trust, and the powers and 
duties of the trustees.
229
 Trustees will typically purchase from the originating firm, in 
accordance with the terms of the trust deed, the financial assets to be securitised and 
then issue securities (trust certificates) to investors.
230
 The trustees acquire prima facie 
ownership and management powers over the assets. The issued trust certificates 
represent equitable undivided beneficial interests in the underlying assets. A trustee 
holds and manages trust property – the transferred financial assets – in its own name 
but for the benefit of investors. The trustee is obliged under the common law, and 
subject to the terms of the trust deed, to manage the affairs of the trust as stipulated 
and to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Trustees are also obliged under the 
common law to exercise due care and diligence in the discharge of their duties. 
As noted above, both natural and juristic persons can act as trustees. 
Consequentially, an originating firm can arrange for the creation or use of a company 
to act as trustee, which creates the trust SPV structure. Costs associated with setting 
up a trust are relatively small. Legal costs arise from the drafting, notarising and 
lodging of the trust deed. Stamp duty has to be paid on the lodging of the trust deed 
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 Section 5(m) of the Deeds Registries Act [Chap 20:05]. 
229
 The core duties of the trustees include the duty to abide by the terms of the trust, the duty to account, 
the duty of good faith and honesty, the duty of care or reasonable prudence and fiduciary duties of 
loyalty. See John Mowbray, QC., Lynton Tucker., Nicholas Le Poidevin., Edwin Simpson., and James 
Brightwell (2000) On Trusts, 17
th
 ed, (London) Sweet and Maxwell, 2000, Chapters 20 and 34.  
230
 A trust certificate is a document that evidences the holder‘s undivided interest, to the extent 
specified in the document, in the trust assets. Trust certificates have debt-like characteristics and are 
repayable from revenue generated by the financial assets subject to the securitization transaction. 
Schwarcz, Steven (2003) ‗Commercial Trusts as Business Organisations: Unravelling the Mystery‘, 
The Business Lawyer 2003, vol. 58, at p. 6. 
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with the registrar of deeds. This is a relatively minor statutory fee.
231
 There is no 
requirement that trusts to be used as securitization SPVs should be capitalised. Trusts 
are not required to file statutory returns like incorporated companies. The filing of 
audited statements, the holding of meetings, operational management of the trust 
assets, etc are issues regulated by and under the terms of the trust deed.  
   
5.3.2. Limited liability status 
Trust law imbues trusts with limited liability-like status. Limited liability status is 
especially important for SPVs because in theory it enables structurers of securitization 
transactions to isolate, calculate and mitigate identified risk. While trusts do not have 
a separate legal persona, property subject to the trust is treated at law as legally 
separate from that of the settlor and the trustee. Trust property stands alone, as a unit, 
with trust debts and obligations being levied only against the trust property and not 
against the settlor or the trustees‘ personal assets. This legal recognition is similar to 
that which accrues to incorporated entities, especially those whose liability is limited 
by shares. As a general rule, the liability of shareholders/members of companies 
limited by shares is limited to the amount of the unpaid up share capital, irrespective 
of how much the company owes.  
An additional feature of trusts is that property subject to the trust is protected from 
claims made by the settlor or its creditors, an originating firm or its creditors, and the 
trustee‘s own creditors, spouse or successors. A trustee‘s personal creditors cannot 
claim or levy against the trust‘s assets, especially where the trustee has made it known 
that s/he is acting, or holds the assets in his or her capacity as a trustee. In addition, 
claims by beneficiaries (investors) – absence breach of trust – are also restricted to 
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 The amount keeps changing due to the hyperinflationary environment.  
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trust property. This special legal treatment ensures that trust property is legally 
segregated from the trustees‘ personal proprietary and other business interests; and 
permits the trust property to be the only focal point for any claims arising. As above, 
the segregation of trust assets from the trustees‘ insolvency estate and third party 
claimants makes trusts attractive for use in securitization transactions, mutual, pension 
and other investment funds.
232
 
 
5.3.3. Fiduciary duties as a form of corporate governance 
Unlike incorporated companies trusts are managed by trustees. Under Roman-
Dutch law and subject to the terms of the trust deed, trustees are bound by common 
law fiduciary duties, which can be variously enhanced by an originating firm or 
arranger.
233
 A trustee has a general duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. In 
addition, in the performance of its duties and powers a trustee is obliged to exercise 
―care, diligence and skill, which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages 
the affairs of another …… and except as regards questions of law, the trustee is bound 
to exercise an independent discretion.‖234 In addition, a trustee is obliged to ―comply 
strictly with [its] mandate and act within the scope of [its] authority, namely, to hand 
over property, or pay funds over, to some person upon the occurrence of an event. [A 
trustee is] liable to the person who has an interest in the property or funds if [it acts] 
without reasonable care and outside the scope of [its] authority.‖235 Further, trustees 
have an obligation to act impartially and not to unduly prefer one or more 
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 Lusina Ho (2004) ‗The Reception of Trust in Asia: Emerging Asian Principles of Trust?‘ Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, at pp. 287-304. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953593  
233
 To prevent abuse of legal ownership, the common law imposes several duties upon the trustees, 
including the duty to abide by the terms of the trust deed, the duty to account, duty to be impartial, duty 
to act in good faith and honesty, the duty of care or reasonable prudence and fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
John Mowbray, QC., Lynton Tucker., Nicholas Le Poidevin., Edwin Simpson., and James Brightwell 
(2000)  (note 229, supra), at chapters 20-34.    
234
 De Villiers v James 1996 (2) ZLR 597 (S) at p. 603; Chirimuta v Action Property Sales (Pvt) Ltd 
HH-5-2007. 
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 De Villiers v James 1996 (2) ZLR 597 (S) at p 605. 
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beneficiaries to the detriment of others.
236
  Trustees‘ duties include a duty to:  (a) 
abide by the terms of the trust deed; (b) account; (c) be impartial; (d) act in good faith 
and honesty; (e) exercise due care or reasonable prudence; and (f) loyalty.
237
 Through 
these fiduciary duties, effective corporate governance principles – as appropriate – are 
typically incorporated into trust deeds to regulate trust relationships. These fiduciary 
duties are applicable even where the trustee is a juristic entity that utilises directors to 
manage the operations of the SPV. It is this versatility of common law trust entities 
that makes them attractive as structured finance vehicles to investors seeking to invest 
in securities backed by income generating assets.  
 
5.3.4. Bankruptcy remoteness 
Does the trust structure provide adequate insolvency remoteness when used as an 
SPV in securitization transactions? Under Roman-Dutch law, once a trust has been 
settled and assets have been sold or ceded in securitatem debiti and transferred from 
an originating firm to the trustees, per the trust deed, the assets legally cease to belong 
to the originating firm and will be held in the name of the trustees - but in trust for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.
238
 Because they are held in trust, these assets do not 
constitute part of the trustee‘s personal estate. In addition, the terms of the trust deed 
can be crafted to include provisions that curtail the trustee‘s power to deal with or 
dissipate trust assets. Such provisions in the trust deed can include restrictions on the 
trustee‘s ability to liquidate the trust relationship. In addition, under the common law, 
trustees are obliged to act impartially, and independently of the settlor and the 
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 Finlayson v Standard Chartered Pension Fund 1995 (1) ZLR 302 (H), at p 317B-C. See also 
Communications and Allied Industries Pensioners Association v Communication and Allied Industries 
Pension Fund SC-29-08 at p 9.  
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 John Mowbray, QC., Lynton Tucker., Nicholas Le Poidevin., Edwin Simpson., and James 
Brightwell (2000) (note 229, supra) at chapters 20-34.     
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 See section 3 of the Companies and Associations Trustees Act [Chap 24:04], where this common 
law rule has been codified in relation to the transfer of immovable property. 
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beneficiaries. If appropriately crafted the trust deed should prevent the settlor or the 
originating firm from exerting adverse influence on or dictating how the transferred 
assets should be utilised or disposed of, unless of course either are beneficiaries under 
the terms of the trust deed. It is these characteristics that ensure a trust structure 
achieves a measure of bankruptcy remoteness, despite trusts not having separate legal 
personality. 
 
5.3.4.1. True-sale securitization transactions 
If the transfer of assets pursuant to a securitization transaction is structured as an 
out-and-out-cession, i.e. as a true-sale and the requisite contractual formalities have 
been completed, Zimbabwe‘s law of sale will – as a general rule - consider ownership 
to have passed from an originating firm to the trustees.
239
 The assets will become trust 
property. The trust property will not – at law - constitute part of the originating firm‘s 
insolvency estate. In principle, this effectively insulates the assets from any claims 
relating to the originating firm‘s insolvency estate. Although this question, i.e. 
whether the trust structure effectively removes transferred assets from the originator‘s 
estate in the event of the latter‘s insolvency is yet to come before, and has not been 
determined by courts in Zimbabwe; as a general rule, the trust assets will be regarded 
as insulated from an originating firm‘s insolvency estate.  
 
5.3.4.2. Non true-sale securitization transactions 
The transfer of financial assets from an originating firm to trustees in securitatem 
debiti, in a non true-sale securitization transaction is most at risk of being impeached 
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 This question is analysed in more detail in chapter 6.  
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and set aside as a result of provisions of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act.
240
 
Where the asset transfer is structured as a secured loan transaction, the High Court 
will, as a general rule, hold that the financial assets constitute part of the originating 
firm‘s insolvency estate to the potential prejudice of investors in the issued 
securities.
241
 The Insolvency Act [Chap 6:04] as read with the Companies Act gives 
the High Court extensive powers to set aside asset transfers made by an originating 
firm to third party creditors, including assets transferred to a trust in securitatem 
debiti. The relevant sections, which are analysed in detail in chapter 6, include section 
269(3) of the Companies Act, and sections 40, 42, 43 and 44 of the Insolvency Act, as 
read with section 270 of the Companies Act.  It should be noted however that these 
sections of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act will apply only if the 
securitization transaction is a secured, as opposed to a true-sale, securitization 
transaction.  
 
5.3.5. Taxation 
As noted in chapter 7, an additional securitization-friendly feature of trusts is that 
because they do not have a separate legal persona, they avoid entity-level tax.
242
 Tax 
on income is levied on the beneficiaries; in this case the investors.
243
 This makes 
trusts cost effective because they are entity-level income tax exempt.  
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 This question is analysed in more detail in chapter 6.  
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 Refer to section 23 of the Insolvency Act as read with section 2 of the Insolvency Act. Section 23 of 
the Act states that: ―(1) The effect of the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent shall be— 
(a) to divest the insolvent of his estate and to vest it in the Master until a trustee has been appointed 
and, upon the appointment of a trustee, to vest the estate in the trustee.‖ Section 23 (2) provides that:  
―For the purposes of subsection (1) and subject to any other law, the estate of an insolvent shall 
include— (a) all property of the insolvent at the date of the sequestration…‖ And Section 2 defines 
property as ―movable or immovable property wherever situated within Zimbabwe, and includes 
contingent interests in property other than the contingent interest of a fideicommissary instituted by 
will or deed inter vivos.‖ [Emphasis added]. 
242
 Refer below to chapter 7 at paragraph 7.5.1. 
243
 This issue is analysed in chapter 7.  
86 
5.3.6. Securities issuance  
As noted above, trust SPVs issue trust certificates. These securities however can 
only be privately placed as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange does not permit trusts to 
issue publicly traded securities. Under the provisions of the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange Listing requirements, only ―companies‖ may list and issue securities 
through the Exchange. This means that a trustee incorporated as a public limited 
liability company would be the only type of entity permitted to issue securities 
through the exchange. And even then, the listing requirements require companies 
intending to list to have traded for a minimum of three years. This means that while 
trusts are appropriate vehicles, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange listing requirements 
need to be reviewed and amended in order to facilitate public trade in securitization 
securities. 
In summary, trust structures can be used as SPVs in securitization transactions. 
They are incredibly versatile, can be bankruptcy-proofed, have a measure of limited 
liability status, are able to issue marketable securities, known as trust certificates, do 
not attract entity-level income tax liability, and are not regarded as debtors under the 
Insolvency Act. In addition, trusts are relatively simple to establish and involve very 
little bureaucracy. Further, trusts are subjected to minimal statutory regulation 
compared to incorporated entities like public and private limited liability companies, 
which makes them cost-effective.  
 
5.4. Corporate SPVs 
The establishment of incorporated business enterprises is generally, but not 
exclusively regulated by the Companies Act [Chap 24:03]. Four types of companies, 
all of which enjoy limited-liability status, can be incorporated under the Companies 
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Act.
244
 These are (i) private limited-liability companies,
245
 (ii) public limited-liability 
companies, (iii) companies limited by guarantee,
246
 and (iv) co-operative 
companies.
247
 Subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, once all the prescribed 
formalities have been complied with and a company is registered, it becomes a 
separate legal entity and acquires the capacity and power of a natural person of full 
capacity.
248
  
Of these companies, the entity that can be used as an SPV in securitization 
transactions is the public limited-liability company. This is because it is the only one 
that is permitted under the Companies Act to issue debt, equity and hybrid securities 
to members of the public. The key difference between a public limited-liability 
company and others incorporated under the Companies Act is that all other companies 
are not permitted to issue debt and equity securities to members of the public.
249
 To 
qualify for use as a securitization SPV, an entity must be capable of issuing debt or 
equity or hybrid securities to investors, either through private placement or a 
securities exchange.  
 
5.4.1. Establishing a public limited liability company 
An originating firm or arranger intending to use a public limited liability company 
as an SPV can either set one up, or simply buy a shelf-company from promoters, both 
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 For information on business enterprises that can be established under the Companies Act see Tett 
and Chadwick, Zimbabwe Company Law (2 ed) 13-14; Jericho Nkala and Timothy Joseph Nyapadi, 
Company Law in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Distance Education College, at p. 91-112; and R.H. Christie 
(1997) Business Law in Zimbabwe (2 ed) Juta. 129-140. 
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 Section 33(1) of the Companies Act.  
246
 Ibid., at section 7(b) as read with section 26.  
247
 Ibid., at section 36.   
248
 Ibid., at section 9.  
249
 A private company is defined as a company ―which by its articles…prohibits any invitation to the 
public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company.‖ Ibid, section 33. 
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relatively inexpensive processes.
250
 As in the U.K., a company requires a promoter, 
the filing of statutory pro-forma documents, including the memorandum and articles 
of association, with the registrar of companies. The entity will require shareholders, a 
registered office, the filing of a prospectus, a minimum share capital, etc. Public 
limited-liability companies are subject to more stringent regulatory compliance 
prescriptions than private limited-liability companies. For instance, a public company 
may not commence operations until all prescribed formalities relating to its 
establishment have been completed. A public company must hold mandatory statutory 
meetings and provide statutory reports. There are strict restrictions on the number and 
nature of directors that can be appointed; there are strict stipulations on the 
shareholding of directors; etc.
251
 Needless to say, these regulatory compliance 
statutory prescriptions have a bearing on the economic cost structure of one-off 
securitization deals. On the other hand, a public limited liability SPV structure would 
be appropriate for use in multi-seller ABCP conduit programmes.
252
  
 
5.4.2. Limited liability status 
Once incorporated, corporate entities established under the Companies Act, 
including public limited-liability companies, acquire a separate legal persona and 
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 For a detailed brief of the mechanics, cost and time it takes to incorporate a company in Zimbabwe 
refer to a report by the International Finance Corporation on 
www.doingbusiness.org/exploretopics/startingbusiness/Details.aspx?economyid=208  
251
 For a detailed synopsis of the process of establishing a public limited liability company in 
Zimbabwe, including the statutory requirements relating to meetings, accounts, the prospectus, 
underwriting, etc, refer to Christie (1997) (note 244, supra) at pp. 377-420.  
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 By end of 2006, ABCP programmes constituted the bulk of asset securitization issuances in South 
Africa, Zimbabwe‘s neighbour. Karen Couzyn and Jason van der Poel of Webber Wentzel Bowens 
(2006) ‗Securitization‘. Available at http://www.wwb.co.za/wwb/view/wwb/en/page2018  See also 
Jobst who states that: ―…ABCP programmes have evolved as an alternative form of SME 
securitization, whose flexibility (in terms of security design and underlying asset type) and disclosure 
requirements about securitized assets remedy existing market challenges of refinancing SME-related 
exposures.‖ Jobst (2006) (note 8, supra), at pp. 731-760.  
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limited-liability status.
253
 These characteristics are essential attributes for 
securitization SPVs, especially where bankruptcy remoteness is sought to be attained. 
 
5.4.3. Bankruptcy remoteness  
The separate legal persona and limited liability status imbues public limited-
liability companies with a measure of bankruptcy remoteness. Additional measures 
are typically employed to insulate corporate SPVs from possible third party 
insolvency-inducing claims. Through appropriate changes to the articles and 
memorandum of association, the ability of an SPV to engage in potentially 
insolvency-inducing activities can be curtailed and mitigated. But this general 
proposition is obviously subject to a caveat as illustrated above. As appears in 
paragraph 5.3.4.2., above, and in chapter 6 below, sections 40, 42, 43 and 44 of the 
Insolvency Act need to be considered especially when arranging a non true-sale 
securitization transaction as each can potentially threaten the viability of securitization 
transactions in the event of the originating firm being placed into insolvency.  
 
5.4.4. Corporate governance 
The corporate governance structure of corporate SPVs is typically engineered to 
ensure that the SPV structure is cost-effective and insolvency-remote. In Zimbabwe, 
where the originating firm is a financial institution regulated by the RBZ, the majority 
of directors on a related securitization SPV‘s board must be independent non 
executive directors.
254
 Where the originating firm is not a financial institution 
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 Section 9 of the Companies Act [Chap 24:03]. 
254
 The RBZ guideline states: ―A banking institution and its associates may not…have its directors, 
officers or employees on the board of an SPV unless the board is made up of at least five members and 
the majority are independent non-executive directors. In addition, the official(s) representing the bank 
must not have veto powers.‖ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: Guideline No. 01-2004/BSD Corporate 
Governance Guideline, at paragraph 4.4 (b).  
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regulated by the RBZ, but is listed on the ZSE, the listing rules require companies to 
comply (although they are not mandatory) with the corporate governance code 
promulgated by the Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe (IDOZ). This code is referred 
to as the Principles of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best Practice. 
It is non-binding, but rule 7.F.5. of the ZSE listing rules requires companies to include 
a statement in their annual reports on their compliancy with the code; and explain any 
failures.
255
 The SC has not promulgated corporate governance rules for listed 
companies. A non-listed public limited-liability SPV is obliged to have at least two 
directors, per the Companies Act. A public limited-liability company requires 
directors, a company secretary, and a registered office.
256
 It needs ―to keep statutory 
books, make statutory filings of audited accounts, tax returns and other corporate 
matters,‖257 and hold statutory meetings. Whether or not the costs associated with 
utilising a public limited liability SPV outweigh the benefits is an actuarial matter 
influenced by the nature and value of the securitization transaction. It is clear however 
that compared to private limited liability companies, public limited liability 
companies are obliged to comply with more statutory prescriptions.  
As a bankruptcy risk management measure, SPVs used in securitization 
transactions are typically structured to be brain dead. To ensure an SPV attains this 
characteristic, arrangers typically ensure that SPVs powers and objects are strictly 
prescribed. In Zimbabwe, this would be done through changes to the corporate SPV‘s 
memorandum of association, which has to be filed with the registrar of companies 
before incorporation. The objects and powers of an incorporated SPV and the powers 
of the directors are contained in the memorandum of association. Depending on the 
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 Musa Mangena and Venancio Tauringana (2007) ‗Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign 
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 Ibid.  
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securitization transaction, SPVs are typically empowered to do no more than collect 
receivables and transmit them to investors. Directors who exceed their powers as 
contained in the memorandum of association can be interdicted by shareholders of the 
company or by any other party with locus standi on the basis of the ultra vires 
doctrine. As stated above, the SPV‘s shareholders are likely to be trustees, who hold 
shares in the SPV entity in trust, for the benefit of investors in the issued securities. 
Operational management of the SPV is provided by nominated managers, although in 
practice, such services are more likely to be provided by specialist fee-charging SPV-
management companies. In the event that an SPV engages in commercial activities 
not provided for under the objects clause of its memorandum of association, such 
activities although ultra-vires are binding on the SPV. This is due to the operation of 
section 9 of the Companies Act, which states that on incorporation a company 
acquires the capacity and power of a natural person. Irrespective of whether an SPV‘s 
management is outsourced or provided in-house, the directors or trustees have the 
same powers and duties as those applicable to an ordinary company or trust, 
respectively. Directors of an SPV, subject to the terms of the articles of association or 
the agreement between the SPV and the management firm have the following duties: 
duty to exercise their powers in good faith in the SPV‘s interests; duty not to make a 
secret profit; duty not to have personal conflicts of interest with those of the SPV; 
duty to disclose; duty of care and skill; duty to act intra-vires the memorandum of 
association, a duty to exercise an independent discretion and other general fiduciary 
duties. 
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5.4.5. Taxation  
Unlike trust structures, which are not considered persons, including for taxation 
purposes, incorporated entities are liable to pay entity-level corporate tax. Currently 
corporate tax stands at 33% of gross income. As appears below in chapter 7, this study 
proposes that corporate structures utilised as securitization SPVs should be subject to 
minimal or no tax in order to facilitate the use of non-trust structures for securitization 
transactions.  
 
5.4.6. Securities issuance  
Unlike private limited-liability companies, co-operative companies or companies 
limited by guarantee, public limited-liability companies are permitted to issue equity, 
debt or hybrid securities to members of the public. This makes them versatile, as they 
can opt and are permitted to place securities privately or through the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. Public limited-liability companies lend themselves to complex structured 
finance deals, including those involving tranching and the issuing of different classes 
and type of securities.  
It is notable that in some financial jurisdictions – such as Ireland - allow private 
companies to raise capital through issuing debt securities. This should be considered 
in Zimbabwe. In addition to reducing compliance costs, including with regards the 
filing of statutory reports, minimum number of directors, appointment of auditors, 
using private limited liability companies as SPVs in securitization transactions will 
significantly reduce structuring costs. In addition, permitting private companies to 
issue at least debt securities to members of the public will enable originating firms to 
save costs and to use as vehicles, private limited liability companies - entities they are 
familiar with. Further, the regulatory requirements which public companies are 
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obliged to comply with under the Companies Act are suited to the regulation of large 
public companies and not (brain-dead) conduits designed to facilitate cost-effective 
financing or risk management measures. It is arguably anomalous to require private 
companies intending to securitize to incorporate public company SPVs. In summary, 
public limited-liability companies make viable SPV structures.  
 
5.5. Partnership SPVs 
Some countries use partnership structures as securitization SPVs. Partnerships are 
commonly used business vehicles in Zimbabwe. Law and accounting firms and a wide 
variety of other commercial ventures are conducted through the medium of 
partnerships. Zimbabwe‘s law of partnership is common law-based and remains 
largely un-codified. A partnership is defined as an unincorporated business enterprise 
made up of two or more people, but not exceeding twenty, each of whom agrees to 
contribute part of the capital and/or labour and share the profits and losses of the 
enterprise.
258
 A partnership is relatively easy to establish. Typically, a partnership 
agreement is drawn up, although there is no requirement that it should be in writing. A 
tacit universal partnership can exist under Roman-Dutch law without a partnership 
agreement being executed.
259
 Where it is in writing, the agreement must be drafted by 
a lawyer.
260
 A partnership exists if the following essential criteria exist: ―(i) each of 
the partners bring something into the partnership or binds himself to bring something 
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into it - which could be in the form of money, labour, skill or property; (ii) the 
business should be carried on for the joint benefit of all parties; (iii) the object should 
be to make profit; (iv) the contract between the parties should be legitimate.‖261 
Despite the lack of separate legal existence, in practice, partnerships are referred to as 
firms or businesses.
262
 
In Zimbabwe, partnership structures do not make suitable securitization SPVs, 
although they have been used in countries some of whose legal norms are derived 
from the English common law. In countries, such as the U.S. where it is possible to 
use partnerships as securitization vehicles, this has been made possible through 
legislative changes creating separate-legal-persona limited-liability partnership 
structures. Under Roman-Dutch law, a partnership has no separate legal personality 
and neither does it have limited liability status.
263
 In addition, unlike trusts, the 
partnership property is owned by all partners jointly and severally. Not having a 
separate legal personality from its members means that a partnership structure cannot 
technically issue securities in its own name. A partnership‘s lack of limited-liability 
status and legal personality renders the partners in a partnership particularly 
vulnerable to third party claims. In addition, the solvency of, and the incurring of debt 
or other financial obligations by any of the partners has an immediate and direct 
bearing on the creditworthiness of the securities issuance. It is extremely difficult, if 
not ineffectual to bankruptcy proof such a structure, at least to the risk level required 
for cost-effective securitization. Although the common law partnership evolved to 
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offer a flexible and non-bureaucratic vehicle to transact business, it is still largely 
rooted in the past and should be reformed. Consideration should be given to creating 
limited-liability partnership structures, such as exists in South Africa for instance.  
 
5.6. SPVs as moneylenders  
Do SPVs used in securitization transactions have to register as moneylending 
institutions? Under the provisions of the Moneylending and Rates of Interests Act 
[Chapter 14:14], [MRI Act] persons – natural and juristic – engaged in the business of 
moneylending are regulated by, are required to be registered with and obtain a licence 
from, the Registrar of Moneylenders.
264
 The MRI Act also regulates and controls the 
rates of interests that can be charged by a moneylender to a borrower. The MRI Act 
makes it a criminal offence for any person to carry on the business of a moneylender 
without a licence.
265
 A moneylender is defined as: ―any person who carries on a 
business of moneylending or who advertises or announces himself or holds himself 
out in any way as carrying on such business…‖266 A borrower is defined as: ―any 
person receiving a loan of money and any person to whom, whether by delegation or 
otherwise, the obligation of any borrower in respect of any loan of money has 
passed.‖ In addition, section 19 of the MRI Act states that the: ―… Act shall apply to 
every transaction which, whatever its form may be, is substantially one of 
moneylending and whether or not the transaction forms part of any other transaction, 
and includes any arrangement under which goods are purchased under a condition of 
repurchase at a higher price…‖  
An SPV engaged in a true-sale securitization transaction, i.e. a transaction in 
which it buys financial assets from an originating firm and issues securities to 
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investors cannot be said to be lending money to the originating firm. The contractual 
relationship between the originating firm and the SPV is that of a seller and buyer, 
respectively, of financial assets. But the reverse is true for an SPV engaged in a non 
true-sale securitization transaction in which one or more originating firms cede in 
securitatem debiti financial receivables for money lent and advanced by the SPV to 
the originating firm. The contractual relationship between an originating firm and an 
SPV in a non true-sale securitization transaction is that of a borrower and a lender, 
respectively, of money; with the SPV lending money to the originating firm on the 
security of a pool of financial assets.  
This begs the question: will an SPV engaged in a non true-sale securitization 
transaction in Zimbabwe be obliged to register as a moneylender in terms of the MRI 
Act? There is no case-law that has opined on what amounts to carrying on business as 
a moneylender. It is arguable that any person who lends money to another as part of a 
business enterprise or undertaking is carrying on business as a moneylender. A one-
off transaction arguably does not amount to carrying on a business of moneylending, 
but a series of transactions can. A one-off transaction carried out by an entity one of 
whose objectives – as stated in its memorandum of association or trust deed - is the 
receipt in securitatem debiti of financial assets from one or more persons, in exchange 
for cash received from investors as consideration for issued securities backed by the 
financial assets can amount to carrying business of moneylending. It is more likely 
than not, and this study argues, that a court will hold that an SPV engaged in a non 
true-sale securitization transaction is engaged in the business of moneylending.  
It is a criminal offence for a person to carry out the business of moneylending 
without a licence.
267
 In addition, it is illegal for a person carrying on the business of a 
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moneylender, registered or not, to charge interest on money lent at a rate that is above 
the prescribed rate of interest.
268
 Any interest paid; over and above the prescribed rate 
of interest can be reclaimed by the borrower.
269
 Similarly, the lender (SPV) cannot 
enforce an agreement requiring a borrower to pay more interest than is lawfully 
chargeable under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.
270
 In the case of a non true-sale 
securitization transaction, the discount rate on the assets ceded in securitatem debiti 
will be regarded as the interest rate chargeable. 
Without an amendment to the MRI Act, to create a safe harbour for securitization 
transactions, SPVs involved in non true-sale transactions will be bound by the 
provisions of the MRI Act. This study recommends that the MRI Act should be 
amended and exempt SPVs incorporated or established for securitization purposes 
from registration under the MRI Act. There is no reason in principle why an SPV 
involved in a true-sale securitization transaction should be placed in a more 
advantageous position that that involved in a non true-sale transaction.   
  
5.7. Summary 
This chapter analysed Zimbabwe‘s corporate, trust and partnership laws with the 
objective of determining juristic entities, which can be used as SPVs in securitization 
transactions. This chapter concludes that trust and public limited-liability structures 
can be used as SPVs in securitization transactions. Of these structures, trust 
arrangements are the best securitization mediums, as they are easier and relatively 
cost-effective to settle, as compared to public limited-liability companies. They are 
extremely versatile, have effective limited liability status, are bankruptcy-remote, 
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enable trust assets to be bankruptcy-proofed and do not attract entity-level income tax. 
In addition, the law does not need to be changed for trusts to be used as securitization 
SPVs.  
Public limited liability companies can also be used as securitization SPV 
structures. The only issues to be considered are incorporation costs, the comparatively 
onerous statutory compliance requirements associated with public companies, and 
entity-level tax. Consideration should be given to amending the Companies Act to 
enable private limited-liability entities to issue debt securities to members of the 
public. This would enable them to be used in securitization transactions.  
Consideration should also be given to creating limited liability partnership 
structures in Zimbabwe. An additional enactment that should be amended, if a cost-
effective securitization-enabling financial framework is to be attained is the MRI Act. 
As the law currently stands, SPVs used in non-true-sale securitization transaction 
would be obliged to register as moneylenders under the MRI Act and are prohibited 
from charging interest above the government prescribed rate of interest.  
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                                                        CHAPTER 6 
           FINANCIAL ASSET TRANSFER AND LEGAL RISKS 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers a critical aspect of securitization transactions: the legal 
transfer of financial assets to be securitized from an originating firm to an SPV and 
attendant risks. It evaluates Roman-Dutch law asset transfer methods and their 
insolvency-risk characteristics. It discusses the structured finance-idiosyncratic true-
sale concept, indicia for true-sale transactions, and the applicability of the concept to 
securitization asset transfers arranged in Zimbabwe. It also analyses several key legal 
insolvency risks that arise from, or with regards to, the transfer of financial assets in a 
securitization transaction. These include: (i) re-characterization risk; (ii) insolvency 
law asset transfer-voiding risks (iii) substantive consolidation risk; (iv) veil piercing 
risk; and (v) foreclosure risk. This chapter concludes that these risks do not adversely 
affect securitization transactions structured in Zimbabwe and that in any event they 
can be structured out of most transactions.  
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6.2. Transfer of assets: Methods 
A typical securitization arrangement involves the legal transfer of financial assets 
from an originating firm to an SPV.
271
 In theory, the isolation and transfer of financial 
assets enables originating firms to de-link their own credit quality from the financial 
assets to be securitized. This process enables them to refinance backed by the credit 
quality - typically enhanced - of the partitioned assets. It is this legal structuring feat 
that has enables firms to access capital-market financing through the securitization of 
various income-generating financial assets. In Zimbabwe, a firm intending to 
securitize its assets may arrange the transfer of assets to the SPV either as an outright 
sale or through a cession in securitatem debiti of the underlying assets.  
 
6.2.1. Law of sale: Roman-Dutch 
Zimbabwe‘s law of sale is drawn from Roman-Dutch law. The locus classicus of 
Hutton v Lippert defines a contract of sale as: ―a contract in which one person 
promises to deliver a thing to another, who on his part promises to pay a certain 
price.‖272 This means there must be an agreement to exchange specific property;273 the 
price for the property must be expressed in money and must be fixed by or 
ascertainable from the contract.
274
 Two legal issues arise directly from the 
consummation of a contract of sale, i.e. the determination of: (i) when ownership of 
property passes from a seller to the buyer; and (ii) where risk of loss of the property 
lies.
275
 Under Roman-Dutch law, the mere signature of a contract of sale does not pass 
rights of ownership. For ownership to pass there must be: (a) an intention to pass 
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ownership;
276
 (b) delivery of the property;
277
 and (c) payment of the price, or the 
provision of credit or security.
278
 Ownership of incorporeal assets, such as financial 
claims, can only be passed through cession. Risk on the other hand passes to the buyer 
on conclusion of the contract of sale. Similarly any gains (profits) arising from the 
property subject to the sale accrue to the buyer on emptio perfecta.
279
  
Financial claims, current or future-flow, may be sold and transferred from one 
party to another only through cession. However, there are at least two other contract 
types that involve the cession of such rights, which result in the sale and transfer of 
such rights. These are assignment and novation. The following is a discussion of all 
three contract types. 
 
6.2.2. Cession 
Under Roman-Dutch law, a creditor (cedent) can enter into an agreement to cede 
(transfer) all existing and/or future personal rights to income to a third party, 
(cessionary). This is referred to as a cession.
280
 As a result of the cession, the 
cessionary steps into the shoes of, and becomes the new creditor.
281
 Through a 
cession, the cedent relinquishes all ―[its] rights to institute or continue with legal 
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proceedings over the subject of the cession.‖282 A cession is therefore an asset transfer 
method.
283
 A cession does not result in a novation. The cessionary merely becomes 
entitled to sue on the existing debt, without the consent of the underlying debtor(s).
284
 
It is noteworthy however that rights and not obligations are ceded. The essential 
elements of a cession are: (i) an intention by the cedent to pass transfer of the debtor‘s 
obligation to the cessionary; (ii) an intention by the cessionary to accept transfer of 
the debtor‘s obligation from the cedent; and (iii) a causa for the transfer, i.e. an 
obligation by a debtor.
285
  
As a general rule, and subject to statutory caveats such as those contained in the 
Deeds Registries Act [Chapter 20:05], Roman-Dutch law does not prescribe 
formalities for the creation of a valid cession of incorporeal rights.
286
 A cession need 
not be in writing,
287
 although for evidentiary purposes, it is advisable that a notarial 
deed of cession be deposed before a notary public, and lodged at the Deeds Registry 
Office. Cessions of mortgage bonds are required to be registered with the registrar of 
Deeds.
288
 In addition, under Roman-Dutch law, the underlying debtor(s), whose debts 
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are being ceded, need not be given notice of the cession and their consent is not 
essential for the cession to be valid.  
For a cession to be valid, the claim being ceded must: (i) be legal; (ii) not be one 
that can be executed by the cedent only (such as a claim for maintenance or alimony); 
and (iii) it must be identifiable and transferable.
289
 In addition, the cession of a debt to 
several cessionaries pro-rata without the consent of the debtor is unenforceable if it 
occasions prejudice to the debtor. Such a cession is voidable, not void ab initio. The 
policy reasoning is that the splitting of a claim between various cessionaries causes 
prejudice to the debtor(s), as they may have to defend several claims instead of one.
290
 
But a cession to several cessionaries jointly and severally is valid, as it does not result 
in the splitting of the debt and does not impose additional burden on the debtors.
291
  
Roman-Dutch law recognises two types of cessions: the out-and-out cession, also 
referred to as an absolute cession and a cession in securitatem debiti. An absolute 
cession is a sale and transfer of assets, which results in the complete transfer, from the 
cedent to the cessionary, of the former‘s rights, title and interests, including rights of 
ownership over the assets. The cessionary becomes entitled to sue the underlying 
debtor in the event of default, and is able to enforce the acquired rights against all 
third parties. Conversely, because the cedent would have been divested of its rights it 
will no longer have locus standi to enforce payment by the underlying debtor.
292
 The 
second type of cession is a transfer of assets made by a cedent to a cessionary to 
secure a loan. As noted above, this is known as a cession in securitatem debiti. A 
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cession in securitatem debiti is akin to a pledge of movable property. The cedent in a 
cession in securitatem debiti retains a reversionary right in the ceded debt, unlike in 
an out-and out-cession. The cedent, in this type of cession is entitled to the return of 
the ceded property, together with all fruits and advantages accrued, once s/he has 
discharged the debt for which the assets were ceded as security.
293
 Similarly, the 
cedent cannot claim against the ceded property for as long as it has not yet discharged 
its debt, and the cessionary is only entitled to call on the cession if the cedent defaults, 
subject to the terms of the notarial deed of cession.
294
  
From the foregoing, it is obvious that both types of cessions can be used as asset 
transfer methods in securitization transactions. The absolute cession is suitable for 
true-sale securitizations, while the cession in securitatem debiti is suitable for non 
true-sale securitization transactions. This makes cession, in either of its forms, a 
viable asset transfer method.
295
  
 
6.2.3. Assignment 
In Roman-Dutch law, the term assignment refers to the transfer by a creditor of 
both its rights and obligations to a third party through a combined cession of rights 
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and a delegation of responsibilities.
296
 An assignment is a form of novation, in that it 
results in the complete substitution of an originating firm for the SPV, as a contractual 
party. As a general rule, an assignment requires the consent of the debtor. The consent 
of the debtor is not required where there does not exist an element of delectus 
personae;
297
 in this case an originating firm may without the consent of its debtors 
cede all its rights and delegate all its duties.
298
 In addition, as a general rule, an 
assignment results in the termination of the creditor‘s rights, title and interests in the 
claims assigned. Assignment therefore provides an effective mechanism through 
which originating firms may segregate and transfer their financial assets to an SPV 
and issue securities backed by these underlying financial assets. It is notable that both 
the South African and Zimbabwean securitization regulations stipulate that 
assignment and novation are the prescribed financial asset transfer methods of 
choice.
299
  
 
6.2.4. Novation 
A novation (novatio voluntaria) describes the consensual cancellation and 
discharge of a contract between parties and the creation of another contract between 
the same parties, or with the substitution of one of the parties.
300
 For securitization 
purposes, through a novation, an originating firm can sell its rights to an income 
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stream to an SPV by obtaining the consent of the underlying debtor to terminate the 
original contract, and substitute the SPV, as the creditor, in the new contract. The new 
agreement will consist of the original underlying debtor with the SPV replacing the 
originating firm as a creditor. Because it involves a waiver of existing rights, under 
Roman-Dutch law, a novation requires the agreement of all the parties to the original 
contract and will not be presumed.
301
 As a general rule, a contract of sale that results 
in a novation, i.e. with the complete substitution of an originating firm with an SPV, 
which is a separate persona, severs the originating firm‘s rights, title or interest in the 
subject matter of the contract. The originating firm‘s rights, title and interests are 
thereby transferred exclusively to the SPV. To this extent, novation constitutes the 
most effective method of transferring rights and obligations from an originating firm 
to an SPV.  
However, the utility value of novation as an asset transfer method in securitization 
transactions is debatable. Novation can be used only in transactions where the 
underlying debtors are few in number and where it is both feasible and cost effective 
to enter into new contracts with them. Most loan portfolios and receivables, are not 
amenable to this type of asset transfer method,
302
 save where a debtor has agreed at 
the time that it entered into the first agreement that the creditor may at any time 
thereafter dispose the debt to a third party. In addition, in practice, novation can be 
more costly than other asset transfer methods, because it may require the re-
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 Christie (1997) (note 244, supra) at p. 108. Refer also to the locus classicus of Ballenden v Salisbury 
City Council 1949 SR 269 at p. 273 (or 1949 (1) SA 240, at 246).  
302
 Thomas W. Albrecht et al, illustrate the dilemma as follows: ―While from a legal perspective 
novation represents the cleanest form of transfer, there are a number of legal and practical reasons why 
novation is rarely used in securitization transactions.‖  First, he mentions that banks do not want their 
customers to know that they are securitizing their assets. Second he states that if the loan asset is 
secured by collateral, the novation terminates the original security interest, which must be replaced by a 
new security interest. And in the circumstances it may be necessary to make additional filings to 
perfect the new security interest. Thomas W. Albrecht and Sarah J. Smith (1998) ‗Corporate Loan 
Securitization: Selected Legal and Regulatory Issues‘, 8 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, 411, 1998. 
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registration of mortgage and notarial bonds over assets, where relevant. To attain a 
novatio voluntaria involves more work, negotiating with the various, if not numerous 
underlying debtors, which also adds greater complexity to transactions. This element 
renders novation unsuitable for transfer of assets, in relation to which, the originating 
firm is expected to perform related contractual obligations or where the originating 
firm enjoys a particular relationship with the underlying debtor(s), which can be 
scuttled under a novation.     
In summary, in Zimbabwe, originating firms intending to sell rights to income 
have the option of choosing either cession or assignment as asset transfer methods. A 
novation, which involves the cession of rights, may be equally suitable as an asset 
transfer method. A cession in securitatem debiti enables a firm to use its financial 
assets as security for money lent and advanced, yet retaining dominium over the 
assets. On the other hand, an out-and-out cession enables a firm to sell and transfer its 
financial assets to an SPV, terminating in the process all its rights, title and interests in 
the assets transferred. Assignment on the other hand, has all the benefits of an out-
and-out cession as well as being a medium to divest obligations linked to a set of 
financial assets. Depending on the nature of the assets to be securitized and the 
intention of the parties, as with an out-and-out cession, assignment enables firms to 
wholly sever their rights of ownership and interests over assets to be securitized. It is 
this quality, which in theory, make cession and assignment excellent bankruptcy-
proof asset transfer methods.  Based on the foregoing, Zimbabwe‘s common law 
provides a medium for the effective sale or pledge of income-generating financial 
receivables in securitization transactions.   
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6.3. True-sale 
The legal characterization and recognition of a transfer of assets from an 
originating firm to an SPV - either as a sale or secured financing arrangement - is an 
extremely important legal issue in securitization transactions.
303
 Where an originating 
firm seeks a securities issuance to be ascribed ratings which are higher than its own 
credit rating, it will typically take measures to insulate the securitized assets from its 
insolvency estate through the sale to the SPV of assets to be securitized. A properly 
structured true-sale places the assets beyond the claims of the originating firm, its 
creditors, liquidator and other third parties. Such a transfer enhances an SPV‘s 
bankruptcy-remoteness, and the credit rating of its securities.
304
 A true-sale ensures 
that if an originating firm is made subject to winding-up proceedings, capital and 
interests payments due on the securities will not be stayed as the revenue flows will 
fall outside the originating firm‘s insolvency estate.305 But what is a true-sale 
securitization transaction?  
 
6.3.1. True-sale: Definition 
There is no settled definition of this structured finance phrase. In practice it is used 
to describe the sale and transfer of financial assets from an originating firm to an SPV, 
which terminates an originating firm‘s ownership rights and interests in the 
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 Jeffrey E. Bjork (1997) ‗Seeking predictability in Bankruptcy: An Alternative to Judicial 
Recharacterization in Structured Financing‘, 14 BANKR. DEV. J.  119, (1997) at p. 127.  
304
 However, as noted above, although commonly assumed, the sanctity of securitization true-sale asset 
transfers in the event of the originating firm‘s insolvency is contested. Some commentators such as 
Prof Carlson have argued that assets transferred to an SPV by an originating firm may be liable to be 
included in the originating firm‘s bankruptcy estate. See David G. Carlson (1998) ‗The Rotten 
Foundations of Securitization‘, 39 WM. & Mary L. REV. 1055 (1998). See also Teresa N. Kerr (2000) 
‗Bowie Bonding in the Music Biz: Will Music Royalty Securitization Be the Key to the Gold for Must 
Industry Participants?‘, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 2000, 367, at pp. 373; Sheryl A. Gusset (1996) 
‗Bankruptcy Remote Entities in Structured Financings‘, AM. BANKR. INST. J., (1996) at p. 14.  
305
 Section 213 of the Companies Act provides for the staying of all proceedings against a company that 
is being wound up and voids asset dispositions made after the commencement of winding-up 
proceedings unless sanctioned by a court.  
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transferred assets.
306
 Both as a concept and a structuring mechanism, the phrase true-
sale was originated to distinguish between, on the one hand, secured financing; and on 
the other, capital market financing involving securities backed by a segregated pool of 
credit and liquidity-enhanced assets sold to an SPV by an originating firm. The RBZ 
securitization guidelines do not define a true-sale, but describe when it occurs. They 
state: ――True Sale‖ occurs where (i) the sale is in compliance with legal provisions 
governing asset sales and the assets are legally isolated from the transferor (i.e. 
beyond reach of the transferor‘s creditors even in bankruptcy); (ii) the transferee is a 
qualifying SPV and holders of the beneficial interest in that entity have the right to 
pledge or exchange those interests; and (iii) the transferor does not maintain effective 
or indirect control over the transferred assets and consideration is other than beneficial 
interest.‖307 As above, this study argues that as a general rule, an absolute cession, an 
assignment or a novation terminate an originating firm‘s rights of ownership in 
transferred assets and vests those in the SPV. Therefore, for as long as all the 
formalities of a contract of sale are completed and the law recognises ownership as 
having passed from an originating firm to an SPV, a true-sale would have been 
attained.   
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 A true sale has also been defined as: ―a transfer of financial assets in which the parties state that they 
intend a sale, and in which all of the benefits and risks commonly associated with ownership are 
transferred for fair value in an arm‘s length transaction.‖ Pantaleo, V. Peter (1996) ‗Rethinking The 
Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets‘, 52, Bus. Law. 159 at p. 159. In the U.S. a true sale 
has been described as ―an absolute transfer of assets resulting in the transferor no longer retaining any 
right, title, or interest in the assets and which removes the assets from the transferor‘s estate‖ under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Committee on Bankruptcy and 
Corporate Reorganisation (1995) ‗Structured Financing Techniques‘ (1995), at p. 64. Whether or not it 
is possible to sever absolutely securitized assets from the insolvency estate of the originating firm is 
debatable as appears below.   
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra), at Part IV to the preface.    
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6.3.2. True-sale and re-characterization risk  
A risk peculiar to securitization transactions is the risk that a transfer of financial 
assets will be re-characterized as a secured loan transaction. This is referred to as re-
characterization risk.
308
 This is one of the reasons why structurers of securitization 
transactions will typically obtain an opinion from legal counsel who assesses the 
robustness of the asset transfer from the originating firm to the SPV. This opinion is 
referred to as a true-sale opinion. The true-sale opinion assesses whether an asset 
transfer satisfies the essential elements of a contract of sale, whether ownership has 
passed from the originating firm to the SPV, and consequently whether the structure 
will be able to withstand claims from the originating firm, its liquidators and creditors. 
In Zimbabwe, the RBZ securitization guidelines give some guidance on the 
constituents of a ―clean-sale‖ for regulatory capital purposes.309 The true-sale opinion 
is considered and used by other securitization participants, such as auditing firms, 
which produce audit reports; and by the rating agencies, which produce rating 
opinions.  Originating firms, their liquidators and creditors have been known to seek 
the re-characterization of an asset transfer as a secured financing arrangement, despite 
the transaction having been structured and denominated as a true-sale.
310
 A 
bankruptcy-remote asset transfer is one that is insulated from such claims.  
In Zimbabwe, ―when, under what circumstances, and to what effect, should a 
transaction denominated by the parties as a ―sale‖ be treated as something else;‖ 311 
i.e. re-characterized? The true-sale question within a structured finance context is yet 
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 Thomas Gordon describes characterization risk as: ―the risk that a court will view the originator‘s 
conveyance of assets to the SPV as a secured loan rather than as a true sale.‖ Thomas J. Gordon (2000) 
‗Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy Remote True Sales‘, University of Chicago 
Law Review, 2000, vol. 67, No. 4, 1317, at p. 1327.  
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 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra) at paragraph 5.2.   
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 In the LTV Steel Co. Inc case, the company filed for chap 11 bankruptcy protection and sought to 
renege on the transfer of assets that it had securitised, contending that it was not a true-sale of assets. In 
re LTV Steel Company, Inc., Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5. 2001.  
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 Jonathan C. Lipson (2002) ‗Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or 
Dormant?‘ 11 J. Bankr. L. and Prac. Vol. 16 (January/February 2002), at p. 24. 
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to be decided by courts in Zimbabwe. Arguably, the adoption of the concept of true-
sale into Zimbabwe‘s jurisprudence is not essential for the creation of a securitization-
enabling financial infrastructure. There are a couple of reasons for this. South Africa‘s 
law of sale is essentially the same as Zimbabwe‘s, and it has managed to propagate 
securitization without specifically adopting the concept of true-sale.
312
 The second 
reason is that the High court in Zimbabwe, exercising its equitable jurisdiction can 
determine if a contract is one for the sale of assets or a secured financing arrangement. 
This study argues that a contract of sale, which results in the transfer of ownership 
rights, equates to a true-sale.  
It is trite that courts in Roman-Dutch law, as well as English common law 
jurisdictions, are empowered to evaluate the substance rather than the form of things, 
including the substance of contractual arrangements.
313
 Under the Roman-Dutch 
system, courts will assess all the factors relevant to a contractual arrangement to 
determine the intention of the parties to a contract.
314
 It is trite that securitization 
transactions often involve arrangements that are not typically associated with, but 
which do not necessarily exclude the presence of, a contract of sale as defined under 
Roman-Dutch law. These include recourse, subordination, over-collateralization and 
other provisions. Whether the sale characterization of a contract made pursuant to a 
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 The same is true for the U.K., which also has not specifically incorporated the concept into its law 
of sale. 
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 In the case of Dadoo  the court acknowledged ―…the fundamental doctrine that the law regards the 
substance rather than the form of things, - a doctrine common, one would think, to every system of 
jurisprudence and conveniently expressed in the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate 
concipitur." Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at p. 547. See also MBE Ltd v Try 
Again Bus Co (Pvt) Ltd 1975 (1) RLR 39, 1975 (2) SA 156; Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH-26-2007; Stanmaker Mining (Pvt) Limited v Metallon Corporation 
Ltd HH-36-2006. For an exposition of the English common law position, refer to the instructive case of 
Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co. Ltd [1992] B.C.C. 270.  
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 McAdams v Fiander‘s Trustee and Bell NO, 1919 AD 207, at pp. 223-224. This case was cited and 
approved in the case of The Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Contage (Proprietary) Limited [1999] 
ZASCA 64 (17 September 1999), where the court stated: ―the real transaction was found to be a loan 
even though the parties had cast their agreement as a sale in the bona fide belief that it would provide 
security to the ―purchaser.‖ But even in such a case, the agreement is plainly a simulation; and it maybe 
a dishonest simulation depending on what the parties intended to make of it.‖  
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securitization transaction will be upheld by a court will in practice depend on whether 
the court accepts that the contract is indeed in substance a contract of sale and not a 
secured financing arrangement. The risk of re-characterization is therefore very much 
fact-sensitive.  
There is obviously no international standard for determining whether a contract is 
a true-sale arrangement. What comparative jurisprudence exists offers little by way of 
determinative guidance. A case whose reasoning may resonate with the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe is the English case of Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co. 
Ltd.
315
 In this case, the agreement between the parties was described in the contract as 
a sale, but it also contained at least four features that suggested the agreement was a 
secured financing transaction. The features which suggested a financing arrangement 
were: (i) the method of calculating the goods price; (ii) the existence of a discount, 
which appeared to be an interest charge rather than a true discount; (iii) rights of 
redemption and (iv) rights of retention. The Court held that it could not conclude that 
in substance it was not the intention of the parties, as derived from the terms of the 
written agreement, not to conclude a contract of sale. Arguably, this case provides 
only minimal guidance on how securitization asset transfers will and should be treated 
and characterized at law. What it does establish is that the true-sale enquiry is fact-
sensitive.      
This study recommends that Zimbabwe‘s judiciary refer to U.S. and Canadian 
jurisprudence; both sets of which are instructive. In the U.S. a five-pronged test is 
used to evaluate whether a transaction is a true-sale securitization. Courts assess, as 
appropriate: (i) the expressed intention of the parties;
316
 (ii) the benefits, if any, of 
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 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co. Ltd Co. Ltd [1992] B.C.C. 270. 
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 Courts in Zimbabwe would in any event consider the intention of the parties, both as expressed in 
writing as well as through an analysis of the substance of the transaction. In the U.S. state bankruptcy 
courts have assessed the expressed intention of the parties; and in instances have gone beyond the 
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ownership which remain with the originating firm after assets have been transferred to 
the SPV;
317
 (iii) the extent to which risk of loss is removed from the originator to the 
SPV;
318
 (iv) the level of control remaining with the originating firm after transfer of 
the assets has been effected;
319
 and (v) how the sale is treated for accounting purposes 
by the originating firm. It is important to note that the weight to be placed on each or a 
combination, or all of the above factors is wholly a question of fact.
320
  
The Canadian true-sale test, which mirrors in substance the U.S. test, is seven-
pronged. It assesses: (i) the intention of the parties as evidenced by the language of 
the agreement and subsequent conduct; (ii) whether the risks of ownership are 
transferred to the purchaser and the extent and nature of recourse to the seller; (iii) the 
right of the seller to surplus collections; (iv) certainty of determination of the purchase 
price; (v) the extent to which the purchased assets are identifiable; (vi) responsibility 
                                                                                                                                            
expressed words to assess what the court perceived as the true intention of the parties. To do this, they 
assessed the parties‘ practices, objectives, business activities and relationships. See for example the 
case of Major‘s Furniture Mart, Inc. v Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1319 
(3d Cir. 1979). But contrast this case with the case of Bear v Coben (In re Golden Plan of California, 
Inc.) where the Court relied almost exclusively on the phrases of choice used by the parties, concluding 
that the parties intended a sale as opposed to a secured loan transaction. In re Goldren Plan of 
California, Inc., 829 F2d 705 (9
th
 Cir. 1986).  
317
In Zimbabwe, if an SPV were to retain some of the benefits and/or risks of ownership, the courts are 
likely to lean in favour of finding that a transaction is a secured loan transaction. In Major Furniture 
Mart, 602 F. 2d 538 (3d Cir, 1979) it was noted that if the SPV did not retain any of the risks or 
obligations of ownership, this would indicate the existence of a secured loan transaction.  
318
 Where little or no risk inherent in the underlying assets is shifted from the originating firm to the 
SPV, the Courts in the U.S. have held such transactions as constituting secured loan transactions as 
opposed to sales of assets. See Major Furniture Mart, (602 F. 2d 538 (3d Cir, 1979) and the case of 
Fireman‘s Fund Insurance Com. v Grover (In re Woodson Co.) 813 F2d 266 (9th Cir 1987). In 
Zimbabwe, recourse provisions in the contractual agreements between the originating firm and the SPV 
is likely to result in a finding of a secured financing transaction as opposed to a true-sale transaction. 
Klee et al state that: ―[t]he presence of recourse is the most important aspect of risk allocation because 
it suggests that the parties intended a loan and not a sale…The greater the recourse the SPV has against 
the originator, through for example charge-backs or adjustments to the purchase price, the more the 
transfer resembles a disguised loan rather than a sale.‖ Klee and Butler (2002) (note 59, supra) at p. 52.  
319
 Courts in the U.S. have held that if the originating firm retains some element of control or 
ownership over the transferred assets such as the right to repurchase assets, or the right to surplus 
funds, then a secured loan transaction is inferred. A U.S. case in point is In re Evergreen Valley Resort, 
Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1664 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). See also Robert Dean Ellis who 
argues that the less control an originating firm has over assets, the higher the chance a court will find 
for a sale as opposed to a secured loan transaction. Robert Dean Ellis (1999) ‗Securitization Vehicles, 
Fiduciary Duties, and Bondholder‘s Rights‘, 24 Journal of Corporate Law.  295, at pp. 301-303.  
320
 For a discussion of all of the above cases refer to the article by Klee and Butler (2002) (note 59, 
supra), at pp. 49-58.  
114 
of the seller in the collection of the receivables; and (vii) whether the seller has a right 
to redeem the receivables on payment of a specified amount.
321
 This test is certainly 
more expansive and recommendable.  
The Canadian true-sale test incorporates the issue of price. On closer scrutiny, this 
is no more than the inclusion of an essential element also found in Roman-Dutch law 
contracts of sale. This study argues that the price enquiry should extend to the 
question, whether the SPV paid a fair value for the transferred assets.
322
 If no 
consideration was paid by the SPV for the assets, or if the assets were grossly under-
valued, this would suggest that the transaction is a secured financing arrangement and 
not a true-sale. This stipulation would be consistent with Roman-Dutch law position 
that parties to a contract of sale ―may fix [a] price as high or low as they wish‖ but it 
must be real and serious.
323
  
Quite apart from court-determined true-sale tests, this study recommends that the 
Zimbabwe‘s Securities Commission (SC) should promulgate securitization transaction 
rules, which deal, inter alia, with true-sale. An issue likely to prove problematic in 
practice relates to recourse provisions in the event of a trigger event occurring. 
Although such provisions are standard in securitization transactions, the question of 
how much risk is required to be transferred to an SPV in order to satisfy the true-sale 
test arises.  
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 Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and Orphans Funds, et al v Telus Communications Inc. 
(2003), 30, B.L.R. (3
rd
) 288 (Ont. C.J.). The true sale test was upheld on appeal. Refer to Metropolitan 
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 This is a factor already included in the RBZ securitization. RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra) at paragraph 
5.2 (d). See also Aicher and Fellorhoff who make much the same argument about ―the reasonable 
equivalent of a fair market price.‖ Robert D. Aicher  and William J. Fellerhoff (1991) ‗Characterization 
of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy of Transferor‘, 65 AM. 
Bankr. L. J. 1991, 181. 
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 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Saner 1927 TPD 162. See also Christie, R.H. (1997) (note 249, 
supra), at p. 145. 
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In summary; although the structured finance true-sale question is yet to be decided 
in Zimbabwe, this study argues that there already exists well developed jurisprudence 
on the considerations to be taken into account when determining whether a transfer of 
assets is a sale, or a pledge of assets to secure a loan. In addition, given the common 
law tradition of considering persuasive comparative jurisprudence, courts in 
Zimbabwe will in practice develop indicia, which will assist in determining whether a 
transaction should be treated as a true-sale or secured financing arrangement. This 
study recommends, subject to the comments above, the Canadian true-sale test, but 
which must be augmented by rules prescribed by the SC.  
 
6.3.3. True-sale and the in fraudem legis principle 
It is trite that an asset transfer described by the originating firm and SPV as a true-
sale will be set aside if it later transpires that it was tainted by fraud. In Zimbabwe, it 
is moot whether a court may set aside a securitization asset transfer on the basis that 
the receivables agreement was in fraudem legis. The argument being that the 
securitization transaction in question was a simulated sale of assets, structured with a 
view to undermining, if not the letter, then the spirit of Part V of Companies Act as 
read with the Insolvency Act; i.e. Zimbabwe‘s insolvency laws. The plea can be made 
in addition to claims arising from the other anti-asset disposal provisions of the 
Insolvency Act. Such a plea is obviously fact-sensitive. If successful, it will void the 
transfer of assets, resulting in the assets being consolidated into the originating firm‘s 
insolvency estate.
324
  
Whether or not a contract is in fraudem legis will depend on the intention of the 
parties as interpreted by the court, and importantly if there is an intention to 
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 It is conceivable that over-collateralisation may be impeached on the ground of a contract in 
fraudem legis, especially where it is considered that the originating firm did not receive reasonably 
equivalent value. For this argument, see for instance, Klee and Butler (2002) (note 59, supra) at p. 67.  
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deceive.
325
 If the parties do not intend to deceive, but in good faith sought to 
characterize their transaction as a sale, yet they did not intend ownership to pass, such 
a sale will still be regarded as a simulated sale and would be re-characterized as a 
secured financing. An illustrative authority is the South African case of McAdams v 
Fiander‘s Trustee.326 However the mere fact that the terms of agreement between an 
originating firm and an SPV contain provisions that are not typically found in 
traditional contracts of sale, does not, on its own, suggest dishonesty or that a sale of 
the assets was not intended. Zimbabwean courts are likely to accept, per custom, that 
some contract terms in securitization will deviate from typical contract of sale 
terms.
327
 
Given that securitization is a widely acknowledged refinancing technique, as 
reflected in the RBZ securitization guidelines; its use in Zimbabwe is unlikely to 
result in a court characterizing related asset transfers as simulated contracts of sale; 
and therefore as contractual arrangements in fraudem legis. But poorly structured or 
fraudulently disguised transactions may fall foul of the in fraudem legis principle. 
 
6.3.4. True-sale safe-harbour  
The interim decision in the LTV Steel Co case in the U.S. caused a furore within 
the securitization industry. Most notably, the Court ominously stated: ―there seems to 
be an element of sophistry to suggest that the debtor does not retain at least an 
equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim order… [to] suggest that 
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 Christie put it thus: ―a contract that is carefully designed to avoid a statutory prohibition will be held 
as void as being in fraudem legis.‖ Christie (1997) (note 244, supra) at p. 89.  
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 McAdams v Fiander‘s Trustee and Bell NO, 1919 AD 207, at pp. 223-224.  
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 The McAdams case, above, was cited and approved in the case of The Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v Contage (Proprietary) Limited [1999] ZASCA 64 (17 September 1999), where the court 
stated: ―the real transaction was found to be a loan even though the parties had cast their agreement as a 
sale in the bona fide belief that it would provide security to the ―purchaser.‖ But even in such a case, 
the agreement is plainly a simulation; and it maybe a dishonest simulation depending on what the 
parties intended to make of it.‖ 
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the debtor lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own 
labour, as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labour, is difficult to accept.‖328 
This implied the court was of the view that in practice they may never be a true-sale in 
securitization transactions. There were calls for the enactment of legislation, which 
would create a statutory safe-harbour by precluding courts from re-characterizing as 
secured refinancing the sale and transfer of property from an originating firm to an 
SPV pursuant to a securitization transaction.
329
 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 
was drafted but failed to pass after facing stiff opposition following the implosion of 
Enron.
330
 Despite this, in the U.S. states of Delaware, Ohio and Texas laws protecting 
prima facie securitization asset transfers were promulgated to address this perceived 
judicial excess.
331
  
Interestingly, after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 was abandoned and in the 
aftermath of Enron, some members of the U.S. Congress proposed the enactment of 
an Act called the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002. Section 102 of this 
enactment granted judges the power, notwithstanding the expressed intention of the 
contractual parties, to ―re-characterize as a secured loan, a sale…if the material 
characteristics of the sale…are substantially similar to the characteristics of a secured 
loan.‖ This legislation also failed to pass. The law as it currently stands in the U.S. is 
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 LTV Steel Co. (note 310, supra), at p. 285. 
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 For a discussion of the LTV case and the question whether securitization is premised on a flimsy 
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Del. HB 348; codified in Title 6, Chapter 27A, of the Delaware Code. Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
1109.75 (Supp. 2002) - and Texas - Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 9.109(e) (2002).  
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that the true-sale character of a securitization transaction asset transfer is determined 
by U.S. state law and is predominantly left to judge-made true-sale tests. It is not 
subject to statutory safe harbours, save for a few states such as Delaware.    
As noted above, courts in Zimbabwe can re-characterize as a secured financing 
arrangement, an asset transfer described in the receivables agreement as a sale 
transaction. Should this common law power be curtailed, with securitization 
transactions being given a statutory safe-harbour? There is merit in the argument that 
a statutory law that protects securitization asset transfers from being re-characterised 
engenders certainty, reduces structuring costs and facilitates the growth and use of 
securitization transactions. However, this study argues against the ousting of judicial 
enquiry into whether an asset transfer is a true-sale or secured financing and the use of 
pre-emptive and prescriptive legislation. Zimbabwe already has well developed legal 
principles and precedents pertaining to the law of sale. Judicially developed true-sale 
criteria will build on these established legal principles. Countries with active 
securitization markets such as South Africa and the U.K. inter alia, have not 
promulgated legislation that prescribe true-sale criteria and have not ousted judicial 
enquiry into asset transfers made pursuant to securitization transactions. For these 
reasons, this study does not recommend the promulgation of a Delaware-style safe 
harbour. The incidence of disputes over true-sale transfers will result in the 
development of true-sale legal jurisprudence. If rulings by courts impede rather than 
facilitate securitization transactions, legislative intervention may then become 
necessary.   
A law that precludes courts from looking into and re-characterising asset transfers, 
where appropriate, in prima facie securitization transactions is likely to facilitate fraud 
and frustrate bankruptcy law and policy. It is reasonable to assume that the negative 
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externalities of such a law will outweigh the benefits to securitization participants. 
Permitting the organic growth and understanding of the law relating to true-sales in 
securitization transactions can facilitate structuring practices that arguably lead to 
broad standardization and transaction-certainty; while at the same time ensuring that 
courts‘ equitable jurisdiction is not unduly fettered. True-sale opinions provided by 
transactional counsel will and should highlight re-characterization and other 
transactional risks. Arguably, not having a statutory safe-harbour contributes to 
securitization issuances coming to market with prices that ideally fully reflect 
transaction risks; which would be masked by a statutory safe-harbour.  
 
6.3.5. True-sale of future-flow receivables 
In principle, current and future rights can be sold and transferred by one party to 
another through cession. The law of cession as it relates to the sale and transfer of 
existing rights of action is settled. But the law regarding the cession of future rights, 
whether contingent or conditional has been a matter of controversy. Roman-Dutch 
law draws a distinction between an agreement to sell or pledge assets and the act of 
transfer itself, which is the cession. A cession of assets must be accompanied by this 
agreement, also known as the obligatory agreement. Since cession is a delivery 
method, the subject matter of the cession must exist for the act of transfer (cession) to 
be capable of being effected. The logic is: one cannot transfer dominium over non-
existent rights. It is now settled that contingent or conditional rights cannot legally be 
ceded, and that only current rights can be ceded.
332
 A caveat: a seller can agree to 
cede rights to income to a buyer when the rights or financial assets come into 
existence. That agreement, i.e. the agreement to cede rights when they come into 
                                                 
332
 In First National Bank the court stated: ―logically speaking a non-existent right of action or a non-
existent debt can never in law be transferred as the subject matter of a cession.‖ First National Bank of 
SA Ltd (note 283, supra), at p. 8.  
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existence at a future date is valid and enforceable.
333
 The cession will be effected if 
and when the assets come to being. If the assets do not materialise, there will be no 
cession, and the party described as the cessionary will not acquire any rights of 
ownership, as the property would not have been delivered. 
In Zimbabwe, courts have dealt with this question in relation, not to securitization, 
but the sale and cession of personal rights in rent-to-buy council properties by council 
tenants.
334
 The question that fell to be decided was whether: (i) rights possessed by 
rent-to-buy council tenants to receive ownership of the council property after 20 or 25 
years of paying rentals were capable of being sold before the expiration of the rent-to-
buy period; and (ii) whether the purchaser could enforce those rights against the 
Council and force the Council to register the purchaser as the new lease-rights holder. 
The law on this question is now settled; and the courts have held that a rent-to-buy 
tenant‘s right to claim transfer of the property on discharging the terms of the rent-to-
buy agreement can be validly sold and ceded. However, the cessionary could not 
legally compel the Council to register it as the new lease rights-holder or seek transfer 
of the property, unless if the terms of the underlying agreement have been fulfilled 
and discharged. Once the contract conditions have been fulfilled, in the absence of 
delivery, the cessionary can seek a court order for specific performance, compelling 
the cedent to obtain transfer of the property from the Council in terms of the rent-to-
buy agreement and thereafter effect transfer to him/her as the cessionary. It is within 
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 In First National Bank it was also held: ―…parties may agree in the obligatory agreement to cede 
and transfer to the cessionary a future or contingent right of action (spes futurae actionis), or a future or 
conditional debt (debitum conditionale, debitum futurum) as and when it comes into existence and 
accrues or becomes due and payable whereupon it will be transferred to the cessionary. If it never 
comes into existence it will amount to a non-existent right of action or a non-existent debt which 
cannot qualify as the subject matter of a cession…‖ Ibid., at p. 9. 
334
 See the following line of cases: Mukarati v Mkumbu 1996 (1) ZLR 212 (S), at 214H; Tobaiwa v 
Kaseke and Another HH-74-2006; Jangara v Nyakuyamba 1998 (2) ZLR 475 (H) at p. 480G- 481A-B; 
Magwenzi v Chamunorwa & Anor 1995 (2) ZLR 332 (S).  The following earlier decisions were 
overturned by the Supreme court on the basis that they had been wrongly decided: Chikonyora v 
Pedzisa 1992 (2) ZLR 445 (S); and Hundah v Murauro 1993 (2) ZLR 401 (S).  
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this context that the law of cession, in so far as it relates to future or contingent rights 
must be understood. 
By parity of reasoning, the same principles can be applied to the cession of future-
flow financial receivables. Future-flow financial receivables can therefore be sold, but 
the sale is deemed to be conditional on the financial assets coming into existence. This 
construction of the law as it relates to the cession of future and contingent rights 
presents serious insolvency risks for future-flow securitization transactions. This is 
because, subject to the terms of the agreement the financial assets will be transferred 
to the SPV, when, and only when, they have come into existence. And it is only then – 
assuming an out-and-out cession – that, the SPV will assume ownership of the 
financial assets, and the cedent‘s rights, title and interests will simultaneously 
terminate. If however, the assets or rights of action come into existence after the 
originating firm has been made subject to a winding-up order, as happened in the First 
National Bank case,
335
 the assets will fall into its insolvency estate by virtue of section 
213 of the Zimbabwe Companies Act, which precludes a firm subject to winding-up 
proceedings from disposing assets without a High court order.  
In addition, because an agreement to cede assets from one party to another 
remains that, an agreement, i.e. until the assets to be transferred come into existence, 
the seller is at liberty to cancel the agreement before transfer, as with any contract. 
This is obviously subject to the buyer‘s remedies for breach of contract. In summary, 
an out-and-out cession cannot effect, and will not result in, a true-sale transfer of 
future-flow financial receivables. Under Roman-Dutch law, the cession of future-flow 
financial receivables has peculiar insolvency risks.  
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 First National Bank (note 283, supra).  
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6.4. Insolvency risks 
It is important that a country‘s legal infrastructure enables rather than impedes 
originating firms from creating bankruptcy-remote securitization structures. Crucially, 
asset transfers made by originating firms pursuant to securitization transactions should 
be immune from insolvency anti-asset disposal provisions of the Companies Act and 
the Insolvency Act. The relevant provisions of the two enactments include sections 
213(c) and 269(3) of the Companies Act, and sections 42, 43, 44 and 47 of the 
Insolvency Act, as read with section 269 of the Companies Act. The latter provisions 
give the High court, sitting as an insolvency court, power to set aside certain 
dispositions of property made by a company subject to winding-up proceedings. 
These anti-asset disposal provisions can adversely affect securitization transactions. In 
practice, true-sale and non-consolidation legal opinions provided in Zimbabwe 
structured securitization transactions need to consider and analyse the bankruptcy 
risks inherent in these provisions.   
 
6.4.1. Section 213(c) of the Companies Act and insolvency risk 
Section 213(c) of the Companies Act can have adverse effects on securitization 
transactions. If an originating firm is retained as a Servicer, section 213(c) of the 
Companies Act can undermine a securitization transaction, if it is subsequently made 
subject to a winding-up order. The section also affects future-flow securitization 
transactions. Section 213(c) states that: ―every disposition of the property, including 
rights of action, of the company…made after commencement of the winding-up, 
shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be void.‖ This means that any disposition of 
property made by a company after the commencement of winding-up proceedings 
risks being declared void. But what amounts to a disposition of property and in what 
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way does this provision affect securitization transactions? The word disposition is not 
defined in the Companies Act. Section 270 of the Companies Act provides that where 
there is a lacuna in the Companies Act with regards the winding-up of companies, 
reference should be made to the provisions of the Insolvency Act dealing with 
insolvent estates. The Insolvency Act defines the word ―disposition,‖ to mean ―…any 
transfer or abandonment of rights to property, and includes a sale, lease, suretyship, 
mortgage, pledge, delivery, payment, release, compromise, donation or any contract 
therefor but does not include a disposition in compliance with an order of a court.‖336 
This definition is unhelpful. It is very broad and equates different juristic acts. For 
instance, it places transfer, delivery, payment, release and sale on the same footing, 
yet the first four are essential elements of a contract of sale under Roman-Dutch law. 
The definition of disposition in South Africa‘s Insolvency Act337 is exactly the same 
as the definition in the Zimbabwe statute. In South Africa, courts have implored 
policy makers to amend the definition on account of its ambiguity.
338
  
The definition gives rise to a conundrum. Does a disposition occur when: (i) an 
originator concludes a contract of sale of financial receivables with an SPV; or (ii) 
financial assets are paid for; or (iii) transfer or delivery is effected by the originating 
firm; or (iv) on the occurrence of each of the foregoing? The definition is arguably 
deliberately over-broad to ensure that companies do not use technical arguments to 
avoid the proscription against asset disposition; for instance, by drawing technical 
distinctions between a sale on the one hand, and delivery of the merx or payment of 
the purchase price on the other. The latter combination results in the transfer of 
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 Section 2 of the Insolvency Act. 
337
 Insolvency Act, Act No. 24 of 1936 (South Africa). 
338
 See Cooper and Another v Merchant Trade Centre Ltd 1999 ZASCA 97. See also Estate Jager v 
Whittaker and Another 1944 AD 246 at 250; Barclays National Bank Ltd v Umbogintwini Land and 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) and Another 1985 (4) SA 401 (D & C); Klerck NO v Kaye 
1989 (3) SA 656 (C) at 674 C - J). 
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ownership pursuant to a contract of sale. It is arguable that the occurrence of any of 
the three – as above – and depending on the facts, amounts to an unlawful disposition. 
Viewed in this way, an unlawful disposition occurs whenever a company assumes the 
right to deal with property, which it owns, or which belongs to a third party, after it 
has been made subject to winding-up proceedings. This right and privilege to dispose 
property is – for public policy reasons – exercised by a liquidator, appointed by a 
court pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Act.  
Argued thus, there is a real risk that the transfer of receivables by an originating 
firm subject to winding-up proceedings to an SPV pursuant to a servicing agreement 
or a future-flow securitization transaction will be regarded as a proscribed disposition 
of assets, contrary to section 213(c).
339
 For this reason, it is arguable that the use of an 
originator to service receivables carries serious insolvency risks.  
The above notwithstanding, this study does not recommend the amendment of 
section 213(c) of the Companies Act to create a safe harbour for originating firms 
acting as Servicers. Originating firms which securitized some of their assets prior to 
being made subject to winding-up orders, should not be granted preferential treatment 
to continue dealing in such assets, when others which refinanced using traditional 
intermediated methods are not granted the same privileges. A safe harbour could 
result in securitization transactions being deliberately used to undermine Zimbabwe‘s 
insolvency framework.  
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 In South Africa, the word disposition has been held to encompass the conclusion of a contract 
providing for the delivery or transfer of property or payment of money, and also the actual physical 
transfer or delivery, or payment. National Bank of SA Ltd v Hoffman‘s Trustee 1923 AD 247 at 251; 
and Estate Jager v Whittaker and Another 1944 AD 246 at 250.  
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6.4.2. Section 269(3) of the Companies Act and insolvency risk 
Section 269(3) of the Companies Act states: ―any cession or assignment by a 
company [subject to winding-up proceedings] of all its property to trustees for the 
benefit of all its creditors shall be void.‖ [Emphasis added]. The application of this 
section to securitization transactions is debatable. On the one hand, it is arguable that 
because it refers to instances where a company cedes or assigns all of its property to 
trustees for the benefit of all its creditors, section 269(3) may apply to, and void, asset 
transfers made in relation to non true-sale, re-characterized or whole business 
securitization transactions in which trust structures have been used. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that a purposive interpretation of section 269(3) would render it 
inapplicable to securitization transactions. Section 269(3) is obviously a public 
interest insolvency anti-asset disposal provision, whose objective is the equitable 
distribution by public authorities of the assets of a person, natural and juristic, unable 
to pay its debts. Refinancing or risk management is usually the main reason behind 
bona fide securitization transactions, and not the avoidance of bankruptcy law. For 
this reason, the section is arguably inapplicable to securitization transactions.  
However, if a securitization transaction results in an originating firm transferring 
all or substantially all of its assets to trustees in a non true-sale, or re-characterized 
securitization transaction, section 269(3) may be triggered and the asset transfer 
voided. Because of the way section 269(3) is drafted, it follows that the financial 
health of an originating firm constitutes a relevant factor to be considered by credit 
rating agencies and investors in non true-sale securitization transactions.  
Should section 269(3) be amended to ensure that asset transfers made pursuant to 
non true-sale and whole business securitization transactions are not voided? Such an 
amendment would clarify that section 269(3) applies only to insolvency law-
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avoidance practices, and not to bona fide securitization transactions.  But, in rebuttal, 
it is arguable that a specific exemption for securitization transactions may result in 
securitization being used as an insolvency law-avoidance mechanism. For the latter 
reason, the amendment of section 269(3) of the Companies Act to create a safe 
harbour for securitization transactions is not recommended.  
 
6.4.3. Section 42 of the Insolvency Act and insolvency risk 
Section 42 provides for the setting aside of a disposition of property made by a 
debtor six months before it was placed under a winding-up order, which: (i) had the 
effect of preferring one creditor over another; and (ii) if immediately after the 
disposition, the liabilities of the debtor exceeded the value of its assets.
340
 It is the 
effect of the disposition, rather than the intention of the debtor, which determines 
whether the asset disposition is voidable. As a general rule, section 42 would not 
apply to a true-sale securitization transaction because in this type of transaction, the 
SPV is not a creditor, but rather a purchaser of a set of financial assets. Section 42 is 
engaged if the securitization transaction is a non true-sale or re-characterized 
transaction, in which the SPV is a creditor.  
Arguably however, a bona-fide, arms length and for fair-value securitization 
transaction, including a non-true sale, should not cause the liabilities of an originating 
firm to exceed the value of its assets. A securitization transaction replaces one type of 
asset with another; i.e. financial receivables with cash, albeit discounted. Therefore, if 
the liabilities of an originating firm exceed the value of its assets, post completion of a 
securitization transaction, it must arguably be the result of over-investment or 
inappropriate action taken by the originating firm and not the result of the transaction. 
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 See the case of Madondo (N.O.) v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation HH-5-2008, which considered 
the meaning and application of section 42 of the Insolvency Act. 
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If however, the securitized assets were grossly undervalued resulting in the 
originating firm‘s liabilities exceeding the value of its assets, the asset transfer may be 
impeached at the instance of a liquidator or opportunistic creditors.  
An SPV in receipt of transferred assets can raise a statutory defence to a claim for 
the setting aside of an asset transfer. It can argue that the transfer of assets was made 
in the ordinary course of the originating firm‘s business and that the transaction was 
not intended to prefer the SPV over other creditor(s).
341
 The phrase ―ordinary course 
of business‖ is not defined in the Insolvency Act, or in Zimbabwe‘s case-law.342 The 
test for whether a disposition is in the ordinary course of business is an objective one. 
An instructive, and in Zimbabwe‘s case persuasive, judicial opinion is contained in 
the South African case of Malherbe‘s Trustee v Dinner and Others,343 which 
interpreted a provision of the South African Insolvency Act, which is exactly the same 
as the Zimbabwean provision, the court stated: ―...... whether the disposition is in 
accordance with ordinary business methods and principles obtaining amongst solvent 
men of business; that is to say a disposition, in order to be in the ordinary course of 
business, must be one which would not to the ordinary man of business appear 
anomalous or un-businesslike or surprising.‖344 In the U.S. courts have devised an apt 
three-tier test to establish if a transaction or payment was made by a firm in the 
ordinary course of its business.
345
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 Section 42(3) of the Insolvency Act.  
342
 Insolvency cases such Madondo have not enumerated the test to be followed in Zimbabwe, when 
determining whether an asset disposition is to be regarded as having been carried out in the ordinary 
course of business. Madondo (N.O) (note 340, supra). For a general discussion on the law relating to 
undue preferences in insolvency case refer to Tett and Chadwick (1981) (note 249, supra) at pp. 154 -
155. 
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 Malherbe‘s Trustee v Dinner and Others 1922 OPD 18.  
344
 Ibid., at 22. This dictum has been approved and followed since. See See also Hendricks N.O. v 
Swanepoel v Swanepoel 1962(4) SA 338 (A) at 345 B-E and Van Zyl & Others N.N.O. v Turner & 
Another N.N.O. 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 245. 
345
 A creditor subject to a preference risk must prove that: (1) the debt paid was incurred in the ordinary 
course of the business of the debtor and the creditor; (2) the payment or other transfer was made in the 
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Although the enquiry is fact-sensitive, it is likely that a bona-fide, arms length and 
for fair-value securitization transaction will be regarded by a court as a refinancing 
measure and not a ruse to prefer one creditor over others. This is more so, if the 
transaction is consistent with securitization industry practice and the transaction was 
completed in accordance with ordinary business terms. For this reason, an amendment 
of section 42 to create a safe harbour for securitization transactions is not 
recommended.  
 
6.4.4. Section 43 of the Insolvency Act and insolvency risk 
Section 43 of the Insolvency Act provides for the setting aside of a disposition of 
property made by a debtor, at a time when its liabilities exceeded its assets, with the 
intention of preferring one creditor over others.
346
 Section 43 may adversely affect 
non true-sale or re-characterized securitization transactions. Practically, a liquidator or 
aggrieved creditor would have to prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
impugned securitization transaction was consummated with the intention of preferring 
one creditor over another, as opposed to being a refinancing or risk management 
measure. An illustrative and persuasive test pertaining to what constitutes an intention 
to prefer one creditor over others can be found in South African jurisprudence. It has 
been held that a court should establish what, on a balance of probabilities, was the 
―dominant, operative or effectual intention in substance and in truth of the debtor for 
making the disposition.‖347  
                                                                                                                                            
ordinary course of business of the debtor and creditor; and (3) the payment or the transfer was made 
according to ordinary business terms.  
346
 Section 43(2) of the Insolvency Act states: ―Every disposition of his property made by a debtor at a 
time when his liabilities exceeded his assets with the intention of preferring one creditor above another 
may be set aside by a court if the estate of the debtor is thereafter sequestrated.‖ 
347
 Cooper and Another v merchant Trade Finance Ltd [1999] ZASCA 97, at paragraph 4-16; See also 
Pretorius‘ Trustee v Van Blommenstein, 1949 (1) SA 267 (O) at 279; Swanepoel, N.O. v National 
Bank of South Africa 1923 OPD 35 at 39; Pretorius N.O. v Stock Owners Co-Operative Co. Ltd 
1959(4) SA 462 (A), at 476 - 477; Giddy, Giddy & White‘s Estate v Du Plessis 1938 EDL 73 at 79; 
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This study does not recommend the amendment of section 43 of the Insolvency 
Act to create a safe harbour for securitization transactions. This provision will affect 
transactions effected by firms at a time when they are already in financial distress. It 
is arguable that for public policy reasons, insolvent firms should not securitize, since 
to do so, may result in insolvency law-avoidance. This notwithstanding, where from 
the facts, it is apparent that creditor preference was not the cause of an asset transfer, 
but rather refinancing or risk management, the impugned asset transfer and 
consequently the securitization transaction should be section 43-immune.  
 
6.4.5. Section 44 of the Insolvency Act and insolvency risk 
Section 44 provides for the setting aside of a disposition of property made by a 
debtor - before winding-up proceedings - in collusion with another person which had 
the effect of prejudicing his creditors or of preferring one creditor over others.
348
 
Obviously, this section does not affect true-sale securitization transactions. It can, 
however, affect non true-sale or re-characterized securitization transactions. Collusion 
is an act of intention. This means a liquidator or aggrieved creditor would have to 
prove on a balance of probability that an originating firm, arranger, or SPV intended 
to collude. Collusion may be inferred, inter alia, if the securitized assets were not 
transferred at arms length or for fair value, or if the court concludes from all the facts 
that it was not the intention of the parties to engage in a bona fide securitization 
transaction, or that the SPV is nothing more than the alter ego of the originating firm. 
This section is therefore unlikely to adversely affect bona fide securitization 
                                                                                                                                            
Eliasov N.O. v Arenel (Pvt) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 415 (R) at 418 G-H; (vii) Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973(3) 
SA 175(T); Van Zyl & Others N.N.O. v Turner & Another NNO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 244 paragraph 
30.  
348
 Section 44 of the Insolvency Act states: ―Every transaction entered into by a debtor before the 
sequestration of his estate in collusion with another person for the disposal of any property belonging to 
the debtor which had the effect of prejudicing his creditors or of preferring one creditor above another 
may be set aside by a court if the estate of the debtor is thereafter sequestrated.‖  
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transactions, and that its impact will depend largely on the structuring measures 
utilised.   
The above notwithstanding, the effects of section 44 are ameliorated by section 
46.
349
 An SPV has a defence against any section 44 claims for as long as it acted in 
good faith, obtained transfer of the assets for value and would suffer loss if the asset 
transfer was set aside. As a condition precedent to setting aside an asset transfer under 
section 46, a liquidator is obliged to compensate the SPV first for any loss that it may 
incur. An SPV would obviously suffer loss if the financial assets backing the 
securities issuance were consolidated into the originating firm‘s estate. Without the 
liquidator providing the SPV with compensation, the asset transfer will not be 
disturbed. Based on the forgoing, an amendment of section 44 to create a safe harbour 
for securitization transactions is not recommended.  
 
6.4.6. Section 47 of the Insolvency Act and insolvency risk 
Section 47 voids the alienation by a company of any of its assets made otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of its business, unless the company gives at least eight 
weeks notice of the intended alienation in three consecutive issues of the Gazette and 
once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper circulating in the district in 
which the business is carried on.
350
 If an originating firm is placed in liquidation, its 
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 Ibid., at section 46 states: ―A person who, in return for any disposition which is liable to be set aside 
in terms of section forty, forty-two, forty-three or forty-four, has parted with any property or security 
which he held or who has lost any right against another person shall, if he acted in good faith, not be 
obliged to restore any property or other benefit received under such disposition unless the trustee has 
indemnified him for parting with such property or security or for losing such right. (2) Sections forty, 
forty-two, forty-three and forty-four shall not affect the rights of any person who acquired property in 
good faith and for value from any person other than a person whose estate was subsequently 
sequestrated.‖ 
350
 Ibid, at section 47 states: ―(1) Every alienation by a trader…of any goods or property forming part 
of that business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of that business, shall, unless the trader has, not 
more than eight weeks before the alienation, given notice of the intended alienation in three 
consecutive issues of the Gazette and once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper 
circulating in the district in which the business is carried on— (a) be void as against his creditors for 
131 
creditors can use section 47 of the Insolvency Act to petition a court for a declaration 
that the asset transfer made by the originating firm to an SPV pursuant to a 
securitization transaction is void and that the transferred assets should be consolidated 
into the originating firm‘s insolvency estate. The asset transfer will not be voided, if it 
was consummated in the ordinary course of business. As argued above, this study 
argues that a bona-fide, arms length and fair-value securitization transaction will most 
likely be regarded by a court as alienation of property in the ordinary course of 
business and not a ploy to defeat bankruptcy law. Put differently, it can be safely 
argued that assets transferred to an SPV pursuant to a securitization transaction will 
not be adversely affected by section 47. 
In summary, as a general principle, true-sale securitization transactions will not be 
affected by sections 42, 43, 44 and 47 of the Insolvency Act. However, these sections 
as well as sections 213(c) and 269(3) of the Companies Act can in certain 
circumstances adversely affect asset transfers and especially in relation to non true-
sale or re-characterised securitization transactions. This study does not recommend 
the amendment of these provisions, as bona fide, arms length and fair-value 
securitization transactions are arguably largely immune from their effect. In addition, 
there is no reason in principle why a non-true-sale securitization transaction should be 
accorded better protection than other secured loan arrangements. To do so would 
arguably result in securitization being used as an insolvency law-avoiding mechanism. 
In addition, it is not necessary to protect poorly constructed securitization transactions 
that are subsequently re-characterised by a court. The setting aside of securitization 
asset transfers in accordance with sections 42, 43, 44 and 47 of the Insolvency Act 
and sections 213(c) and 269(3) of the Companies Act will not undermine well-
                                                                                                                                            
the period of six months immediately following the alienation; and (b) be void as against the trustee if 
his estate is sequestrated within the period of six months immediately following the alienation...‖ 
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structured securitization transactions. These sections prevent financially distressed 
companies from attempting to defeat insolvency policy by engaging in pre-
petition/per-insolvency arrangements that prejudice or prefer some creditors. 
Amendments to sections 42, 43, 44 and 47 of the Insolvency Act and sections 231(c) 
and 269(3) of the Companies Act will undermine rather than advance bankruptcy 
policy. This study concludes therefore that Zimbabwe‘s insolvency laws do not create 
undue insolvency risks for securitization transactions.  
 
6.5. SPV substantive consolidation risk 
The legal recognition of separate juristic entities, especially in insolvency, is a 
critical aspect of structured finance transactions. As aforementioned, in a basic 
securitization model, an originating firm will utilise a separate entity (SPV) to 
refinance through the cession to the SPV of a pool of financial assets in return for 
cash. The SPV will fund the asset acquisition through the issuance of capital market 
securities. The SPV can be a subsidiary of the originating firm, or an unrelated third 
party entity. It may be a trust, corporate or a hybrid structure. It is conceivable that a 
liquidator or creditor of an originating firm may seek to have juristic entities that were 
created by, or are affiliated with, the originating firm, especially those where it holds a 
controlling shareholding, consolidated into the originating firm‘s insolvency estate. If 
such an order is granted, the court would disregard the separate legal existence of an 
SPV and consolidate it into the originating firm‘s insolvency estate. Essentially, the 
SPV and originating firm will be treated as one and their assets commingled. The risk 
that an SPV‘s separate legal status will be disregarded, and its assets commingled 
with those of the originating firm is referred to in (U.S.) structured finance parlance as 
substantive consolidation risk. Where substantive consolidation is ordered, as opposed 
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to an administrative consolidation, the SPV will – for practical purposes - also be 
placed into bankruptcy.  
 
6.5.1. Substantive consolidation: Definition 
The doctrine of substantive consolidation only arises in the context of insolvency 
proceedings. Although uniquely a U.S. concept, the origins of this doctrine can be 
traced to the English common law equity doctrine known as the piercing of the 
corporate veil. However, substantive consolidation is different from corporate veil 
piercing in that it takes into consideration factors that arise in bankruptcy proceedings. 
It is an equitable doctrine which has been defined as the ―effective merger of two or 
more legally distinct (albeit affiliated) entities into a single debtor with a common 
pool of assets and a common body of liabilities.‖351 The entities in question can be a 
parent company and one or more subsidiaries of the parent company. On the other 
hand, piercing the corporate veil involves making the shareholder(s) liable for the 
liabilities of an entity, i.e. the corporate veil is pierced and liability is ascribed to a 
shareholder or director.   
 
6.5.2. Substantive consolidation doctrine: As applied in the U.S.  
In the U.S. there continues to be much debate on the test to use, the factors and 
principles to be taken into account, and the weight to be accorded to such factors and 
principles, when determining whether to substantively consolidate two or more related 
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juristic entities.
352
 Since the 1980s, U.S. state courts followed either of two lines of 
cases; the in re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd case
353
 or the in re Auto-Train Corp 
case,
354
 when considering substantive consolidation applications.
355
 This led to 
inconsistent judicial pronouncements. However, U.S. courts appear – at least for now 
– to have settled on a substantive consolidation analysis contained in the In re Owens 
Corning case.
356
 The court in re Owens Corning case stated that an applicant seeking 
an order for the substantive consolidation of one entity into another must establish, 
prima facie, either that, (a) pre-petition, the entities ―disregarded separateness so 
significantly that creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and treated them 
as one legal entity;‖357 or (b) ―post-petition, the debtors‘ assets and liabilities are so 
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.‖358 The decision 
also listed a set of principles constraining courts‘ discretion in substantive 
consolidation cases. It stated: (i) absent compelling circumstances, courts must respect 
the separate legal persona of different juristic entities; (ii) the harm substantive 
consolidation addresses is nearly always that caused by debtors who disregard 
separateness; (iii) mere benefit to the administration of the case does not justify 
substantive consolidation; (iv) substantive consolidation is "extreme" and imprecise, 
and should be used rarely and as a remedy of last resort after considering and rejecting 
other remedies; and (v) substantive consolidation may not be used offensively, i.e., 
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having a primary purpose of disadvantaging tactically a group of creditors in the plan 
process or altering creditors' rights.
359
 
 
6.5.3. Substantive consolidation doctrine: Application in Zimbabwe 
Does the High Court of Zimbabwe have jurisdiction to order that an SPV 
incorporated under the Companies Act be substantively consolidated with another 
company (originator) subject to winding-up proceedings? This is a moot question. 
Part V of the Companies Act which provides, inter alia, for the winding up of 
companies does not give the High Court statutory authority to substantively 
consolidate two legally separate but related entities. In the U.S., courts claim to derive 
their equity jurisdiction to order substantive consolidation of entities from section 
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The section states, a bankruptcy court ―may issue any 
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions 
of this title;‖ i.e. the bankruptcy code. Zimbabwe does not have a similar provision in 
its Companies Act or the Insolvency Act; the two enactments which deal with 
winding-up of corporate entities. The High Court would not be able to exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of section 13 of the High Court Act, which states that the 
High Court is a court of inherent jurisdiction. This section gives the High Court power 
to control is proceedings only and not the power to create law. Where a particular 
issue is determined by a statute, the High Court is obliged to base its decisions on the 
basis of the statutory enactment in question. This study concludes that Zimbabwe‘s 
High Court does not have the enabling authority and power to substantively 
consolidate separate juristic entities as do U.S. courts.  
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Arguably, this conclusion is subject to at least two, albeit theoretical caveats: 
First; the High Court can order a securitization SPV to be substantively consolidated 
with an originating firm, if the originating firm holds a majority shareholding in a 
corporate SPV, and if it passes a special resolution authorising the winding-up of the 
SPV in question.
360
 In other words, a subsidiary-entity SPV can be substantively 
consolidated with an originating firm, if the latter catalyses winding-up proceedings 
against the SPV entity. As illustrated by the U.S. case of LTV Steel Co., an 
originating firm may attempt to get legal possession of assets that it had previously 
transferred to an SPV pursuant to a true-sale securitization transaction. The likelihood 
of this occurring in Zimbabwe is small. This risk can be structured out through 
restricting the discretion of boards of SPVs to initiate insolvency proceedings. In 
addition; the utility of such an application is dubious, especially as regards true-sale 
securitization transactions, which by their nature result in the termination of the 
originating firm‘s rights, title and interests in the transferred assets. An originating 
firm would resort to this application, if it knew it would be able to establish some 
impropriety with the initial asset transfer, which would vitiate its legality, leading to 
the conflation of both entities‘ assets. Further, assuming a non true-sale transaction; 
an application for the winding-up of a securitization SPV would be unnecessary as the 
originating firm‘s claims with regards assets ceded in securitatem debiti fall into its 
insolvency estate anyway, and liable to be distributed, per the normal rules, by a 
liquidator.    
Secondly; it is conceivable that an originating firm subject to winding-up 
proceedings, with an equity holding in a securitization SPV may request the High 
court to order the winding-up of the SPV on the basis that it is ―just and equitable‖ 
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that it be wound-up.
361
 This application would not be granted in the absence of some 
just and equitable reason, more probably an impropriety, which ought not to exist in 
bona fide securitization transactions. Even if successful, this application would not 
necessarily result in the consolidation of the two entities‘ assets. The originating firm 
would have to make a further application for the setting aside of the asset transfer. 
This would conclude the substantive consolidation procedure. Such an application can 
only succeed if there exists a cause of action, such as fraud. Again, this is highly 
unlikely in a bona fide true-sale securitization transaction. Additionally, as noted 
above, such an application is unnecessary in the case of a non true-sale securitization 
transaction.   
Originating firms‘ ability to petition the High court for the winding up of 
securitization SPVs can be curtailed through the use of third-party securitization SPV 
structures, i.e. entities in which originating firms do not have a shareholding. If the 
originating firm has a controlling stake in an SPV, its ability to place the SPV into 
liquidation can be neutered through the SPV‘s articles and memorandum of 
association. For instance, the structure may include a requirement, and the RBZ 
securitization guidelines do actually require, that independent director(s) sit on the 
board and that their written consent is required before the SPV can be wound-up. If 
this condition is breached, the directors can institute a court application to interdict the 
board from winding-up the SPV. If the independent directors are improperly 
influenced to agree to the winding up of the SPV, investors in securities issued by the 
entity may rely upon the directors‘ fiduciary duties and sue them for damages. In 
addition, as it customary, the SPV can be expressly prohibited through its 
memorandum of association from filing for voluntary winding-up.  
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Does the High court have jurisdiction to order a securitization SPV to be 
consolidated with an originating firm subject to winding-up proceedings at the 
instance of the originating firm‘s creditors? Creditors who are unable to satisfy their 
claims from an originating firm‘s insolvency estate may attempt to levy their claims 
against the assets of SPV entities affiliated or associated with the originating firm. In 
theory, they can do so by seeking to consolidate the SPV with the originating firm. If 
successful, the impact of their claim would lead to the securitization SPV being 
placed into bankruptcy as well. This theoretical consideration notwithstanding, in 
Zimbabwe, creditors of an originating firm do not have locus standi under the 
Companies Act to apply for the winding-up of a separate-entity SPV with whom they 
do not have a relationship. The categories of applicants that can apply for the winding 
up of a firm incorporated under the Companies Act include the company – through its 
management, its creditors, and contributories.
362
 It is noteworthy that a securitization 
SPV is typically structured not to have creditors; and the originating firm‘s creditors 
would not – as a general rule - be considered to be creditors of a separate entity 
securitization SPV.  
In summary, this study argues that in Zimbabwe, substantive consolidation risk is 
largely theoretical. It is debatable if it exists as a remedy. What is obvious is that 
creditors of an originating firm do not have locus standi to apply for the substantive 
consolidation of a subsidiary (SPV) of an originating firm in insolvency on the basis 
that the originating firm owes them money. The creditors would not have a claim 
against the SPV, not in contract and not in tort.  
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6.6. Veil-piercing risk 
In Roman-Dutch law, as it is under the English common law, the disregarding by 
a court of the separate existence of a registered corporate entity and the treatment of 
its rights, liabilities or activities as those of its shareholders or directors is referred to 
as piercing the corporate veil.
363
 A corporate veil can be pierced, either by virtue of a 
statutory provision or common law principles of equity. The Companies Act permits 
the High Court to disregard the corporate veil in certain circumstances, but these are 
not analysed here as they do not impinge on securitization transactions.
364
 What is 
discussed below is the common law equitable principle of piercing the corporate veil.  
 
6.6.1. Veil-piercing doctrine: As applied in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe the starting off point in the discussion about piercing the corporate 
veil is the English locus classicus of Salomon v Salomon.
365
 The Salomon case laid 
the principle that a company, after incorporation becomes a separate legal entity, 
distinct from its members, and is neither an agent nor a trustee of its members.
366
 
Incorporation imbues a company with limited liability; meaning that members are not 
liable for its obligations or liabilities. The Solomon v Salomon principle is now 
statutorily enshrined in section 9 of the Companies Act. It is also a trite principle that 
an incorporated company‘s separate legal personality is not inviolable or absolute. 
The veil of incorporation can be pierced – in the case of Zimbabwe – by the High 
Court exercising equitable powers under the common law. The act of piercing can 
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result in the rights, liabilities or activities of a company being treated as those of its 
shareholders or its management.
367
  
In common with the position in English common law jurisdictions, Zimbabwe‘s 
law on the piercing of the corporate veil is not settled. Unsurprisingly, it has proved 
difficult to establish a consistent set of principles underlying why and when an 
entity‘s corporate veil should be pierced. Zimbabwean case-law and (sparse) 
jurisprudence on the subject reveals that the corporate veil will be pierced where fraud 
has been established, to prevent some manifest injustice,
368
 or where the company in 
question is merely the alter ego of a shareholder.
369
 Zimbabwe‘s stare decisis does 
not, however, lay down well-defined criteria to be taken into account when 
determining whether an entity‘s corporate veil should be pierced. Judicial opinion 
tends to repeat, without much analysis, old English law cases in which the corporate 
veil was pierced and liability ascribed to an entity‘s shareholders.370 In the case of 
Mkombachoto v Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Limited the court held: ―It does not 
appear that the law is settled as to the circumstances in which the court can or should 
―lift‖ or ―pierce the veil‖ of corporate personality.‖371 Regrettably, despite making this 
erstwhile observation, the court did not refer, as is customary in the absence of 
binding or consistent authority, to persuasive comparative jurisprudence, or attempt to 
draw key factors that ought to be considered in such cases. The court did not address 
the doctrine in any systematic manner, or refer to developments in England, South 
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Africa and other common law countries where courts have equitable power to pierce 
the corporate veil, albeit in a manner criticised by Professor Farrar as ―incoherent and 
unprincipled.‖372  
The judiciary in Zimbabwe should clarify the ambit and application of the 
doctrine. This is not to suggest that courts should establish rigid definitive criteria of 
the instances when courts will or should pierce the corporate veil, as was tried in two 
South African cases of Lategan v Boyes
373
 and Botha v van Niekerk;
374
 only to be 
overruled in Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd.
375
 Instead, this 
study proposes that courts should clarify, broadly, the instances when, subject to the 
facts of each case, the corporate veil of a company may be disregarded. This will 
greatly assist practitioners, including of securitization transactions, to calculate the 
risk of the corporate veil of an incorporated entity being pierced.  
 
6.6.2. To lift, to peer or to pierce? 
Courts and commentators in Zimbabwe, as in South Africa and elsewhere, have 
over the years interchangeably and confusingly used the verbs: lift, peer, and pierce to 
refer to a situation where a court disregards the separate existence of a company with 
the result that the rights, liabilities or activities of a company are treated as those of its 
shareholders or its management. Zimbabwean courts are yet to, and should, 
distinguish these three verbs in veil-piercing cases; as happened in England and South 
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Africa.
376
 Staughton LJ in the case of Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd 
(No 1)
377
 aptly captures this issue and notes: ―To pierce the corporate veil is an 
expression that I would reserve for treating the rights and liabilities or activities of a 
company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. To lift the 
corporate veil or look behind it, therefore should mean to have regard to the 
shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.‖ This study recommends 
Staughton LJ‘s formulation and uses same in the analysis below.  
 
6.6.3. Veil-piercing of an SPV by an originating firm’s creditors 
Can an originating firm‘s creditors, who being unable to satisfy their claims 
against the firm‘s assets, obtain a court order piercing the corporate veil of an SPV 
used by the originating firm in a securitization transaction with the result that they are 
able to levy their claims against the SPV‘s assets? In theory this risk exists. Creditors 
of an originating firm can apply to court for an order piercing a related securitization-
SPV‘s corporate veil. The risk is two-fold. If a court were to grant an order to pierce 
the corporate veil of a securitization SPV, thereby placing it in bankruptcy 
proceedings; this would be a risk on its own, irrespective of whether the originating 
firm‘s creditors in reality are able to levy their claims against the SPV‘s assets. The 
second risk is actually the levying of claims against the SPV‘s assets as concurrent 
creditors, which is unlikely assuming a true-sale transaction involving bona fide asset 
transfers. To date there has been no case in Zimbabwe where creditors of an 
originating firm have sought to pierce the corporate veil of an affiliated structured 
finance SPV.  
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As noted above, Roman-Dutch case-law provides that a company‘s corporate veil 
will be pierced where fraud has been established, to prevent some manifest injustice, 
where the company in question is the alter ego of a shareholder.
378
 Notably however, 
the general rule under Roman-Dutch law is that courts will not lightly disregard a 
company‘s legal personality.379 Indeed, an applicant seeking the piercing of the 
corporate veil of a company has to establish ―an element of fraud or other improper 
conduct in the establishment or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs.‖380 
Whether a court will order a securitization-SPV‘s corporate veil to be pierced will in 
practice depend on the facts of each case, and in particular, the characteristics of the 
impugned transaction, the factual contentions made by the litigants, and whether the 
court is persuaded that the transaction in question was not a bona fide commercial 
transaction. 
 
6.6.3.1. Fraud 
The transfer of assets to an SPV by an originating firm, pursuant to a 
securitization transaction, which is tainted by fraud, runs the risk of being impeached 
at the instance of the originating firm‘s creditors or its liquidator. Where fraud is 
established, an asset transfer can be set aside by a court using common law equity 
principles. A bona fide, arms length, for fair value securitization transaction should 
not be exposed to the risk of having its assets consolidated with those of the 
originating firm on this basis.  
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6.6.3.2. Alter ego and manifest injustice 
The corporate veil of a company can be pierced to prevent some manifest 
injustice, if it is established that such an entity is nothing more than the alter ego of a 
shareholder or director.
381
 Creditors of an insolvent originating firm may in theory 
levy their claims against financial assets transferred to an SPV pursuant to a 
securitization transaction by contending that the SPV is nothing more than the alter 
ego of the originating firm, and that some manifest injustice would be occasioned if 
its corporate veil is not pierced. The leading case for this proposition is the case of 
Cattle Breeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Veldman.
382
 In the case, Mr. Veldman was the sole 
shareholder and director of Cattle Breeders (Pvt) Ltd. The company owned the farm 
on which Mr Veldman lived with his family. After Mr and Mrs. Veldman‘s marriage 
broke down, Cattle Breeders (Pvt) Ltd instituted eviction proceedings against Mrs. 
Veldman. The High court refused to grant the order for eviction against Mrs. 
Veldman. It held that: (i) the company was no more than the alter ego of Mr. 
Veldman; and (ii) Mr. Veldman intended to evict his wife from the farmhouse, which 
was for all accounts their marital home, without providing her with alternative 
accommodation, as he was required to do under Zimbabwe‘s laws. The ratio 
decidendi in this case has since been reaffirmed in numerous other matrimonial 
cases.
383
  
Despite this jurisprudence, which emanates from matrimonial cases, this study 
argues that the risk of the corporate veil of an SPV being pierced by a court at the 
instance of an originating firm‘s creditors is slight and can be eliminated through 
appropriate securitization transaction structuring arrangements. The risk that an SPV‘s 
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integrity will be imperilled by creditors of the originating firm on the basis that it is 
the latter‘s alter ego will in theory exist if: (i) the SPV in question was established by 
the originating firm; (ii) the SPV is for all practical purposes operated/administered or 
controlled by, and is not independent of, the originating firm; or (iii) if the 
management of the affairs of the originating firm and the SPV are not adequately 
separate or distinct. Arguably therefore, a properly structured securitization 
transaction in which the SPV is not controlled or managed by the originating firm 
should be insulated from claims made by the originating firm‘s creditors.  
In addition to the alter ego element, creditors of an originating firm would have to 
establish - on the facts - some manifest injustice. What is manifest injustice? It would 
appear, although this is by no means settled, that courts in Zimbabwe will not pierce 
the corporate veil of a company merely because it considers that it is in the ―interests 
of justice to do so.‖384 Although not cited by the High Court in any of their decisions 
on piercing the corporate veil, this proposition is similar to that enunciated in the 
South African case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 
and Others,
385
 and the English case of Adams v Cape Industries.
386
The facts of the 
case of Mukombachoto v Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd are particularly 
instructive. The applicant owned money to the respondent (bank) by way of an 
overdraft facility, secured by a mortgage bond over her immovable property. In 
addition, she had guaranteed, in her personal capacity, two loans issued to two 
companies in which she was both a director and a shareholder. The mortgage bond 
over her immovable property did not cover the two loans issued to the companies. The 
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applicant paid off her overdraft and sought cancellation of the mortgage bond over her 
immovable property. The respondent refused, arguing that the applicant still owed it 
money and that, inter alia, the corporate veil of the two companies must be pierced so 
that liability for the companies‘ debts should be ascribed to the applicant in her 
personal capacity; which debts would then be set off against the mortgage bond. On 
the facts, the court concluded that the transactions were not fraudulent. The court went 
on to hold: ―…the only other issue I have to determine is whether manifest injustice 
would be denied if I do not ‗lift the veil‘. As indicated…the problems of the first 
respondent seem to be self-inflicted. The first respondent should have sought security 
for the indebtedness that the two companies were about to incur. First respondent, in 
its wisdom, chose not to do so. The first respondent can still sue and recover from the 
applicant and other guarantors for the companies‘ indebtedness. I do not think that 
manifest justice would be denied in such circumstances. I, therefore, cannot disregard 
the separate legal personalities of the two companies under consideration.‖ Taking the 
case of Mkombachoto as precedent, it is arguable that the failure by creditors of an 
originating firm to satisfy their claims against its assets is unlikely to be considered by 
the courts as constituting manifest injustice justifying the piercing of a related SPV‘s 
corporate veil.  
In practice, the interests of an originating firm‘s creditors will be counterbalanced 
by the interests of investors in securities issued by the SPV, which are backed by the 
securitized financial receivables. This point is well made in the leading South African 
case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others in 
which it is stated that where fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct is 
established, a court should balance on the one hand the ―need to preserve the separate 
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corporate identity‖387 of the firm ―against policy considerations which arise in favour 
of piercing the corporate veil.‖388 
In summary, courts in Zimbabwe can in theory pierce the corporate veil of an 
entity, including a corporate securitization SPV, if established that it is the alter ego 
of the originating firm, and that manifest injustice will be occasioned if its corporate 
veil is not pierced. The risk of this happening with regards securitization SPVs is 
small given that true-sale securitization transactions transfer ownership rights from an 
originating firm to an SPV. There is no need to apply for the piercing of the corporate 
veil where non true-sale securitization transactions are involved. In the absence of 
some asset transfer-busting malfeasance, an application to pierce the corporate veil 
will therefore not serve any useful purpose for creditors, although it can seriously 
affect a securitization transaction.  
 
6.6.3.3. Agency 
Can creditors of an originating firm, which securitized some of its financial 
receivables, obtain a court order piercing the corporate veil of a subsidiary-entity SPV 
on the basis that the latter is an agent of the originating firm? If granted, such an order 
would permit creditors to levy their claims against the SPV‘s assets. The theory that a 
company‘s corporate veil can be pierced if it is an agent of another emanates from the 
English case of Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd Co. v Birmingham Corporation;
389
 in 
which the court held that a subsidiary company was an agent of the parent company. 
This case no longer represents the law in England, having been superseded, as appears 
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below, by cases such as Adams v Cape Industries
390
  and In re Polly Peck.
391
 These 
cases declared that an agency relationship is not to be inferred simply because of the 
existence of a group of companies. There is no case-law precedent on this point in 
Zimbabwe.  
The case which is especially relevant to structured finance transactions is the case 
of In re Polly Peck. Creditors of Polly Peck, a company in liquidation made an 
application for the piercing of a corporate veil of a bond issuing off-shore subsidiary-
entity SPV on the basis, among others, that it was an agent or nominee of the parent 
company in liquidation. It was contended that the factors that were indicative of the 
agency relationship were that the SPV had been incorporated solely to issue bonds, 
had no separate and independent management and it had a very small paid-up share 
capital. Such features are typical of securitization SPVs. In re Polly Peck, the court 
refused to accept this argument and held: ―…neither agency nor nomineeship – nor 
still less, sham or something akin to sham – is to be inferred simply because a 
subsidiary company has a small paid-up capital and has a board of directors all of 
whom or most of whom are also directors or senior executives of its holding 
company.‖392 If the contention had been accepted the SPV‘s assets would have been 
consolidated with those of the parent company. On this point, the ratio decidendi in 
Polly Peck will be considered as persuasive authority on the subject of piercing the 
corporate veil on account of an agency relationship between an originating firm and a 
securitization SPV.  
Although not yet decided in Zimbabwe, it is arguable that drawing on both South 
African and English law jurisprudence on the subject, the corporate veil of an SPV 
may be lifted if proven on the facts that it is the agent of an originating firm and if to 
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do so will avoid some grave impropriety. It is notable however that agency is a matter 
of fact, has to exist in reality, and is not to be inferred from the mere fact that the 
entities in question are part of the same groups of companies. In conclusion, following 
the decision in re Polly Peck case, it is arguable that in Zimbabwe, the likelihood of 
creditors of an originating firm piercing the corporate veil of a subsidiary SPV on the 
basis of agency is small. And in any event, the risk can be structured out of 
securitization transactions by ensuring that the originating firm and SPV are unrelated 
entities.  
 
6.6.3.4. Single economic entity 
Can creditors of a firm, which securitized some of its financial assets, obtain a 
court order piercing the corporate veil of a subsidiary-entity SPV on the basis that the 
two constitute a single economic entity? Such an order would result in creditors, in 
theory, being able to levy their claims against a securitization SPV‘s assets. There is 
no case-law precedent in Zimbabwe on this point. Following South African and 
English precedent on the issue, this study argues that the risk of the corporate veil of a 
securitization SPV being pierced on account of the originating firm holding all or the 
majority of the SPV‘s shareholding is small; and only exists, arguably, if it is 
established from the facts that the subsidiary is a façade or a sham, and has not used in 
a bona fide securitization transaction.  
In both South Africa and England, it is fairly settled that the corporate veil of a 
subsidiary SPV will not be pierced simply because the parent firm (the originating 
firm) and the SPV are a single economic unit or entity. A recent South African case to 
rule to this question is the case of Mohammed Abdulmohsin and Others v Pema and 
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Others.
393
 In the case, Malan J. cited with approval the case of Shipping Corporation 
of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another
394
 and the dictum contained in 
LAWSA, which states: ―…except where the wording or purpose of a particular statute 
or contract justifies the treatment of parent and subsidiary as one unit or undertaking, 
the mere fact that a group of companies constitutes a single economic unit (even 
where it consists of a holding company and wholly owned subsidiaries) does not in 
itself justify the treatment of the group as a single company. The position is of course 
otherwise where a subsidiary is a mere façade or a sham.‖395  
The ratio decidendi in the cases of Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council,
396
 
and DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, in which 
the courts permitted the piercing of the corporate veil of an entity on the basis that it 
constituted a single economic entity with its parent company, no longer reflects the 
law in England. The law now provides, as noted in Gower‘s Principles of Modern 
Company Law: ―there is no general principle that all companies in a group of 
companies are to be regarded as one; on the contrary, the fundamental principle is 
unquestionably that each company in a group of companies…in a separate legal entity 
possessed of separate rights and liabilities.‖397 Similar pronouncements and decisions 
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have been made in the cases of Ord and Another v Belhaven Pubs Ltd, 
398
Adams v. 
Cape Industries plc
399
 and in re Polly Peck.
400
 
In conclusion, this study argues that the above will be considered as highly 
persuasive and will be applied in Zimbabwe. It is unlikely, although not 
inconceivable, that a court will pierce the corporate veil of a securitization SPV in 
order to permit the originating firm‘s creditors to levy their claims against an SPV‘s 
assets. However, the circumstances under which an SPV‘s corporate veil can be 
pierced are severely circumscribed and are unlikely to affect bona fide, arms-length, 
for fair value securitization transactions.  
 
6.6.4. Veil-piercing of a subsidiary-entity SPV by an originating firm 
It is not inconceivable that an originating firm in financial distress may seek the 
return of financial receivables it ceded and transferred to an SPV as part of a 
securitization transaction. A case that illustrates this risk is the case of LTV Steel Co, 
Inc.
401
 In brief: after securitizing its receivables, LTV Steel Co, Inc., got into financial 
difficulties and applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In its application it 
alleged that the financial asset transfers to its wholly-owned subsidiary SPV (LTV 
Sales Finance Company) were not true-sales, but disguised secured refinancing 
transactions. The case was settled out of court without a pronouncement by the Court 
on whether a parent company can obtain an order declaring that, a true-sale 
securitization transaction notwithstanding, a subsidiary-entity SPV is nothing more 
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than a refinancing stratagem, whose assets during periods of financial distress can be 
made available to the originating firm.  
What is the likelihood that an originating firm in Zimbabwe will be able to obtain 
a court order piercing the corporate veil of a subsidiary-entity SPV in order to get its 
hands on securitized assets? What is obvious is that if an originating firm has a 
controlling interest in an SPV, and it is an entity incorporated in terms of the 
Companies Act, the originating firm can – per section 206(a) of the Companies Act - 
pass or cause to be passed a special resolution for the SPV to be wound up by the 
High Court.
402
 But this risk can be easily structured out of securitization transaction 
arrangements. And in any event, the order does not result in the originating firm being 
able to use as it pleases the assets held by the SPV. Investors in the assets issued by 
the SPV will also be claimants, if not treated as secured creditors.  
What is the risk that the High court will pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary-
entity SPV on the basis of a contention by the originating firm that the securitization 
SPV in question is a sham, a stratagem, or an instrumentality used in a refinancing 
transaction? Although not inconceivable, the likelihood of this happening is negligible 
as regards bona fide securitization transactions. In a true-sale securitization 
transaction, the originating firm‘s rights of ownership are extinguished on the sale and 
cession of its financial receivables. This should preclude the originating firm from 
piercing the corporate veil of the SPV by successfully contending that it retains 
ownership rights or interests in the assets subject to the securitization transaction. The 
same is not true however for non true-sale securitization transactions were the 
originating firm retains ownership rights and may in practice breach the terms of the 
agreement of cession in securitatem debiti. It is conceivable that an originating firm 
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may argue that the sale of assets to an SPV was simulated. But if it does so, it exposes 
itself to a claim of securities fraud – under the Securities Act - especially at the 
instance of investors in the SPV‘s securities issuance.403 It is unlikely that a court 
would order the piercing of the corporate veil of a subsidiary-entity SPV at the 
instance of the originating firm, without hearing from, or upholding the interests of, 
investors in the securities issued by the SPV. If a court were to pierce the corporate 
veil of such a subsidiary-entity SPV, it may in reality facilitate fraud. It is arguably 
fraudulent for an originating firm to set up a subsidiary-entity SPV, which it 
effectively controls, and to which it transfers assets for the issuance of securities, only 
to turn around and seek to pierce the SPV‘s corporate veil with the view of clawing 
back those same assets, without compensating investors in securities issued by the 
SPV for their loss.  
In addition, in practice it is likely that directors of a securitization SPV will 
oppose an application for the piercing of the corporate veil of the SPV, which if 
successful would result in the SPV losing the assets securing its securities issuance. If 
an SPV‘s directors fail or refuse to contest a claim made by an originating firm, any 
losses made by the SPV or investors in securities issued by the SPV may be recovered 
from the directors in their personal capacity. Directors of corporate entities have 
fiduciary duties, which include a duty to act bona fide and in the interests and benefit 
of the company.  
In conclusion, although in theory there is a risk that an originating firm may make 
a court application seeking the piercing of its subsidiary SPV‘s corporate veil; this 
risk is typically mitigated through appropriate structuring arrangements. In addition, 
the nature of a true-sale securitization transaction should in practice preclude an 
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originating firm from seeking to pierce the corporate veil of its subsidiary 
securitization SPVs. 
 
6.6.5. Veil-piercing of a trust SPV by an originating firm’s creditors  
The above analysis concentrated on substantive consolidation and piercing of the 
veil of companies incorporated under the Companies Act. This section addresses a 
question, not yet decided in Zimbabwe, but one which is relevant to securitization 
transactions, which is: does the veil-piercing doctrine apply to trust structures? The 
answer to this question will determine whether a liquidator or creditor of an 
originating firm subject to liquidation proceedings has a cause of action, which 
permits it to ask a court to pierce the veil of a trust SPV and thereby levy claims 
against trust assets. There has been no case in Zimbabwe, South Africa and the U.K. 
where the doctrine of piercing the veil has been successfully applied to trusts. In 
Zimbabwe, as argued below, although it is conceivable, it is unlikely that the doctrine 
will be applied to trust entities. There is a theoretical risk that an originating firm‘s 
creditors may seek to levy their claims against assets transferred to a trust SPV by an 
originating firm through a court order declaring that the trust SPV is a sham, or an 
instrumentality of the originating firm set up to avoid its liabilities. A similar 
contention was made, albeit unsuccessfully, by applicants in the case of Grupo Torras 
S.A. and Culmer v Al-Sabah and four others.
404
 The ratio decidendi in this case is 
particularly instructive. 
In Grupo, the applicants cited several cases to the court which appeared to suggest 
that the veil of a trust structure could be pierced.
405
 However all of the decisions cited 
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were interlocutory Mareva injunction cases and none addressed the question whether 
the doctrine of piercing the veil applied to trusts. It is arguably an oxymoron to refer 
to the veil of a trust. As argued in Grupo, trusts do not have a veil, being very 
different in legal construction compared to corporate entities. Incorporated entities 
have a legal persona; trusts do not. Whereas incorporated entities have shareholders 
who can lawfully exercise control or power over the management of the company, the 
settlor of a trust has no such power, outside the terms of the trust deed; and the 
trustees hold and manage trust property for and on behalf of nominated beneficiaries. 
In other words, the difference between the control over an entity‘s affairs that can 
lawfully be exercised by a controlling shareholder on the one hand and a settlor of a 
trust on the other hand explains why a company‘s veil can be pierced and a trust 
having no veil to pierce.
406
  
It is of course correct that trusts are in practice, although not in law, often treated 
as separate legal entities; and that for this reason it is arguable that they should be 
treated the same as incorporated entities.
407
 A counter argument however would be 
that the veil-piercing doctrine permits courts to remedy misuses of the corporate form, 
where managers are mostly controlled by the majority shareholder(s). On the other 
hand however, the common law has equitable remedies for misuses of the trust 
structure, which render it unnecessary to talk of piercing the veil. If trustees, who at 
common law are obliged to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust 
assets, subject to the terms of the trust deed, breach their fiduciary duties, courts will 
intervene and remedy the breach in question. In Grupo, the court held that if the 
doctrine of piercing the veil applied to trusts, the level of control required of the 
settlor should – by parity of reasoning - equate to that of a controlling shareholder in 
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an incorporated entity. In addition, the applicants bore the onus of establishing that the 
trustees not only followed the wishes of the settlor, but did so without exercising bona 
fide discretion.
408
 This test sets a very high threshold.  
What if a settlor transfers a set of assets to a trust SPV as part of a fraudulent 
scheme, structured as a securitization transaction? Where fraud is present, the asset 
transfer can be set aside by a court under the common law. There is no need to pierce 
the veil in this particular instance. It is conceivable that a financially distressed firm, 
abusing its informational advantage, may hive off some of its assets to a trust SPV 
structure, pre-liquidation, to avoid paying some of its creditors and structure the 
arrangement as a securitization transaction. As above, in this instance, using 
provisions of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act, the asset transfer will be set 
aside at the instance of the liquidator or creditors of the originating firm.  
In summary, this study concludes that the risk of an SPV‘s corporate veil being 
pierced at the instance of an originating firm and its creditors is largely theoretical. In 
the absence of fraud, it is highly unlikely that a court in Zimbabwe will impeach an 
asset transfer made by an originating firm to a trust SPV on the basis of the veil-
piercing doctrine. And that in any event, the risk can be structured out of most 
securitization transactions, especially true-sale transactions.   
      
6.7. Foreclosure risk 
A securitization-enabling financial infrastructure should ideally have foreclosure 
laws and practices that enable securitization SPVs or servicers to sue for and recover 
amounts due on the underlying financial receivables, and to attach and sell - in 
execution - assets secured by mortgage and notarial bonds or other financial 
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instruments, in the event of an obliger breaching the terms of, or defaulting on, the 
underlying agreement. This section focuses on mortgage and notarial bonds as these 
are the main hypothecating instruments in Zimbabwe. And it evaluates the question: 
what is the risk that an SPV will be unable to efficiently, expeditiously and cost-
effectively foreclose on and realise property hypothecated through either a mortgage 
bond or a notarial bond ceded to an SPV pursuant to a securitization transaction? This 
question is obviously best answered by reference to the terms of the receivables 
agreement between the parties and the nature of the financial assets transferred to the 
SPV. For this reason, the analysis below is largely general in nature. 
 
6.7.1. Mortgage bonds 
Mortgage bonds, it is often argued, provide the soundest form of security.
409
 They 
are used to hypothecate immovable property and historically constitute a significant 
part of financial instruments used in securitization transactions such as residential and 
commercial property mortgage-backed securitization. This section evaluates the 
question: In Zimbabwe, what is the risk that an SPV will be unable to efficiently, 
expeditiously and cost-effectively foreclose on and realise property hypothecated 
through a mortgage bond, which was ceded to an SPV pursuant to a securitization 
transaction? 
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6.7.1.1. Definition of a mortgage bond 
A mortgage bond is an instrument of hypothecating immovable property.
410
 
Hosten defines a mortgage as: ―…the real rights possessed by one person, who is 
called the mortgagee, over the property of another, who is called the mortgager, as 
security for the payment or fulfilment of a debt or some other personal obligations due 
by the latter to the former entitling the former to have his claim satisfied out of the 
proceeds of the property mortgaged in preference to such of the mortgagor‘s other 
creditors who have not a prior right or better right over the property.‖411 
At least three different types of mortgage bonds are recognised in Roman-Dutch 
law. A bond passed in favour of a creditor for money lent and advanced for the 
purchase price of land is called a kusting brief.
412
 Although not referred to by any 
special name, the second type of mortgage bond is one that is passed over the 
immovable property of a debtor in respect of money lent and advanced. It need not be 
linked to the purchase of immovable property. The third type of mortgage bond is 
referred to as a covering bond. This type of mortgage bond is passed in respect of 
money lent and advanced and money to be lent and advanced, or simply in respect of 
money to be lent and advanced to the mortgagor in the future.
413
 A mortgage bond 
creates and evidences both personal rights in, and real rights to, property which is 
subject to the mortgage bond. Before registration, a mortgage bond evidences the 
agreement entered into between the mortgagee and the mortgagor and in so doing sets 
out the range of personal rights enjoyed by each party under the terms of the mortgage 
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agreement. A creditor‘s personal rights under a mortgage bond are turned into a 
limited real right of security only on the registration of the mortgage bond at the 
Deeds Registries, in terms of the Deeds Registries Act.
414
 Under Roman-Dutch law a 
mortgage bond must refer to and bind specific immovable property. A mortgage bond 
that purports to bind all of the mortgagee‘s property, i.e. all its immovable and 
movable property is invalid and will not be registered by the registrar of deeds.
415
 This 
means that such a bond will not pass to the mortgagee any rights in rem over the 
property sought to be used as security.  
 
6.7.1.2. Foreclosing on a mortgage bond 
Where a mortgage bond has been passed over specific immovable property and 
the mortgagor breaches a term of the mortgage agreement or defaults on agreed 
periodic payments, the mortgage bond holder, i.e. either the mortgagee or the 
cessionary can seek to have the property over which the mortgage bond was passed 
sold in execution to recover payment of the outstanding debt. This is the issue, which 
is of relevance to structurers of securitization transactions. The contractual rights of 
the mortgage bond holder to terminate the mortgage agreement and foreclose on the 
immovable security are subject to common and statutory law stipulations. 
Parate Executie: Under Roman-Dutch law, a provision in a mortgage bond 
entitling the mortgage bond holder to take possession and sell hypothecated 
immovable property in the event of default by a mortgagor without recourse to the 
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mortgagor or a court is void. Such a clause is known as a parate executie clause.  
Parate executie clauses are regarded as void contractual provisions because they are a 
form of oppressive self help on the part of mortgagees.
416
 However, this proscription 
is subject to the following caveat: it is lawful for a mortgagor to enter into an 
agreement with a mortgage bond holder, post-default, for the latter to perfect its 
security by attaching or taking possession of the hypothecated immovable property 
and selling it in execution in order to realise outstanding debt.
417
 Where the mortgagor 
has entered into an agreement with a mortgage bond holder authorising the latter to 
sell the hypothecated property to realise the outstanding debt, the mortgage bond 
holder can only perfect the security by obtaining a court order.
418
      
Sales in execution of hypothecated immovable property: As noted above, 
under Roman-Dutch law, a mortgage bond holder can only perfect its security over 
specific hypothecated immovable property by obtaining an order from the High Court. 
The order will authorise the judgment creditor to attach and sale the immovable 
property in execution. The immovable property has to be sold by the Deputy Sheriff 
through a public auction,
419
 although private sales can be effected with the consent of 
all interested parties. The process of foreclosure is relatively simple. The whole 
process, depending on the facts of each case, from litis contestatio to judgment, to the 
attachment and sale in execution of the immovable property can take place in a matter 
of a few months. The law and practice relating to the attachment and sale in execution 
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of immovable property is contained in Order 40 (rules 322 to 367) of the High Court 
of Zimbabwe Rules, 1971.  
Where the facts are clear and not in dispute, a mortgage bond holder can apply to 
the High Court for summary judgment and the issuance of a writ of execution. This is 
a drastic measure and award, granted by the High Court where it is obvious from the 
facts of the case that the defendant debtor clearly does not have a bona fide defence to 
the claim and that the notice of opposition entered does not disclose a defence or that 
the notice was filed in order to delay the mortgagee perfecting its security and 
disposing the immovable property and realising the outstanding amount on the 
underlying agreement.
420
  
Setting aside sales in execution of immovable property: The grounds upon 
which sales in execution of immovable properties can be set aside are contained in the 
High Court of Zimbabwe Rules, 1971. Rule 359 of the Rules of the High Court states: 
―Any person having an interest in the sale may make a court application to have it set 
aside on the ground that the sale was improperly conducted or the property was sold 
for an unreasonably low sum, or any other good ground. Any such person shall give 
due notice to the sheriff of the application stating the grounds of his objection to the 
confirmation of the sale. On the hearing of the application the court may make such 
order as it deems just.‖ [Emphasis added] 
To what extent, if any, does this provision pose a risk to a securitization SPV‘s 
interests of being able to quickly, efficiently and cost-effectively realise the proceeds 
– through a sale in execution – of immovable properties secured by mortgage bonds 
sold and ceded to secure a mortgage-backed securitization or other derivative 
transactions? Rule 359 has certain peculiar features that merit close analysis. First; the 
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provision accords locus standi - to challenge sales in execution of immovable 
properties - to ―any person‖ who has ―an interest‖ in the subject matter of the sale in 
execution. In practice this is likely to refer, for instance, to mortgagees, securitization 
SPVs in possession of ceded mortgage bonds, mortgagors, the wife or minor child of 
a mortgagor, a liquidator of a mortgagor, a tenant in occupation of the immovable 
property, or some other person with a real, substantial and legally identifiable interest 
in the immovable property sold in execution. Second,  a person with locus standi can 
challenge the sale in execution of the immovable property on three grounds, namely, 
that: (i) the sale was improperly conducted, (ii) the property was sold for an 
unreasonably low sum, and (iii) that there is a good reason why the sale in execution 
should be set aside.  
Locus Standi: It is arguable that rule 359 provides for too broad a category of 
persons who may exercise locus standi in relation to sales in execution of immovable 
property. And that this poses a risk to the efficient realisation of hypothecated 
immovable property. This risk is ameliorated however by the prevailing restrictive 
judicial philosophy pertaining to locus standi in disputes involving private as opposed 
to public interest cases. An instructive case on this point is the High Court case of 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
421
 in which Makarau J 
drew a distinction between public interest versus private interest litigation.
422
 She 
cited with approval the case of Zimbabwe Teachers Association and Others v Minister 
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be arguable for public interest litigation, it does not appear to me that a similar wide approach is 
desirable in private interest litigation. From a reading of the authorities on private interest litigation, it 
is a settled position that the applicant must show that he or she has a legal interest in the suit that will 
be affected by the court‘s judgment. Whether that is a requirement in public interest litigation is a 
question I shall leave open for discussion in a suitable case.‖ Zimbabwe Stock Exchange v Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority HH-120-2006, at pp. 5-6.  
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of Education
423
 in which it was held: ―The petitioners must show that they have a 
direct and substantial interest in the subject matter and what is required is a legal 
interest in the subject matter of the action.‖424 Makarau J concluded that a ―…body 
will have locus standi in a suit where it shows that it has a legal interest in the subject 
matter of the suit and such interest may be prejudicially affected by the decision of the 
court. This is what constitutes a direct and substantial interest to found locus standi at 
common law.‖425 This case was not appealed, and it sets out the law on locus standi in 
Zimbabwe.  
Based on the foregoing, the class of persons likely to be classified as having a 
legal interest in the sale in execution of an immovable property will, in practice, be an 
extremely limited one. This is because in order to establish locus standi, a party must 
show that a direct and substantial interest will be or has been affected by the improper 
disposal of the property, or that the property was disposed for an unreasonably low 
price or that it seeks the setting aside of the property on ―any other good ground.‖ The 
first two grounds are relatively straight forward and should not, in practice, impinge 
on the efficient realisation of immovable property over which there exists mortgage 
bonds ceded to an SPV in a securitization transaction. The third ground merits closer 
analysis, as it is a catch-all phrase, which enables any person with a direct, substantial 
and legally recognisable interest in an immovable property to challenge sales in 
execution on any good ground.   
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Good ground cause of action: The provision in rule 359 of the High Court Rules, 
which permits the High Court to set aside a sale in execution on any ―good ground‖ 
raises potential risks for securitization transactions. The ―good ground‖ provision 
enables the High court to take into account equitable considerations in disputes 
involving applications to set aside a sale in execution of an immovable property. In 
the seminal case of Lalla v Bhura,
426
 Davies J held: ―the wording of the rule itself is 
all-important. The concluding portion of the rule provides that ‗on the hearing of the 
application the court may make such order as it deems just‘ and it seems to me these 
words clearly indicate that in considering what is meant by the rule, and particularly 
what is meant by the phrase ‗any other good ground‘ the court can and should 
properly have regard to equitable considerations.‖427 In interpreting rule 359, courts in 
Zimbabwe cited with approval the South African case of Cairns‘ Executors v 
Gaarn,
428
 in which Solomon J, when considering a similar provision in the South 
African High court rules stated: ―The discretion of the Court is a very wide one, and, 
in my opinion, it is impossible, and even if it were possible it would be undesirable, to 
lay down any hard and fast line as to the principles upon which its discretion should 
be exercised. Every case must be judged on its own facts, and these may vary 
indefinitely. But though we ought not, in my opinion, to lay down any principles as to 
the special circumstances which will justify the Court in granting relief, we are on the 
other hand bound by the rule itself, and we can only assist a party upon ‗upon 
sufficient cause shown.‖429   
In theory, there is a risk that the locus standi rule and the wide equitable discretion 
exercised by the High Court to set aside sales in execution can combine to frustrate 
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the expeditious and cost-effective realisation of hypothecated immovable property. 
However, the practice in Zimbabwe, as illustrated by the numerous judicial 
pronouncements is that sales in execution will not be lightly set aside. Rule 359 of the 
High Court Rules has been restrictively interpreted and applied. It has been held that 
rule 359 relates only to conditional sales in execution.
430
 This means an interested 
person may only apply to the High Court for the setting aside of a sale in execution of 
an immovable property, if the highest bidder at the public auction has not been 
confirmed by the Sheriff as the purchaser, and where transfer from the owner to the 
purchaser has not taken place. Even then, courts are reluctant to set aside sales in 
execution of immovable property, including conditional sales. In exercising its 
equitable discretion, a court typically weighs the advantages and disadvantages of 
setting aside a sale in execution on equitable grounds; cognisant always of the need to 
maintain public confidence in such enforced sales.
431
 In the case of Lalla v Bhura, in 
often cited dictum, it was held: ―…if courts were over ready to set aside sales in 
execution under rule 359, this might have a profound effect upon the efficacy of this 
type of sale. Would-be purchasers might well be deterred from attending and bidding 
if they considered their efforts might easily be frustrated by an application under rule 
359, and as a general principle I think it should be accepted that a court will not 
readily interfere in these matters.‖432  
                                                 
430
 Mapedzamombe v Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe & Anor 1996 (1) ZLR 257 at pp. 260D-261A. 
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(1) ZLR 626 (H) at 634D. 
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 Lalla v Bhura (note 431, supra) See also the case of Munyoro v Founders Building Society and 
Others 1999 (1) ZLR 344 (H). In Morfopoulos v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd, Gillespie J gave 
as his reasons for declining to set aside a sale in execution the following reasons, that: ―….(a) the 
166 
Courts are even more reluctant to set aside sales in execution where a sale has 
been confirmed and transfer effected to the purchaser. It has been held that where 
transfer has been effected to the purchaser, following a sale in execution, the sale 
cannot be impeached on the basis of rule 359. An interested person with locus standi 
would need to make the application under the common law. A sale in execution where 
transfer has already been effected can only be set aside under the Roman-Dutch 
common law, if there is a substantiated allegation of bad faith, or if the purchaser had 
prior knowledge of irregularities pertaining to the sale in execution or if the sale is 
tainted with fraud.
433
  
In practice therefore, Zimbabwe‘s Roman-Dutch law permits mortgage bond 
holders to effectively foreclose, and realise mortgaged property. The risk of 
inefficient, inexpedient and costly foreclosure of immovable properties is relatively 
small and should not impede the structuring of mortgage backed securitization 
transactions.   
 
6.7.2. Notarial bonds 
Under Roman-Dutch law, movable property can be hypothecated in favour of 
another through the execution of a notarial bond. In practice a finance provider will 
enter into either an out-and-out cession or a cession in securitatem debiti of a set of 
financial receivables whose payment is secured by a notarial bond. Notarial bonds are 
                                                                                                                                            
judgment creditor is provided with his just relief; and (b) the reliability and efficacy of sales in 
execution should be upheld so that potential bidders at auction sales (are) not discouraged from 
bidding, and thus reducing the potential sale price to be realised.‖ Morfopoulos v Zimbabwe Banking 
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typically utilised where creditors want security for a loan advance, but it is 
commercially inconvenient, inappropriate, or impractical for a debtor to physically 
pledge (deliver) its movable assets, or where it does not have immovable assets to 
mortgage as security.
434
 This section evaluates the question: what is the risk that an 
SPV will be unable to efficiently, expeditiously and cost-effectively foreclose on and 
realise property hypothecated through a notarial bond and ceded to an SPV pursuant 
to a securitization transaction? 
  
6.7.2.1. Definition of a notarial bond 
A notarial bond is defined as: ―a bond attested by a notary public hypothecating 
movable property generally or specially.‖435 There are two types of notarial bonds: a 
general notarial bond and a special notarial bond. A general notarial bond covers and 
binds all of the debtor‘s movable property; while a special mortgage bond only covers 
specific movable property.
436
 Once executed, a notarial bond must be registered in the 
Deeds Registries Office within three months.
437
 Failure to register a notarial bond 
within the specified time frame renders it invalid, unless if the High court grants an 
extension of the time limit.
 438
 A notarial bond does not transmit personal rights of 
security unless if it is registered.  
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The security offered by a notarial bond is inferior compared to a mortgage bond or 
the pledge of movable assets.
439
 A notarial bond does not, without more, give the 
bondholder the rights of a secured creditor.
440
 The registration of a notarial bond does 
not give the bondholder a real right of security, and neither does it amount to the 
giving of notice to the world of the existence of the claim.
441
 Where a notarial bond 
contains a perfection clause, which permits the notarial bondholder to take possession 
of the hypothecated movable property in the event of default or breach of a material 
contractual provision, and the bondholder exercises this option, a real right of security 
will accrue to the bondholder.
442
 A notarial bondholder may apply for a provisional 
court order on an ex parte basis for the attachment of the hypothecated property. If a 
rule nisi is granted, on the return day, the creditor can perfect its security by obtaining 
a final order. Thereafter, the notarial bondholder can sell the attached property in 
satisfaction of its claim against the debtor. Put simply, it is only on acquiring physical 
possession of the hypothecated property that a notarial bondholder enjoys a real right 
of security.
443
 The rights enjoyed by a notarial bondholder, once it has perfected its 
security, are similar to those enjoyed by a pledgee.
444
  
Prior to the attachment of the hypothecated movable property, the owner of the 
property (debtor) is at liberty to deal with it as it pleases, including hypothecating it to 
a third party or even disposing of same. Where the notarial bondholder fails to attach 
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the movable property prior to a debtor going insolvent, for instance, the bondholder 
will not enjoy the rights of a secured creditor. The bondholder will only enjoy 
preference rights over other unsecured creditors of the debtor with respect to the 
proceeds of the assets subject to the notarial bond.
445
 If however, the bondholder 
perfects its security by seeking and obtaining an order attaching the movable property 
subject to the pledge, it will, on the debtor‘s insolvency, enjoy the rights of a secured 
creditor.  
 
6.7.2.2. Foreclosing on a notarial bond 
A notarial bond will typically entitle the bondholder to attach and sale 
hypothecated property if the debtor defaults, or breaches a material term of the 
underlying agreement. The notarial bondholder‘s rights are subject to common and 
statutory law restrictions. It is typical to find clauses in notarial bonds which entitle 
the bondholder to attach and sale movables in the event of default or which permit the 
bondholder to take over the movable property in question.  
Parate Executie: while a parate executie clause in a mortgage bond is invalid; the 
same clause, if contained in a notarial bond, is valid under Roman-Dutch law, 
―…provided it does not prejudice, or is not likely to prejudice, the rights of the debtor 
unduly.‖446 It follows, however, that the bondholder would only be able to dispose of 
the hypothecated property, if it acquires the rights of a pledgee by obtaining physical 
possession of same. In South Africa, the constitutionality of parate executie clauses 
was challenged on the basis that such contractual clauses amounted to self-help 
violating the right of recourse to a court enshrined in section 34 of the South African 
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Constitution. Overturning the dictum in Findevo (Pty) v Faceformat SA (Pty) Ltd,
447
 
the Supreme Court of South Africa in the case of Bock and Others v Dubororo 
Investments (Pty) Ltd
448
 correctly found that parate executie clauses were 
constitutional because a debtor is not precluded from seeking redress from a court in 
the event that a notarial bond or sale of hypothecated movable assets is contra bonos 
mores.
449
  
Although the constitutionality of parate executie clauses has not been contested in 
Zimbabwe, it is likely that courts will follow the dictum in the Bock case. It should 
also be noted that a clause in a notarial bond, or the sale of hypothecated movable 
property in circumstances that would be regarded at common law as contra bonos 
mores are also likely to violate the provisions of the Contractual Penalties Act 
[Chapter 8:04].
450
  
In summary, it is clear that under Roman-Dutch law, a securitization SPV in 
possession of financial assets secured by a notarial bond will, in principle, be able to 
attach and sell – without the need for a court order – hypothecated movable property. 
This legal position is favourable to securitization SPVs as it allows, subject to public 
policy considerations, for the expeditious, cost-effective and efficient realisation of 
hypothecated movable assets.  
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Pactum Commissorium:  Notarial bonds can contain provisions which permit the 
bondholder to take ownership of the security, if the pledgor defaults or breaches a 
term of the relevant underlying agreement. This is known as a pactum commissorium 
agreement.
451
 Under Roman-Dutch law a pactum commissorium agreement is void 
and is not enforceable on public policy grounds.
452
 As illustrated by the case of 
Kufandirori, courts will not only declare a pactum commissorium void, they will also 
have regard to section 4 of the Contractual Penalties Act [Chap 8:04].
453
 The Act 
regulates the enforcement of penalty clauses in contractual agreements.
454
 It 
authorises courts to give equitable relief to litigants who establish that particular 
contractual provisions, such as pactum commissorium and other penalty provisions are 
unfair.
455
  
Sale in execution of movable property secured by a notarial bond: A judgment 
creditor may approach either the Sheriff, or messenger of court, respectively, for the 
sale by public auction or private treaty of hypothecated property. Where a judgment 
and writ of execution was issued by the High Court, the judgment debtor‘s assets will 
be attached and sold in execution by the Sheriff of the High Court. Such a sale is 
governed by the High Court rules, subject obviously to common and statutory law 
stipulations. Where the judgment and notice of attachment was issued by the 
Magistrates Court, the disposal of the movable property will be instituted by the 
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Messenger of Court. Sales in execution of movables conducted by the Messenger of 
Court are governed by the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules, 1980.
456
 An agreement 
between a debtor and creditor that movables hypothecated in terms of a notarial bond 
be realised through a private treaty will be upheld.  
Setting aside sales in execution of movable secured by a notarial bond: The 
law regulating the setting aside of sales in execution of movables is contained in the 
rules of the High court and Magistrates court, depending on which court issued the 
process. A party with locus standi, as discussed above, may challenge a sale in 
execution, per the rules of the court, on the grounds that the sale was improperly 
conducted, (ii) the property was sold for an unreasonably low sum, and (iii) that there 
is a good reason why the sale in execution should be set aside. None of these 
preceding grounds are detrimental to securitization transactions, per se.   
In summary, Zimbabwe‘s foreclosure laws and practice permit judgment creditors 
to expeditiously, efficiently and cost-effectively foreclose and realise assets ceded to 
them in securitatem debiti or in an out-and-out cession. Mortgage and notarial 
bondholders‘ rights are respected. As with any bureaucracy there are administrative 
functions that can always be improved, but the law is generally adequate and the 
jurisprudence leans in favour of respecting sales in execution. 
 
6.8. Summary 
This chapter assessed asset transfer methods that can be used in domestic 
securitization transactions. It also assessed a range of key legal risks that in theory can 
adversely affect the sanctity of an asset transfer from an originating firm to an SPV. 
Three broad conclusions are drawn in this chapter. First: Zimbabwe‘s Roman-Dutch 
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law provides an effective medium for the disposal and/or transfer of financial assets 
from an originating firm to an SPV pursuant to a securitization transaction. Second: a 
contract of sale of financial assets, which is accompanied by their out-and-out cession 
from the seller to the purchaser, has the same legal effect as a true-sale. Third: the 
various securitization transaction insolvency-inducing legal risks – including: (i) 
insolvency risks inherent in the anti-asset disposal provisions of the Companies Act 
and the Insolvency Act; (ii) re-characterization risk; (iii) substantive consolidation 
risk; (iv) veil-piercing risk; and (v) foreclosure risk – peculiar to, and arising from, 
Zimbabwe‘s legal infrastructure do not, as a general rule, adversely impinge on 
securitization transactions; and in any event can be effectively mitigated.  
Regarding true-sale, this chapter suggested comparative true-sale indicia and 
concluded that: (a) the legal effect of Zimbabwe‘s law of sale and out-and-out cession 
was akin to, or resulted in the same legal effect as, a true-sale; (b) bona fide, arms 
length, for fair value securitization asset transfers are unlikely to be characterized as 
in fraudem legis arrangements; (c) under Roman-Dutch law it is not possible to effect 
a true-sale of future-flow receivables; (d) originating firms do not retain an SPV 
insolvency-inducing equitable interest in financial assets sold to an SPV; and that (e) 
there is no need to curtail the judiciary‘s equitable discretion to re-characterize 
securitization asset transfers through the creation of a statutory safe harbour. 
Regarding insolvency risk, this chapter concluded that non true-sale transactions, 
as with any secured refinancing arrangements, were exposed to insolvency risks 
inherent in sections 42, 43, 44 and 47 of the Insolvency Act, as well as sections 269(3) 
and 213(c) of the Companies Act. But these sections do not impinge on true-sale 
securitizations and no legal reform is necessary. Further, the chapter concluded that 
creditors of an originating firm do not have a cause of action to apply for, and courts 
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do not have jurisdiction to issue, an order for the substantive consolidation of a 
subsidiary SPV with an originating firm in insolvency. It also concluded that the veil-
piercing doctrine (i) arguably does not apply to trusts; (ii) needs to be clarified and its 
parameters determined, especially regarding corporate SPVs; and (ii) creates a 
theoretical risk of creditors obtaining access to assets transferred from an originating 
firm to an SPV, but the likelihood of this occurring following a bona fide, arms 
length, for fair value securitization transaction is low. Finally, the chapter concluded 
that Zimbabwe possesses an adequate legal foreclosure framework, which permits 
judgment creditors to cost-effectively and expeditiously foreclose on an underlying 
agreement in the event of a material breach of contract or in the event of default.  
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           CHAPTER 7 
                TAXATION 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Tax is an extremely important cost factor in securitization transactions. Tax 
liabilities naturally increase the cost of engaging in, and can impinge upon the 
viability of, securitization transactions. This is especially relevant in the context of 
countries whose tax infrastructure is not specifically tailored to facilitate 
securitization. This chapter analyses the tax liabilities to which an originating firm, 
SPV and Servicer engaged in a typical securitization transaction is likely to be 
exposed. It assesses whether in Zimbabwe an originating firm is obliged to: (i) pay 
and account for income tax on the cash received from an SPV as consideration for 
received financial assets; (ii) charge an SPV value added tax (VAT) on the sale of 
financial assets; (iii) pay stamp duty on the cession and transfer of financial assets to 
an SPV. It also assess whether an SPV is liable to pay: (a) entity-level income tax; and 
(b) stamp duty and VAT on the issue of securities. Further it asses whether a Servicer 
is liable to charge and pay VAT on fees it charges originating firms. As a 
consequence, this chapter analyses the provisions of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 
23:06], the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12], the Stamp Duties Act [Chapter 
23:09], the Capital Gains Tax Act [Chapter 23:01] and the Finance Act [Chapter 
23:04]. As the titles of each of these statutes suggest, they govern the assessment, 
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collection and enforcement of income tax, value added tax, stamp duty and capital 
gains tax, respectively. The Finance Act governs a variety of tax issues, including 
rates of tax chargeable.  
 
7.2. Zimbabwe’s tax framework: In brief  
Zimbabwe has a relatively well-developed system of taxation. The primary 
regulatory authority is the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), which is headed 
by a Commissioner.
457
 ZIMRA draws its authority and power from the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority Act.
458
 Created in 2001, it is the successor body to the Department 
of Taxes, Customs and Excise. ZIMRA has the primary responsibility of assessing, 
collecting and enforcing the payment of taxes in Zimbabwe.
459
 ZIMRA produces 
publications on the various taxes that it is statutorily obliged to assess, levy and 
enforce.
460
 Hill‘s Income Tax Law in Zimbabwe is the primary reference book on 
income tax law in Zimbabwe.
461
 Some tax cases are reported in the Zimbabwe Law 
Report publication and the South Africa‘s tax law reports; which is a boon, given that 
Zimbabwe does not have its own separate tax case-law reports. Zimbabwean tax 
judgements often cite as persuasive authority South African tax case-law precedents 
and vice-versa.
462
 Zimbabwe‘s tax statutes are often drawn on, or borrow from, South 
Africa‘s tax statutes.  
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 Section 2 (a) of the Income Tax Act defines Commissioner a: ―the Commissioner in charge of the 
department of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority which is declared in terms of the Revenue Authority 
Act [Chapter 23:11] to be responsible for assessing, collecting and enforcing the payment of the taxes 
leviable under this Act.‖ It should be noted however that the Commissioner is sometimes referred to as 
the Commissioner General. This emanates from the fact that section 2(b) also defined Commissioner as 
referring to a Commissioner General.  
458
 Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Act [Chap 23:11]. 
459
 Ibid., at section 3. 
460
 See for example, ZIMRA (2007) ‗Valued Added Tax: Traders‘ Guide‘. Available at 
http://www.zimra.co.zw/Vat/VAT%20GUIDE%202nd%20edition.pdf  
461
 L.W. Hill (1997) Income Tax in Zimbabwe, 5
th
 ed, Butterworths.  
462
 See for instance and as an illustrative example the South African Supreme Court of Appeal case of 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services v C.J. Smith [2002] ZASCA 126. See also the 
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7.3. Tax dispute resolution framework 
A taxpayer dissatisfied with a tax decision made by the Commissioner can appeal 
to one of three tax courts. Appeals against income tax and capital gains tax 
assessments made by the Commissioner can be made either to the High court or the 
Special Court for Income Tax Appeals (Special Court).
463
 Appeals against stamp duty, 
VAT and customs and excise assessments have to be lodged with the Fiscal Appeal 
Court.
464
 This tax dispute resolution system – as discussed below - should be 
rationalised to create a unitary tax court structure. The existing court structure reflects 
the piecemeal development of specialised courts in Zimbabwe in general, and of tax 
courts in particular. 
 
7.3.1. Appeals against income tax and capital gains tax decisions 
As noted above, appeals against income tax and capital gains tax decisions made 
by the Commissioner can be lodged by a taxpayer either with the High court or the 
Special Court. The decision to appeal to either of these courts is at the discretion of 
the appellant taxpayer.
465
 These two courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over 
income tax and capital gains tax appeals.
466
 It is likely that a deliberate decision was 
taken to retain the High Court‘s jurisdiction over income and capital gains tax appeals 
in case there were insufficient contested cases to justify the retention of a free-
                                                                                                                                            
case of Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority where Kudya J. 
after considering South African and English jurisprudence made the following, albeit trite, observation: 
―I am, of course, not bound by either English or South African case law. They, however, would be 
persuasive authority. I am also not bound by the decisions of MAKONI J, who has concurrent 
jurisdiction with me nor by that of HLATSHWAYO J, in the Special Court, both carry persuasive 
authority too.‖ Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH-26-
2007, at p. 14. 
463
 Section 65(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
464
 See sections 12 - 16 of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act as well as sections 17-19 of the same Act. 
465
 Section 65(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
466
 Ibid.  
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standing Special Court. However the Special Court continues to be operational and 
issues a significant number of the tax judgments in Zimbabwe.  
The Special Court derives its jurisdiction over income tax and capital gains appeal 
cases from section 64 of the Income Tax Act and section 25(2) of the Capital Gains 
Tax Act, respectively. The High court derives its jurisdiction from section 64 of the 
Income Tax Act, as well as section 13 of the High Court Act, which gives it full 
original jurisdiction over all civil matters arising in Zimbabwe. Appeals can only be 
lodged with either the Special Court or the High court against decisions made, or 
deemed to have been made, by the Commissioner in terms of the respective 
enactments. The Special Court is a court of record, although hearings are not 
public.
467
 Its rules of procedure, largely similar to those of the High court are 
contained in schedule 12 to the Income Tax Act. The Special Court is headed by a 
President. Only former judges of the Supreme Court or the High court, or those 
qualified to be appointed as judges, may be appointed as President of the Special 
court.
468
 If a tax-payer elects to challenge a tax decision before the High Court, the 
case would be heard as an ordinary civil appeal matter. It is important to note 
however, that the procedure for income-tax and capital gains tax appeals made by a 
tax-payer to the High Court is governed by the provisions of the High court rules as 
read with the provisions of the Income Tax Act and in particular provisions of the 
twelfth schedule to Act.
469
 
Both the Special Court and the High Court can amend, reduce, withdraw or 
confirm a tax decision made by the Commissioner, or refer the assessment or decision 
                                                 
467
 Ibid., at section 65(7). 
468
 Ibid., at section 64(3).  
469
 See for instance the case of Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe v Commissioner General: Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority HH-9-2006, at p. 1.  
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back to the Commissioner for further investigation and assessment or decision.
470
 
Appeals against tax decisions made by the Special Court or the High court lie to the 
Supreme Court,
471
 but only on a point of law.
472
 Where it is alleged that the court 
made an error of fact, the error must be grossly unreasonable to wit it becomes an 
error of law.
473
  
 
7.3.2. Appeals against VAT and Stamp Duty 
The Fiscal Appeal Court is established in terms of section 3 of the Fiscal Appeal 
Court Act (Chap 23:05). The Fiscal Appeal Court has primary statutory jurisdiction to 
hear and determine appeals against assessments of stamp duty and VAT
474
 and 
customs and excise levies
475
 made by the Commissioner. The Fiscal Appeal Court is a 
court of record and consists of a President.
476
 The Fiscal Appeals Court Act provides 
that the President of the Fiscal Appeal Court shall either be the President of the 
Special Court for Income Tax Appeals, or a current or former judge of the High Court 
or Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, or an individual who would qualify to be appointed 
as a judge of either of these superior courts.
477
 Appeals against decisions of the Fiscal 
Appeal Court lie to the Supreme Court on a point of law only and in line with the 
rules regulating the noting of appeals from the High court to the Supreme Court.
478
 
                                                 
470
 Section 65(10) (a) of the Income Tax Act. 
471
 Ibid., section 66(1) (a) and (b). With regards capital gains tax, section 25(2) specifically incorporates 
sections 63-70 of the Income Tax Act as regulating appeals against tax decisions made by the 
Commissioner.  
472
 Ibid.  
473
 In Wet Blue Industries (Pvt) Limited, Malaba AJ in a majority decision held: ―…the determination 
by…the special court, that the amounts of money paid by Wet Blue Industries to the three parties as 
rebates were part of the gross income it had received during each year of assessment, was a finding of 
fact which is not appealable unless it is so grossly unreasonable as to amount to a misdirection on the 
law.‖ [Emphasis added] Wet Blue Industries (Pvt) Limited v Commissioner of Taxes SC-43-03, at pp. 
6-7. 
474
 Sections 12 to 16 of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act. 
475
 Ibid., at section 17 to 19. 
476
 Ibid., at section 3(2). 
477
 Ibid., at section 3 (2) and (3). 
478
 Ibid., at section 11. 
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7.3.3. Proposal: Single tax appeals court 
Although the above-described court structure works in practice, it has obvious 
draw-backs. Knowing which court to approach with which tax appeal requires an 
intimate knowledge of the tax enactments. The Income Tax Act and the Fiscal 
Appeals Court Act should be amended to create one tax court. This specialist court 
would obviate the need to maintain the concurrent jurisdiction exercised by the High 
court in income and capital gains tax cases, which this study recommends should be 
removed. The creation of a unitary tax court will arguably enable the expeditious and 
more efficient resolution of tax disputes. This could result in faster decision making, 
cost-savings for taxpayers and the revenue authority, and would pave the way for the 
compilation of Zimbabwe‘s own tax law reports, including the enhancement of tax 
law jurisprudence.    
 
7.4. Originator tax risks  
The transfer of assets by an originating firm to a securitization SPV gives rise to 
several potential tax liabilities. Depending on several factors, including whether the 
transfer of assets from an originating firm to an SPV is a sale or a pledge, the 
transaction may incur VAT, income tax and stamp duty liabilities. The applicability of 
each of these tax claims as regards originating firm can increase the overall cost of 
securitization. These are analysed in seriatim below.   
 
7.4.1. VAT implications of the receivables’ contract 
In a true-sale securitization transaction an originating firm will sell its financial 
assets to an SPV. This begs the question: is the originating firm obliged to charge the 
SPV VAT on the sell price? This is an important question as the standard rate of VAT 
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on the provision of goods or services is 15% of the value thereof; which if applicable 
to the receivables agreement can constitute an extremely high, if not transaction-
busting, tax cost.  
 
7.4.1.1. VAT principles: In brief 
Until the introduction of VAT in 2003, the tax payable on the supply of goods and 
services in Zimbabwe was sales tax.
479
 VAT is an indirect tax, unlike sales tax. The 
VAT Act provides for the assessment, charging and enforcement of VAT with respect 
to the supply of goods and services. VAT is charged on the value of goods or services 
supplied at each stage of a distribution chain.
480
 The VAT Act requires all persons 
―who carry on any trade‖ as suppliers of goods and services in Zimbabwe to register 
with ZIMRA for VAT purposes.
481
 As a general rule, all traders in goods and services 
in Zimbabwe are obliged to charge and account for VAT. There are exceptions to this 
general rule, and these are specifically referred to in the Act.  
VAT rates are gazetted in terms of the Finance Act by the Minister of Finance 
from time to time.  There are currently three applicable VAT rates: a 0% rate, a 15% 
rate (standard rate) and a 22.5% rate, which is referred to as a special rate. As a 
general rule, all supplies of goods and services are standard-rated at 15% of the value 
of the goods or services supplied. Certain supplies, not relevant to domestic 
securitization transactions attract a 0% or 25% VAT rate.
482
 Certain supplies of goods 
and services are specifically exempted from VAT, per section 11 of the VAT Act. 
VAT therefore presents a significant tax cost to commercial transactions which 
                                                 
479
 Sales tax was imposed in terms of the Sales Tax Act  [Chap 23:08]. 
480
 Section 6 of the VAT Act states: ―…there shall be charged, levied and collected, for the benefit of 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund a tax…on the value of- (a) the supply by any registered operator of 
goods or services supplied by him on or after the fixed date in the course or furtherance of any trade 
carried on by the him.‖ 
481
 Ibid., at section 23.  
482
 Ibid., at section 10(1) and (2) as read with the second schedule. 
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involve the supply of goods and services. If applicable to the various arrangements 
that constitute a securitization transaction, it is obvious that the levying of VAT either 
at the standard rate would represent a significant structuring cost. 
 
7.4.1.2. VAT applicability to receivables contracts 
Is an originating firm liable to charge and account for VAT on the sale (supply) to 
an SPV of financial assets to be securitized? This is a moot question; but it is arguable 
that securitization transactions do not attract VAT. Rights to income, which are the 
assets sold in securitization transactions, are not ―goods,‖ the supply of which attracts 
VAT under the VAT Act. Section 2 of the VAT Act defines goods as: ―corporeal 
movable things, fixed property and any real right in any such thing or fixed property, 
but excluding (a) money; (b) any right under a mortgage bond or pledge of any such 
thing or fixed property…‖ [Emphasis added]. It is apparent from the definition that 
only corporeal and real rights fall into the definition of goods, whose supply attracts 
VAT. Rights to income (or financial assets) are incorporeal goods. For this reason, the 
cession or assignment of rights to income does not attract VAT.  
It is trite that the cession of financial assets by an originating firm to an SPV in a 
non true-sale securitization transaction does not attract VAT. Obviously a cession in 
securitatem debiti cannot be described as a sale or a supply of goods. It is a secured 
loan agreement. It is also notable that the definition of goods in the Act specifically 
excludes from its ambit ―(a) money; (b) any right under a mortgage bond or pledge of 
any such thing or fixed property…‖ This means rights under a mortgage bond or a 
cession or pledge of any incorporeal thing or personal rights therein are not vatable 
―goods‖ for purposes of the VAT Act. Consequentially, this study argues that: (i) 
generally, the cession of financial assets by an originating firm to an SPV pursuant to 
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a non true-sale securitization transaction is VAT-exempt; (ii) cessions of mortgages or 
other financial assets are similarly VAT-exempt.  
The above notwithstanding: does the sale of financial receivables by an 
originating firm to an SPV constitute a supply of taxable services? The VAT Act 
defines services to mean ―…anything done or to be done, including the granting, 
assignment, cession or surrender of any right or the making available of any facility or 
advantage, but excludes the supply of goods, money or any stamp, as contemplated in 
paragraph (c) of the definition of ―goods.‖‖483[Emphasis added]. As noted above, 
rights of action are sold and transferred from an originating firm to an SPV through 
either cession, or assignment. Prima facie, the ―granting, assignment, cession or 
surrender of [a] right‖ to claim a particular income stream by an originating firm to an 
SPV would arguably fall within the ambit of the definition of vatable services.  
Although in theory arguable, this contention is fatally flawed. It ignores the legal 
difference between a contract of sale accompanied by an out-and-out cession of assets 
from an originating firm to an SPV, and a contract for the provision of services. The 
word ―sale‖ is defined in the VAT Act to mean ―…an agreement of purchase and sale 
and includes any transaction or act whereby or in consequence of which ownership of 
goods passes or is to pass from one person to another.‖484 A contract of sale of 
financial assets cannot at the same time be legally characterised as a contract for the 
supply of services.
485
 To do so would result in an absurdity; which per the rules of 
statutory interpretation, is presumed not to be the intention of the legislature.
486
  
                                                 
483
 Ibid., at section 2. 
484
 Ibid. 
485
 This is not to suggest that a single contractual document cannot embody both types of contracts, i.e. 
one part constituting a contract of sale of specified goods and another part constituting a contract for 
the provision of services. But the same transaction involving the sale and transfer of goods cannot be 
both characterized as a contract of sale and provision of services. They are two legally distinct types of 
contracts.   
486
 Imperial Asset Management (Pvt) Limited v Fungai Kuipa N.O. and 2 others HH-95-2005. 
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Based on the foregoing, this study concludes that the sale and cession of financial 
assets from an originating firm to an SPV is not subject to VAT. However, ZIMRA 
should promulgate securitization guidelines that clearly stipulate that the sale of 
securitization assets is not subject to VAT. This will engender certainty about the tax-
cost structure of securitization transactions. Uncertainty is costly, as the proper 
meaning to be ascribed to statutory provisions may be contentious and may end up 
being settled in court. The VAT Act should be amended and specifically VAT-exempt 
securitization receivables agreements. This can be done with specific reference to 
securitization, or by adopting South Africa‘s definition of VAT-exempt financial 
services. South Africa‘s VAT Act No. 89 of 1991 is an example of a tax statute that 
does not specifically refer to securitization, but which permits the VAT-free disposal 
of financial assets, such as a company‘s loan book.487 At 15% of the value of the 
assets sold and transferred to the SPV, the standard VAT-rate represents a significant 
tax cost, which in practice can so drastically increase the cost of refinancing as to be 
uneconomic. The express statement of the inapplicability of the VAT Act to 
securitization asset transfers, or its amendment will facilitate securitization 
transactions by clarifying the law.  
 
7.4.2. Income tax implications of the receivables’ contract 
A securitization receivables‘ contract results in an originating firm receiving 
money from the SPV as consideration. Is this cash-flow that accrues to the originating 
firm subject to income tax? This is an important consideration, which in practice 
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 Section 12(a) of the South African VAT Act exempts financial services from VAT. In South Africa, 
financial services are defined in section 2 of the VAT Act to mean: ―…the issue, allotment, drawing, 
acceptance, endorsement or transfer of ownership of a debt security…‖ The Act proceeds to define a 
debt security as: ―an interest in or right to be paid money; or an obligation or liability to pay money that 
is, or is to be, owing by any person, but does not include a cheque.‖ See also Deloitte (2006) ‗South 
African Securitization Industry, Top 10 Issues for 2006‘, at p. 12. Available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/research/0,1015,cid%253D101104,00.html   
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would influence corporate firms‘ refinancing and risk management options and 
strategies. Obviously, it is not a question that can be resolved in the abstract, as 
transactions are typically designed to achieve idiosyncratic income tax treatment of 
the cash-flow obtained from the SPV under the receivables contract. For this reason, 
the following is a general analysis.  
 
7.4.2.1. Income tax principles: In brief 
The Income Tax Act governs the assessment, levying and enforcement of income 
tax. As a general rule, all persons (natural and juristic) are obliged, subject to the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, to pay income tax on income received or accrued, 
or deemed to have accrued. The rate of income tax relevant to this study is corporate 
income tax, which stands at 33% of a firm‘s annual income. Income tax is levied in 
terms of section 6 of the Income Tax Act, which provides: ―There shall be charged, 
levied and collected throughout Zimbabwe…an income tax in respect of the taxable 
income…received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during the year of 
assessment…‖ Income Tax is levied only on the ―taxable income‖ of a person, as 
stipulated in the Act. There are three stages involved in the calculation of a person‘s 
taxable income.  
First stage: this involves the computation of the taxpayers‘ gross income, which 
is defined in section 8 of the Income Tax Act to mean:  ―… the total amount received 
by or accrued to or in favour of a person or deemed to have been received by or to 
have accrued to or in favour of a person in any year of assessment from a source 
within or deemed to be within Zimbabwe excluding any amount so received or 
accrued which is proved by the taxpayer to be of a capital nature …‖ [Emphasis 
added]. In arriving at ―the total amount‖, the taxpayer is obliged to aggregate total 
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income received, or which accrued in its favour during the tax year. An amount is 
considered to have ―accrued to, or in favour of‖ a taxpayer, not on the amount 
becoming due and payable, but when the taxpayer becomes entitled to it.
488
 In other 
words, a taxpayer is obliged, subject to the permissible deductions, as appears below, 
to pay income tax on income that it has ―become entitled to‖ in a given tax year, even 
if the income is yet to be received, and irrespective of whether the amount is 
immediately enforceable or not.
489
 Mere entitlement, which must not be conditional, 
is enough to trigger an income tax liability.
490
 Another important consideration is that 
income of a capital nature is excluded from the amount that constitutes the taxpayer‘s 
gross income. In other words, income of a capital nature is specifically income tax-
exempt.
491
 The onus to establish that a particular cash-flow is capital in nature and 
therefore exempt from income tax falls on the taxpayer and not the Commissioner.
492
 
In addition, the burden of proof is established on a balance of probabilities.
493
 
Second stage: involves determining a person‘s income.494 This involves deducting 
amounts, from the person‘s gross income, that are specifically exempted from income 
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 Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH-26-2007, at p. 13. 
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 Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service [2002] 
ZASCA 118, at paragraph 3. 
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 Income is defined in the Income Tax Act to mean: ―the amount remaining of the gross income of 
any person for any such year after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt from income tax under 
this Act.‖ Section 8(1)(s) of the Income Tax Act. 
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tax, by virtue of section 14 of the Income Tax Act, as read with the third schedule to 
the Act.  
Third stage: involves determining a person‘s taxable income.495 This is achieved 
by deducting, from the taxpayer‘s income – identified at stage two - allowances 
permitted under section 15 of the Income Tax Act. The allowable deductions include, 
notably, deductions of ―expenditure and losses…incurred for the purposes of trade or 
in the production of the income.‖496 The balance remaining is referred to as the 
taxable income. It is on this residual figure that income tax is levied. For corporate 
firms, the income tax rate on the taxable income is 33%.    
When considering whether a securitization transaction will be subject to income 
tax, the starting point is section 8 of the Income Tax Act. The general rule is that 
consideration received by an originating firm from an SPV under the terms of a 
receivables contract for financial assets sold and transferred will be deemed to 
constitute part of the originating firm‘s gross income, unless if the cash-flow is held to 
be income of a capital nature. If the consideration paid to the originating firm by the 
SPV is held to be income of a capital nature, the amount will not be included into the 
computation of its gross income. And if the originating firm made any profit on the 
receivables transaction, this amount will not be subject to income tax. Similarly, if the 
originating firm makes a loss on the receivables transaction, such loss will not be 
deductible from the originating firm‘s gross income. Losses of a capital nature are not 
income-tax deductible because of the operation of section 15(2) (a) which provides 
for permissible deductions. Section 15(2) states: ―The deductions allowed shall be – 
(a) expenditure and losses to the extent to which they are incurred for the purposes of 
                                                 
495
 Taxable income is defined in the Income Tax Act to mean: ―the amount remaining after deducting 
from the income of any person all the amounts allowed to be deducted from income under this Act.‖ 
Ibid., at section 8(1) (s). 
496
 Ibid., at section 15(2).  
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trade or in the production of the income except to the extent to which they are 
expenditure or losses of a capital nature.‖ [Emphasis added].  
If on the other hand, the cash-flow under the receivables contract is held to be 
income of a revenue nature, the amount will be included in the originating firm‘s 
gross income and will be subject to income tax. This is because section 8 of the 
Income Tax Act only excludes from inclusion into a taxpayer‘s gross income, income 
which is of a capital nature. This means income of a revenue nature is automatically 
included in the computation of a taxpayer‘s gross income. In practice, any profit 
which accrued to the originating firm on the receivables‘ transaction will be reduced 
by the income tax liability. Conversely, any losses and expenses incurred in the 
transaction will be income-tax deductible. As above, this is due to the operation of 
section 15(2) of the Income Tax Act which permits deductions of expenditure and 
losses incurred in the production of income, where the cash-flow in question is 
revenue in nature.  
The determination of whether cash-flow from the disposal of financial assets is 
revenue or capital in nature is extremely important for originating firms engaging in 
securitization transactions. In practice, most financial assets are discounted. It stands 
to reason that it is more likely than not that originating firms engaged in securitization 
transactions will seek revenue characterization of the income stream, which would 
enable them to deduct the discount from their gross income and also claim a 
deduction of expenses incurred in structuring the securitization transaction. 
Admittedly, this is a generalization. Whether a revenue or capital characterization is 
sought will depend on the intended structure.  
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7.4.2.2.  Cash-flow from the receivables’ contract: revenue or capital?  
Is the consideration paid to an originating firm by an SPV under the terms of a 
receivables‘ agreement revenue or capital for income tax purposes? The Income Tax 
Act does not define what is meant by ―income of a revenue nature‖ and ―income of a 
capital nature.‖ It has been left to courts to establish the broad parameters of what the 
two phrases means in practice. In addition, because Zimbabwe‘s Income Tax Act does 
not make specific reference to securitization, it is difficult in the abstract to 
categorically state how cash-flows from the receivables‘ contract will be treated for 
income tax purposes. Whether cash-flow is treated as revenue or capital can only be 
established after consideration of factors peculiar to each asset disposal.
497
 Case-law 
states that legal tests enunciated to resolve the revenue/capital question are not 
prescriptive but illustrative.
498
  
It has been held that in determining whether the proceeds of a transaction are 
revenue or capital in nature, courts must apply ordinary common sense and business 
standards,
499
 and should endeavour to establish the true nature of an underlying 
transaction. Whether a particular income stream is characterized as revenue or capital 
in nature is a question of law.
500
 However, the characterization is an inference drawn 
from a wide variety of factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the transaction that gave 
rise to the income streams. These factors include: (i) the expressed intention of the 
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 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v George Forest timber Co Ltd 1924 AD 516 at pp. 522-223.  
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 It has been held: ―…the expressions receipts ―of a capital nature‖ and expenditure ―not of a capital 
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 Rhodesia Railways and Others v Commissioner of Taxes 1925 AD 438 at 462.  
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 It has been held: ―It is true that the question is ultimately one of law: whether receipts are of a 
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a matter of law.‖ Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Pick ‗n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 
1992 (4) SA 39 (A) at page 33.  
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taxpayer in disposing an asset;
501
 (ii) the originating firm‘s business, its practices, and 
its objectives as contained in the memorandum of association; (iii) whether the 
income resulted from a disposal of assets which constitutes on-going business – i.e. a 
series of transactions; or (iv) whether the disposal was a one-off transaction.
502 
Where 
the income-stream is part of a firm‘s trading capital or on-going business or was a 
scheme of profit making, any loss or gain arising from the underlying transaction will 
be revenue in nature.
503
 The caveat, however, is that the cash-flow from the disposal 
of a capital asset – such as ordinary or subordinated shares held as an investment – 
remains capital, unless if it is established from the facts that this was an income or 
profit making scheme.
504
 It is arguable that money received from the disposal of 
financial assets - mortgage bonds for instance - pursuant to a securitization transaction 
constitute cash-flow received as part of a firm‘s on-going business. Mortgage 
repayments are income of a revenue nature in the hands of the mortgage lender and 
therefore subject to income tax. The disposal of this income flow – i.e. the mortgage 
repayments - to an SPV as part of a securitization transaction should not transform the 
resulting future-flow income into income of a capital nature. Arguably, the income 
retains its revenue characteristic, albeit discounted with the objective of releasing 
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118. In the case of Pick`N Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, Nicholas AJA held: ―Where profit has 
resulted from the disposal of the taxpayer‘s assets, it may be either capital or income, depending on the 
circumstances. If there was a mere realization of capital at an enhanced value, the entire proceeds 
would remain capital. But if it was an act done in the ordinary course of the vendor‘s business (if it 
resulted from the productive use of capital to earn it), then the resulting gain would be income.‖ Pick`N 
Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (note 502, supra), at p. 18. 
504
 See for instance the case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Stott 1928 AD 252, at p. 263. 
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liquidity.
505
 But it is also arguable, if the taxpayer (originating firm) has already paid 
income-tax on the cash-flow under the receivables‘ contract by the time it structures a 
securitization transaction, that at that point, the cash-flow, being effectively residual 
funds, must - in the hands of the originating firm - be capital. After accounting for 
income tax, the funds become free-cash, which the taxpayer is free to reinvest or hold. 
If the taxpayer discounts the rights to the financial assets, it is arguably discounting a 
capital asset. On that basis, the income earned on the disposal of the receivables is 
income-tax exempt. It is also arguable that in such circumstances, the intention behind 
disposing the financial receivables is to realise capital for reinvestment.
506
 But 
contrast this proposition to the South African case of Creative Productions (Pty) Ltd 
in which it was held that factoring discounts are revenue in nature, therefore 
deductible, despite the intention of the seller being to raise capital.
507
 The South 
Africa Revenue Service has argued, in its draft securitization guidelines that if 
through securitization a firm has substantially sold its business, any resulting cash-
flows may be characterised as capital in nature, for purposes of income tax.
508
  
The above analysis establishes that the characterization of receivables contract 
cash-flow as either revenue or capital will determine whether it is liable to income tax. 
It also establishes that although there exists general principles which can be utilised 
when determining whether a cash-flow will be characterized as revenue or capital, 
each case has to be assessed on its own facts. It is difficult to determine in the abstract 
how cash-flows under the receivables‘ contract will be treated for income tax 
purposes. This study recommends however that for clarity‘s sake, ZIMRA should 
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 ITC 217, 8 SATC 171. 
506
 Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1978 (1) SA 101 (A) at 
118A-E. 
507
 CSAR v Creative Productions (Pty) Ltd, 1999 (2) SA 14.  
508
 South African Revenue Service Draft Securitization Guidelines, at p. 11, citing the following cases, 
ITC 223, 6 SATC 150; and ITC 466, 11 SATC 251. 
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produce guidelines on how securitization receivables cash-flows are likely to be 
treated for income tax purposes in the hands of an originating firm.  
 
7.4.3. Stamp duty applicability to asset transfer  
Zimbabwe, in common with many countries that borrowed from the English 
common law system, operates a stamp duty regime for instruments used to transmit 
certain incorporeal rights, such as mortgage and notarial bonds. This begs the 
question: does the transfer of assets, pursuant to a receivables‘ contract, from an 
originating firm to an SPV attract stamp duty? 
 
7.4.3.1. Stamp duty principles: In brief 
The Stamp Duties Act as read with the Finance Act governs the levying, 
collection and rates of stamp duty. Section 25 of the Finance Act stipulates the 
instruments which attract stamp duty in Zimbabwe. They are: (i) bonds; (ii) brokers‘ 
notes; (iii) cheques; (iv) insurance policies; and (v) title deeds (on lodging at the 
Deeds Registry office); and (v) notarial deeds, such as deeds of cession of mortgage 
and notarial bonds.
509
 This means the sale and transfer of receivables, which does not 
involve the use of any of these instruments stipulated in section 25 of the Finance Act, 
does not attract stamp duty.  
Of the five instruments, bonds are the most relevant to securitization transactions. 
The word ―bonds‖ is defined in section 25 of the Finance Act to mean: ―any mortgage 
bond or notarial bond, or any cession or substitution of debtor in respect of a notarial 
bond.‖ Section 25 stipulates further that for every ZW$100 or part thereof, secured by 
a bond, the stamp duty chargeable is 40 cents. In other words, stamp duty is charged 
                                                 
509
 Section 25 of the Finance Act must be read together with section 5 of the Stamp Duties Act, which 
states: ―…there shall be charged, levied and paid upon every instrument or other matter described in 
Chapter II of the Finance Act…the duties specified therein.‖ 
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at 0.4% of the value of a bond. A question that arises from the above statutory 
provisions, which is relevant for securitization purposes is: does the cession of debts 
secured by mortgage or notarial bonds attract stamp duty?  
 
7.4.3.2. Stamp duty liability on asset transfer 
Does a cession of a mortgage and/or notarial bond attract a stamp duty liability? 
The short answer is no; cessions of mortgage bonds and notarial bonds are stamp 
duty-exempt. As noted above, as part of its efforts to create a mortgage backed 
securitization market, the Ministry of Finance through the Finance Act (No 2) of 1999 
made cessions of mortgage bonds stamp duty-exempt in 2000. Section 25 of the 
Finance Act, which is the exemptions clause, excludes from stamp duty liability the 
following:  ―(a) any sum separately secured by a bond to cover any costs incurred in 
connection with the debt; (b) any bond which is auxiliary or collateral to, or 
substituted for, a previously made and duly stamped bond executed by the same 
person and for the same debt or obligation; (c) any bond which is executed by way of 
suretyship only, where there exists a duly stamped bond for the same debt or 
obligation executed by the principal debtor or obligor; (d) any cession or substitution 
of debtor in respect of a bond mentioned in exemption (b), not being a substituted 
bond; (e) any cession or substitution of debtor in respect of a bond mentioned in 
exemption (c).‖ [Emphasis added]. Although inelegantly worded, this provision 
supports the conclusion that cessions of mortgage and notarial bonds are stamp duty 
exempt. The cession of a bond which is collateral or substituted for a previously made 
and duly stamped bond executed by the same person for the same debt or obligation is 
stamp duty exempt. However, due to the manner in which this section is worded, it is 
likely to engender uncertainty and litigation. This section should be amended and 
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clearly stipulate in simple English that cessions of mortgage and notarial bonds are 
stamp-duty exempt.  
In summary, an originating firm is exposed to at least three significant tax claims; 
VAT, income tax and stamp duty. This study concludes that the sale and cession of 
financial assets is VAT-and stamp duty-exempt. However, for clarity‘s sake, both the 
VAT Act and Stamp Duty Act should be amended and specifically refer to, and make 
exempt from VAT and stamp duty, respectively, securitization transaction asset 
transfers. The section also discussed, but without drawing any definitive conclusions, 
the question whether income accruing to an originating firm from the disposal to an 
SPV of its financial assets, as part of a securitization transaction, is subject to income 
tax.  
 
7.5.  SPV tax risks 
Being the hub of a securitization transaction, SPVs used in securitization 
transactions receive several asset and cash flows, including: (i) financial receivables 
to be securitized; (ii) payments made by investors for the issued securities; and (iii) 
periodic payments made by the underlying obligers. These various income streams 
and transactions give rise to several tax claims, including income tax, stamp duty, and 
VAT. If applicable, these tax costs increase the aggregate cost of securitization. 
Although gains of a capital nature are taxable in Zimbabwe on the disposal of 
prescribed assets, this tax is not relevant for purposes of this section. The Capital 
Gains Tax Act (CGT Act) applies only when there is a gain (profit) of a capital nature. 
SPVs used in securitization transactions issue discounted securities, and 
consequentially they do not typically realise gains. In addition, the CGT Act exempts 
from capital gains tax, gains realised on the disposal of marketable securities issued 
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on a securities exchange.
510
 This would cover securitization issuances. As a result, this 
section focuses only on the following types of taxes: income tax, stamp duty and 
VAT.    
 
7.5.1. Income tax liability 
Because securitization transactions are not accorded special tax treatment, the 
income tax treatment of securitization SPVs has to be determined by reference to the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act. In practice, a securitization SPV will receive 
financial assets from an originating firm, cash following the issue of fixed income 
securities, and periodic sums of money from obligers, through a servicer. This begs 
the question: are these cash-flows subject to an income tax claim in the hands of the 
SPV? It is extremely difficult to answer this question in the abstract. At best, it is 
possible to draw some general principles on how securitization SPVs will in practice 
be treated; but much depends on the actual structural mechanics of the transaction 
employed.  
 
7.5.1.1. Trust SPVs income tax liability 
The legal status of an SPV determines whether its cash-flows are subject to 
income tax. The Income Tax Act defines a taxpayer as: ―any person in respect of 
whom an assessment is made; and includes…any person who is required in terms of 
this Act to furnish a return.‖511 The category of persons classified as taxpayers 
include: ―a company, body of persons corporate or unincorporated (not being a 
partnership), local or like authority, deceased or insolvent estate and, in relation to 
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 Section 10(j) of the Capital Gains Tax Act. 
511
 Section 2 of the Income Tax Act. 
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income the subject of a trust to which no beneficiary is entitled, the trust.‖512 
[Emphasis added] It follows that a trust structure used in a securitization transaction, 
whose trust deed clearly identifies beneficiaries, is income tax-exempt. Income that 
accrues to a securitization trust, or more aptly, to the trustees, will, therefore, be taxed 
in the hands of the beneficiaries. A trust structure with beneficiaries, if used in a 
securitization transaction will be a mere conduit. It is precisely for this reason - i.e. the 
income tax exemption - that this study argues that in Zimbabwe, trusts structures 
constitute the most cost-effective securitization SPV structures. A caveat: a trust SPV 
structure without identified beneficiaries is liable to ―entity-level‖ income tax.  
 
7.5.1.2. Corporate SPVs income tax liability 
Unlike trust structures, the general rule for corporate entities is that they are 
subject to income tax. But whether or not particular cash-flows are taxable is both a 
question of fact and law. In theory, it is possible to structure an income tax-neutral 
securitization SPV structure. As noted above, characterization of income flows either 
as income of a revenue, or of a capital, nature may result in net income tax-cost 
savings. It is not the case that one and not the other will in all cases give rise to a 
favourable tax-cost structure. This study posits however that it is more likely than not 
that securitization SPVs will be structured with a view to achieving revenue treatment 
of cash-flows. Such treatment permits SPVs to claim deductions for losses and 
expenditure incurred in the structuring the securitization transaction; but this is by no 
means a rule of general application.  
 
 
                                                 
512
 Ibid., at section 2.  
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7.5.1.2.1. Revenue treatment  
In practice, an SPV can be structured to achieve revenue characterization of its 
various income streams. In order to attain revenue treatment of its income streams, an 
SPV would have to establish that it was carrying on a ―trade‖ as defined in the Income 
Tax Act.
513
 If it does, the SPV will become entitled to deduct from its taxable income 
―expenditure and losses to the extent to which they are incurred for the purposes of 
trade or in the production of the income except to the extent to which they are 
expenditure or losses of a capital nature.‖514 [Emphasis added] Buying financial 
receivables from firms with the purpose of issuing securities can be characterised as 
―doing trade;‖ i.e. trade in purchasing financial assets and issuing securities backed by 
those assets.
515
 The definition of trade – cited above – is wide enough to envisage 
such activity. If challenged by the Commissioner, the SPV bears the onus of 
establishing that it was engaged in trade.
516
 Numerous factors will, in practice, be 
taken into account when assessing whether in reality the SPV was carrying on a trade. 
These include inter alia: (i) the objectives of the SPV as contained in its 
memorandum of association and/or trust deed; (ii) the SPV‘s business operations and 
practices as reflected by its statutory reports, board meeting minutes, contract 
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 ―Trade‖ is so broadly defined in the Income Tax Act as to be almost unhelpful in the determination 
of whether a taxpayer was carrying out trade or not in practice. Section 2 of the Income Tax Act states: 
――Trade‖ includes any profession, trade, business, activity, calling, occupation or venture, including the 
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 Commissioner of South African Revenue Service v Contour Engineering (Pty) Ltd 61 SATC 447, at 
452. 
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documents, etc; (iii) the SPV‘s shareholding; (iv) the nature of its issued securities, 
i.e. whether it is a pay-through or a pass-through structure.    
In addition to establishing that it was carrying on a trade, the SPV would have to 
establish that the financial receivables constitute its trading stock. Can financial 
receivables ceded to an SPV by an originating firm be characterized as the former‘s 
trading stock? If the financial receivables are not regarded as trading stock, they will 
be treated as a capital investment, which precludes revenue treatment of the financial 
receivables for income tax purposes. The definition of ―trading stock‖, which is 
expansive but not exhaustive, is found in section 2 of the Income Tax Act.
517
 In the 
relevant part it states: ――trading stock‖ includes – (a) goods and other property of any 
description…which are acquired…in the ordinary course of trade for the purposes of 
disposal in the ordinary course of trade…‖ [Emphasis added]. The definition can 
arguably be split into two parts. First; the property must be ―acquired‖ in the 
―ordinary course of business.‖ Second; the property must have been acquired ―for the 
[purpose] of disposal in the ordinary course of business.‖ If accepted that the business 
of an SPV is the buying of financial receivables and the issuance of capital market 
securities which are secured by these receivables, then it follows that its acquisition of 
financial receivables constitutes trading in the ordinary course of its business. But 
does the issuance of securities backed by the financial receivables in the securities 
markets result in the ―disposal‖ of the financial receivables? The Act requires a 
disposal of the assets for them to be characterized as its trading stock. The issuance of 
securities backed by financial assets to investors arguably constitutes a disposal of the 
underlying financial assets. What the SPV disposes to disparate investors, albeit in an 
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 For an analysis of whether a similar provision in the South African Income Tax Act is exhaustive, 
refer to the cases of Syfrets Participation Bond Managers Ltd v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service 2001 (2) S.A. 359 (SCA); (2) De Beers v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1985 
ZASCA 84. 
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altered form, are the rights to income, which it acquired from the originating firm. The 
Zimbabwean case of Commissioner of Taxes v BSA Co Investments is authority for 
this argument.
518
  
If this is accepted by the Commissioner that the SPV was conducting trade and 
that the receivables constitute its trading stock; (i) expenditure incurred in acquiring 
the assets; and (ii) losses made either in acquiring or disposing the assets; would in 
both cases constitute allowable deductions, per section 15(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
In terms of factual sequencing, the SPV would have to establish that (i) the loss and/or 
expenditure was in fact suffered; (ii) the loss and/or expenditure was incurred in the 
production of income; (iii) the loss and/or expenditure was not of a capital nature; and 
(iv) the loss and/or income was incurred for the purposes of the trade of the 
taxpayer.
519
    
 
7.5.1.2.2. Capital treatment 
It is conceivable that structurers of a securitization transaction may wish to obtain 
capital treatment of one or more of the income-flows that transit through an SPV. This 
is likely where surplus funds are anticipated and the payment of income tax is sought 
to be avoided. Financial receivables may be characterized as income of a capital 
nature in the hands of an SPV if, for example, the SPV is a pay-through structure that 
issues equity-like debt securities, instead of pure debt securities. An example is where 
an SPV tranches its securities. But the obvious downside to this characterization is 
that losses and expenditure incurred will not be deductible from the SPV‘s taxable 
income.  
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In summary, the short answer to the question whether a corporate SPV structure is 
subject to entity-level income tax is in the affirmative. However, the extent of its 
income-tax liability depends on the individual characteristics of each transaction. It is 
not inconceivable that an SPV‘s income tax liability can be reduced to virtually zero. 
However, there is merit in the argument that as part of a series of measures whose 
objective is the creation of an effective securitization-enhancing financial 
infrastructure, consideration should be given to the amendment of the Income Tax Act 
to exempt securitization SPVs from entity-level income tax. This is the position in the 
U.S. for instance where the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC), the 
Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT) and the Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REIT) structures are exempted from entity-level income tax 
liability. As part of the creation of a securitization-enabling financial infrastructure, it 
is recommended that policy makers in Zimbabwe consider amending the Income Tax 
Act and enable the creation of similar structures with a view to boosting the 
securitization of financial claims.  
 
7.5.2. Stamp duty liability on securities issuance 
In Zimbabwe, marketable securities are exempt from stamp duty as they are not 
listed in section 25 of the Finance Act among instruments whose use attracts a stamp 
duty liability. However, where the services of a stockbroker have been used in the 
selling of securities, a stamp duty cost arises. What attracts stamp duty is not the 
securities issuance, but the brokers‘ note.520 A stock brokers‘ note attracts stamp duty 
at 1% of the fees raised by the stock broker for its services,
521
 which amount is 
typically passed on to the issuer or purchaser of securities by the stock broker. 
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Although this stamp duty arises only if an SPV utilises the services of a stock broker, 
its utility or purpose – given the electronic nature of most securities transactions – is 
dubious; and consideration should be given to repealing same.   
 
7.5.3. VAT liability on securities issuance 
When seeking to determine whether a securities issuance by an SPV is subject to 
VAT the first question to ask is whether the SPV has made a taxable supply, either of 
goods or services. An SPV sells securities to raise capital. These securities are by 
nature incorporeal assets and as a result, as argued above, fall outside the definition of 
goods contained in the VAT Act, whose supply is subject to VAT. In the VAT Act, 
the definition of ―goods‖ is restricted to corporeal items. This notwithstanding, is an 
SPV a service provider? The definition of ―services‖ in the VAT Act is broad. The 
word ―services‖ is defined to mean: ―anything done or to be done, including the 
granting, assignment, cession, surrender of any right or the making available of any 
facility or advantage, but excludes the supply of goods, money.‖522 This definition is 
very broad, and arguably covers the operations of a securitization SPV. It is 
noteworthy that services provided and products sold by banking and building society 
institutions are described as the supply of financial services in the VAT Act.
523
 Does 
this mean when issuing securities, an SPV must add VAT to the securities issue price? 
It is important to note that listed companies do not charge VAT on their securities 
issuance. Stock brokers who deal in securities are the ones obliged to charge VAT on 
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 Ibid., at section 2 states: ――financial services‖ means – (a) any service provided by a banking 
institution registered or required to be registered in terms of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20]; or (b) 
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their fees, which suggests that a securitization SPV securities issuance is VAT-
exempt.
524
   
The above notwithstanding, if an SPV is a registered banking or building society 
institution – an unlikely although not impossible scenario – its issuance of securities 
will definitely be VAT-exempt. Section 11(a) of the VAT Act states: ―The supply of 
any of the following…services shall be exempt from the tax imposed in terms of 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section six – (a) the supply of any financial 
services…‖ In section 2 of the VAT Act services provided by banking and building 
societies are characterized as supplies of financial services. In addition, it is clear from 
a reading of section 11 of the VAT Act, as read with section 2, that the issue of equity 
securities by a corporate SPV would be VAT-exempt. Section 11 exempts from VAT 
the ―supply of any financial services…‖ Section 2 of the VAT Act, in the relevant 
part, defines financial services to mean ―…the issue or transfer of ownership of any 
share in a company or interest in a private business corporation.‖ [Emphasis added]. 
The reference to ―share in a company‖ refers to equity securities.  
The treatment of a securitization securities debt issuance for VAT purposes is 
however less certain. It is arguable that the issuance of debt securities by a 
securitization SPV will be characterised as a provision of a VAT-exempt financial 
service; and this is why. In the relevant part, section 2 of the VAT Act defines 
financial services to mean ―…the provision of any deposit, loan or credit, including 
the provision of any guarantee, indemnity, security or bond in respect of the 
performance of obligations to a deposit, loan or credit…‖ [Emphasis added]. It is 
arguable that the issuance of a bond (bond here defined as a debt security) by an SPV 
to an investor in return for a cash sum is tantamount to the issue of a bond in respect 
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to the performance of a loan, i.e. the amount that the investor would have paid the 
SPV. The argument here is that the purchasing of securities by investors basically 
constitutes a series of small loans to the issuer, which in turn issues bonds as 
acknowledgement of indebtedness. In support of this proposition it is arguable that the 
legislature could not have intended to treat equity and debt capital-raising by 
corporate entities differently for VAT purposes.  Put simply; it could not have been 
the intention of the legislature to exempt equity capital-raising from VAT while 
subjecting debt capital-raising to VAT. If this proposition is correct, then the raising 
of capital, through the issuance of equity or debt securities, is also VAT-exempt. 
What about trust certificates issued by a trust SPV structure; do they attract VAT 
on issue? Although it does not possess legal personality, a trust is deemed to be a 
person for VAT purposes.
525
 Section 47 of the VAT Act stipulates that where an 
entity is a trust fund, the person deemed to be responsible for performing the duties 
imposed by the VAT Act is the person administering the fund in a fiduciary capacity. 
This means that a trust, for purposes of the VAT Act, is a VAT paying entity. This 
begs the question: are trust certificates issued by a trust vatable?  Section 11 of the 
VAT Act does not specifically refer to trust securities or proclaim that they are VAT-
exempt. But can it be argued that like incorporated SPV entities, trust structures 
issuing securities pursuant to a securitization transaction are providing a financial 
service? If so, what kind of financial services? Although in law, trust certificates 
represent ownership interests in the assets subject to the trust; their issuance is outwith 
the provision that defines the issue of shares by a company as a VAT-exempt supply. 
This is because the provision specifically refers to shares ―in a company‖ and a trust is 
not a company. But is the issuance of trust certificates saved from VAT liability by 
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virtue of the provision that makes VAT-exempt the ―provision…of any security or 
bond in respect to the performance of obligations related to a…loan...‖526 To sustain 
this argument, it would have to be accepted that a the word ―security‖ used in the 
definition is broad in at least two senses: (i) that it relates to property pledged or ceded 
as collateral for money lent and advanced; and/or (ii) that it also refers to securities 
used as investment instruments which in part evidences investors‘ claims against the 
issuer in return for money lent and advanced. If this argument fails, then it is likely 
that the issue of trust certificates will attract VAT.   
This technical approach to determining whether a securities issuance by a 
securitization SPV is subject to VAT is not ideal. The law should be clarified and it is 
recommended that securities issuance by SPVs used in securitization transactions 
should be made specifically VAT-exempt. 
In summary, the above analysis established that SPVs used in securitization 
transactions would, in Zimbabwe, be subject to several tax claims, including notably 
income tax, stamp duty and VAT. Trust entities used in securitization transactions are 
income tax-exempt, while corporate entities are not. The income tax treatment and 
liability of corporate SPVs will depend largely on factors intrinsic to the securitization 
transaction. It is possible to attain tax-cost savings on both the characterization of a 
securitization SPV‘s cash-flows as either revenue or capital in nature. This study 
recommends that Zimbabwe‘s income tax legislation should be amended with the 
view to making securitization SPVs income tax-exempt. This would assist in reducing 
transaction and compliance costs. It would also assist in standardizing structures and 
promoting transaction certainty. With regards stamp duty, the chapter concludes that 
the issuance of securities by an SPV is liable to stamp duty, but only if it utilizes the 
                                                 
526
 Ibid., section 2. 
205 
services of a stockbroker and only on the latter‘s fees. The chapter also concludes that 
the VAT Act should be amended and specifically exempt from VAT the issue of 
equity, debt, hybrid and other securities. In addition, securities issued by banking or 
building society institutions and equity securities issued by SPV entities incorporated 
under the Companies Act are VAT-exempt. Although it is arguable that debt 
securities are also VAT-exempt, this is by no means certain.  
 
7.6. Servicer tax risks  
One of the key parties to any securitization transaction is the servicer. The servicer 
is a service provider, whose main role is the servicing (especially the collection) of 
periodic cash payments made by obligers, which it forwards to the SPV. The 
contractual terms between the servicer, the originating firm and the SPV are typically 
contained in and regulated by a pooling and servicing agreement. Depending on the 
intention of the parties to the securitization transaction and other variables, the 
servicer role is typically performed either by the originating firm, or by a third party 
professional firm. Among a host of responsibilities, the servicer also serves the 
important role of administering the receivables, ensuring timeous payment by the 
obligers, including initiating recovery and foreclosure proceedings in case of default 
on the underlying debt.  
It is typical for the agreement entered into between an SPV and the servicer to 
stipulate a fee to be paid to the servicer for its services. This section limits itself to an 
analysis of the tax treatment of this fee as it is typically the main cash-flow that arises 
between a servicer on the one hand and the other parties to the securitization 
transaction. In addition, this section will not analyse the income tax treatment of the 
fee charged and received by a servicer, as this does not have a direct bearing on the 
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cost of structuring securitization transactions. Rather, it analyses whether the services 
provided by a servicer constitute the supply of vatable services under the VAT Act? If 
it is vatable, then the fee charged by the servicer will have to include VAT, which 
amount will have to be paid by the SPV to the servicer, in the process increasing the 
overall cost of securitization transactions.  
 
7.6.1. VAT liability on provision of services 
Given the extremely broad definition of the word services in the VAT Act, as 
noted above, it is clear that services performed by a servicer constitute taxable 
services for purposes of the VAT Act. An analysis of the VAT Act establishes several 
principles. If the originating firm is retained as servicer and if it also happens to be a 
banking or building society institution, the service performed by the originating firm 
in its capacity as a servicer will be VAT-exempt. This is because section 11 of the 
VAT Act exempts from VAT ―the supply of any financial services.‖ VAT-exempt 
financial services include ―any service provided by a banking institution registered or 
required to be registered in terms of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20]; or any service 
provided by a building society registered or required to be registered  in terms of the 
Building Societies Act [Chapter 24:02].‖527  
On the other hand, where the originating firm is not a banking institution or a 
building society institution, and it acts as a servicer in a securitization transaction; or 
where the entity chosen to act as the servicer is a third party independent entity, which 
is not a banking institution or a building society institution, the services that such 
entity renders for and on behalf of the SPV are vatable at the standard rate of 15%. 
This is because the provision of such services is not saved from VAT liability by 
                                                 
527
 This construction is drawn from a reading of section 11 of the VAT Act as read with section 2 of the 
same.  
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section 11 of the VAT Act which stipulates supplies of goods and services which are 
VAT-exempt.  
This study proposes that policymakers in Zimbabwe should consider the cost-
implications of VAT on securitization transactions generally. Because securitization 
transactions by nature consist of a series of contractual arrangements, each such 
arrangement is likely to give rise to VAT implications.  There is merit in the argument 
that the provision of professional services to a securitization SPV in the collection, 
administration and forwarding of cash from obligers to the SPV should be VAT-
exempt. A question may be asked: why should the provision of servicer services by a 
banking or building society institution be VAT-exempt, yet the provision of similar 
services by all others is subject to VAT at 15%? This VAT-cost factor, among others 
may result in only a few types of firms, especially financial institutions, refinancing 
using the technique. But where parties are forced for cost reasons to use an originating 
firm, which is a financial institution, as a servicer, the absence of arms-length 
transaction may have serious implications for the bankruptcy remoteness of resulting 
securitization transactions.  
 
7.7. Summary 
This chapter analysed (i) Zimbabwe‘s tax law infrastructure; (ii) the tax dispute 
resolution framework; and (iii) the likely income tax, VAT and stamp duty risks for 
originating firms, SPVs and servicers arising from the various arrangements that 
constitute a basic securitization transaction. This chapter concluded that on the whole 
Zimbabwe‘s extant tax infrastructure presents a few impediments to the 
implementation of securitization transactions. Ideally, ZIMRA should produce 
guidelines, which address the likely tax treatment of securitization transaction cash-
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flows. This would assist in reducing information asymmetries. This chapter 
recommended that Zimbabwe‘s tax appeals court system should be rationalised, 
through the creation of a tax appeals court with original jurisdiction to hear appeals 
against tax decisions made by the Commissioner. This requires amendments to the 
Income Tax Act and the Fiscal Appeals Court Act. Appeals against decisions made by 
the new appeals court should lie to the Supreme Court, and only on points of law.  
With regards specific tax risk exposures, the chapter made several findings. First; 
the income received by an originating firm from an SPV pursuant to a securitization 
transaction is - as a general rule - subject to income tax, unless if the originating firm 
establishes and the Commissioner of Tax accepts that the receipt is income of a 
capital nature. Second; the sale of financial assets by an originating firm to an SPV is 
arguably VAT-exempt, although the VAT Act should be amended, or ZIMRA should 
issue guidelines, which clearly stipulate this. Third; cessions of mortgage bonds and 
notarial bonds are arguably stamp duty-exempt. However, this study recommends that 
the Stamp Duty Act should be amended and unambiguously state that cessions of 
mortgage and notarial bonds used for securitization transactions are stamp duty-
exempt. Fourth; corporate-entity SPVs used in securitization transactions are liable to 
pay entity-level income tax, while trust structures are exempt. This study recommends 
that SPVs used for securitization transactions should specifically be made income tax-
exempt. Fifth; a stamp duty liability arises on the brokers note issued by a stockbroker 
engaged by an SPV or arranger in relation to a securities issuance. Sixth; the issue of 
securities by a securitization SPV is not a vatable supply of goods or services and is 
therefore VAT-exempt. Seventh; a Servicer is liable to levy VAT on the fees it 
charges an originating firm or SPV pursuant to a securitization transaction.  
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    CHAPTER 8 
       DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
A crucial component of a securitization-enabling financial infrastructure is an 
effective and versatile dispute resolution system. This chapter assesses whether 
Zimbabwe‘s dispute resolution system permits the effective and expeditious 
resolution of disputes that can arise from securitization transactions. As noted above, 
a typical securitization transaction consists of a series of contractual arrangements 
between an originating firm, the SPV, underwriters, servicers, trustees, credit 
enhancers and investors in issued securities. Disputes, both public and private law in 
nature, can arise over any of these contractual arrangements and relationships, 
including over the: (i) various participants‘ tax liabilities; (ii) insolvency of either an 
originating firm, or an SPV; (iii) legal characterization of the asset transfer; (iv) 
services provision by servicer(s) and credit and liquidity enhancers; and (v) the 
discharge by trustees or directors of their duties as contained in the trust deed, or 
articles of association, respectively. This chapter profiles Zimbabwe‘s court structure 
and identifies the court with primary jurisdiction over typical securitization 
transaction disputes. In addition, it analyses: (a) the applicability of arbitration to 
securitization disputes; and (b) whether parties to a domestic securitization transaction 
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can lawfully agree that their contractual disputes should be governed by a foreign 
court or foreign law.  
 
8.2. Zimbabwe’s court structure 
Zimbabwe‘s judicial system comprises several statutory courts and tribunals.528 
Some of these courts have power to exercise both criminal and civil law jurisdiction – 
such as the Magistrates court and the High court - while others have a narrow 
specialist jurisdiction, and others possess only appellate jurisdiction. Zimbabwe‘s 
courts can be characterised as comprising Magistrates‘ courts,529 High courts530 and a 
Supreme Court.
531
 The Supreme Court is the ultimate appellate authority, although 
parties alleging a breach of the bill of rights may approach the Supreme Court as a 
court of first instance.
532
 There are other specialist courts outside of this general court 
structure, including the Administrative Court,
533
 the Labour Court
534
 and the Fiscal 
Appeals court.
535
 There are other courts including the Small Claims Court,
536
 and the 
Customary Law Court.
537
 The jurisdiction and powers of each category of courts is 
governed by a relevant Act of parliament, and in the case of the Magistrates, High and 
Supreme Courts, the acts are complemented by gazetted rules of practice and 
procedure. 
                                                 
528
 A detailed analysis of the court system is unnecessary for purposes of this study.  
529
 Magistrate‘s courts are established in terms of the Magistrate‘s Court Act [Chap 7:10].  
530
 High courts are established in terms of the High Court Act [Chap 7:06]. 
531
 The Supreme Court is the highest appellate body and is established in terms of the Supreme Court 
Act [Chap 7:13]. 
532
 Section 24 of the Constitution states: ―If any person alleges that the Declaration of Rights has been, 
is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is detained, if 
any other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person), then, without 
prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or 
that other person) may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Supreme Court for 
redress.‖ 
533
 The Administrative court is established in terms of the Administrative Court Act [Chap 7:01].  
534
 The Labour court is established in terms of the Labour Act [Chap 28:01]. 
535
 The Fiscal Appeals court is established in terms of the Fiscal Appeals Court Act [Chap 23:05].  
536
 The Small Claims court is established in terms of the Small Claims Court Act [Chap7:02].  
537
 The Customary Law and Local Court is established in terms of the Customary Law and Local 
Courts Act [Chap 7:05]. 
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8.3. Jurisdiction over securitization-transaction disputes 
The court with criminal law jurisdiction over securities law violations - under the 
Securities Act - is the Regional Magistrates court.
538
 The civil division of the 
Magistrates court can exercise jurisdiction over some of the disputes that arise over 
securitization transactions, subject to the value of the issues in dispute not exceeding 
the gazetted amount.
539
 As a consequence, the court which will typically exercise 
jurisdiction over most disputes that can arise from the various arrangements that 
constitute securitization transactions is the High court. It is a court of inherent 
jurisdiction. Section 13 of the High Court Act states that: ―subject to this Act and any 
other law, the High Court shall have full original civil jurisdiction over all matters 
within Zimbabwe.‖ This statutory provision has been interpreted in light of the 
common law position that the High court has power to regulate its own procedures 
and judgments.
540
 Practice and procedure before the High court is codified in the High 
court rules, including as interpreted by case-law. The High court‘s inherent 
jurisdiction is not automatically ousted merely because an enactment provides that 
another court has jurisdiction.
541
 Appeals against decisions made by the High court lie 
to the Supreme Court,
542
 which is the ultimate appellate authority. Its decisions are 
final and binding on all subsidiary courts in Zimbabwe, although it is not bound by its 
own precedents.  
In the event of dispute, all of the following will be adjudicated by the High court: 
(i) contractual disputes between an originating firm and an SPV over the asset 
                                                 
538
 Section 117 of the Securities Act.  
539
 This amount is relatively small. Because of hyper-inflation – at the time of writing this thesis – the 
amount keeps changing.  
540
 Post and Telecommunications Corporation v Mahachi 1997 (2) ZLR 71 and Vengesai and Others v 
Zimbabwe Glass Industries 1998 (1) ZLR 593. 
541
 Hatfield Town Management Board v Mynfred Ponetry Farm (Pvt) Ltd, 1963(1) SA 737 (SR) at 739, 
City of Harare v Gwindi HH-147-03, Chawora v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe HH-59-2006. 
542
 Section 43 of the High Court Act. See also section 21 of the Supreme Court Act [Chap 7:13]. 
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transfer, or contract performance; (ii) contractual disputes arising from arrangements 
between the SPV and the credit and liquidity enhancers and other securitization 
participants; and (iii) dispute between an issuer-SPV and securities investors. It is also 
noteworthy that the High court has power to enquire into and determine existing, 
future or contingent rights.
543
 It can issue declaratory orders, interdicts and make 
orders for specific performance, or in lieu thereof, damages.  
Insolvency, either of the originating firm or the SPV, is a key risk factor in 
securitization transactions. Indeed, securitization is predicated on the mitigation of 
various SPV insolvency-inducing risks. All insolvency proceedings – for public 
policy reasons - are adjudicated by the High court. Section 2 of the Companies Act 
defines court ―in relation to any company‖ as meaning the High Court, except where 
criminal law issues arise.   
The tax dispute resolution framework has already been canvassed above. In 
summary, appeals against stamp duty and VAT assessments made by the 
Commissioner of Taxes lie to the Fiscal Appeal Court.
544
 Appeals against income tax 
and capital gains and capital gains withholding tax assessments made by the 
Commissioner can be made either to the High court or the Special Court for Income 
Tax Appeals (Special Court). Both the Fiscal Appeal Court and the Special Court are 
the equivalent of the High Court, presided over by Judges - either retired former 
judges of the High or Supreme courts, or whose experience, qualifications and 
expertise qualifies them to be appointed judges of the High court.
545
  
                                                 
543
 Section 13 of the High Court Act.  
544
 Section 13 of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act.  
545
 Ibid., at section 3. Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe does not have separate tax law reports. Decisions 
of the Fiscal Appeals court are reported in the Zimbabwe Law Reports publication. This study 
recommends that given the number of tax cases before the Fiscal Appeals court, consideration should 
be given to publishing separate tax law reports. This will go some way in making tax law decisions 
more accessible to practitioners, members of the public and the business community. 
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Admittedly, the above is a positivist analysis of the judicial system in Zimbabwe. 
The analysis has been restricted to legal issues and has not addressed political issues 
that have dogged the country in recent years. There exist valid concerns about the 
previous government‘s546 political commitment to the rule of law, independence of 
the judiciary and respect for private property rights. Much of the adverse criticism 
stems from a controversial land reform programme initiated by the government in 
2000, which resulted in the expropriation of farms previously owned by white 
farmers. The expropriation programme is now largely complete, although disputes 
over compensation continue in Zimbabwe, before the Southern African Community 
Development Community (SADC) tribunal
547
 and the World Bank‘s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
548
 These concerns, although valid, have 
not been canvassed here because they are arguably transient, are political in nature, 
rather than legal, and are restricted to an asset type - or political issue - that has 
minimal direct impact on securitization transactions. In addition, there is no evidence 
to suggest that political and legal disputes over land have compromised the judicial 
system or the quality of judgments pertaining to other civil disputes. To the extent that 
this is a possibility, this would require a separate and full study, which is beyond the 
scope of this study.   
In summary, this study concludes that although needing reform in places, 
Zimbabwe has a well-developed and structured judicial system that enables the 
resolution of securitization-related disputes. The High court is the court with power to 
adjudicate over most securitization disputes. This study has not assessed the quality of 
                                                 
546
 Between 1980 and 2008, the government of Zimbabwe was constituted by the ZANU PF party. 
Following political and economic turmoil, ZANU PF and the (then) opposition party Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) now share power in a unity government.  
547
 See for instance the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) 
[2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008). 
548
 See for instance the case of Bernadus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6. 
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judgements made by the High and Supreme Courts, except by way of reference 
throughout this study. They are however, arguably good. This section of the research 
sought to reflect on whether, challenges notwithstanding, Zimbabwe has a judicial 
system that is able to intercede and resolve disputes that are likely to arise from 
securitization transactions. The study concludes that on the whole it does and that 
most securitization disputes fall to be decided by the High court of Zimbabwe.  
 
8.4. Arbitration 
Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It has been defined as: 
―…the process by which a dispute or difference between two or more parties as to 
their mutual rights and liabilities are referred to and determined judicially and with 
binding effect by the application of law by one or more persons (the arbitral tribunal), 
instead of a Court of law. The decision of the arbitral tribunal is usually called an 
award. The reference to arbitration may arise from the agreement of the parties 
(private arbitration) or from statute. The agreement of the parties is in practice almost 
invariably in writing…"549 
 
8.4.1. Zimbabwe’s arbitration framework 
In Zimbabwe, as noted by the World Bank in 2000, arbitration is an established 
and often used alternative dispute resolution mechanism, whose awards are enforced 
by the superior courts.
550
 An arbitration centre, known as the Commercial Arbitration 
Centre was established created in Harare in 1995. The centre provides training and 
                                                 
549
 Halsbury‘s Laws of England, Vol. 2, 4th edition, para 601, at pp. 332-333. 
550
 The World Bank in its report on Zimbabwe stated: ―Arbitration is now regularly chosen as the 
means of resolving commercial disputes and the superior courts have an enviable record of enforcing 
arbitrage agreements and awards expeditiously, economically and reliably.‖ World Bank (2000) 
‗Zimbabwe: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes‘. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_zimbabwe.html  
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courses on arbitration and other non-formal alternative dispute resolution techniques, 
such as conciliation, mediation, negotiation et al. The centre also retains a database of 
arbitrators. It is usual in Zimbabwe for parties to a contract to stipulate that if they 
cannot agree on an arbitrator to resolve their dispute; either one or all of the parties to 
a dispute will request the Commercial Arbitration Centre to appoint an arbitrator.
551
 
The Commercial Arbitration Centre produces a quarterly publication called the 
Commercial Dispute Resolution Bulletin. In addition, the centre produced and 
regularly updates its Sourcebook on Arbitration Materials.
552
  
Arbitration offers contracting parties relatively expeditious and cost-effective 
resolution of commercial disputes. Arbitration is typically less adversarial, less costly, 
involves less formality and bureaucracy as parties need not comply with the gamut of 
court procedures. To an extent, because it privatizes dispute resolution, arbitration 
arguably saves tax-payer funds. Further, arbitration proceedings are typically private 
in nature, and parties, if they so chose, can appoint, as arbitrators, experts in a relevant 
field.
553
 In addition, arbitration is not fettered by monetary jurisdiction prescriptions, 
as compared, say to the Magistrates‘ court in Zimbabwe. Further, the grounds upon 
which arbitral awards can be set aside are extremely limited. This is in furtherance of 
the public policy objective of ensuring finality in arbitration proceedings.
554
 Arbitral 
awards are enforceable by, and once registered with, and on application to, the High 
court, they become an order of the court.   
 
 
 
                                                 
551
 A case that illustrates this is the case of Ropa v Reosmart Investments and Another SC-38-06. 
552
 Sourcebook of Arbitration Materials: edited by Ian Donovan., Robert McMillan and Muchadeyi 
Masunda (1995) The Commercial Arbitration Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe 
553
 Christie (1997) (note 244, supra) at p. 463.  
554
 Ropa (note 551, supra).  
216 
8.4.1.1. Law and practice 
Through the Arbitration Act No. 6 of 1996, Zimbabwe repealed its old arbitration 
enactment,
555
 and adopted, with minor amendments, the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law on International Commercial 
Arbitration. Some commentators have argued that the almost wholesale adoption of 
the UNCITRAL model law by Zimbabwe improved the country‘s arbitration law and 
practice and enabled them to become consistent with international standards.
556
 It is a 
well-established principle in Zimbabwe that an arbitration clause in a contract, such as 
a securitization receivables contract, will as a general rule, be given effect to and will 
preclude the resolution of the relevant dispute through the formal judicial system.
557
 
Contracting parties‘ discretion to refer disputes to arbitration is limited by section 3(2) 
                                                 
555
 Arbitration Act (Chap 7:02). 
556
 See for instance the article by Basil Coutsoudis (undated) UNCITRAL instruments in Southern 
Africa. Available at http://www.law-online.co.za/IntTradeLaw/UNCITRAL%20Instruments.htm  
557
 Zimbabwe‘s law on arbitration is illustrated quite well in the case of Capital Alliance (Pvt) Ltd v 
Renaissance Merchant Bank Ltd and 4 Others HH-108-2006, where Patel J. stated: ― Article 8(1) of the 
Model Law (viz. the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act [Chapter 7:15]) codifies and restates the 
common law on arbitral agreements as follows: ―A court before which proceedings are brought in a 
matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when 
submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, stay those proceedings and refer the 
parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed.‖ In Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation v Flame Lily Broadcasting (Pvt) Ltd 1999 
(2) ZLR 448 (H), it was held that a clause in a contract to refer a dispute to arbitration is binding on the 
parties and a party is not at liberty to revoke this clause at any time if he wishes to do so. In PTA Bank 
v Elanne (Pvt) Ltd & Ors 2000 (1) ZLR 156 (H), it was observed that the question of whether a dispute 
fell within the arbitration clause in an agreement was primarily a question of interpretation of the 
agreement and the arbitration clause. Once it is established that the dispute falls within the ambit of the 
arbitration clause, the onus to show why court proceedings should not be stayed falls on the party 
challenging the reference to arbitration. See Independence Mining (Pvt) Ltd v Fawcett Security 
Operations (Pvt) Ltd 1991 (1) ZLR 268 (HC) at 272. As to the approach to be applied in interpreting an 
arbitration clause, it is instructive to consider the decision in Bitumat Ltd v Multicom Ltd 2000 (1) 
ZLR 637 (H), at 639-40, where SMITH J stated as follows: ―In my opinion, where parties have entered 
into an agreement which contains an arbitration clause that is clearly intended to be widely cast, the 
court should not be astute in trying to reduce the ambit of the arbitration clause. Where an arbitration 
clause exists in any such agreement, the court is required to give effect thereto — see Article 8(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law which was adopted as part of our law by the Arbitration Act 6 of 1996 and 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation v Flame Lily Broadcasting (Pvt) Ltd t/a Joy TV 1999 (2) ZLR 
448 (H). It may well be that at some stage after a dispute has arisen, because of changed circumstances, 
the parties concerned agree that the matter should be determined by a court of law, rather than by 
arbitration in terms of the agreement in question. In these circumstances, the decision of the parties to 
abandon the arbitration clause in their agreement must be specific and clearly evidenced. It cannot be 
implied by the conduct of, or correspondence between the parties — it must be explicit. After all, if the 
arbitration clause is contained in a written agreement, then the decision to change the agreement must 
either be in writing or else so clearly evidenced by the conduct of the parties that there is no room for 
doubt.‖ 
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of the Arbitration Act. An arbitration agreement will not be upheld and enforced 
where it relates to: (i) a contract whose provisions are contrary to public policy; (ii) 
the resolution of a dispute which by operation of law cannot be resolved through 
arbitration - for instance, criminal and matrimonial law cases, and cases involving 
minors and persons who are legally incapacitated; (iii) matters concerning a consumer 
contract - as defined under the Consumer Contracts Act [Chap 8:03] unless the 
consumer has by separate agreement agreed to refer arising disputes to arbitration.
558
  
 
8.4.1.2. Consumer contracts not subject to arbitration 
Disputes arising from a consumer contract cannot be resolved through 
arbitration.
559
 This means a dispute between contractual parties to a securitization 
transaction over a contract characterized as a consumer contract, cannot be resolved 
through arbitration. The Consumer Contract Act defines a consumer contract as a: 
―contract for the sale or supply of goods or services or both, in which the seller or 
supplier is dealing in the course of business and the purchaser or user is not, but does 
not include (a) a contract for the sale, letting or hire of immovable property; or (b) a 
contract of employment.‖560 
Is a securitization receivables contract a consumer contract? The Consumer 
Contracts Act does not define the words ―goods‖ or ―services‖. This is an anomaly 
which ought to be addressed as the interpretation given to both words determines the 
application of the enactment to a dispute. This study argues that rights of action are 
                                                 
558
 Section 2 of the Consumer Contracts Act defines a consumer contract as a ―contract for the sale or 
supply of goods or services or both, in which the seller or supplier is dealing in the course of business 
and the purchaser or user is not, but does not include (a) a contract for the sale, letting or hire of 
immovable property; or (b) a contract of employment.‖ See also Cabri (Pvt) Limited v Terrier Services 
(Pvt) Limited HH 51-2004 for a discussion on the definition of a consumer contract, especially with 
regards a contract to provide services, which in Zimbabwe is interpreted broadly.  
559
 Section 3(2) of the Arbitration Act.  
560
 Section 2 of the Consumer Contracts Act [Chapter 8:03]. 
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not goods. It is also noteworthy that the definition of goods for VAT purposes 
excludes rights of action.
561
 Assuming, without conceding, that rights of action 
constitute goods, it is arguable that because an SPV is in the business of buying or 
receiving rights of action for the purpose of issuing securities, the receivables contract 
falls outwith the definition of a consumer contract. Per the definition, the purchaser 
must not be dealing in the course of business, while the seller should be. The Act is 
meant to protect consumers. In a securitization context, the SPV will certainly be 
engaged in the course of business and is therefore not a consumer.  
Arguably therefore, an arbitration provision in a receivables agreement will, as a 
general rule, be enforced. This proposition should also hold true for other 
securitization transaction contracts. Contractual agreements between an originating 
firm and a servicer, or an SPV and credit and liquidity enhancers are unlikely – for 
similar reasons - to be characterized as consumer contracts. This means, arbitration 
clauses in securitization contracts are more likely than not to be upheld for as long as 
it is clear from the agreement that it is the contracting parties‘ intention to refer 
disputes arising to arbitration. 
 
8.4.1.3. Arbitration agreements do not oust jurisdiction of the High court 
It is important to note that arbitration agreements do not oust the jurisdiction of 
the High court over civil disputes.
562
 As a general rule, the High court will, in 
practice, uphold an arbitration agreement by staying litigation proceedings instituted 
before it, save where it finds that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable for public 
                                                 
561
 Section 2 of the VAT Act. 
562
 Makarau J. in Cargill Zimbabwe v Culvenham Trading (Pvt) Limited, stated: ―… [a]n arbitration 
clause does not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the court.  It merely seeks to compliment 
the court process in resolving disputes by engaging in an alternative dispute resolution process but 
remains under the control of the courts.‖ Cargill Zimbabwe v Culvenham Trading (Pvt) Limited HH-
42-2006.  
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policy or statutory reasons.
563
 This practice is particularly useful to securitization 
participants as litigants will be precluded from drawing out the resolution of 
commercial disputes subject to arbitration by instituting litigation before the High 
court.   
 
8.4.1.4. Setting aside arbitral awards 
An attractive attribute of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is that the 
arbitral award, once issued is final, and can only be set aside by the High Court in 
extremely limited circumstances.
564
 This legal position is illustrated by the case of 
Ropa v Reosmart Investments and Another
565
 in which, citing with approval, the 
South African authors Butler and Finsen‘s, the court stated: ―The most important legal 
consequence of a valid final award is that it brings the dispute between the parties to 
an irrevocable end: the arbitrator‘s decision is final and there is no appeal to the 
courts. For better or worse, the parties must live with the award; unless their 
arbitration agreement provides for a right of appeal to another arbitral tribunal. The 
                                                 
563
 Edgars Stores Managers Association v Edgars Stores Limited SC 103-2004; PTA Bank v Elanne 
(Pvt) Ltd 2000 (1) ZLR 156; Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation v Flame Lily Broadcasting (Pvt) Ltd 
1999 (2) ZLR 448; Independence Mining (Pvt) Ltd v Fawcett Security Operations (Pvt) Ltd 1991 (1) 
ZLR 268. 
564
 Article 34 of the Arbitration Act lists the circumstances under which an arbitral award may be set 
aside by the High Court of Zimbabwe, which is the court to which all challenges must lie. Article 34 
states as follows: (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the High Court only if— (a) the party 
making the application furnishes proof that— (i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in 
article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication on that question, under the law of Zimbabwe; or 
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or 
of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iii) the award deals with a 
dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions 
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the 
award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (iv) the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Model Law from which 
the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Model Law; or 
(b) the High Court finds, that— (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of Zimbabwe; or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of 
Zimbabwe…‖ 
565
 Ropa (note 551, supra).  
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issues determined by the arbitrator become res judicata and neither party may reopen 
those issues in a fresh arbitration or court action.‖566 Gwaunza J.A. further stated: 
―this position applies with equal force in Zimbabwe‖ and that there is no appeal 
against an arbitral award.
567
 
The grounds for setting aside arbitral awards are stipulated in article 34(a) (i) to 
(iv) of the Arbitration Act.
568
 The grounds stated therein are technical and are unlikely 
to be problematic for securitization transactions. Article 34(b) permits the setting 
aside of an arbitral award on public policy grounds. Although prima facie, article 
34(b) is a catch-all provision, in practice, it has been restrictively construed and 
applied. Regarding this provision, the Supreme Court has held: ―… the approach to be 
adopted is to construe the public policy defence, as being applicable to either a foreign 
or domestic award, restrictively in order to preserve and recognise the basic objective 
of finality in all arbitrations; and to hold such defence applicable only if some 
fundamental principle of the law or morality or justice is violated.‖569 It stated further: 
―An award will not be contrary to public policy merely because the reasoning or 
conclusions of the arbitrator are wrong in fact or in law. In such a situation the court 
would not be justified in setting the award aside. Under article 34 or 36, the court does 
not exercise an appeal power and either uphold or set aside or decline to recognise and 
enforce an award by having regard to what it considers should have been the correct 
decision. Where, however, the reasoning or conclusion in an award goes beyond mere 
                                                 
566
 Ropa (note 551, supra), at p. 4.  
567
 Ibid. See also D.W. Butler and E. Finsen (1993) Arbitration in South Africa - Law & Practice, Juta 
& Co. Cape Town, at p 271.  
568
 Article 34(a) (i) to (iv) provides that arbitral awards will set aside if: (i) a party to the arbitration 
agreement was under some incapacity or the agreement is not valid under the law; (ii) the applicant was 
not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings; (iii) the award 
deals with a dispute not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to the arbitration; 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties. 
569
 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S) at p. 465. See also Smith 
J‘s decision in National Social Security Authority v Chairperson, National Social Security Workers 
Committee and National Social Security Workers Committee HH-51-2002, at p. 7. 
221 
faultiness or incorrectness and constitutes a palpable inequity that is so far reaching 
and outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that a sensible and 
fair minded person would consider that the conception of justice in Zimbabwe would 
be intolerably hurt by the award, then it would be contrary to public policy to uphold 
it. The same consequence applies where the arbitrator has not applied his mind to the 
question or has totally misunderstood the issue, and the resultant injustice reaches the 
point mentioned above.‖570 This dictum represents the law as it stands in Zimbabwe 
regarding the setting aside of arbitral awards on public policy grounds. Case-law is 
replete with attempts by litigants seeking the review of arbitral awards by the High 
court, but it has consistently refused to accede to such applications.
571
 
 
8.4.1.5. Enforcement of arbitral awards 
A party seeking to enforce an arbitral award must make a written application to 
the High Court giving notice to the other litigant(s).
572
 As a general rule, the High 
court will enforce an arbitral award unless if the other litigant(s) successfully contends 
that the award should not be enforced.
573
 The High Court may decline to enforce an 
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arbitral award on public policy grounds,
574
 or on the grounds stipulated in article 34(a) 
of the Arbitration Act, which are: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under 
some incapacity or the agreement is not valid under the law; (ii) the applicant was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings; 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or falling within the terms of 
the submission to the arbitration; (iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
575
 On the 
public policy ground, the High Court has refused to enforce an arbitral award where 
there was sufficient reason for believing that an arbitrator may have been biased – due 
to a prior undisclosed association with one of the litigants.
576
 In Musonzoa (Pvt) Ltd v 
Standard Fire and General, the court held that it was against Zimbabwe‘s public 
policy to enforce awards made by arbitrators in circumstances where fundamental 
rules of natural justice were violated.  
In summary, the law and practice of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism is established in Zimbabwe. Contractual parties can rely on arbitration for 
the expeditious, equitable, cost-effective and expert resolution of disputes arising 
from securitization transactions.  
 
8.5. Choice of law and jurisdiction 
Agreements entered into between securitization participants may contain choice of 
law and jurisdiction clauses. Jurisdiction clauses are sometimes referred to as choice 
of forum clauses. Choice of law and forum clauses identify, in the event of dispute, 
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the law - either domestic or foreign - which will govern the contractual relationship 
between the contracting parties, and the adjudicating court, tribunal or forum. It is a 
generally accepted principle of private international law that contracting parties may 
choose a law to govern their contractual relationship and in addition agree to refer 
their contractual disputes to arbitration or to be heard by either a domestic or a foreign 
court. Although there is scant Zimbabwean literature on this subject, especially as it 
relates to conflicts of law in commercial contracts, the position in Roman-Dutch law 
is that choice of law and choice of forum agreements are, as a general rule, upheld and 
enforced.
577
  
 
8.5.1. Choice of forum 
Can parties to a contract in a domestic securitization transaction agree that their 
contractual disputes will be adjudicated by a foreign court? And secondly, does this 
choice of jurisdiction oust the High court of Zimbabwe‘s jurisdiction to adjudicate 
over the dispute? The general rule is that where parties to a contract have expressly 
identified a foreign jurisdiction to adjudicate over their contractual disputes; their 
agreement will be upheld and enforced by the High court. This general proposition is 
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subject: (a) to the court finding that the foreign jurisdiction chosen is the one closely 
connected to the dispute in question; (b) that there are no statutory and/or public 
policy reasons precluding the resolution of the dispute before a foreign court. This is 
the position in Roman-Dutch law.  
It is important to note that jurisdiction exercised by the High court over civil 
matters in Zimbabwe is not granted or ousted by agreement between contracting 
parties. The High court exercises jurisdiction by operation of law. The High court‘s 
inherent jurisdiction is, as noted above, statutorily entrenched in section 13 of the 
High Court Act. Practically, where parties to a contract have expressly stipulated in 
their agreement that all disputes arising from their contract must be adjudicated by a 
foreign court but one of the parties objects to the enforcement of the contractual term, 
the High court is obliged to decide if it or the foreign court should exercise 
jurisdiction over the dispute. In determining the exercise of jurisdiction, the High 
court would need to consider all the factors relevant to the case and decide if those 
factors indicate that it has a closer connection to the contractual dispute than the 
foreign jurisdiction. If the High court will still stay proceedings before it, if the factors 
pertaining to the dispute strongly point to the foreign jurisdiction being the more 
appropriate forum to adjudicate over the parties‘ contractual dispute.  
Case-law suggests that a range of factors are taken into account when determining 
whether a choice of forum agreement is to be upheld. These include the parties 
residency, domicile, place of business, place where the contract was entered into, 
place where offer and/or acceptance was made, place where the goods or services are 
to be delivered or rendered, respectively, place where enforcement of the judgment 
are to take place, etc. Although not defined in Roman-Dutch law as such, these factors 
are broadly the same as those considered under the English common law doctrine of 
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forum non conviniens.
578
 It is not clear if this doctrine, which parties can use to 
challenge the initiation of litigation before English courts on the basis that another 
more convenient forum exists, is part of Roman-Dutch law. The absence of case-law 
on this point suggests to the contrary.
579
   
The Zimbabwean case of Colour Fast Textile Limited v P and O Neidlloyd
580
 
which dealt with choice of forum and choice of law clauses was wrongly decided. In 
the case, the bill of lading at the centre of the dispute contained a provision which 
stated that any arising dispute would be governed by English law and adjudicated 
exclusively by the High Court of Justice in London. The High court found that the 
applicant, as the consignee, was bound by the terms of the bill of lading. The 
applicant had lodged an urgent application for the release of goods it had imported 
into Zimbabwe. Gowora J. presiding stated: ―The function of courts is to give effect to 
provisions in a contract as that reflects the intention of the parties, it is not for the 
court to depart from those terms and write its own terms. The High Court of Justice in 
London has been granted exclusive jurisdiction by the contract to adjudicate on the 
contract as it relates to a claim against the carrier and there is no way that this court 
can find jurisdiction to hear the matter. The applicant as I have found is bound by the 
terms of the contract and this court does not have jurisdiction according to the 
contract. The application is therefore not properly before me.‖581 [Emphasis added]  
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The above-cited statement is an incorrect statement of the law relating both to the 
issue of conflict of laws and jurisdiction as in applies in Zimbabwe. Because it was 
not nuanced, the statement by Gowora J. gives the impression that the High court‘s 
jurisdiction to adjudicate over matters, where parties have chosen a particular law and 
jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from their contractual relationship, is 
thereby automatically ousted.  This is incorrect and does not reflect the established 
principle that there is a general presumption against the ouster of the High court‘s 
jurisdiction. Gowora‘s judgment is at odds with Section 13 of the High Court Act, 
which clearly states: ―subject to this Act and any other law, the High Court shall have 
full original civil jurisdiction over all persons and over all matters within Zimbabwe.‖ 
The proper position is that the High court is unlikely to lightly uphold an objection to 
the exercise of civil jurisdiction as happened in the Colour Fast Textiles Limited case. 
Karwi J. in the case of Chawora v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, citing authority 
correctly stated the legal position. He stated: ―It is…true that superior courts will 
jealously guard their jurisdiction and there exists a presumption against the ouster of 
the court's jurisdiction unless the legislature states so in very clear terms. Thus it is 
imperative that any statute or contract that purports to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts must be restrictively interpreted.‖582  
Gowora J. should have considered whether the facts of the matter indicated that 
the High court of Justice in London was the court with the closest or most real 
connection with the dispute in question. She simply took the agreement as 
determinative of the question on jurisdiction. In the Colour Fast Textiles Limited case, 
the contracting parties‘ place of domicile and residency was Zimbabwe; it was the 
place of performance - the locus solutionis - it was where all the contractual parties 
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carried on their business, and it was where the property, subject of the dispute, was 
physically present. The applicant was seeking the release of goods that it had bought 
and paid for c.f.i.
583
 The goods were already in Zimbabwe and it could be argued that 
although flowing from a bill of lading, the action by the applicant was common-law 
based and vindicatory in nature, and the issue was whether the second respondent was 
entitled to retain custody of the goods in the circumstances of the case. A strong case 
could, on the facts, be made that the cause of action arose in Zimbabwe and therefore 
the High court should have exercised jurisdiction. Arguably, if opinion has been 
sought from English legal counsel, it is likely that the parties would have been 
informed that the High court of Justice in London applied the forum non conviniens 
principle.  
In addition to the above, Gowora J. should have considered the issue of choice of 
law and jurisdiction separately. Her treatment of the issues was cursory at best. 
Choice of law and choice of forum are two distinct concepts, although in practice they 
are usually linked.
584
 It is open to the High court of Zimbabwe, as appears below, to 
hold that despite the foreign jurisdiction clause, it would exercise jurisdiction over the 
matter, but apply the foreign law chosen by the parties. The High court can so hold 
because it is a court of inherent jurisdiction, with power to regulate its own 
proceedings and judgments. Further, Gowora J. should not have refused to exercise 
jurisdiction. Instead, if she wanted to hold the parties to the choice of forum provision 
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in the bill of lading, she should have stayed the proceedings before her, pending the 
initiation of proceedings in London.   
The ousting of the High court‘s jurisdiction in circumstances such as those in 
Colour Fast Textiles Limited is yet to be properly and fully argued before the High 
court, with appropriate authority being brought to the attention of the court.
585
 It is 
highly unlikely that the High court of Zimbabwe will - in a similar and appropriately 
considered case - uphold an objection to its exercise of jurisdiction where the only 
factor connecting the dispute to the foreign jurisdiction is the provision in the parties‘ 
contractual agreement, and most or all other factors point to the High court of 
Zimbabwe being the appropriate forum to resolve the contractual dispute. This would 
be especially true if Zimbabwe is the place where the contract was entered into, the 
place of performance, the parties‘ domicile and residency, place where the parties‘ 
business is carried out, etc.  
The above analysis illustrates that if parties to a securitization contract have 
chosen a foreign jurisdiction to adjudicate over their contractual disputes, such an 
agreement, will, as a general rule be upheld and enforced in Zimbabwe. However, 
jurisprudence on the issue remains underdeveloped.  
 
8.5.2. Choice of law 
In Zimbabwe, parties to securitization contracts may agree to have their 
contractual relationships governed by a foreign law in place of the lex fori. The 
receivables contract, the trust relationships as determined by the trust deed, the 
contracts entered into between an SPV, credit and liquidity enhancers as well as other 
participants such as underwriters and servicers are all examples of contracts where the 
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parties may choose a foreign law to govern their relationships. There are myriad 
reasons why parties may choose a foreign law over the lex fori. The contract in 
question may be international in nature, or the parties may prefer the outcome that 
results from the application of a particular foreign law, or the parties may be of the 
view that the chosen law is more certain or has been tested before the relevant courts 
or tribunals and its parameters are well known in the jurisdiction in question.  
 
8.5.2.1. Choice of law identified 
Under Roman-Dutch law, if parties to a contract have expressly chosen a foreign 
law over the lex fori to govern their contractual relationship, their agreement will, as a 
general rule, be upheld and enforced.
586
 If one of the parties to the contract contests 
the use of the foreign law in question, the court will then proceed to determine the 
proper law of the contract, or the legal system to which the contract has the closest or 
most real connection.
587
 The court will also consider whether there are statutory 
and/or public policy reasons precluding the resolution of the dispute using the 
particular foreign law.  
In assessing the proper law of the contract, where this is in dispute, despite an 
apparent choice of law having been made by the contracting parties, the court will 
analyse all the factors relevant to the dispute including the locus contractus, the locus 
solutionis, the domicile and the nationality of the parties, among other factors.
588
 This 
is the law and practice that will be followed in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean case of 
Colour Fast Textiles Limited cited and criticised above, should be disregarded as bad 
law. Persuasive alternative dicta can be found in the South African cases of (1) Parry 
v Astral Operations Ltd; (2) Kleinhans v Parmalat S.A. (Pty) Ltd, and Forsyth and 
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Joubert‘s publications cited above.589 In addition, in Zimbabwe, where choice of law 
disputes arise, reference should be made, as appropriate since Zimbabwe is not a 
signatory, to the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.  
Another principle of Roman-Dutch common law is that a choice of law provision 
in a contract will be given effect to subject to the country‘s mandatory rules, which 
the parties cannot contract out of. These include for instance public policy 
considerations as contained in the Consumer Contracts Act, Contractual Penalties 
Act,
590
 and other relevant statutes. In other words, the High court is more likely than 
not, to refuse to use a foreign law to govern a contractual relationship where use of 
that foreign law would lead to the violation of a right that is publicly protected in 
Zimbabwe. On this principle, reference can be made to South African cases where 
labour laws were held to be mandatory domestic laws that parties could not contract 
out of.
591
  
Case-law also establishes that where parties allege that a particular foreign law 
governs their contractual relationship, the parties must provide the law in question. In 
the South African case of Parry v Astral Operations Ltd, Pillay D, J. stated that: ―[a] 
foreign law must be proved by evidence. It is a question of fact not of law. The court 
may take judicial notice of the foreign law if the sources are unimpeachably accurate 
and authoritative. A printout from a website on the Internet is not, without more, such 
a reliable source.‖592  
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8.5.2.2. Choice of law not identified 
Where parties to a contract have not expressly stipulated a law of a particular 
jurisdiction to govern their contractual relationship, and where the issue arises, a court 
will, as a general rule, utilise private international law conflict of law principles to 
identify the proper law of the contract. In cases where there is no international 
component to a contract and where the offer and acceptance were made in Zimbabwe; 
where the contract is to be performed in Zimbabwe, by parties based in Zimbabwe, 
Zimbabwe‘s common and statute laws will, as a general rule, apply. 
Where however, there is an international component, or one party contends that 
the parties intended that a foreign law apply to their contractual arrangements, 
reference will, as a general rule, be made to Roman-Dutch jurisprudence and rules of 
private international law to determine the proper law of the contract. Given 
Zimbabwe‘s Roman-Dutch common law background, almost all of the relevant, albeit 
scant literature, available on this subject is drawn from South African precedent and 
commentators. It is now relatively well-established, although it was initially a source 
of some contention, that in the absence of contractual parties electing the law of a 
particular jurisdiction, the court before whom the parties are appearing will seek to 
identify the proper law of the contract, which is the law with which the contract has 
the closest and most real connection. The South African locus classicus on this 
subject - Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Efroiken and Newman
593
 - framed the enquiry as 
an attempt to find the presumed intention of the contracting parties with regards the 
law to govern their contractual relationship. In practice this test has largely been 
discarded in favour of one that is more in line with the dictates of the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) and 
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international practice.
594
 It is now generally accepted that the test to be used in 
conflict of laws enquiry is one that seeks to identify the legal system with which the 
contract has the closest and most real connection. Given the trend in South Africa and 
the fact that the reformulated test is consistent with the test contained in clause 4 of 
the Rome Convention, current South African jurisprudence is more likely to 
commend itself to courts in Zimbabwe. The process of identifying the proper law of 
the contract, i.e. the legal system with which the contract has the closest and most real 
connection, involves taking into consideration a myriad of factors. A commentator has 
correctly held, and this study contends, that a combination of the following factors, 
drawn from South African case-law, should as appropriate, be taken into account 
when considering choice of law in contractual disputes arising in Zimbabwe: (i) the 
locus solutionis (the place of performance); (ii) the locus contractus (the place of 
conclusion of the contract); (iii) the place of offer; (iv) the place of acceptance; (v) the 
place of agreed arbitration; (vi) the domicile of the parties; (vii) the place where the 
parties carry on business; (viii) the domicile of the agents of the parties; (ix) the future 
domicile of the parties; (x) the habitual residence of the parties; (xi) the nationality of 
the parties; (xii) the form, terminology and language of the contract; (xiii) the locus 
rei sitae (the place where the property is situated); (xiv) the locus libri siti (the place 
where the property is registered); (xv) the locus expeditionis (the place of despatch); 
(xvi) the locus destinationis (the place of destination) (xvii) the place of registration of 
the vehicle (means of conveyance) by which the res vendita is transferred; (xviii) the 
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currency in which the contractual obligation of payment is expressed; (xix) the 
incorporation of a statute in the contract.
595
 
Needless to say, each case would need to be decided on its facts and the weight to 
be given to each or a combination of factors will depend on the circumstances 
prevailing in each case. In the case of Kleinhans v Parmalat S.A. (Pty) Ltd, Pillay D, 
J. aptly noted that: ―…in assigning the proper law of the contract, there is no clear 
conflict rule which can mechanically be applied to yield a certain answer. A coterie of 
connecting factors, including the locus contractus, the locus solutionis, the domicile 
and the nationality of the parties clamour for attention.‖596 In addition, procedurally 
and consistent with the established legal principle that ―he who asserts must prove,‖ 
the party contending that a particular rule of law applies bears the onus of establishing 
on a balance of probabilities that the foreign law in question is the proper law of the 
contract.
597
 Further, it is arguable that the rule of private international law to be 
applied in Zimbabwe pertaining to the procedural laws to be applied to a contractual 
dispute governed by a foreign law will be the same as the rule applied in South Africa. 
In South Africa, the general rule is that the lex loci contractus, i.e. the law of the place 
where the contract was entered into, determines the formalities of a contract. This is 
the same rule as applies under English rules of private international law.
598
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There is a dearth of Zimbabwe-specific legal material on conflict of law pertaining 
to commercial contracts. This is a disadvantage. However, as noted above, given that 
the roots of Zimbabwe‘s common law are largely Roman-Dutch, reference has always 
been and should be made to South African academic commentary and stare decisis, as 
persuasive opinion. Guidance on how courts in Zimbabwe are likely to approach 
conflict of law cases with a private international law dimension can be safely gleaned 
from South African jurisprudence. It is suggested that policy makers in Zimbabwe 
should give consideration to ratifying and incorporating into Zimbabwean law aspects 
of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980). 
Further, given the paucity of Zimbabwe-specific legal material, transactional counsel 
engaged in securitization transactions structured in Zimbabwe needs to ensure that 
contractual agreements contain clear and unambiguous choice of law and dispute 
resolution clauses. 
 
8.6. Summary 
In summary, this chapter concludes that Zimbabwe possesses a civil justice 
system which can be harnessed to resolve disputes that can arise from securitization 
transactions. The High court of Zimbabwe is the court that has jurisdiction over most 
disputes which can arise from securitization transactions. Zimbabwe also possesses an 
established arbitration legal framework, which can be utilized by parties to 
securitization transactions. As a general rule, the law regards arbitral awards as final 
and they can be set aside only on extremely limited grounds. This is obviously an 
attractive characteristic for participants of securitization transactions who may prefer 
this private form of dispute resolution, which is expeditious, equitable, and cost-
                                                                                                                                            
law which applies to the underlying transaction or occurrence (the proper law or lex causae). The same 
rule applies in English private international law. 
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effective. The chapter also analysed the law on choice of law and forum, which are 
typical of commercial contracts. This study recommends that policymakers should 
consider ratifying the Rome Convention on the law Applicable to Contracts (1980). 
On the whole, the identified weaknesses notwithstanding, this chapter concludes that 
Zimbabwe has a generally adequate civil judicial system which enables the resolution 
of disputes that typically arise in relation to securitization transactions.   
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  CHAPTER 9         
               FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the extent to which laws underpinning Zimbabwe‘s 
financial services regulatory framework enable the effective management of risks that 
can arise from securitization. Zimbabwe‘s financial services regulatory framework is 
composed of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), the Insurance and Pensions 
Commission (IPC), and the Securities Commission (SC). As illustrated by the 2007 
global financial crisis, securitization is not a risk-free. For this reason, emerging 
markets‘ legal infrastructure must - in addition to enabling securitization - enable the 
prevention and management of securitization transaction risks. The chapter concludes 
that Zimbabwe‘s hybrid - functional/institutional - financial markets regulatory 
framework:
599
 (i) is rudimentary and should be reformed to enable the three regulatory 
agencies to contribute to the mitigation of securitization transaction risk; and (ii) 
owing to its underdeveloped state it inadvisable for firms, in the absence of regulatory 
reform, for a full blown securitization market to propagate. It also argues for the 
extant regulatory system to be reconstituted into an integrated regulatory system.  
 
 
                                                 
599
 In this thesis the words regulatory and supervisory are used interchangeably to refer both to rule-
making (regulation) and the application of those rules (supervision). For a discussion on the different 
types of financial services regulatory models, refer below to section 9.5.   
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9.2. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
The RBZ is established pursuant to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act.
600
 It 
administers: (i) the Banking Act which regulates banking institutions; (ii) the Building 
Societies Act which regulates building societies; (iii) the Troubled Financial 
Institutions (Resolutions) Act (TFIR Act), - used to resolve banking, building society 
and other money-lending financial institutions deemed to be troubled and whose 
collapse can threaten financial stability; (iv) the Moneylending and Rates of Interest 
Act (MRI Act) which regulates firms involved in the business of money-lending; (v) 
the Asset Management Companies Act (AMC Act) which regulates the operations of 
asset management companies in Zimbabwe; and (vi) the Collective Investment 
Schemes Act (CIS Act) which regulates the operations of collective investment 
schemes.  
 The RBZ was created in 1956 and is headed by a Governor who chairs the board 
of directors.
601
 It has four deputy governors, who are engaged for fiver-year terms.
602
 
The RBZ has limited real independence, as it is obliged to comply with directives and 
other prescriptions issued by the government through the Minister of Finance.
603
 
Among other core responsibilities, the RBZ is responsible for supervising banking 
institutions and for fostering the liquidity, solvency, stability and proper functioning 
of Zimbabwe‘s financial system.604 This section addresses the question: to what extent 
do the legal enactments administered by, or relating to, the RBZ enable it to prevent 
and manage risks that can arise when regulated financial institutions engage in 
securitization transactions?  
                                                 
600
 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chap 22:15].  
601
 Ibid., at section 14.  
602
 Ibid., at section 15.  
603
 Ibid., at section 8. 
604
 For a full restatement of the functions and powers of the RBZ refer to section 6 and 7 of the RBZ 
Act respectively.   
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9.2.1. Context 
As discussed in chapter 2, the global financial crisis and the case of the U.S., 
clearly illustrate the risks that can arise when regulators fail to effectively regulate 
banking and other financial conglomerates‘ involvement in securitization transactions. 
Securitization enabled banking and other firms to change their capital models from 
the originate-to-hold model to the originate-to-distribute model. This securitization-
enabled capital structure reduced regulatory capital costs, increased liquidity, 
enhanced profits and consequentially remuneration for financial executives. However, 
conversely, there was an increase in moral hazard, representing banking corporate-
governance and risk-management failures.  
Banking regulators failed to effectively regulate the securitization process leading 
to increased fraud,
605
 predatory lending and other unfair consumer practices.
606
 In the 
period leading up to the 2007 global financial crisis, there was an overall increase in 
subprime mortgage lending and issuance of subprime mortgage-backed securities,
607
 
including complex, difficult to price CDO securities. The period also witnessed the 
increased origination and use of derivative instruments, including unregulated credit 
default swaps (CDS). The increase in subprime mortgages was enabled in part by the 
poor prudential regulation of loan origination and underwriting standards.
608
   
Banking regulators also failed to effectively regulate the banking sector‘s risk 
management practices.
609
 Banking regulators and investors over-relied on CRA 
opinions to determine the risk profiles of financial assets, including for regulatory 
                                                 
605
 Gorton (note 131, supra), at p. 73. 
606
 Tashman (note 136, supra) at p. 410.   
607
 See generally Yuliya S. Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert (2008) ‗Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis‘, (December 5, 2008). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396  
608
 Commentators such as argue that the U.S. Community Reinvestment Act, which encouraged banks 
to lend to marginalised communities, who previously had been unable to access credit, encouraged the 
growth of the subprime mortgages market. See for instance Tarr (2009) (note 135, supra). 
609
 United States Department of the Treasury (2009) ‗Financial Regulatory Reform - A New 
Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation‘, at p. 5. Available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf 
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capital purposes.
610
 This had catastrophic consequences. Following the onset of the 
global financial crisis, it became clear that some structured finance securities, 
especially subprime mortgage backed securities, had been grossly mispriced by 
CRAs.
611
 This adversely affected the liquidity of assets (some of which had triple-A 
ratings) held on bank balance-sheets, resulting in massive losses as they sold their 
assets at fire-sale prices, or re-valued them at mark-to-market prices;
612
 which eroded 
their capital bases and impaired their refinancing abilities.
613
  
Regulators also failed to prevent financial institutions from being exposed to high 
asset concentration risk and other risk exposures.
614
 This resulted in banking 
institutions‘ prescribed capital and liquidity prescriptions failing to prevent bank 
insolvencies, necessitating public bailouts to prevent systemic meltdown. In 2009, the 
U.S. Treasury lamented: ―Regulators did not require firms to hold sufficient capital to 
cover trading assets, high-risk loans, and off-balance sheet commitments, or to hold 
increased capital during good times to prepare for bad times. Regulators did not 
require firms to plan for a scenario in which the availability of liquidity was sharply 
curtailed.‖615 The loss of confidence in structured finance securities as a class, 
following the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble shut down the interbank market as 
banks - fearing counterparty risk - refused to lend to each other.
616
 Banks started 
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 Ibid., at p.46. 
611
 John P. Hunt (2009) ‗Credit Rating Agencies and the 'Worldwide Credit Crisis': The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement‘. Columbia Business Law 
Review, Vol. 2009, No. 1, at pp. 10-12. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267625  
612
 For a discussion of fair-value accounting and the impact on asset values following the onset of the 
global financial crisis, see John P. Hunt (2009) ‗One Cheer for Credit Rating Agencies: How the Mark-
to-Market Accounting Debate Highlights the Case for Rating-Dependent Regulation‘, South Carolina 
Law Review, Vol. 60, 2009. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331633  
613
 Andrew W. Lo (2008) ‗Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008‘, at 
p.14. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398207 
614
 United States Department of the Treasury (2009) (note 609, supra) at p. 5.  
615
 Ibid.  
616
 International Monetary Fund (2008) ‗Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks 
and Restoring Financial Soundness‘, at p. 55. Available at 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/index.htm 
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hoarding cash as they intensified their recapitalisation efforts, compounding the global 
recession.  
In aggregate, these and other regulatory failures by banking (and securities and 
insurance) regulators contributed to the credit crisis. Given this context it is axiomatic 
that an emerging market intending to propagate a securitization-enabling 
infrastructure must ensure that the legal framework underpinning its banking 
regulatory system enable the prevention and management of risks that can arise from 
banking institutions‘ involvement in securitization transactions either as originators, 
providers of securitization transaction services or as investors in issued structured 
finance securities. The following sections analyse whether the RBZ has power to 
mitigate risks that can be spawned when regulated banking institutions engage in 
securitization transactions. The phrase banking institutions is used in a general sense, 
unless stated otherwise, to refer to commercial banks, investment banks, discount 
houses, finance houses and building societies. 
 
9.2.2. RBZ’s regulatory jurisdiction 
A fragmented financial services regulatory system – as opposed to an integrated 
one – is vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage, enabling financial institutions to escape the 
strictures of regulation, as illustrated by the U.S.
617
 To prevent regulatory arbitrage 
and gaps, it is arguably better to have all banking, building society and other deposit 
                                                 
617
 United States Department of the Treasury (2009) (note 609, supra) at p. 5. The U.S. has a 
fragmented financial services regulatory model. See below at section 9.5. For an illustrative article on 
the problem of regulatory arbitrage in banking see Shasha Dai (2009) ‗The Ugly Spectre of Regulatory 
Arbitrage in Bank Deals‘, Wall Street Journal (20 May 2009). Available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/05/20/the-ugly-spectre-of-regulatory-arbitrage-in-bank-deals/  
See also Cormick Grimshaw (2009) ‗Bank Regulatory Arbitrage and Deregulation: the Number of 
Bank Regulators Matters‘. Available at http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2009/06/bank-regulatory-
arbitrage-and.html 
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taking institutions effectively regulated by one agency.
618
 As a general principle, in 
Zimbabwe, the RBZ regulates banking, building society, asset management and 
money-lending firms, as well as collective investment schemes. As noted in chapter 4, 
section 4 of the Banking Act stipulates that commercial banks, investment banks, 
merchant banks, discount houses, finance houses are regulated and supervised by the 
RBZ through a Registrar of Banking Institutions. The regulatory jurisdiction of the 
RBZ over banking institutions is relatively straightforward, but its regulatory 
jurisdiction over building societies and banking institutions created by an Act of 
parliament, such as the POSB is subject to caveats, as appears below. 
 
9.2.2.1. Building societies and the POSB  
The RBZ regulates the POSB, which as noted in chapter 4 above, is a banking 
institution created by an Act of parliament. The RBZ regulates the operations of the 
POSB only because the Minister of Finance used his discretion per section 3 of the 
RBZ Act to delegate his regulatory and supervisory authority to the RBZ. This 
authority can be withdrawn or amended by the Minister of Finance at his discretion.
619
 
But for this delegation, it is notable that the primary regulatory authority over the 
POSB is the Minister of Finance. The RBZ also regulates building societies in 
Zimbabwe. Similar to the situation with the POSB, the RBZ exercises regulatory 
authority over building societies by virtue of a ministerial delegation. But for this 
                                                 
618
 This is an argument that is made by the U.S. Treasury to redress the problem of regulatory arbitrage 
that afflicts the fragmented U.S. regulatory system. United States Department of the Treasury (2009) 
(note 611, supra), at p. 5.  
619
 Section 3 of the RBZ states: ―(1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, direct that all or any of 
the provisions of this Act relating to banking institutions shall apply, with such modifications and 
subject to such terms and conditions as he may specify in the notice, to (a) all building societies 
established in terms of the Building Societies Act [Chapter 24:02] or any particular such building 
society or class of such building societies; (b) the Peoples Own Savings Bank operating under the 
Peoples Own Savings Bank Act [Chapter 24:10]; and the provisions concerned shall apply accordingly, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Building Societies Act [Chapter 24:02] or the Post 
Office Savings Bank Act [Chapter 24:10]. (2) The Minister may at any time amend or revoke a 
direction in terms of subsection (1) or any term or condition thereof.‖ [Emphasis added]. 
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delegation, the primary regulatory authority over building societies is the Minister of 
Finance.  
This regulatory framework, which subjects the regulation by the RBZ of some 
banking and building society institutions to the political discretion of a Minister of 
Finance, is flawed. This should be rectified to ensure that all banking institutions, be 
they commercial banking institutions, investment banks, building societies, banks 
created by an Act of Parliament - such as the POSB, or any other money-lending 
entity are mandatorily regulated by one agency. In addition, such regulatory reform 
would ensure that any prudential guidelines prescribed by the RBZ to prevent or 
manage risks, including those associated with securitization, will be binding on all 
financial institutions undertaking banking, building society or other money-lending 
business in the country.  
 
9.2.2.2. Mortgage brokers  
The RBZ does not have jurisdiction to regulate or supervise the operations of 
mortgage brokers. A mortgage brokerage firm that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
banking institution is regulated by the RBZ, pursuant to section 45 of the Banking 
Act, as an associate of a banking institution. But independent brokerage firms are not. 
This is a regulatory gap, which can be exploited to escape rules and regulations aimed 
at ensuring best practice loan origination and underwriting standards by financial 
institutions. As illustrated by the U.S. subprime crisis, this can lead to an important 
sector of the economy engaging in activities which potentially threaten financial 
stability. Because mortgage brokerage firms are not banks, it stands to reason that 
they must be regulated by a regulator such as an integrated financial services 
regulator, or at least supervised on a consolidated basis. As argued below in paragraph 
243 
9.5., this thesis argues for the establishment of an integrated regulatory agency such as 
the U.K.‘s Financial Services Authority (FSA) or a twin-peaks model such as 
Australia‘s Prudential Regulation Agency and the Securities and Investments 
Commission.
620
  
 
9.2.2.3. Asset management companies and Collective investment schemes  
Zimbabwe has an odd regulatory arrangement for its asset management companies 
and collective investment schemes. Both are regulated by the RBZ. Section 5 of the 
AMC Act states that no person may carry on any asset management business without 
a registration certificate issued by the RBZ. Section 3 of the AMC Act defines the 
business of asset management as follows: ―…a person carries on the business of asset 
management if he or she, on behalf of one or more clients, invests the property of 
such client or clients in any one or more of the following ways – (a) in the money 
market; (b) in a recognised stock exchange; or (c) by purchasing immovable property, 
motor vehicles or other valuable property for resale within any period of twelve 
months; with a view of securing a profit for such client…‖ [Emphasis added]  
A collective investment scheme is defined in section 3 of the CIS Act as follows: 
―a collective scheme is an arrangement with respect to property of any description, the 
purpose or effect of which is to enable participants to participate in or receive profits 
or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the 
property, where - (a) the participants do not have day-to-day control over the 
management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to 
give directions in regard to its management; and (b) the arrangement has either or 
both the following characteristics - (i) the participants‘ contributions and the profits or 
                                                 
620
 The two entities constitute the twin-peaks regulatory model. 
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income out of which payments are to be made are pooled; (ii) the property is managed 
as a whole.‖ Collective investment schemes relate to investments in securities on 
stock exchanges.  
Clearly, collective investment schemes and asset management companies should 
be regulated by the SC because their main business is investment in securities on 
behalf of investors. This is a regulatory anomaly, which in practice is likely to lead to 
regulatory arbitrage and can possibly lead to some areas of these entities‘ operations 
not being regulated at all by the RBZ, because the activities fall outside its regulatory 
jurisdiction or expertise. The CIS Act and the AMC Act were enacted in 2004 and 
2001 respectively. This was before the enactment of the Securities Act, which became 
law in 2008, and by extension before the existence of the SC. Both the CIS and the 
AMC Act were promulgated during a period marked by unregulated financial activity, 
some of which threatened financial stability. These entities should be regulated by the 
SC and not the RBZ.  
 
9.2.2.4. Consolidated supervision 
The above notwithstanding, it is notable that in 2007 with the objective of 
ensuring overall financial market stability, the RBZ created a framework for the 
consolidated supervision of banking and non-banking entities. It promulgated RBZ 
Guideline No. 02-2007/BSD: Consolidated Supervision Policy Framework. The RBZ 
justified the issuance of the Guidelines on the need to mitigate systemic risk: a crucial 
consideration in an era of financial conglomerates and where securitization has in 
effect blurred the traditional finance areas of banking, insurance and securities 
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trading.
621
 The Guideline enables the RBZ to indirectly supervise any financial 
conglomerate one of whose related entities is a regulated banking institution.
622
 The 
RBZ promulgated the guidelines because there are financial conglomerates in 
Zimbabwe whose interests span the banking, insurance and securities markets.
623
 To 
an extent this framework can be harnessed to ensure overall financial market stability 
through the consolidated supervision of firms which are critical to the functioning of 
financial markets. Laudable though it is, this initiative suffers from a particularly 
serious weakness. The framework was created through guidelines issued by the RBZ 
and not through an Act of parliament. It is arguable that these guidelines do not carry 
sufficient legal authority required to give such consolidated supervision teeth to 
ensure compliance.  
The legal status of RBZ-issued guidelines - within Zimbabwe‘s banking 
regulatory framework - is ambiguous. It is unclear if guidelines issued by the RBZ 
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 The RBZ Bank Supervision Guideline states: ―1.5. Financial conglomerates bring with them a 
number of regulatory and supervisory concerns, including but not limited to abuse of economic power; 
agency problems; imprudent intra-group transactions and exposures; reputation risk; moral hazard; 
regulatory arbitrage; conflicts of interest; complex corporate structures; and potential for risk 
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current best practice in supervision.‖ [Emphasis added]. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Licensing, 
Supervision and Surveillance Guidelines No. 02-2007/BSD, at pp. 5-6. 
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 Clause 1.4 states: ―the primary objective of Consolidated Supervision is not to supervise each and 
every entity in the group but to supervise the regulated entity as part of the group so as to take into 
account the potential impact of the various group entities on the banking institution‖…. In the preamble 
in clause 2 to 4 thereof, the Guidelines state: ―2. The Banking Act [Chapter 24:20], in particular 
Section 45(1)(c), empowers the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to monitor, supervise and investigate 
associates of banking institutions, hence facilitate supervision of banking institutions on a consolidated 
basis. 3. This Guideline shall apply to every banking institution, bank holding company, financial 
conglomerate, mixed activity group, and their associates as defined in section 2 of the Banking Act 
[Chapter 24:20]. 4. For purposes of Consolidated Supervision, insurance companies shall be included 
in the consolidation to the extend of providing a qualitative assessment only but excluded with respect 
to Quantitative Consolidation of the banking group.‖ Ibid., at p. 4. 
623
 Examples of such entities include Trust Holdings, Kingdom Financial Holdings, National Merchant 
Bank of Zimbabwe, Inter Market Financial Holdings. In its January 2009 Monetary Statement the RBZ 
Governor stated that some banking institutions engaged in regulatory arbitrage by using unregulated 
conduits to transact non-banking business activities. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2009) ‗Monetary 
Policy Statement‘, at paragraph 2.6.2. Available at 
http://www.rbz.co.zw/pdfs/2009%20Julymps/mpsjul2009.pdf  
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have the force of law or are mere instructions or directives. If the guidelines have the 
force of law, then they are of peremptory application and are binding on all regulated 
institutions. If on the other hand, they have the legal status of instructions or 
directives; it means they do not have the force of law; and that if they are breached, 
the errant banking institution is at liberty to challenge the lawfulness, or reasonability 
of the instruction or direction.  
The sole authority with power under the Banking Act, the Building Societies Act, 
the AMC Act and the CIS Act to issue subsidiary legislation, which regulates aspects 
of regulated institutions‘ affairs, is not the RBZ, but the Minister of Finance. Section 
81 of the Banking Act, section 75 of the Building Societies Act, and section 42 of the 
AMC Act all of which are similarly worded in the relevant parts state: ―the Minister 
may make regulations providing for all matters which by this Act are required or 
permitted to be prescribed or which, in his opinion, are necessary or convenient to be 
prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.‖624 Section 31 of the Banking 
Act also states that the Minister of Finance may prescribe regulations providing, inter 
alia, for banking institutions‘ ―assets, liabilities, credits, deposits and, generally, the 
conduct of their financial affairs.‖625 No legal provision in the Banking Act, the 
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 Section 24 of the Asset Management Act [Chap 24:26] states: ―The Minister may, after consultation 
with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, make regulations prescribing all matters which by this Act are 
required or permitted to be prescribed or which, in the opinion of the Minister, are necessary or 
convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.‖  
625
 Section 31 of the Banking Act titled: ―Prescription of further financial requirements‖ states: ―(1) 
Subject to this Act, the Minister may, in regulations made under section eighty one, prescribe 
requirements to be complied with by all banking institutions in regard to their assets, liabilities, credits, 
deposits and, generally, the conduct of their financial affairs. (2) Regulations referred to in subsection 
(1) may provide for - (a) the ratios and exposures to be maintained by banking institutions, in regard to 
their assets, off-balance-sheet items and other categories of their capital base; (b) the aggregate amount 
of credits that banking institutions may have committed or outstanding at any time; (c) the maturity 
profile of assets and liabilities of banking institutions; (d) the minimum aggregate liquid resources to be 
maintained by banking institutions in relation to the value of their assets or their total liabilities to the 
public; (e) the maximum aggregate amount of credits and investments, or specific categories thereof, 
that may be made by banking institutions; ( f ) the classification and evaluation of assets of banking 
institutions, and provision to be made on the basis of such classification; (g) prohibiting or restricting 
the accounting of non-performing loans as income; (h) prohibiting, restricting or regulating - (i) the 
types or forms of credits and investments that may be made by banking institutions; (ii) the matching 
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Building Societies Act, the AMC Act, the CIS Act, or the RBZ Act extends similar 
powers to the RBZ.  
In the guidelines, the RBZ states that they are issued pursuant to section 45(2)(c) 
of the Banking Act. Section 45(2)(c) states: ―The Reserve Bank‘s function of 
monitoring and supervising banking institutions and other companies may be 
exercised through all or any of the following methods - (a)… (b)… (c) any other 
lawful means the Reserve Bank thinks appropriate.‖626 This provision does not give 
the RBZ subsidiary legislation making authority. Subsidiary-law making authority, 
being a delegation by parliament of its legislative powers, must be expressly 
stipulated. The power to enact law, including subsidiary law, cannot be implied. If 
legislative making authority could be implied from such a provision, it would mean 
that any regulatory, supervisory or administrative body that is given authority to use 
lawful means to achieve its prescribed objectives could similarly assume that it has 
subsidiary-law making authority,
627
 which would be perverse.  
It is true that globally, central banks issue guidelines which bind regulated entities. 
On this account, section 45(2)(c) can be read to authorize the issuance of guidelines 
                                                                                                                                            
by banking institutions of maturity and interest in respect of assets and liabilities; (iii) the maintaining 
by banking institutions of unhedged positions in foreign currencies, precious metals or precious stones; 
(i) terms and conditions applicable to any type or form of financing extended or received by banking 
institutions, including deposits and contingent liabilities. (2) Any banking institution that contravenes 
regulations referred to in subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence. 
626
 In full, section 45(2)(c) of the Banking Act states: ―The Reserve Bank‘s function of monitoring and 
supervising banking institutions and other companies may be exercised through all or any of the 
following methods - (a) the analysis of documents and information supplied to it in terms of section 
thirty eight; (b) the inspection of documents and the obtaining of information at the premises of the 
banking institutions concerned, and the analysis of such documents and information; (c) any other 
lawful means the Reserve Bank thinks appropriate.‖ 
627
 See for instance the case of Trust Insurance Brokers v The Minister of Finance and The 
Commissioner of Insurance. The Minister of Finance who does have subsidiary law making power 
under the Insurance Act had prescribed regulations that imposed additional qualifications that 
individuals intending to register as insurance brokers needed to comply with. But the Insurance Act 
stated the qualifications that those intending to act as brokers had to possess. The applicant argued, 
successfully, that the Minister of Finance had exceeded his legislative authority. The court held: 
―subsidiary power must be construed strictly‖ and that the exercise of that subsidiary legislation 
making authority had to be clearly stipulated by statute. Trust Insurance Brokers v The Minister of 
Finance and The Commissioner of Insurance SC-6-2008. 
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by the RBZ because guidelines are instructions or directives and they do not have to 
be prescribed as subsidiary legislation. If correct, it follows that the RBZ can only 
issue guidelines on issues that have already been prescribed either by parliament or by 
the Minister of Finance. This means, if the RBZ issues guidelines on matters not 
covered, or envisaged, by an Act of Parliament or a statutory instrument, the guideline 
could be ultra-vires the Banking Act or the RBZ Act, whichever is applicable.  
For legal certainty, this study recommends the amendment of the RBZ Act, the 
Banking Act and the Building Societies Act to give the RBZ clearer legal authority to 
prescribe regulations, which are of peremptory application. The RBZ should be 
accorded some - circumscribed - subsidiary-law making power. Such power would 
enable the RBZ to react swiftly to developments in the financial services sector -
including in the securitization market - without the inefficiencies of reverting to the 
Minister of Finance or to parliament for remedial action. In addition, such legal 
reform would remove any doubts that the RBZ has power to issue guidelines dealing 
with, inter alia, consolidated supervision of financial institutions, banking institutions 
risk management systems including aspects relating to their assets, liabilities, credits, 
deposits and, generally, the conduct of their financial affairs.  
 
9.2.3. RBZ’s risk-management power 
The tools at the disposal of the RBZ to prevent and manage risk are quite 
expansive, the above notwithstanding. Its power to prevent and manage risks, 
including risks that can be spawned by regulated entities engaging in securitization 
transactions, are contained in the Banking Act, the Reserve Bank Act, the Troubled 
Financial Institutions (Resolutions) Act and the various RBZ Guidelines. These 
enactments enable the RBZ to prevent and manage, or to prescribe guidelines that 
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enable it to prevent and manage some of the key risks that can arise from banking, 
building society and other money-lending institutions engaging in securitization 
transactions.  
 
9.2.3.1. Risk management powers: In general 
As noted above, the RBZ is responsible for supervising the operations of regulated 
banking institutions, their subsidiaries and holding companies.
628
 It has power to 
initiate investigations into the operations of, and impose administrative penalties on, 
regulated banking institutions.
629
 It can issue prescriptions relating to, and supervise 
banking institutions‘ risk management systems, capital reserves and solvency 
requirements. If a banking institution contravenes a term or condition of its 
registration, or a provision of the Banking Act, or a direction, requirement or order 
issued by the RBZ, as provided for under the Banking Act, the RBZ can: (i) issue a 
warning; (ii) require the banking institution to appoint a person, who in its opinion is 
able to advise the institution in the proper conduct of its business; (iii) issue written 
instructions requiring the institution to take remedial action; (iv) impose a monetary 
penalty; (v) instruct the institution to suspend or remove any of its directors, officers 
or employees; (vi) direct the institution to suspend all or part of its banking business; 
(vii) appoint a supervisor to monitor the institution‘s affairs; and (viii) impose a term 
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 Section 45 of the Banking Act states: ―Subject to this Act, the Reserve Bank shall be responsible for 
(a) continuously monitoring and supervising banking institutions and associates of banking institutions 
to ensure that they comply with this Act.‖ The term associates of banking institutions is defined in 
section 2 to mean: ―associate‖, in relation to a banking institution, means - (a) its subsidiary, as defined 
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or condition on the institution‘s continued registration.630 It is also notable that the 
RBZ has started the gradual introduction of Basel II, which will assist with risk-
mitigation,
631
 although notably, it has been implicated as one of the drivers of the U.S. 
subprime crisis.
632
 In addition and more importantly, in 2007, the RBZ issued 
securitization guidelines, which are binding on all regulated entities intending to take 
part in securitization transactions as originators, service providers and investors in 
securities.
633
  
 
9.2.3.2. Deposit protection Fund 
Zimbabwe has a deposit protection fund, whose primary objective is the 
prevention of bank runs, in the event of a contributory banking and building society 
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institution under the management of a curator; ( j) recommend to the Registrar - (i) the imposition of 
any term or condition on the institution‘s continued registration, or the deletion of any such term or 
condition; or (ii) the cancellation of the institution‘s registration.‖ 
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institution becoming insolvent.
634
 Although in practice there can be a myriad of 
reasons why a banking institution may become insolvent, the 2007 global financial 
crisis illustrated how the origination and issuance of mispriced structured finance 
products can impair a banking institution‘s solvency and result in bank-runs. In the 
U.K., Northern Rock‘s business model, which relied on the securitization-enabled 
originate-to-distribute model and the wholesale market, caused a run on the bank 
when news leaked that it had sought liquidity from the Bank of England following the 
hiatus in inter-bank lending; itself the result of a loss of confidence in structured 
finance products.
635
 To prevent a systemic run on banks, notwithstanding its deposit 
insurance scheme, the U.K. government was forced to guarantee all of Northern 
Rock‘s deposits and then injected capital into the bank and subsequently nationalised 
it.
636
  
Zimbabwe‘s deposit protection fund is administered by the Deposit Protection 
Board (DPB), which is in effect an adjunct of the RBZ. The DPB was created 
pursuant to Part XII of the Banking Act. The DPB is composed of the RBZ Governor 
and three other persons appointed by the Governor of the RBZ from a list of 6 names 
submitted by an organisation that represents the majority of contributory institutions, 
i.e. the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe.
637
 The extent to which Zimbabwe‘s 
deposit protection fund can in practice prevent bank runs is yet to be tested. It is 
notable that the maximum amount guaranteed under the deposit protection scheme is 
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set from time to time by the DPB.
638
 The deposit protection fund is available as one of 
several constituent elements of Zimbabwe‘s financial stability framework, which can 
be used to prevent and manage systemic risk that can arise from securitization 
transactions.   
 
9.2.3.3. Troubled bank resolution framework 
Following the onset of the global financial crisis, it became apparent, in the U.S. 
and the U.K., among other countries, that there was a need to put in place a 
framework for the efficient and effective resolution of insolvent financial institutions 
to prevent and manage systemic risk. In the U.K., the government promulgated in 
2008, the Banking (Special provisions) Act, which granted the government temporary 
power to deal with failing banks. This was superseded by the Banking Act 2009. The 
Banking Act gives the government power to intervene, including by nationalising 
bank-holding companies and building societies where the failure of a deposit-taking 
institution within a group could cause a wider threat to financial stability.
639
 In 
addition, the U.K. government is drafting a new insolvency regime for financial firms 
whose collapse could threaten financial stability.
640
 The U.S. is mulling the formal 
establishment of a similar system, in which the Federal Reserve will be given more 
powers to ensure the orderly resolution of insolvent bank-holding companies or other 
non-bank entities whose collapse threatens overall financial stability.
641
   
                                                 
638
 Following the dollarization of the economy in February 2009, the DPB is yet to announce the 
maximum deposit amount insured.  
639
 U.K. HM Treasury (2009) ‗Reforming Financial Markets‘, at p. 13. Available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf  
640
 Ibid., at p.5. See also section 220 of the Banking Act 2009, which gives the government power to 
introduce – through secondary legislation – regulations providing for the special resolution of banking 
and building society institutions.  
641
 United States Department of the Treasury (2009) (note 609, supra) at p. 76.  
253 
Owing to several bank failures in Zimbabwe in 2003-2004, the government 
promulgated the Troubled Financial Institutions (Resolution) Act (TFIR Act) to 
ensure the expeditious resolution of financial institutions in financial distress or which 
are insolvent with the objective of preventing threats to financial stability. The TFIR 
Act, unlike the framework proposed in the U.K. and U.S., applies only to firms 
regulated by the RBZ, i.e. banking institutions, building societies, the POSB, asset 
management companies and collective investment schemes.
642
 It does not apply to 
other critical financial services firms, such as insurance firms. This is a shortcoming 
which should be rectified. In the U.S., the collapse of the insurance firm American 
Integrated Group (AIG) averted by the government through a bail-out - resulting in its 
effective nationalisation - illustrates the importance of non-banking financial firms 
whose failure can threaten financial stability.  
The above notwithstanding, the RBZ can use the provisions of the TFIR Act to 
prevent or manage systemic risks that can arise in the event of a financial institution 
becoming insolvent or financially distressed. Section 4 of the TFIR Act empowers the 
RBZ to appoint an inspector to conduct an investigation into the affairs of a regulated 
entity if: (i) it is indebted and is unable to repay its indebtedness to the RBZ; (ii) will 
need to receive public funds in order to prevent systemic risk; (iii) has failed to 
comply or is unwilling to comply with any requirement relating to capital, reserves, 
assets, liabilities, credits or deposits; or (iv) is not conducting its business in 
accordance with sound administrative, accounting, corporate governance or risk 
management practices or procedures. Section 6 of the TFIR Act provides that if 
following an investigation, these failures are established, the RBZ will declare the 
affected institution to be a troubled financial institution and appoint an administrator. 
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Following a declaration - which is also binding on any associates of the regulated 
financial institution - and appointment of an administrator, management and control 
of the ―troubled‖ financial institution is transferred to the administrator.643 
A declaration that a regulated financial institution is a troubled financial institution 
has drastic implications. Such a declaration: (a) places the institution under the control 
and management of an administrator; (b) suspends the powers of every director, 
officer and member of the institution, except to the extent permitted by an  
administrator; (c) nullifies every disposition of  property, including rights of action, of 
the institution and every transfer of shares or alteration in the status of its members, 
made after the commencement of the administration, unless the administrator 
otherwise orders; (d) suspends the operation of any set-off by the institution in respect 
of any amount owing by a creditor of the institution; (e) suspends all rights of action 
against the institution and every action or proceeding commenced against the 
institution except by leave of, and subject to terms imposed by, the administrator; (f) 
vacates any attachment or execution put in force against the assets of the institution 
after the commencement of the administration; (g) suspends  any lien held by any 
financial institution or other person over the property of the institution except a lien 
held by the Reserve Bank or by a payment system recognised by the Reserve Bank in 
terms of section 3(1) of the National Payment Systems Act [Chapter 24:22].
644
 
The TFIR Act provides that the object of administration is the safeguarding of the 
interests of depositors, creditors and members of the troubled financial institution by 
restoring the institution to a sound financial condition. If the institution cannot be 
restored to financial health, section 10 of the TFIR Act states that the administrator 
can: (a) reconstruct the institution through securing the registration of a successor 
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financial institution which will take over the troubled financial institution‘s assets and 
liabilities; (b) amalgamate the troubled financial institution or any part of its banking 
or other business with one or more other troubled financial institutions and secure the 
registration of a successor financial institution that will take over the assets, liabilities 
and banking or other business undertaken by the amalgamated financial institutions; 
(c) transfer all or any part of the banking or other business of the troubled financial 
institution to any other financial institution together with all or part of the assets and 
liabilities of the troubled financial institution which remain after the administration; 
(d) wind up the troubled financial institution in accordance with section 57 of the 
Banking Act, if any of the foregoing options are not, in the opinion of the 
administrator, feasible. 
This thesis argues that these powers of the RBZ can - in general - and as argued 
below, be harnessed to mitigate key securitization transaction risks such as those 
highlighted by the 2007 global financial crisis, which include, inter alia, the abuse or 
over-reliance on the originate-to-distribute business model, poor regulation and 
supervision of banking risk management systems and poor corporate governance 
practices.  
However, it is unclear whether the RBZ has the capacity to effectively regulate 
and supervise securitization transacting by regulated financial institutions. The 
comprehensive regulation and supervision of securitization requires adequate 
resources. The RBZ would need a sufficiently high number of specially qualified 
personnel - lawyers, actuaries, accountants, risk management specialists, etc. to 
administer the framework. The RBZ‘s enforcement unit would have to be adequately 
resourced, including with appropriate technology with which to identify and compute 
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risk factors and also be allowed to take wide-ranging enforcement actions against 
errant institutions or persons.  
 
9.2.4. Prescription of securitization-transacting best practice 
Does the RBZ have authority to prescribe and require regulated institutions to 
adhere to securitization transaction best practices? It is notable that in 2007, the RBZ 
promulgated securitization guidelines, RBZ Guideline No. 01-2007/BSD: Special 
Purpose Vehicles, Securitisation & Structured Finance. The Guideline provides that 
every regulated financial institution that seeks to engage in a securitization transaction 
as an originator, provider of securitization transaction services or as an investor in 
structured finance securities is obliged to adhere to the prescriptions in the 
Guideline.
645
 The Guideline stipulates, among others, the following risk management 
prescriptions: (i) corporate governance and risk management procedures that must be 
adhered to by regulated institutions taking part in securitization transactions;
646
 (ii) 
rules pertaining to the purchase and supply of financial assets to a securitization 
SPV;
647
 (iii) disclosure requirements and corporate governance prescriptions for 
SPVs;
648
 (iv) rules pertaining to credit and liquidity enhancement, servicing, 
underwriting and lending to SPVs;
649
 and (v) regulated banking institutions‘ capital 
requirements for securitization transactions that should either be based on the 
standardized approach or the internal ratings based-approach.
650
 The rules also 
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prescribe penalties for non-compliance. In addition to the securitization guideline, the 
RBZ has promulgated separate corporate governance guidelines for financial 
institutions,
651
 established a framework for the registration and conduct of CRAs 
intending to rate securities issued by banking institutions
652
 and risk management 
guidelines.
653
 These guidelines and applicable statutory instruments can be harnessed 
to provide for the prudential regulation and supervision of banking and other 
institutions‘ involvement in securitization. These guidelines do prescribe some 
securitization transaction best practice rules, and can be amended to provide for 
evolving risk management situations.   
 
9.2.5. Originate-to-distribute business model 
The securitization-enabled originate-to-distribute business model revolutionized 
the financial services sector in general and in particular the banking sector and other 
loan-providing firms. As noted in chapter 2, it enabled banking institutions to: (i) 
reduce regulatory capital costs; (ii) create liquidity from otherwise illiquid assets; (iii) 
specialise in various intermediation roles; (iv) access relatively cheaper finance; and 
(v) enabled - for some firms - rapid business expansion. But conversely the originate-
to-distribute model induced and increased moral hazard, fuelled the misalignment of 
incentives and resulted in banking institutions being exposed to new risks that could 
not necessarily be mitigated by traditional risk management methods. The originate-
to-distribute business model increased systemic risks through the combination of 
increased: (i) origination of complex and difficult to price securities; (ii) counter-party 
credit exposures; and (iii) over-reliance for liquidity on wholesale markets. Many U.S. 
and U.K. financial institutions, including the likes of Northern Rock in the U.K. and 
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Countrywide Financial and Wachovia Corporation in the U.S. used the liquidity 
creating attributes of securitization and the originate-to-distribute business model to 
aggressively expand and maintain their market shares. These institutions failed 
following the collapse of confidence in structured finance products, which resulted in 
the freezing of wholesale markets, and with it, their primary source of funding.  
The over-reliance by financial firms on the originate-to-distribute business model 
is a reflection of the poor regulation and supervision of - in particular - banking 
institutions‘ prudential risk management systems. Both in the U.S. as well as in the 
U.K., banking regulators failed to set and supervise appropriate risk management 
policies and practices. As a result, extreme capital structures such as those employed 
by the likes of Northern Rock and Countrywide emerged. This over-reliance on the 
originate-to-distribute business model by banking and other financial institutions has 
been singled out as one of the key drivers of the global financial crisis.
654
 Does the 
RBZ have power to prevent such over-reliance - with systemic risk implications - on 
the originate-to-distribute business model by regulated financial institutions?  
No banking institution in Zimbabwe utilizes an originate-to-distribute business 
model because securitization is yet to propagate and the secondary market for 
instruments backed by financial receivables is shallow. For this reason, the RBZ‘s 
guidelines on risk-based supervision - RBZ: Bank Licensing, Supervision and 
Surveillance (Risk-based Supervision Policy Framework): Guideline No. 2 - 
2006/BSD - do not address such banking capital structures. To reduce moral hazard 
that can be spawned by financial firms‘ usage of the originate-to-distribute business 
model, the RBZ should prescribe regulations which, inter alia, require originating 
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firms to maintain skin in the game, i.e. to retain a prescribed interest (risk) in the 
assets to be securitized.
655
  
 
9.2.6. Loan origination standards and practices 
Some financial institutions took advantage of the credit risk transfer 
characteristics of securitization to originate and underwrite subprime loans, which 
were later offloaded onto domestic and international financial markets in the form of 
CDOs and other complex securities. This is especially true of the U.S., where 
financial executives, arguably spurred by the quest for higher bonuses and profits, 
increased the origination of subprime loans from the 1990s onwards.
 
Increased 
subprime loan issuance was fuelled by the combination of: (i) the securitization-
enabled originate-to-distribute model; (ii) credit risk mispricing by CRAs - which 
suffered from severe conflicts of interests - and insurance firms; (iii) a voracious 
appetite for high yield (and by extension high risk) structured finance securities by 
investors, including prudentially regulated institutional investors; (iv) overall poor due 
diligence by both retail and wholesale securities investors; and (v) the deregulation of 
the financial services sector. Subprime loan origination was an obviously profitable 
business line for both banking and non-banking financial entities, including mortgage 
brokers. Securitization and low interest-rate wholesale funding enabled the entry into 
the loan-origination market of lightly capitalised and highly leveraged entities, some 
of which were poorly regulated. The growth of subprime loan origination, 
underwriting and securities issuance also resulted in increased loan fraud and predator 
lending. 
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In the U.S., regulators were aware for more than a decade that subprime loan 
origination and underwriting and the issuance of securities backed by these assets 
carried significant systemic risks. It was for this reason that the Federal Reserve, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision issued interagency guidelines on subprime lending in 1999. The 
guidelines noted the higher risks inherent in subprime loan origination and 
underwriting, and prescribed risk management guidelines.
656
 Does the RBZ have 
power to prevent a race to the bottom, i.e. the erosion of loan origination and 
underwriting standards that can arise - largely due to moral hazard with systemic risk 
implications - from the securitization by regulated institutions of financial 
receivables?  
The RBZ has not promulgated guidelines or regulations that deal with loan 
origination standards and practices. Although arguable, it is myopic to argue that 
issues of loan origination and underwriting standards, including issues of predatory 
lending and fraud are matters of consumer protection, and therefore should not be of 
primary concern to a central bank; and that these are best regulated and enforced by a 
consumer protection watchdog. Poor loan origination and underwriting standards by 
banking institutions can threaten financial stability. And in today‘s interconnected 
financial markets, such poor risk management practices and policies can threaten the 
stability of global financial markets. The transfer of risks inherent in poorly originated 
or underwritten loans from one entity into the entire financial system, through credit 
risk transmission arrangements inherent in securitization increases overall systemic 
risks. It is this realisation that caused the federal banking agencies in the U.S., as far 
back as 1999 to issue guidelines on the origination and underwriting of subprime 
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loans. And the 2007 global crisis has exposed the systemic risks inherent in such 
financial assets. 
The RBZ should introduce a framework - through guidelines or preferably 
peremptory regulations - that regulates loan origination and underwriting standards to 
ensure macro financial stability. In its absence, there is a real risk that financial firms 
may, through the use of the securitization-enabled originate-to-distribute business 
model, erode loan origination and underwriting standards; spurred by profit-seeking. 
 
9.2.7. Investment in structured finance securities 
One of the touted benefits of securitization is that it results in the reduction of risk 
as it is diffused through various market participants - i.e. from banking and other loan-
originating firms to insurance and underwriting firms, and retail and wholesale 
investors with different risk appetites. But the 2007 global financial crisis showed that 
contrary to these assertions, securitization in effect obscured risk and led to credit risk 
concentration in prudentially regulated financial institutions. Firms obliged to invest 
only in investment grade securities, such as banking institutions, insurance firms and 
pension funds were disproportionately affected. And these were the institutions, 
which in search of higher yields invested heavily in triple-A rated structured finance 
securities, such as CDOs. Following the loss of confidence in structured finance 
securities, there was a wholesale market liquidity crisis, as a result of which structured 
finance securities, starting with subprime mortgage-backed securities, turned toxic. 
They could not be disposed of, except - in some cases at fire-sale prices. Firms unable 
to refinance collapsed,
657
 merged
658
 were taken over by governments‘ intent on 
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avoiding the total collapse of their financial systems,
659
 or their metamorphosed into 
commercial banking institutions.
660
 
The toxic assets clogged up bank balance sheets.
661
 In the U.S., the government 
introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) to purchase or insure these 
illiquid assets to reignite bank lending. In 2009 in the U.K., the authorities introduced 
the Asset Protection Scheme (APS), which enables regulated firms to buy insurance 
from the Treasury, to cover losses on qualifying financial assets. The objective behind 
both the TARP and the APS is to get regulated banking institutions to reduce 
exposures to the toxic structured finance securities and enable the institutions to 
increase their lending to the productive sector. Can the RBZ regulate and supervise - 
from a risk management perspective - regulated financial institution‘s discretion to 
trade, deal or hold some types of structured finance securities, such as CDOs, or those 
backed by subprime loans for instance?  
Zimbabwe does not have a TARP/APS-type programme. This is unsurprising, 
since it has not been affected in the manner that developed countries were affected by 
the global financial crisis. Arguably, to prevent moral hazard, it does not need a 
permanent TARP/APS-scheme. However, it does operate a prescribed asset regime. It 
is notable that the RBZ securitization guideline states that regulated financial 
institutions may purchase securities issued by a securitization SPV subject - for 
capital adequacy purposes - to risk-weights attached to the securities in question by 
the RBZ from time to time.
662
 In addition, it is notable that section 31 of the Banking 
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Act authorises the RBZ to determine banking institutions‘ minimum equity capital 
requirements, prudential capital reserves and ratios and general financial requirements 
pertaining to bank assets, liabilities, credits, investments and their off-balance sheet 
exposures.
663
 In short therefore, the RBZ can and does regulate the trade and dealing 
by regulated institutions in structured finance securities. And if a fully fledged 
securitization market emerges the RBZ can - if appropriate - impose restrictions on 
the types of assets traditional banking and building society institutions may hold or 
prescribe the amount of regulatory capital to be set aside in the event at particular 
securities investments are made.  
 
9.2.8. Performance-linked compensation schemes 
A long standing criticism of banking and other financial institutions‘ corporate 
governance structures, in the U.S. and the U.K. is that financial industry performance-
linked compensation schemes encouraged excessive short-term risk taking and 
enhanced moral hazard.
664
 Some commentators argue that performance-linked 
                                                                                                                                            
the bank has no pre-existing obligation to undertake the purchase; (c) the total value of assets 
purchased, and held on the books of the banking institution are within the maximum authorized 
investment limits prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time; and (d) where non-performing 
assets are purchased: (i) the assets must be marked-to-market for financial and regulatory purposes; and 
(ii) The banking institution demonstrates that the assets are acquired at a fair market value that fully 
reflects the non-performing status of assets and the presence of any credit enhancement(s) by an 
independent party. 5.16 Where any of these conditions are not met, the purchase should be regarded as 
a credit enhancement. 5.17. A banking institution may also purchase securities issued by an SPV, and 
treat them for capital adequacy purposes according to the risk weights attached to the securities 
themselves as prescribed by the Reserve bank from time to time, provided: (a) the conditions in clause 
5.15. are satisfied; (b) the bank has adequate risk management systems to curb disproportionate 
accumulation of securities issued by an SPV relative to its total assets and capital; (c) purchases of 
subordinated securities issued by an SPV should be treated as a credit enhancement, as either a first or 
a second loss facility depending on the level of loss the securities are supporting. 5.18. Where these 
conditions are not met, any acquisitions arising from market making activities should be regarded as 
credit enhancements. 5.19 Where the Reserve Bank assesses that a banking institution‘s purchase of 
securities implies that it is supporting investments in an SPV beyond any legal obligation, the bank will 
be required to hold capital against all the securities issued by the SPV.‖ RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra) at 
paragraph 5.15 – 5.19.  
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compensation schemes in the financial services sector contributed to the 2007 global 
financial crisis.
665
 Although the malady did not affect only those financial firms 
involved in structured finance transactions, there is merit in the argument that the use 
of performance-linked bonuses, stock options, and golden parachutes, among others, 
to remunerate and incentivize finance executives did encourage risky behaviour in 
firms engaged in structured finance. Such incentive structures may ultimately have 
encouraged the compromised fee-driven origination of subprime mortgages, issuance 
of subprime mortgage-backed securities, including CDOs and other complex 
structured finance securities.
666
  
Arguably, remuneration structures that include bonuses and stock options enable 
financial firms to attract and retain talented staff.
667
 But such structures can increase 
incentive misalignment and agency costs. Holders of stock options benefit when a 
firm‘s stock‘s price rises but do not suffer an immediate financial detriment when 
prices fall.
668
 Critics of such incentive structures argue that they encourage balance 
sheet misrepresentation, tax evasion and other corporate malfeasance.
669
 They also 
shift risk of loss to shareholders, although ultimately, as shown by the 2007 global 
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financial crisis, ultimate loss is borne by taxpayers when governments intervene to 
save financial systems from collapse. In the U.K., as part of a raft of measures 
designed to address the misalignment of incentives in the financial services sector, the 
FSA prescribed a Code of Practice dealing with remuneration practices. The draft 
Code of Conduct requires firms to: ―…establish, implement and maintain 
remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote 
effective risk management.‖670 Similar proposals have been mooted in the E.U. as 
well as the U.S. Does the RBZ have power to impose corporate governance practices 
to guide, among others, regulated firms‘ incentive structures?   
The RBZ does not currently regulate financial institutions‘ compensation 
structures. Although controversial, there is merit in the argument that the RBZ should 
consider establishing a corporate governance framework for regulated financial 
institutions that directly refers to and regulates financial industry compensation 
schemes to ensure that they do not encourage inappropriate and excessive risk taking 
and short-termism. Such reforms can be implemented through the amendment of the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Guideline No. 01-2004/BSD: Corporate Governance 
Guideline. This guideline stipulates various corporate governance principles that 
regulated institutions are expected to adhere to. Amendments to this guideline should 
ideally link incentive structures with risk management, addressing conflicts of 
interests and disclosures relating to salaries and other compensation schemes. It has 
been correctly argued that cash bonuses and stock options should be paid on the basis 
of long term performance and not on the basis of annual returns.
671
 It is also arguable 
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that firms in financial distress or that have accessed lender of last resort facilities or 
have received or likely to receive public funds should not be permitted to pay bonuses 
without authorization from the central bank.  
The above notwithstanding, the issue of excessive risk-inducing executive 
compensation structures is not of prudential interest to banking institutions only. It is 
an issue of interest to all public companies. To this extent, and to enable the 
prescription of consistent and holistic principles, compensation structures of public 
companies, including banking institutions (whether public or not) should ideally be 
regulated and policed by an integrated regulator. 
Based on all the foregoing, it is apparent that there is in existence a framework 
that enables the RBZ to prudentially regulate and supervise banking, building society 
and other financial institutions‘ involvement in securitization transactions as 
originators, providers of securitization transaction services and as investors. In 
addition, it is clear that the RBZ can issue guidelines that can enable it to strengthen 
this framework with the objective of preventing and managing securitization 
transaction risks. However, the extant prudential framework it is rudimentary. The 
RBZ should be given power to prescribe binding guidelines or regulations and this 
should be clearly stipulated through an amendment to the RBZ Act. In addition, the 
extant regulatory framework should be reformed to enable the RBZ to manage, inter 
alia, risks that can flow from: (i) poorly structured risk management policies and 
practices; (ii) regulated firms‘ use of the originate-to-distribute business model; (iii) 
loan origination and underwriting standards; (iv) misaligned incentive structures - 
through the promulgation of codes of conduct, including on remuneration practices; 
(v) moral hazard drivers; and (vi) the dealing, trading or holding of structured finance 
securities by regulated institutions. 
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9.3. Insurance and Pensions Commission 
In Zimbabwe, insurance firms, mutual insurance firms, pensions and provident 
funds and insurance brokers are regulated and supervised by the IPC. The IPC is a 
body corporate, capable of suing and being sued in its own name.
672
 The IPC is 
headed by the Commissioner of Insurance and Pensions (the Commissioner). The 
Commissioner is appointed by the Insurance and Pensions Commission Board (the 
IPC board), in terms of section 19 of the IPC Act. The operations of the IPC are 
controlled and managed by the IPC board,
673
 whose members‘ are appointed by the 
Minister of Finance on renewable three-year terms of office.
674
  
In contrast to the RBZ governor, who is a presidential appointee and the overall 
chief of the central bank, the Commissioner of the IPC is an employee of the IPC 
board. Subject to the IPC boards‘ control, the Commissioner is responsible for 
supervising and managing the IPC‘s staff, activities, funds and property; and for 
performing such other functions as the Board may assign to him or as may be 
conferred or imposed on him by or under the IPC Act or any other enactment.
675
 The 
functions and powers of the IPC are contained in section 4 of the IPC Act. The IPC 
was established in 2001, and is responsible for the registration, regulation and 
supervision of the operations of insurance firms and insurance brokers in Zimbabwe, 
ensuring that they meet prescribed standards, as provided for under the IPC Act, the 
Insurance Act and the Pension and Provident Funds Act, respectively. This section 
addresses the question: to what extent do the legal enactments administered by, or 
relating to, the IPC allow it to prevent and manage risks that arise when regulated 
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insurance firms engage in securitization transactions, especially as providers of credit 
default risk insurance?  
 
9.3.1. Context   
As illustrated by the case of the U.S. and the 2007 global financial crisis, legal 
frameworks relating to the insurance industry should enable the effective prevention 
and management of risks that can arise from insurance firms‘ involvement in 
securitization transactions as originators, but principally as providers of credit default 
risk insurance and investors in structured finance securities.
676
 As noted in chapter 
one, in addition to internal credit enhancement measures, securitization issuances are 
typically credit enhanced through credit default risk insurance provided by insurance 
firms, either multiline or monoline insurance firms. In the U.S., the established 
monoline insurance firms included the likes of MBIA Inc., Ambac Financial Group 
Inc, which provide one line of insurance business, i.e. credit default risk insurance 
(bond insurance hereafter). Multiline insurers include the likes of AIG.  
Bond insurers are a critical component of structured finance markets 
infrastructure. Using the backing of their own triple-A ratings, bond insurers 
guarantee payment to investors in the event of default by an issuer on fixed-income 
securities‘ capital and interest repayments.677 Because bond insurers assumed the risk 
of default of all insured structured finance securities issuances, including subprime 
mortgage-backed securities whose credit risk they had mispriced, their systemic 
importance was exponentially increased.  
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Despite their critical importance within financial markets, insurance regulators, 
especially in the U.S. context failed to properly regulate and supervise bond insurers 
risk management systems. Bond insurers were allowed to assume too much risk 
relative to their prescribed capital and solvency requirements. The 2007 global 
financial crisis revealed that global capital and solvency frameworks for insurance 
firms, and especially bond insurers were inadequate.
678
  
In addition insurance regulators failed to prevent the over-exposure of bond 
insurers to subprime mortgage-backed securities market risk. This resulted in credit 
risk concentration in the few credit default insurers.
679
 This situation increased the risk 
that the downgrading of a bond insurer‘s credit rating or its failure would threaten 
financial stability.
680
 AIG illustrates this risk very well. Fearing that its collapse would 
exacerbate the global financial crisis,
681
 following AIG‘s structured finance securities-
linked liquidity crisis, the government was forced to bail it out.
682
 The U.S. Treasury 
department and the Federal Reserve justified AIG‘s bailout by saying: ―Given the 
systemic risk AIG continues to pose and the fragility of markets today, the potential 
cost to the economy and the taxpayer of government inaction would be extremely 
high. AIG provides insurance protection to more than 100, 000 entities, including 
small businesses, municipalities, 401(k) plans, and Fortune 500 companies who 
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together employ 100 million Americans. AIG has over 30 million policyholders in the 
U.S. and is a major source of retirement insurance for, among others, teachers and 
non-profit organizations. The company also is a significant counterparty to a number 
of major financial institutions.‖683 It is within this context that this section assesses 
whether the IPC is capable of preventing and managing key risks that can potentially 
arise due to insurance firms‘ exposures to structured finance securities products. 
 
9.3.2. IPC’s regulatory jurisdiction 
As noted above, the IPC, through the Commissioner, regulates and supervises the 
operations of insurance firms, mutual insurance firms, pension and provident funds 
and insurance brokers in Zimbabwe. Unlike the RBZ whose regulatory jurisdiction is 
qualified in relation to certain banking institutions established by an Act of 
parliament, the IPC has regulatory jurisdiction over all insurance firms operating in 
Zimbabwe. This means all registered insurance firms, whether monoline or multiline 
insurance firms, are regulated and supervised by the IPC.  
 
9.3.2.1. Insurance-firm holding companies 
Does the IPC have regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction over insurance firm-
holding companies or non-insurance subsidiary entities? Unlike the RBZ, the IPC 
does not have power to oversee the operations of insurance firms on a consolidated 
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basis and has not attempted to do so. Despite having power to issue binding 
regulations, per section 6 of the Insurance Act, the IPC has not created a framework 
that enables it to consider regulated institutions‘ risk management systems and other 
exposures on a consolidated group basis. To the extent that an insurance firm-holding 
company is also a bank-holding company, the exercise of regulatory jurisdiction by 
the IPC on a consolidated basis would amount to a duplication of regulatory 
jurisdictions. This is an additional reason why an integrated regulatory agency system 
amounts to a better regulatory system. It minimises regulatory duplication, regulatory 
gaps, regulatory arbitrage, and allows the effective regulation and oversight of 
financial conglomerates.  
 
9.3.2.2. Credit default swaps 
The losses that AIG experienced leading to its bailout were largely due to its CDS 
exposures, which constituted part of its bond insurance business.
684
 A CDS is a 
private contract between one party (the protection seller), which in exchange for a fee, 
agrees to compensate another party (the protection buyer) if a specified credit event 
(such as bankruptcy or credit default) occurs with respect to a company (the reference 
entity) or a debt obligation.
685
 In the U.S. the provision of CDS was not regulated, and 
AIG, among others, ―…was able to pursue a multi-billion dollar CDS business free 
from regulatory filings, mandated capital requirements and government 
intervention.‖686 Because of the systemic risks inherent in CDS, in the U.S., 
legislation - the Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 - 
to regulate the CDS market is being considered. Proposals to reduce CDS trade-risk 
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include the requirement that these instruments be traded on a regulated securities 
exchange, subject to minimum disclosure requirements and documentation 
standardization.
687
  
In Zimbabwe, the entity with authority to regulate some CDS contracts is the SC 
and not the IPC. This is because the word ―security‖ is defined in section 2 of the 
Securities Act to include some CDS contracts, as follows: ―…any contract for 
differences, that is to say, a right under a contract which does not provide for the 
delivery of securities or commodities but whose purpose or professed purpose is to 
secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuation in - (i) a share index or index 
of commodity prices or other similar reference point; or (ii) the price of other 
particular securities or commodities; or (iii) the interest rate available on money 
placed on deposit; or (iv) the exchange rate available between two or more 
currencies.‖  
It is unclear whether the SC has power to impose conditions or regulate over-the-
counter (OTC) securities trades. It is arguable that OTC CDS which do not use the 
four reference points mentioned in the Securities Act are not regulated by the SC or 
the IPC. The Securities Act and the Insurance Act must be amended to enable both the 
SC and the IPC, respectively, to regulate CDS contracts - in all their possible forms - 
to mitigate risks that can arise from these derivative instruments. This is especially 
important for insurance firms, which – as part of their bond insurance business also 
engage in CDS trade. The IPC should promulgate peremptory rules to regulate CDS. 
Ideally however, to prevent regulatory gaps - because they have ―characteristics of a 
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security, a contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery and an insurance 
contract‖,688 - CDS should be regulated by an integrated regulatory agency.  
 
9.3.3. IPC’s risk-management authority 
Although Zimbabwe‘s insurance industry regulatory and supervisory framework 
is basic, it can be harnessed to mitigate some risks that arise from insurance firms‘ 
involvement in structured finance transactions, either as originators or more likely as 
providers of credit risk insurance or as investors in structured finance securities. The 
extant framework should however be enhanced to, inter alia, enable the IPC to 
regulate and supervise insurance industry risk management policies, practices and 
procedures relating to the provision of credit default risk insurance and related 
consumer protection issues. 
The IPC through the Commissioner is empowered to register, regulate and 
supervise the operations of insurance firms and insurance brokers, among others.
689
 In 
addition, the Commissioner is empowered to prescribe codes of conduct and 
standards, which registered insurance firms and brokers, are obliged to comply 
with.
690
 Further, the Commissioner has power to demand from a regulated insurance 
entity any document or information.
691
 The IPC can initiate investigations into the 
affairs or operations of any such entity in the following instances, if an insurer: (i) 
fails to furnish the Commissioner with any documentation or information requested; 
(ii) furnishes incorrect or incomplete information; (iii) breaches a provision of the 
Insurance Act; (iv) fails within a thirty-day period to remedy an irregularity that has 
been identified by an auditor or actuary; (v) breaches margins of solvency prescribed 
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pursuant to section 24 of the Insurance Act, or (vi) if the Commissioner believes that 
the rights of any class of policy-owners are being prejudiced by an insurer. 
Pending or following an investigation, the Commissioner may impose restrictions 
on the operations of an insurer, including restrictions on its ability to issue insurance 
policies. The Commissioner may issue a report, following the investigation, which is 
submitted to the Minister who may issue any order as is appropriate in the interests of 
policy-owners.
692
 In addition, the Commissioner has power to declare through the 
issuance of a Gazette that a specified practice or method of conducting business 
constitutes an irregular practice or an undesirable method of conducting business.
693
 
And any insurer that violates the prescription commits a criminal offence punishable 
by a term of imprisonment or a fine or both.
694
 These powers are obviously expansive 
- especially the power to prescribe codes of conduct and risk management policies and 
proscribe undesirable practices through the issuance of a Gazette - and can be used to 
mitigate some of the ill-effects that can arise from insurance firms‘ involvement in 
structured finance transactions.   
This notwithstanding, a critical shortcoming with this framework, as rightly noted 
by the RBZ governor in his January 2009 Monetary Policy Statement, is the failure by 
the IPC to put in place a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory framework for 
insurance firms. In his January 2009 Monetary Statement the RBZ governor stated: 
―…2.24 [the] absence of a well defined and comprehensive regulatory and prudential 
supervision framework for…Insurance Companies…has significantly compromised 
financial stability… 2.31. We…call upon the Insurance and Pensions 
Commission…to put in place comprehensive prudential supervision frameworks for 
the effective supervision of insurance companies, pension funds…based on 
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international best practice. 2.32 The insurance industry in particular, should be primed 
for adoption of the provisions of Solvency II, which framework has three pillars 
namely (a) measurement of assets, liabilities and capital; (b) supervisory review 
process; and (c) disclosure requirements.‖695 
 
9.3.4. Capital and liquidity requirements for insurance firms 
As noted above, regulators, especially in the U.S., failed to establish and supervise 
an appropriate risk management capital and solvency prescriptions for insurance firms 
providing bond insurance. The result was that when the housing bubble burst and 
foreclosures increased, claims on bond guarantees issued by such insurers as AIG, 
Ambac and MBIA spiked. But because these insurance firms were lightly capitalised 
they struggled to refinance following the loss of market confidence in their ability to 
meet their obligations.
696
 Their business models were based on the erroneous 
assumption that the risk of systemic default on insured products was highly 
improbable. Given this context, an emerging market seeking to create a securitization-
enabling and risk mitigating financial infrastructure must ensure that the capital and 
solvency framework for its insurance firms engaged in structured finance transactions, 
among others, is robust and provides an effective cushion against systemic risk 
events.  
The Insurance Act stipulates capital and solvency rules for insurance firms, but 
these are not risk-based.
697
 The Insurance Act states for instance that an insurance 
firm shall be considered as having a margin of solvency sufficient to carry on 
insurance business if the total value of its assets in relation to the insurance business 
                                                 
695
 RBZ (2009) (note 623, supra) at p. 49.  
696
 Sjostrom (2009) (note 685, supra), at p. 17.  
697
 Section 24 of the Insurance Act. 
276 
exceeds its liabilities by more than one million dollars.
698
 This computation of the 
amount of the capital required to cushion insurance firms from their business 
exposures is archaic, not risk-sensitive and for this reason is ill suited for modern-day 
prudential regulation and supervision of firms providing credit default risk insurance. 
This should be remedied through an amendment of the Insurance Act and - as 
recommended by the RBZ governor in his January 2009 monetary policy statement - 
the gradual adoption of Solvency II.
699
  
Solvency II: (i) introduces more risk sensitive and economic risk-based solvency 
requirements; (ii) requires a total balance sheet approach to solvency requirements; 
(iii) requires insurance firms to put in place appropriate risk management policies and 
practices; and (iv) requires increased disclosure of information. Regarding insurance 
industry reforms, it is notable that the Group of 7 countries, following the 2007 global 
financial crisis, through the Financial Stability Forum called on member countries to 
strengthen their regulatory and capital frameworks for monoline insurers in relation to 
structured finance exposures.
700
 Zimbabwe should follow suit for its insurance 
industry as a whole and especially for firms that provide or are exposed to credit 
default insurance. 
 
9.3.5. Investment in structured finance securities 
Because insurance firms are prudentially regulated, they are often subjected to 
restrictions regarding the type of securities they may trade, deal or hold as 
investments. Typically, as is the case in Zimbabwe, they are obliged to invest in 
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prescribed securities, usually gilts and/or investment grade-rated securities. Because 
structured finance securities were mispriced and typically ascribed investment grade 
ratings, insurance firms‘ balance sheets - similar to those of banks - were left bloated 
with toxic assets following the collapse of the global structured finance securities 
market.   
The Insurance Act prescribes categories of securities insurance firms are 
authorised hold.
701
 Structured finance securities fall outwith the category of securities 
that insurance firms are permitted to trade, deal or hold. This study argues that the 
extant prescribed assets regime unduly limits insurance firms‘ treasury decisions. 
Instead of a prescribed assets regime, the Insurance Act should prescribe assets that 
insurance firms may not trade or deal in, or securities against which high capital 
reserves must be kept if held by a regulated entity. Structured thus, particularly risky 
structured finance securities such as CDOs may then be proscribed, or alternatively 
conditions may be imposed on insurance firms‘ ability to hold them, including 
mandatory authorization from the IPC. The IPC should consider imposing risk 
management rules pertaining to the nature of structured finance securities that 
regulated insurance firms might deal or trade.   
In summary, based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the extant insurance 
regulatory regime can be harnessed to prevent and manage some of the risks that can 
arise from insurance firm‘s involvement in structured finance transactions as credit 
default insurers and as investors in structured finance securities. But the framework is 
rudimentary. The extant prudential regulation and supervision framework for 
                                                 
701
 Section 26 of the Insurance Act states ―(1) Every insurer shall, in respect of the insurance business 
carried on by him in Zimbabwe, hold the insurance fund referred to in subsection (2) of section twenty 
nine in such prescribed securities and in such proportions of prescribed securities as may be specified 
by the Minister in terms of subsection (2). (1A) An insurer who contravenes subsection (1) shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level five or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.‖ 
278 
insurance firms should be reformed. The IPC should establish a framework, regulating 
especially risk management frameworks of insurance firms engaged in structured 
finance transactions. The framework should provide for, among others: (i) risk-
sensitive capital and solvency rules (including Solvency II adoption); and (ii) 
corporate governance stipulations that address among others - as argued above in 
relation to banking institutions - executive compensation, conflicts of interests and 
other good corporate governance principles. The prescribed asset regime stated in the 
Insurance Act should be reformed to give insurance firms greater freedom; regulated 
however for risk management purposes to ensure that insurance firms are prohibited 
from, or are obliged to keep high capital reserves against, holding specified risky 
assets. To reduce regulatory arbitrage, regulatory gaps and regulatory inefficiency, 
there is merit in the argument - as appears below - that an integrated regulatory 
agency structure should be created that will facilitate the consolidated regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions, especially in an environment graced with 
financial conglomerates. 
 
9.4. Securities Commission 
The SC is Zimbabwe‘s capital markets regulator. It is established in terms of 
section 3 of the Securities Act. The SC consists of between 3 and 5 commissioners 
appointed by the Minister of Finance. It consists of: (i) the chair of the principle 
registered securities exchange in Zimbabwe;
702
 (ii) an RBZ employee responsible for 
financial markets; and (iii) three persons appointed from one or more associations 
―which represent persons trading or dealing in securities, managing portfolios of 
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securities, or recording transfers or other transactions relating to securities.‖703 The 
SC‘s primary mandate is to ensure capital markets integrity through the regulation of 
securities trading - including through the registration, supervision and regulation of 
securities exchanges and licensed persons - and the protection of investors.
704
   
The Securities Act, promulgated into law in 2008, is the primary capital markets 
regulatory enactment in Zimbabwe. It repealed the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act 
[Chap 24:18],
705
 which used to be the primary regulatory enactment. Although the 
Securities Act envisages the existence of several exchanges, Zimbabwe currently has 
one securities exchange, which is the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). The ZSE 
was established in 1896, making it the second oldest securities exchange in Africa.
706
 
Shares, debentures, government stock and bonds, municipal bonds and other quasi-
government bonds are the major capital market instruments used in Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe‘s capital market is largely institutional, although the promulgation of the 
CIS Act and the AMC Act resulted in increased usage - primarily through unit trusts - 
of the ZSE for investment purposes by retail investors.  
This section analyses the SC‘s regulatory authority over securities trading in 
Zimbabwe. It evaluates whether the Securities Act enables the SC to: (i) prevent and 
manage risk that can arise from the trading especially of structured finance securities; 
and (ii) effectively regulate key gatekeepers to the capital markets, especially 
structured finance lawyers, CRAs and public auditors. Internationally, and especially 
in the U.S. context, these gatekeepers‘ failures in relation to the structuring of 
securitization transactions - from the collapse of Enron to the 2007 global financial 
crisis - elicited a lot of criticism and calls for reform.   
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9.4.1. Context 
The 2007 global financial crisis represents not just a failure of regulation of 
banking and insurance firms, but also of securities markets regulation. In the U.S., the 
SEC, in common with other global securities regulators, failed to effectively regulate 
and supervise the process of issuing, and entities that were involved in the issuing, of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, among others, which are at the heart 
of the global financial crisis. Securities laws are typically geared to contribute to 
systemic risk reduction, as well as ensuring efficient capital markets and protecting 
investors through, inter alia, statutorily-prescribed peremptory periodic disclosures of 
material information by issuers to financial markets participants; and through the 
effective supervision and enforcement of applicable laws and regulations. Using the 
example of the U.S., it is clear that the SEC‘s failure to effectively regulate and 
supervise the origination and issuance of mispriced, opaque, highly complex and 
difficult to price structured finance securities contributed to the 2007 global financial 
crisis. 
 
9.4.1.1. Failure to regulate the issuance of complex securities 
A key objective of securities regulation is to ensure that issuers and related service 
providers (gatekeepers) effect full disclosure of material information relating to an 
issuer and issued securities. Full disclosure of material information enables 
transparent, efficient, and fair capital markets. Using the U.S., as an illustration, it is 
notable that with regards structured finance securities and derivatives, the practices 
and policies employed the SEC eschewed full disclosure and analysis. Instead the 
SEC presided over a system in which it and securities investors over-relied on 
unregulated ratings provided by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
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(NRSRO), which arguably became proxies for full disclosure.707 NRSROs are CRAs of 
which the major three - Standard and Poor‘s, Moodys and Fitch-Ratings - constitute an 
effective oligopoly. As discussed in detail in chapter 9, CRAs play a critical role in 
structured finance securities market, and were essential to financial markets‘ acceptance 
of structured finance securities. Ratings influence whether an originator can access capital 
markets, the cost of refinancing and for some prudentially regulated institutions, they 
determine which assets can be used as regulatory capital.  
CRAs played a key role in the 2007 financial crisis, and were responsible for 
mispricing structured finance securities. This was notwithstanding the enactment of the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 (CRAR Act), following CRAs‘ failure to 
timeously downgrade Enron‘s stock. CRAs continued to be riven by conflicts of interest, 
over-rely on mathematical models and on artificial and wrong assumptions, especially 
relating to real estate prices. The CRAR Act does not regulate the rating process, or 
require CRAs to disclose their rating methodologies to the SEC or to market 
participants.
708
 In addition, there is a near total lack of liability for CRA malfeasance. 
Lack of transparency in rating processes, for a long time the subject of criticism, was 
not addressed by the CRAR Act.  
Credit default risk mispricing by CRAs went largely undetected until the onset of 
the financial crisis, giving rise to questions about the integrity and usefulness of 
ratings. Unquestionably, there was a failure to effectively regulate CRAs. There was 
little, if any, oversight over CRAs ratings opinions, or their methodologies, yet 
regulators relied, and required issuers and investors to rely, on CRAs‘ ratings opinions 
especially with regards structured finance securities.  
                                                 
707
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The structured finance securities issuance framework operated by the SEC proved 
ill-suited to the task of managing securitization transaction risks. The global financial 
crisis established that trade in highly complex securities can lead to: (i) a failure of 
investing standards; (ii) the impairment of disclosure; and (iii) the susceptibility of 
markets to contagion and fraud.
709
 The SEC‘s primary securitization regulatory 
enactment, the 2005-enacted Regulation AB,
710
 did not address the problems 
generated by the origination and issue of complex structured finance securities. 
Regulation AB has been criticised for not requiring: (i) issuers to conduct and warrant 
that they had undertaken appropriate due diligence measures; (ii) arrangers and 
underwriters to ensure that underlying loan origination documentation had been 
verified, audited and characteristics noted for disclosure as part of the issuance 
process and other risk management purposes;
711
 and (iii) CRAs to undertake due 
diligence measures relating to assets backing securities on which they issued opinions. 
Instead, Regulation AB requires statistical data on the characteristics of an asset pool, 
―such as yield, cash flows, interest rate sensitivity, total rate of return, and the 
financial impact of losses ‗based on a variety of loss or default experience, 
prepayment, interest rate and related assumptions.‘‖712  
Because disclosure pertaining to structured finance securities was poor, when 
defaults on underlying mortgages occurred, the resultant panic affected global 
financial markets. Some commentators argue that the SEC over-relied on CRA-issued 
ratings because of the increasing complexity of some of the structured finance 
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securities.
713
 Proponents of securitization, such as Schwarcz, argued that even if full 
disclosure had been effected it is highly unlikely that investors and other market 
participants would have understood them.
714
 But it is indisputable that these securities 
were opaque, led to risk concentration, were extremely sensitive to market liquidity 
conditions (and did prove to be illiquid), and were too reliant on mathematical models 
for price discovery.  
 
9.4.1.2. Lax risk management practices and policies 
In 2008 the SEC conceded that its regulatory and supervisory framework for 
investment banks in the U.S. was flawed, which had led to the collapse or re-
organisation of the major U.S. investment banks: Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
715
 These 
institutions, which were heavily involved in the structured finance market were 
regulated under the Consolidated Supervised Entity programme (CSE programme). 
Among its notable features, the CSE programme freed investment banks from strict 
debt-to-equity ratios and allowed them to use highly leveraged capital structures under 
a loosely supervised and voluntary regime.
716
 While the CSE programme allowed 
investment banks to adopt high-leverage business models, resulting in the growth of 
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their balance sheets and short-term profitability; it also resulted in the assumption of 
greater risks, but subject to inadequate capital and liquidity requirements.
717
 
The capital model enabled by the CSE programme and supervised by the SEC was 
highly susceptible to liquidity risk; a risk which it seriously underappreciated.
718
 The 
CSE programme employed a ―more relaxed alternative net capital rule‖719 as opposed 
to the more stringent net capital rule applicable to firms regulated by the Federal 
Reserve. This was compounded by the absence of close supervision and the failure to 
put in place appropriate prudential risk management guidelines that regulated 
investment banks‘ exposures to particular assets, such as mortgage backed securities, 
and that required more stringent stress testing of capital and liquidity requirements.  
The SEC‘s Office of the Inspector General noted that following their entry into the 
CSE programme, all the major investment banks substantially increased their leverage 
and debt-to-equity-ratios,
720
 creating serious insolvency problems. The SEC conceded 
that it had miscalculated the risks inherent in the risk management policies it expected 
investment banks to follow, because it had presumed that secured financing could be 
obtained if a regulated entity had quality assets.
721
 Following the freezing of the 
wholesale finance markets, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch with their debt-to-equity 
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rations at 33:1 and 40:1 respectively,
722
 merged with other banks because of their 
unsustainable debt levels and refinancing problems. Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 
11-bankruptcy protection; and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted into 
bank holding companies - which brought them under the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Federal Reserve with access to lender of last resort and deposit insurance protection.  
The SEC is also accused of failing to regulate and supervise investment banks‘ 
asset concentration risk as part of investment banking overall risk management 
systems.  This resulted in investment banks such as Bear Stearns being over-exposed 
to mortgage securities.
723
 Such concentrated exposures to U.S. subprime mortgage-
backed securities caused severe losses, eroded capital bases and heightened financial 
distress as firms struggled to refinance.
724
 The SEC‘s regulation of investment banks 
under the CSE programme formerly ended in September 2008 and the Federal 
Reserve now regulates them.   
 
9.4.1.3. Inadequate resourcing of the SEC 
The SEC has also been criticised for its failure to effectively discharge its 
securities markets regulatory responsibilities because of inadequate resources. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated for instance that the SEC had 
inadequate manpower, expertise and technology with which to effectively discharge 
its mandate; and corporate misconduct investigations were hampered and enforcement 
staff members were discouraged from issuing penalties against corporations.
725
 As a 
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result, the SEC struggled to identify market manipulation and protect investors. These 
are some of the reasons given for the failure to discover, notwithstanding complaints 
and some investigations, the Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff‘s hedge fund.726 
The following section analyses whether the SC has the necessary tools with which to 
prevent and manage risks that can arise from the issuance and trade in structured 
finance securities in Zimbabwe.  
 
9.4.2. Securities Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction 
As noted above, the SC: (i) regulates the marketing of, and investment in, 
securities;
727
 (ii) regulates and registers securities exchanges;
728
 (iii) regulates and 
licenses persons who trade or deal in or manage securities;
729
 and (iv) regulates the 
establishment and functions of central securities depositories to facilitate the 
marketing and transfer of securities.
730
 The SC registers all securities exchanges in 
Zimbabwe,
731
 and is empowered to impose terms and conditions on securities 
exchanges licences.
732
  
In addition, the Securities Act requires the SC to licence and regulate the activities 
of any person carrying on a licensable activity. A licensable activity is defined in 
section 2 of the Securities Act to include: ―…the giving of investment advice, that is 
to say - (i) advising other persons on their investments in securities; (ii) issuing or 
publishing analyses or reports on securities; (iii) on behalf of a client, undertaking the 
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services and expertise, as challenges to bringing actions. Also, Enforcement staff said a burdensome 
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management of a portfolio of securities for the purpose of investment, including the 
arranging of purchases, sales or exchanges of securities through a licensed 
dealer…‖733 [Emphasis added]. The Securities Act lists persons deemed to carry out 
licensable activities. These include: securities dealers, securities investment advisers, 
securities investment managers, securities trustees and securities custodian service 
and securities transfer service providers. This means broker-dealer firms are regulated 
by the SC. As noted above collective investment schemes and asset management 
companies are not required to be licensed by the SC,
734
 which is an anomaly given 
that their main activities are securities related and should therefore be regulated by the 
SC and not by the RBZ.  
 
9.4.2.1. Structured finance lawyers, CRAs and auditors 
From the definition of licensable activity, it is clear that CRAs and securities 
lawyers although not mentioned by name, are required to obtain a licence from and 
are regulated by the SC. CRAs issue reports on securities and for this reason fall 
within the definition of persons undertaking licensable activities.
735
 The same applies 
to securities lawyers since they give advice to investors in, or underwriters of, 
securities issued by a structured finance SPV, opining whether full disclosure has 
been effected under the relevant securities laws.
736
  
Whether transactional lawyers and public auditors are obliged to obtain a licence 
from the SC is less certain. Transactional lawyers advise issuers or arrangers and 
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produce true-sale and non-consolidation opinions.
737
 Similarly, auditors verify the 
accuracy of an issuer client‘s financial records and produce audit reports. To the 
extent that true-sale and non-consolidation opinions and audit reports are third- party 
opinions
738
 issued in reality for the benefit of securities investors; transactional 
counsel and auditors engaged to advise securitization transactions, arguably fall 
within the category of persons whose activities require them to obtain licences from 
the SC.
739
 This conclusion is arrived at only by looking at the purpose of third party 
opinions, rather than the strict legal effect of the contractual relationship between an 
opining transactional lawyer or an auditor. If a strict legal interpretation were adopted, 
the necessary conclusion would be that an auditor providing an audit report and a 
transactional lawyer providing a true-sale or non-consolidation opinion to an 
issuer/arranger client is not giving advice to another person ―on their investments in 
securities.‖ This definition of licensable activity in section 2 of the Securities Act 
should be reformulated to clearly stipulate that all structured finance lawyers and 
auditors involved in structuring securities products to be publicly traded are regulated 
to that extent by the SC. Alternatively the SC should issue guidance notes which 
clarify that all structured finance lawyers and public auditors are deemed to be 
undertaking licensable activities.  
Section 38(3) (a) (iv) and (v) of the Securities Act exempts from registration 
lawyers and auditors registered under the Legal Practitioners Act and the Public 
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Accountants and Auditors Act, respectively, whose securities advice is incidental to 
their overall practice. There are a few, if any, lawyers and public auditors in 
Zimbabwe whose practice will consist exclusively or substantially of providing 
securities investment advice. Most lawyers‘ and auditors‘ practices will include other 
areas of the law and audit practice, respectively. This creates a risk that in practice 
very few, if any, lawyers and auditors will seek, or can be compelled to seek, 
registration with the SC. Lawyers and auditors play a critical gatekeeping function in 
structured finance markets. Their failures, as reflected by the role of Enron‘s lawyers 
and auditors in fraudulent securitization-type transactions, can result in corporate 
collapses or the undermining of financial stability. This exemption should be removed 
to ensure that all structured finance lawyers and auditors engaged in securitization 
transaction are required to obtain licenses from and be regulated by the SC.  
Section 38 of the Securities Act also exempts from registration registered banking, 
building society and insurance institutions. While this exemption is understandable 
and avoids duplicating regulatory jurisdictions and authority; it is unclear if 
employees of these institutions engaged as lawyers and auditors and who give 
securities investments advice are also exempted from registration under the Act and 
are consequentially not regulated by the SC. This ambiguity should be clarified, as the 
regulation of the foregoing by the SC should not depend on their employment status.  
This study recommends that the CIS Act, the AMC Act and the Securities Act 
should be amended to provide that persons providing investment advice to, and 
investing people‘s assets in the securities markets should be registered, regulated and 
supervised by the SC. In addition, the Securities Act should be amended to clearly 
stipulate that structured finance lawyers and public auditors involved in structured 
finance transactions and who give advice to originating firms, arrangers, issuers, and 
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investors are obliged to obtain a licence from, and are regulated by, the SC. This 
would enable the SC to mitigate financial information failure risks that can be caused 
by the fraudulent, reckless, or negligent provision of financial advice by key capital 
markets gatekeepers to structured finance market participants through: (a) the 
promulgation and enforcement of peremptory rules of conduct; (b) surveillance and 
monitoring; and (c) administrative sanctions, such as deregistration, monetary fines 
and other penalties.  
 
9.4.3. Securities Commission’s risk-management authority 
The powers of the SC as contained in the Securities Act are quite expansive. As 
noted above, the SC registers and supervises the operations of public securities 
exchanges in Zimbabwe. It can amend or cancel securities exchanges‘ registration 
certificates.
740
 It also registers persons carrying on licensable activities and makes 
rules governing their operations, per section 118 of the Securities Act. The rules 
prescribed by the SC have the force of law - as subsidiary legislation - once gazetted 
by the Minister of Finance through a statutory instrument.
741
  
The SC has power to obtain information or documents - necessary for the 
prevention, investigation or detection of an offence or breach of the Securities Act – 
from a licensed person, a registered securities exchange or a securities depository, or 
from an employee of, or person who has or had any business or dealings with, the 
foregoing.
742
 In addition, the SC has power to investigate the business, activities or 
operations of any registered securities exchange, licensed person or central 
depository. For this purpose, the SC can appoint one or more of its employees or a 
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member of the Public Service Commission to be an inspector.
743
 Further, the SC can 
order an investigation if a licensed person, securities exchange or central depository 
(licensee hereafter): (i) fails to furnish information or documentation that has been 
requested by the SC, or furnishes incorrect or incomplete information or if the 
furnished information establishes a breach of the Securities Act; (ii) fails to correct an 
irregularity in the conduct of its business, activities or operations within 30 days of 
being ordered to do so by the SC; or (iii) prevents an inspector from exercising its 
powers as provided for under the Securities Act. The SC can also initiate an 
investigation if it has reasonable grounds for believing that any class of clients of a 
licensed person or members of a securities exchange or participants or depositors in a 
central depository are being prejudiced. An inspector appointed by the SC has 
extensive powers of search and seizure, and exercises the same powers as a 
Commissioner appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chap 10:07].  
With regards a licensee, the SC can, following an investigation by an inspector: (i) 
issue a warning; (ii) require the appointment of a person who can best advice the 
licensee on the proper conduct of its business; (iii) issue a written instruction, require 
the licensee to undertake remedial action specified in the instruction; (iv) impose a 
monetary penalty; (v) instruct the licensee to suspend or remove any of its officers or 
employees from their duties; (vi) direct the licensee to suspend all or any of its 
business; (viii) appoint a supervisor to monitor the affairs of the licensee; (ix) require 
the licensee - where it is a corporate body to convene a meeting of its members to 
discuss remedial measures to be taken; (x) cancel the licensee‘s licence or amend any 
of its licence terms or conditions; and (xi) in the case of a central securities 
depository, direct the operator to dissolve same or amend any rules governing its 
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operations.
744
 The SC can also apply to Court to interdict a threatened breach of the 
Securities Act by any person,
745
 and initiate class actions on behalf of aggrieved 
investors.
746
 Further, the SC has an array of supervisory and enforcement powers over 
securities law violations. It supervises the framework that penalises the misuse of 
insider information, improper securities trading, such as fraud, false trading and 
market manipulation.
747
  
Although its powers, as described above, are expansive the SC is yet to create a 
framework that: (i) regulates and supervises the process of issuing, and the entities 
that issue, structured finance securities: (ii) regulates the issuance of key types of 
structured finance securities products, such as basic ABS, or more complex CDOs; 
(iii) regulates CDS transactions; (iv) ensures the adequate protection of investors in 
structured finance securities; and (v) ensures overall financial market stability.  The 
SC was criticised by the RBZ Governor in his January 2009 Monetary Statement 
Policy for these failures.
748
 Given this situation, if firms in Zimbabwe were to 
originate and issue structured finance securities, the SC would not be able to prevent 
or effectively manage potential consequential risks, such as those highlighted above.  
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This study recommends that the SC prescribe a framework of rules and best 
practice guidelines governing the origination and issuance of structured finance 
securities. The SC must: (i) stipulate due diligence requirements that must be 
undertaken and certified by issuers pertaining to loans to be securitized – to mitigate 
the risk of moral hazard, incentive misalignment, fraud and other abusive practices; 
(ii) prescribe risk management rules for issuers, including rules pertaining to 
minimum capital and liquidity requirements; (iii) establish a framework for the 
registration, regulation and supervision of CRAs, including the rating process, 
establishing due diligence thresholds for CRAs rating public structured finance 
securities issuances;
749
 (iv) create a framework for the registration, regulation and 
supervision of structured finance lawyers and public auditors, clearly stipulating 
guidelines for true-sale and non-consolidation opinions as well as audit reports, 
respectively;
750
 (v) prescribe disclosure rules governing structured finance securities 
to reduce systemic risk - and possibly require issuers to retain some prescribed risk in 
securitization structures - and warrant that a prescribed threshold of due diligence has 
been undertaken by issuers, arrangers, underwriters, third party opinion givers such as 
structured finance lawyers and auditors, and CRAs; and (vi) establish a framework 
that results in the standardization of documentation for financial assets to be 
securitized, but under an enhanced disclosure framework.  
 
9.5. Recommendation: Establishment of an integrated regulatory system 
As above, this study argues that Zimbabwe should reform and reconstitute its 
hybrid financial services regulatory agency framework into an integrated one to 
ensure that it is capable of preventing and managing risk that can arise from the 
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securitization. Although the extant regulatory system can in practice be harnessed to 
prevent and manage some securitization transaction risks, it suffers from some 
weaknesses, as reflected above. Typified by the U.S. financial services regulatory 
system, a hybrid regulatory structure is prone to regulatory gaps and enables 
regulatory arbitrage. 
Save for the U.S., it is notable that most other countries that have securitization 
markets reformed their financial services regulatory systems into integrated models.
751
 
This is especially true of European countries,
752
 where reforms were driven largely by 
changes in the nature of financial services,
753
 such as: (i) financial deregulation; (ii) 
increased dominance of financial conglomerates; (iii) increasing connectedness and 
complexity of financial markets and products;
754
 and (iv) the blurring of traditional 
financial roles and products caused in part by securitization.
755
 In most cases, the 
number of regulatory agencies was reduced
756
  and their capacity enhanced.
757
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Financial Regulator Model‘, at p. 258. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=346120  
755
 See for instance Blanchard who states that securitization increased interconnectedness between 
different types of financial institutions within and across countries. Olivier Blanchard (2009) ‗The 
Crisis: Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies‘, IMF Working Paper (WP/09/80), at p. 7. 
Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0980.pdf  
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 Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor (2007) ‗Building Supervisory Structures in Sub Saharan 
Africa - An Analytical Framework‘, IMF Working Paper (WP/07/18), at p. 3. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0718.pdf  
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 Several commentators argue that there is a trend towards consolidated regulator models. See for 
instance Coffee and Sale (2008) (note 664, supra) at p. 10. This trend, notwithstanding, apparently, 
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Integrated regulatory models are considered more effective and efficient at regulating 
and supervising increasingly sophisticated and globalised financial services.
758
  
Although there does not exist one optimal financial services regulatory agency 
system,
759
 it is notable that the 2007 global financial crisis prompted questions about 
the effectiveness of hybrid regulatory agencies (U.S.),
760
 universal regulatory agency 
structures (U.K.)
761
  and in those with a twin-peaks system (Australia). Notably, as 
illustrated by the global financial crisis, each of these jurisdictions failed to effectively 
manage risks inherent in structured finance. These developments suggest that 
although important, the structure of a regulator model may be less of an issue 
compared to how effectively and efficiently: (i) it discharges in practice its regulatory 
and supervisory functions; (ii) its constituent parts operate and coordinate; and (iii) 
how well it resolves systemic risk.
762
  
                                                                                                                                            
hybrid (functional and institutional) regulatory systems remain in the majority. See also Masciandaro 
and Quintyn (2008) (note 752, supra) at p. 3; Richard Podpiera and Martin Cihák (2007) ‗Are More 
Integrated Prudential Supervision Agencies Characterized By Better Regulation and Supervision?‘ at p. 
1. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998624  
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 Some commentators posit that domestic politics and corporate scandals influenced some regulatory 
reform initiatives. The U.K. is an example of a country that reformed its financial services sector 
regulatory system in part due to internal political considerations. For this argument, see generally 
Ferran (2002) (note 754, supra). See also Coffee and Sale (note 664, supra) at p. 14. 
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 See for instance Erlend Walter Nier who states: ―The question which regulatory structures are 
conducive to achieving the goals of financial regulation has long been a difficult policy issue….It is 
likely that no single structure will be optimal for all countries, regardless of the state of development of 
the financial sector and other contextual circumstances.‖ Nier (2009) (note 753, supra), at p. 37.  
Regarding the on-going debate in the U.S. about reform of its financial services regulatory system, 
John Coffee and Hillary Sale argue that a comparative survey of regulatory reforms implemented by 
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760
 United States Department of the Treasury (2009) (note 609, supra) at p. 4.  
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 Willem H. Buiter (2007) ‗Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis‘, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research: Policy Insight No. 18, December 2007), at p. 13. Available at: 
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight18.pdf 
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 See for instance Abrams and Taylor who state: ―Maintaining and enhancing supervisory capacity 
and the effectiveness of supervision should be the primary goal of any proposed regulatory reform. As 
such the development of regulatory capacity should be given prominence over the issue of regulatory 
structure, and the latter is only a matter of fundamental concern to the extent that it can assist in 
achieving this overarching objective.‖ Richard K. Abrams and Michael W. Taylor (2000) ‗Issues in 
Unification of Financial Sector Supervision‘, IMF Working Paper (WP/00/213) at p. 5. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00213.pdf In addition, as noted by Nier, whichever 
regulatory model is adopted, it must ensure that: (i) the key regulatory objectives of systemic risk 
reduction and consumer protection are assigned to an agency; (ii) each agency has an internally 
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9.5.1. Arguments for an integrated regulatory model in Zimbabwe 
Although there is no universal theory of financial services regulation,
763
 this study 
argues that the structure of Zimbabwe‘s financial services regulatory system should be 
reformed; not because the system has failed to manage securitization-transaction 
related risks, but because, as illustrated above, in practice it is likely to prove 
ineffective at managing risks - such as those exposed by the 2007 global financial 
crisis. The primary reason for this hypothesis is that Zimbabwe‘s regulatory system, 
especially its securities markets regulatory framework, is rudimentary and is under-
developed to adequately prevent and manage securitization transaction-related risks.  
Although supporting evidence is scant, commentators argue that integrated 
regulatory agencies deliver higher quality regulation of banking, insurance and 
securities markets compared to other systems.
764
 Arguably, integrated regulatory 
structures: (i) are better at regulating financial conglomerates; (ii) reduce the need for, 
and inefficiencies arising from, inter-agency co-ordination across sectoral lines;
765
 
(iii) prevent regulatory arbitrage; (iv) result in the development of a professional body 
of qualified and experienced regulatory staff, spanning the entire financial services 
sector; (v) increase regulatory efficiency, reduce the costs of compliance and assist in 
achieving economies of scale;
766
 (vi) reduce regulatory turf wars and increase 
regulatory accountability; and (vii) result in greater regulatory agency flexibility, 
                                                                                                                                            
tools are granted to those agencies tasked with the relevant objective; (v) it creates synergies across 
tools; (vi) it creates synergies across regulatory institutions; (vii) it reduces the potential for inter-
agency frictions; (viii) consistency with pre-existing objectives and (ix) it must reduce duplication. Nier 
(2009) (note 753, supra) at p. 38.  
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 Kenneth K. Mwenda (2006) ‗Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a 
Unified Regulator‘, World Bank. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRSUMAFTPS/Resources/Legal_Aspects_of_Financial_Sces
_Regulations.pdf  
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 Ibid., at pp. 18-22.  
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 Nier (2009) (note 753, supra) at p. 40.  
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 Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn (2008) ‗After the Big Bang and Before the Next One? 
Reforming the Financial Supervision Architecture and the Role of the Central Bank. A Review of 
Worldwide Trends, Causes and Effects (1998-2008)‘, at pp. 6-8. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336390  
297 
allowing swifter familiarity with, and responses to, risks peculiar to financial 
innovations compared to functional or institutional regulation, which may be based on 
a narrow range of institutions and products.
767
 Obviously integrated systems have 
their disadvantages. Achieving a balance between conduct of business regulation on 
the one hand and prudential regulation on the other can be a challenge, a fact noted in 
the context of the U.K.‘s FSA.768  
This study recommends the jettisoning of the current regulatory system in favour 
of either the universal or twin-peaks regulatory model or a variant of either. The 
current hybrid system is fragmented and ill-suited for a modern financial system. A 
fragmented regulatory system results in regulation based on legal form rather than 
economic substance.
769
 This criticism, which has been levelled against the current 
U.S. financial services regulatory system,
770
 applies with equal force to Zimbabwe. As 
noted above, the RBZ regulates some and not all banking and building society 
institutions, the IPC regulates insurance firms and pensions and provident funds, 
while the SC regulates the securities markets as well as some of the securities markets 
gatekeepers, but it does not regulate collective investment schemes or asset 
management companies. This system has obvious regulatory flaws, including 
regulatory gaps and can facilitate regulatory arbitrage especially by financial 
conglomerates engaged in more than one line of financial services business.
771
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regulatory systems refer to Abrams and Taylor (2000) (note 762, supra)  
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 The Financial Services Authority (2009) (note 751, supra) at p. 87. For some of the disadvantages of 
the integrated regulatory structure, refer to Nier (2009) (note 753, supra) at pp. 41-43.  
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 Ibid.  
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 See for instance the complaint made by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor in his Monetary 
Statement for 2009: ―2.24 The absence of a well defined and comprehensive regulatory prudential 
supervision framework for the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, Stock Brokers, Insurance Companies and 
Pension Funds has significantly compromised financial stability. 2.25 Inadequate oversight of the 
capital market, pension and insurance sectors has provided a hotbed for illegal transactions, indiscipline 
and reckless disregard of rules and regulations. 2.26 Stock-broking firms have continued to mushroom 
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Zimbabwe should enact a law that provides for an integrated regulatory agency. 
As noted above, a weak consolidated supervisory framework has been structured 
through the issuance by the RBZ of a set of Guidelines.
772
 The Guidelines enable the 
RBZ to indirectly supervise any financial conglomerate one of whose related entities 
is a regulated banking institution.
773
 The RBZ promulgated the guidelines because 
there are financial conglomerates in Zimbabwe whose interests span the banking, 
insurance and securities markets,
774
 which exposes the banking system to myriad 
risks.
775
 The obvious weakness with this consolidated supervisory system, as argued 
in paragraph 9.2.2.4. is that it was structured through Guidelines and not through an 
Act of Parliament. This consolidated supervision framework is arguably ineffectual. It 
cannot be used to effectively regulate and supervise banking, insurance and securities 
firms and markets. The new integrated framework would enable the consolidated 
regulation and supervision of: (i) banking, building society, micro-finance and other 
                                                                                                                                            
all over the market some of which are under resourced, and are manned by unaccountable one man 
bands.‖ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2009) (note 623, supra), at p. 49.  
772
 RBZ (2007) (note 621, supra).  
773
 Clause 1.4. to the  introduction the Guideline states: ―the primary objective of Consolidated 
Supervision is not to supervise each and every entity in the group but to supervise the regulated entity 
as part of the group so as to take into account the potential impact of the various group entities on the 
banking institution‖…. In the preamble in clause 2 to 4 thereof, the Guidelines state: ―2. The Banking 
Act [Chapter 24:20], in particular Section 45(1)(c), empowers the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to 
monitor, supervise and investigate associates of banking institutions, hence facilitate supervision of 
banking institutions on a consolidated basis. 3. This Guideline shall apply to every banking institution, 
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section 2 of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20]. 4. For purposes of Consolidated Supervision, insurance 
companies shall be included in the consolidation to the extend of providing a qualitative assessment 
only but excluded with respect to Quantitative Consolidation of the banking group.‖ Ibid.  
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Governor stated that some banking institutions engaged in regulatory arbitrage by using unregulated 
conduits to transact non-banking business activities. RBZ (2009) (note 621, supra) at paragraph 2.62. 
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 The RBZ Bank Supervision Guideline states: ―1.5. Financial conglomerates bring with them a 
number of regulatory and supervisory concerns, including but not limited to abuse of economic power; 
agency problems; imprudent intra-group transactions and exposures; reputation risk; moral hazard; 
regulatory arbitrage; conflicts of interest; complex corporate structures; and potential for risk 
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provides a methodology to assess and monitor how effectively a banking group identifies, measures, 
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current best practice in supervision.‖ [Emphasis added]. Ibid., at pp. 5-6.  
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money lending institutions; (ii) non-banking financial institutions, including hedge 
funds, to prevent the emergence of an unregulated shadow banking system; (iii) non-
banking institutions such as insurance firms, pension and provident funds, investment 
banking institutions, asset management companies and collective investment schemes; 
and (iv) key gatekeepers to the financial markets. 
Such an integrated agency structure is better placed to establish a framework for 
the regulation and supervision of: (i) the securitization-enabled originate-to-distribute 
business model for all deposit taking institutions and other financial firms capable of 
accessing wholesale funding, such as insurance firms; (ii) prescribe and supervise 
financial institutions‘ risk management practices, with particular focus on risk-based 
capital and liquidity requirements for banking, insurance and broker-dealer firms; (ii) 
securitization transaction best practice guidelines, which deal, among others, with the 
origination and underwriting of loans – including through standardization 
requirements; (iv) financial industry-wide compensation schemes and other good 
corporate governance requirements; (v) structured finance securities issuance, 
including the regulation of derivative instruments such as CDS; (vii) an enhanced 
capital markets regulatory framework, including enhanced disclosure rules, especially 
for structured finance securities, which as shown by the 2007 global financial crisis 
can be complex and difficult to price.  
The integrated framework should be complemented by a law providing for the 
resolution of financial institutions whose insolvency will undermine financial 
stability. As noted above, the TFIR Act only applies to banking and building 
institutions regulated by the RBZ. But as shown by the case of AIG, the collapse of 
non-banking institutions can threaten financial stability. An integrated regulatory 
agency will also be able to prescribe a framework that enables the holistic regulation 
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and supervision of securitization transactions and consequential risks. In addition, an 
integrated agency would be able to ensure consumer protection, i.e. the protection of 
consumers of financial products and services as well as investors in securities.  
Obviously, to be effective, the integrated agency must be adequately resourced, 
i.e. with adequate numbers of personnel with appropriate expertise, who are provided 
with sufficient resources - human, material, financial and technical - to effectively 
discharge their statutory mandate of prudential financial sector regulation and 
supervision.  In addition, the agency would have to: (i) enforce applicable laws, 
policies and practices; and (ii) be independent in law and practice from interest groups 
such as financial industry stakeholders and the government in the discharge of its 
responsibilities.
776
  
 
 
9.6. Summary 
In summary, this chapter evaluated the law relating to the RBZ, the IPC and the 
SC; the banking, insurance and securities markets regulators, respectively. Of the 
three regulatory agencies, the RBZ is the only one that has put in place a framework 
for the prudential regulation of securitization. The SC is yet to put in place any 
framework, which among others, would: (i) regulate the origination, trade or dealing 
in structured finance securities; (ii) create a capital markets gatekeeping regulatory 
framework;
777
 and (iii) prescribe risk prevention and management rules that can 
potentially arise from securitization. Similarly, the IPC is yet to create a modern 
prudential regulatory framework for insurance firms intending to engage in 
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 A criticism levelled against the U.K.‘s FSA is that it was compromised by interest group capture and 
was lax in enforcing applicable laws, did not have adequate enforcement resources and personnel. John 
Armour (2008) ‗Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Assessment‘. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 106/2008, at pp. 19-22. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542    
777
 Refer to chapter 9.  
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securitization transactions as originators, providers of credit default risk insurance or 
as investors in structured finance securities. To this extent, Zimbabwe has an 
inadequate and incomplete structured finance risk mitigation framework. On this 
account, this study concludes that it would be arguably imprudent for a full-blown 
securitization market to propagate in the absence of a reformed and enhanced 
financial services regulatory framework. From a risk management perspective, such a 
framework should take the form of an integrated financial services regulatory agency 
model over the extant hybrid financial services regulatory system.  
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CHAPTER 10 
CAPITAL MARKETS GATEKEEPING FRAMEWORK 
 
 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the extent to which Zimbabwe‘s capital markets 
gatekeeping framework enables the prevention of risks that can arise from 
securitization. Failures by gatekeepers to the capital markets (gatekeepers hereafter) 
which contributed to the 2001 collapse of Enron and the 2007 global financial crisis, 
illustrate the need for strengthening capital markets gatekeeping frameworks. This 
chapter evaluates the legal framework relating to structured finance lawyers, public 
auditors and CRAs. They are among gatekeepers who are critical to structured finance 
transactions and related risk mitigation. Being a legal study, this thesis does not 
evaluate whether or the extent to which the risk to the reputations of these gatekeepers 
mitigates financial information failure risk.
778
 The 2007 global financial crisis has in 
any event illustrated the limits of reputation and the need to establish effective 
gatekeeper regulation and supervision frameworks. This chapter concludes that 
Zimbabwe‘s framework relating to structured finance lawyers, public auditors and 
CRAs is underdeveloped must be enhanced to ensure the effective mitigation of 
securitization transaction related risks. 
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 Such an analysis would require an empirical analysis which would constitute a separate study of its 
own, and is beyond the scope of this study.  
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10.2. Context 
A gatekeeper is a private firm that uses its reputation (or expertise) ―to assure 
[financial market participants of] the accuracy of statements or representations that it 
makes or verifies.‖779 Underlying this definition is the argument that being 
reputational intermediaries, these private firms have more to lose than gain by 
falsifying or certifying transactions or records that are inaccurate or that violate 
applicable laws or practices.
780
 Investment banks, securities analysts, structured 
finance lawyers, public auditors and CRAs are all among a group of gatekeepers 
critical to the efficient functioning of capital markets.  
The collapse of Enron epitomised the failure of gatekeepers to diligently discharge 
their responsibilities, resulting in the transmission of misleading financial information 
within the financial markets to the prejudice of investors. Enron‘s auditors (Arthur 
Andersen) and lawyers (Vinson and Elkin - including its in-house counsel
781
) were 
complicit in the structuring of pseudo-securitization transactions, enabling it to 
misstate its financial statements, and consequentially misleading the investing public. 
In addition, CRAs failed to timeously downgrade Enron‘s rating.  
 In response to Enron‘s collapse, the U.S. enacted the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). This 
Act: (i) enhanced public auditors‘ and structured finance lawyers‘ regulatory 
                                                 
779
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Reforms, Berkley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series 2004, paper 160, at pp. 10-
11. Available at: http://repositories.cdlib/blewp/art160  
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 Coffee and Sale (2008) (note 664, supra) at p. 2. But the gatekeeping failures leading to the collapse 
of Enron and to the global financial crisis weaken this definition. Risk to reputation did little, it 
appears, to incentivise CRAs, for instance, to issue accurate ratings for instance, and neither did it stop 
lawyers and auditors assisting Enron to enter into transactions that enabled it to manipulate its financial 
reports.  
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securities fraud due to their involvement in the structuring of some of Enron‘s off balance sheet 
transactions.  See a critique of the role played by lawyers in the collapse of Enron in Keith, R. Fisher 
(2004) ‗The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron‘. University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform, Vol. 37, p. 1017, at pp. 1093-1096. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=824426  See 
also Susan P. Koniak (2003) ‗When the Hurlyburly‘s Done: The Bar‘s Struggle with the SEC‘, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1242-43 (2003). 
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framework; and (ii) required the enhancement of the CRA regulatory framework. As a 
result, the CRAR Act was enacted.  The CRAR Act did not and arguably could not 
have prevented CRAs from mispricing structured finance securities. The CRAR Act 
does not, as highlighted above, empower U.S. regulators to adequately regulate the 
rating process.  
The complicity of lawyers, auditors and CRAs in the issuance of misleading 
financial information to capital markets participants, as evidence by the case of Enron 
and the 2007 global financial crisis illustrate the need for robust capital markets 
gatekeeping frameworks; and especially in emerging markets intending to create 
securitization-enabling financial infrastructure. The following section analyses 
Zimbabwean law relating to structured finance lawyers, public auditors and CRAs.    
 
10.3. Structured finance lawyers 
Lawyers are integral to securitization transactions as transactional and securities-
law counsel. Structured finance lawyers advise issuers or investors; issuing true-sale 
and non-consolidation opinions and opining on securities law compliance. These 
opinions are part of transactional due diligence and are often prerequisite to deal 
closure. Although contested, it is argued that these legal opinions assist in reducing 
information asymmetries.
782
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 See for instance Lipson who disputes the informational value of true-sale and non-consolidation 
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Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808064  
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10.3.1. Structured finance lawyers as gatekeepers 
Although contested, there is a general consensus that lawyers are gatekeepers.
783
 
Critics argue that lawyers traditionally owe a duty to advocate for, and confidentiality 
to, their clients; both of which are undermined if they are regarded as gatekeepers. 
This notwithstanding, it is generally accepted that structured finance lawyers, whether 
acting as transactional or securities law counsel, do have gatekeeping functions.
784
 
Structured finance legal opinions are intended to assure third parties, especially 
underwriters and securities investors that appropriate due diligence has been 
undertaken and that a securitization transaction is bankruptcy remote. Diligently 
discharging this role, structured finance lawyers can detect and potentially disrupt 
wrongful conduct by withholding their certifying opinions.
785
 For these and other 
reasons, it has been argued that structured finance lawyers have, and should be 
compelled to exercise, gatekeeping responsibilities.
786
 Theoretical disputes 
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Century‘, Poonam Puri and Jeffrey Larson, eds., at p. 114.  
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The lawyer can control market access by withholding cooperation from the potential wrongdoer. She 
can refuse to do necessary legal work, provide legal opinions or otherwise refuse to associate the law 
firm‘s name with a questionable transaction.‖ Mark A. Sargent (2003) ‗Lawyers in a Perfect Storm‘, 
Villanova University School of Law, School of Law Working Paper Series, No. 16, 2003, at p. 25. 
Available at http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art16   
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 John Coffee states: ―Attorneys can also be gatekeepers when they lend their professional reputations 
to a transaction…‖ John C. Coffee (2002) ‗Understanding Enron: Its About the Gatekeepers, Stupid‘, 
Columbia Law School, The Centre for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 207, at p. 5. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=325240  In a later article, John Coffee states that structured 
finance lawyers have ―guardianship-like responsibilities to investors who rely upon the disclosures that 
the securities attorney typically prepares or reviews.‖ John C. Coffee (2003) ‗The Attorney as 
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notwithstanding, this study proceeds on the premise that structured finance lawyers 
are gatekeepers
787
 and that rules of professional conduct - common to most 
jurisdictions - require them to exercise gatekeeping responsibilities.  
 
10.3.2. Existing risk management framework 
In Zimbabwe lawyers are referred to as legal practitioners. Although in practice a 
distinction is drawn between advocates (barristers) and legal practitioners (solicitors), 
the Legal Practitioners Act [Chap 27:07] permits all lawyers right of audience before 
Courts in Zimbabwe, because the profession is fused. However, advocates may not 
operate trust accounts, and receive instructions only from lawyers in private practice 
or from the State. All practising lawyers must be members of the Law Society of 
Zimbabwe (LSZ), which is the representative body of lawyers. It is self-regulatory 
and is responsible for the interests and welfare its members, and is responsible for 
enforcing rules of professional conduct. This section assesses whether the extant 
gatekeeping regulatory and liability framework enables the prevention of lawyer-
facilitated fraud and other misdemeanours, which can arise in the context of structured 
finance securities origination and issuance.  
 
10.3.2.1. Fraud 
The Securities Act proscribes securities fraud. A lawyer commits securities fraud, 
if s/he assists an issuer/arranger-client to fraudulently induce another to trade or deal 
in securities by: (i) deliberately or recklessly making a statement - such as a true-sale 
or non-consolidation opinion - which is false or misleading; and which (ii) s/he knows 
                                                                                                                                            
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC‘, 103 Columbia Law Review, 1293, 2003, at p. 1295. Available at 
http://srrn.com/abstract=395181 See also Marc Steinberg (2006) ‗The Corporate Securities Attorney as 
a ‗Moving Target‘-Client Fraud Dilemmas‘, Washburn Law Journal, 2006, vol. 46 at p. 1.  
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 Zacharias argues that lawyers have always had a gatekeeping function. Fred Zacharias (2004) 
‗Lawyers as Gatekeepers‘, San Diego Law Review, 2004, vol. 41, 1387. 
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is false or misleading; (iii) or if s/he dishonestly conceals material facts.
788
 Section 
97(1) is ambiguous and the extent to which it deters lawyer-facilitated securities fraud 
is open to question. One interpretation of the section is that to secure a conviction, a 
prosecution must establish that a person was actually induced to trade or deal in 
securities as a result of a false or misleading opinion made by a lawyer that was aware 
of its falsity. An alternative interpretation is that the prosecution does not need to 
establish that a person was induced to trade or deal in securities. The deliberate 
issuance of a misleading opinion by a lawyer well aware of its falsity, or the 
deliberate withholding of material information, establishes the offence of fraudulent 
inducement. This ambiguity needs to be clarified. The SC should issue guidance notes 
to clarify what - in its opinion - amounts to fraudulent inducement to trade or deal in 
securities in violation of section 97(1). Such guidance will assist in establishing the 
type of misleading information whose dissemination constitutes a securities law 
violation.  
Arguably, section 97(1) is only ever likely to be applied against a lawyer in the 
event of collusion between a lawyer and an issuer to defraud investors by making 
intentionally misleading legal misrepresentations. Lawyers assist issuers and are not 
principal actors. In addition, an additional hurdle to establishing liability is that a 
typical true-sale or non-consolidation legal opinion is a reasoned opinion.
789
 This 
means it does not guarantee the decision that a court seized with a dispute will reach 
on a matter covered in an opinion. This makes it difficult to establish the mens rea 
required to establish fraud on the part of the opining lawyer.  
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 Steven Schwarcz states that all structured finance opinions are reasoned opinions; i.e. legal opinions 
which do not set black-letter legal conclusions, but engage in substantive discussion of the applicable 
law and qualify the discussions as appropriate with reasonable assumptions, cautionary language and 
disclosure of uncertainties. Steven L. Schwarcz (2005) (note 739, supra), at p. 12.  
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A structured finance lawyer convicted under section 97(1) of the Securities Act 
can be sued for damages under section 98 and/or under the common law for 
fraudulent misrepresentation.
790
 The lawyer, the law firm and the issuer client can be 
sued jointly and severally. An aggrieved party would need to establish causation; i.e. 
that the legal opinion was the proximate cause of its loss. In practice this may prove 
difficult given that for their investment decisions investors are more likely to rely on 
an aggregate of factors, including easy-to-digest information such as ratings or the 
advice of investment experts, and not simply on a true-sale or non-consolidation 
opinion for their investment decisions. But it is also true that most securitization deals 
cannot be closed in the absence of these third-party legal opinions.  
To establish a cause of action in tort an aggrieved claimant alleging fraudulent 
misrepresentation has to establish that the legal opinion was the proximate cause of 
his or her pecuniary loss. To do so, the plaintiff would have to contend and the court 
has to accept that: (i) the opinion is a third-party legal opinion; (ii) at the material 
time, the lawyer had a duty of care to the claimant;
791
 (iii) the claimant relied upon the 
opinion, and that it was reasonable for the claimant to rely on the third party legal 
opinion; and (iv) that as a result of this reliance on the legal opinion, the claimant 
suffered pecuniary loss (financial detriment).  
There is yet to be established rules and jurisprudence on structured finance 
lawyers‘ ethical and legal obligations pertaining to third-party legal opinions. There is 
no statutory framework to give guidance or establish a duty of care threshold. This 
                                                 
790
 Unlike in the U.S. where, following the Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 14 (1994) lawyers are generally immune from civil liability in cases where they 
aided and abetted their client‘s wrong doing in securities issuances, in Zimbabwe, there is no such 
restriction. Lawyers can be sued by aggrieved investors and others who suffered loss as a result of 
fraud, negligence, recklessness, or where the lawyer aided and abetted a client to commit fraud, or 
deliberately withhold material information.  
791
 In the U.S. context Laby argues that lawyers have a duty to exercise reasonable care when providing 
third party legal opinions used in business transactions. Arthur Laby (2006) ‗Differentiating 
Gatekeepers‘, Brook Journal of Corporate Finance and Commercial Law, vol. 1, 2006, 119, at p. 131. 
Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953948 
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should be remedied through the promulgation and enforcement by the SC and the Law 
Society of rules of professional conduct for structured finance lawyers. In the absence 
of such a framework and in the event of dispute, it is highly likely that the High Court 
will set a standard of care test for lawyers who provide third-party legal opinions. It is 
arguable and indeed likely that a court will hold that a lawyer engaged to produce a 
third-party legal opinion owes third-party beneficiaries a duty of care, i.e. a duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence.
792
 It is likely that a lawyer that 
intentionally provides a misleading third-party legal opinion with the intention to 
commit fraud, may be found liable for pecuniary loss occasioned to investors.
793
 To 
limit liability, lawyers typically circumscribe those who may rely on their third-party 
opinions,
794
 and that this may to an extent limit the range of potential claimants. 
Liability will therefore depend on the facts of each case. The extent of a lawyer‘s 
liability for fraud is limited to the extent of their culpability and the loss occasioned to 
the claimant.
795
 The possibility of such open-ended liability does arguably have a 
deterrent effect upon would-be tort-feasors.  
 
10.3.2.2. Negligent misrepresentation 
An issuer can sue a lawyer in contract and/or tort for pecuniary loss arising from 
the reckless or negligent provision of wrong legal advice in relation to a securities 
issuance. The misrepresentation must be material. It is difficult, although not 
                                                 
792
 Regarding the appropriate standard of care, the American Bar Association asks the question: ―What 
would a lawyer of reasonable skill and knowledge and similarly situated have done under the 
circumstances?‖ A.B.A. Comm. on Legal Opinions, (2004) ‗Law Office Opinion Practices‘, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 327, 328 (November 2004). 
793
 Although a factual matter, the damages must not be remote.  
794
 Jonathan C. Lipson (2006) (note 82, supra) at p. 82.  
795
 Writing on Zimbabwe, Christie states that: ―fraud is a delict…it follows that damages may be 
claimed against the maker of a misrepresentation…‖ He also makes the point that: ―the measure 
of…delictual damages is to make good the loss suffered by the innocent party as a direct result of the 
fraud.‖ Christie (1997) (note 244, supra) at p. 81. With respect to Zimbabwean case-law on the 
computation of delictual damages for fraud, refer to the seminal case of Pocket‘s Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v 
Lobel‘s Holdings (Pvt) Ltd 1966 RLR 150, at pp. 163-4 and 247-8.   
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impossible however to establish liability for wrong legal advice that occasions 
pecuniary loss.  
A lawyer may also be sued in tort over true-sale and non-consolidation opinions 
by underwriters and investors who relied on these third-party opinions. They do not 
have a cause of action in contract, owing to the absence of a contractual relationship 
with the lawyer. As noted above, in practice, a typical true-sale or non-consolidation 
opinion does not give guarantees. It is a reasoned opinion, typically with qualified 
conclusions, which are based on facts as presented to a lawyer by a client. As noted 
above, to establish a cause of action in tort an aggrieved claimant alleging negligence 
or recklessness has to establish that the legal opinion was the proximate cause of his 
or her pecuniary loss.  
A lawyer that: (i) violates section 97(1) or any other provision of the Securities 
Act; (ii) facilitates a securities law violation by its client; (iii) is reckless or negligent 
in giving structured finance-related legal advice; or (iv) that engages in conduct likely 
to bring the legal profession into disrepute, can be disciplined by the disciplinary 
tribunal of the Law Society of Zimbabwe under its Rules of Professional Conduct.
796
 
The disciplinary tribunal is empowered - after a hearing - to disbar, suspend from 
practice for a particular period, order the payment of damages to an aggrieved client, 
or impose some other penalty.
797
 This study recommends that the SC should establish 
a similar framework - because none currently exists - for the regulation and 
supervision of structured finance lawyers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
796
 Section 23 of the Legal Practitioners Act (Chap 27:07). 
797
 Ibid., at section 28.  
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10.3.3. Enhanced risk management framework 
The SC is yet to establish a structured finance lawyers‘ regulatory framework. 
There are no rules regulating the registration and supervision of structured finance 
lawyers, the provision of securities law advice, true-sale and non-consolidation 
opinions or any other related codes of conduct. The SC must provide guidance on 
third-party opinions, which are fundamental legal elements of securitization 
transactions.
798
 
One of the criticisms levelled against lawyers following the collapse of Enron was 
that they did not intervene to stop, or were involved in, the structuring of fraudulent 
securitization transactions.
799
 Currently, a lawyer in Zimbabwe who discovers 
evidence of a material securities law violation by a client is not under an obligation to 
intervene. Ethics demand the lawyer withdraw representation, but because of 
confidentiality rules, the lawyer is under no obligation to do more. This study 
recommends the promulgation of a corporate governance-type rule similar to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act-imposed reporting-up-the-corporate ladder rule. In the U.S., 
lawyers are obliged to report up the corporate ladder evidence of a ―material violation 
of securities laws or a breach of fiduciary duties or similar violation by a company or 
any agents.‖800 Although controversial, this stipulation does not breach client-attorney 
confidentiality and it ensures that lawyers do not ignore evidence of fraud or a 
                                                 
798
 In the U.S. for instance the SEC regulates structured finance lawyers. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
empowers the SEC promulgate standards of professional conduct. In addition, it is notable that the 
American Bar Association and TriBar have rules which give guidance on third-party legal opinions. 
Refer to The Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys 17 CFR Part 205, Release Nos. 33-8185; 34-47276; IC-25919, issued January 
29, 2003, Available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm 
799
 For an eloquent criticism of the role played by lawyers in the collapse of Enron, refer to Koniak 
(2003) (note 781, supra); See also William Simon (2004) ‗Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: 
Lawyer responsibility for collective misconduct‘, Columbia Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper Group, Paper No. 04-80. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=602627  
800
 Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). It requires the SEC to adopt rules ―requiring an 
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or a breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive 
office of the company (or the equivalent thereof).  
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material securities law violation.
801
 In Zimbabwe a similar rule can be incorporated 
through an amendment to the Securities Act, the Law Society of Zimbabwe rules of 
professional conduct, and/or a code of conduct for structured finance lawyers.
802
 Such 
an amendment, which must define what is meant by a material violation, can arguably 
improve corporate governance for public issuers,
803
 and in the process reduce the risk 
of, among others, fraudulent securitization transactions.   
In the U.S. it was proposed that lawyers should issue mandatory ―no-violation-of-
law‖ opinions for structured finance transactions. Although such a prescription would 
enhance the due diligence threshold, it is arguably unrealistic and costly. This 
proposal would also require lawyers to second-guess opinions made by accountants 
and others engaged to either assist in arranging, or issue third party opinions relating 
to, a securitization transaction. Such a requirement would require structured finance 
lawyers to be trained in accountancy to a high standard in order to be able to review 
accounting determinations.
804
    
This study does not recommend the imposition of an obligation on structured 
finance lawyers to whistle-blow on their clients through a noisy withdrawal of 
representation where there is evidence of a material securities law violation or breach 
of fiduciary duties. Such a proposal was made by the SEC in the U.S. but shelved 
after opposition from the American Bar Association and others.
805
 A whistle-blowing 
                                                 
801
 See also Sargent (2003) (note 785, supra), at pp. 54-55.  
802
 The American Bar Association amended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct and incorporated 
rules 1.6., and rule 1.13., which are largely similar to the SEC rules.  
803
 The corporate governance benefits of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have been attacked by 
lawyers and some scholars. For an illustrative article refer to Jill E. Fisch and Kenneth M. Rosen 
(2003) ‗Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?‘. Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, 
No. 4, p. 1097, 2003. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=367661   
804
 For a critique of the suggestion that lawyers should be obliged to second guess accounting 
determinations in certain instances, see Steven L. Schwarcz (2005) ‗Financial Information Failure: 
Redrawing the Boundary Between Lawyer and Accountant Responsibility‘, Duke Law School Legal 
Studies Paper No. 89. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845510  
805
 Refer to rule 205.3 (d) Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
Securities Act Rel. No. 33-8150 and 34-46868 (Nov 21, 2002) 67. Fed, Reg. 71670, 71670, 71705-06 
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obligation is objectionable because it breaches client-attorney confidentiality. In 
addition, it can be argued that such a rule is not required because in Zimbabwe, as in 
other jurisdictions, ethics oblige a lawyer to terminate representation if continued 
representation will result in the commission of a criminal offence. A lawyer may not 
aid and abet the commission of a criminal offence by a client.   
Coffee
806
 and Sargent,
807
 - with Schwarcz and others disagreeing
808
 - have argued 
that structured finance lawyers should be obliged to enquire if a proposed structured 
finance transaction on which they have been engaged to draft a third-party legal 
opinion has a legitimate business purpose. The problem with the proposal made by the 
Coffee et al is that it does not define what is meant by legitimate. It is an amorphous 
term, influenced by subjective considerations. There is a distinction between legal 
legitimacy and moral legitimacy. To the extent that Coffee et al argue that a lawyer 
should withdraw representation or whistle-blow on a client because of his or her own 
perceptions of business legitimacy is to introduce an impractical, costly and ill-
defined duty on the profession. A lawyer‘s duty is not to opine on the business 
legitimacy of a transaction, but rather on the law. Structured finance lawyers should 
not be obliged to second-guess their client‘s business decisions. In any event, rules of 
professional conduct applicable to lawyers in Zimbabwe, as in the U.K and the U.S. 
already require them not to knowingly assist their clients to engage in criminal 
conduct. This rule combined with a section 307 equivalent obliging lawyers to report 
                                                                                                                                            
(Dec. 2, 2002). Both for and against letters sent in to the SEC can be viewed at 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S4502.shtml  
806
 Coffee for instance vociferously argues that when giving legal advice lawyers should not have a 
tunnel vision or wear blinders. John Coffee (2005) ‗Comment: Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? 
Gatekeepers and Third Party Opinions‘, Texas Law Review vol. 84, 2005, 59. 
807
 Sargent (2003) (note 785, supra).  See also Nathan Koppel (2004) ‗Wearing Blinders‘, 26 American 
Lawyer 75 (July 2004).  
808
 Schwarcz notes: ―…neither third-party legal opinions nor legal opinions addressed to clients purport 
to evaluate a transaction‘s inherent business wisdom. At least heretofore, an opining lawyers has had 
no duty to evaluate the business merits of the underlying transaction beyond the obvious ethical and 
legal obligations of not knowingly furthering a fraudulent transactions. Steven L. Schwarcz (2005) 
(note 739, supra) at p.10.  
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up-the-corporate-ladder material violations of securities law would seem adequate in 
the circumstances. 
In summary, although Zimbabwe has a basic structured finance lawyer regulation 
and gatekeeping framework, it must be enhanced. The Securities Act should clearly 
spell out that structured finance lawyers involved in structuring securities products to 
be publicly traded are regulated to that extent by the SC. Statutory rules should be 
promulgated which prescribe rules of professional conduct for structured finance 
lawyers. These rules should, inter alia, regulate third-party legal opinions and 
structured finance lawyers should be obliged to report up the corporate ladder material 
violations of securities law.  
  
10.4. Auditors 
Independent public auditors and accountants (auditors hereafter) are critical to the 
functioning and integrity of the capital markets, including in the structuring of 
securitization transactions. An independent auditor reviews a firm‘s internally 
generated financial statements and records and tests their accuracy by examining a 
sample of transactions which the firm engaged in during the period under review.
809
 
Thereafter the auditor produces a certifying opinion.
810
 Audit certificates are used, not 
just by the public company‘s management and shareholders but also by investors. 
They are especially important in ABCP programmes and complex structured finance 
transactions such as CDOs, which involve numerous receivables, including re-
securitizations.  
In Zimbabwe, public companies - and this would include any listed SPV - are 
obliged under the Companies Act as well as under the ZSE listing rules and 
                                                 
809
 David Millon (2003) ‗Who caused the Enron debacle?‘ Washington and Lee Law Review, 2003, at 
p. 2.  
810
 This is often referred to as an audit certificate.  
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regulations to produce audited financial reports.
811
 Audited financial reports are 
essential because of the need to ensure the integrity of financial information that is 
disseminated within financial markets and utilised by the investing public and 
regulators. Zimbabwe‘s audit firm industry is relatively large and sophisticated with 
representation of some of the large international auditing firms.
812
 
As noted above, the accounting scandals unearthed in the aftermath of the collapse 
of Enron illustrated audit industry-related regulatory and gatekeeping failures. Several 
auditing firms such Arthur Anderson were complicit or negligent in certifying 
misleading and in instances fraudulent structured finance transactions.
813
 Lack of 
auditor independence, conflicts of interest and poor corporate governance structures, 
which enabled fraud and the production of misleading audit reports, were some of the 
factors that contributed to auditor gatekeeping failures in corporations in the U.S. and 
other countries.
814
 As a direct result of the corporate scandals, in the U.S. through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditing profession is now regulated by the federal 
government. Worryingly however, this new regulatory regime did not stop the 
auditors of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities - a hedge fund - which lost a 
reported record US$50 billion of investors‘ money in a ponzi scheme giving it a clean 
                                                 
811
 Part IV of the Companies Act and paragraph 4 of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
(2002). 
812
 Zimbabwe‘s audit firm industry includes the following PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst and 
Young, Kudenga and Company, KPMG, Deloittes and Touche, AMG Global and Company, Matamba 
and Company, Ruzengwe and Company, O‘Connor and Babrock, among others. 
813
 In addition to Enron, Arthur Anderson was also embroiled in other securities fraud allegations, more 
particularly with regards, Waste Management, Sunbeam, HBOCMcKesson, The Baptist Foundation 
and Global Crossing. Arthur Anderson was accused of failing to issue qualified audit reports. In 2008 it 
was discovered that Bernard Madoff‘s hedge fund - Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC – 
although audited by public auditors as required by law, was nothing more than one ponzi scheme, 
which lost investors circa U.S.$50 billion. 
814
 Of course, these are not the only explanations for the incidence of corporate scandals to have hit the 
US and the EU since 2000. Some commentators point to stock market bubbles, a decline in business 
morality, weak boards of directors, an increase in corporate greed, and changes in executive 
compensation which gave incentives for aggressive accounting and in instances outright fraud. Coffee 
(2004) (note 779, supra), at p. 2. 
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bill of health.
815
 This section evaluates whether Zimbabwe‘s auditor regulatory 
framework can mitigate securitization risks that can be caused by auditor gatekeeping 
failures.   
 
10.4.1. Auditors as gatekeepers  
Pubic auditors are generally regarded as the archetypical gatekeeper. An auditor 
can withhold or issue a negative audit report and in so doing can prevent fraud or 
disrupt other corporate misconduct. It is argued that an auditor pledges its reputational 
capital to ―assure the accuracy of statements or representations that it makes or 
verifies.‖816 Because of the limited transactional pay-off, it is argued, an auditor has a 
lot more to lose than gain by producing false or misleading audit reports.
817
 This 
research proceeds on the basis that auditors are gatekeepers to the financial markets.  
 
10.4.2. Existing risk management framework 
The auditing industry in Zimbabwe self-regulates under the rubric of the Public 
Accountants and Auditors Act (the PAA Act).
818
 The PAA Act creates a board called 
the Public Accountants and Auditors Board (PAAB) to regulate the practice and 
                                                 
815
 For a short synopsis of the ponzi business empire run by Madoff, refer to Hrishkesh D. Vinod 
(2008) ‗Preventing Madoff-style Ponzi enabled by Jewish Reputation, Incompetent Regulators and 
Auditors‘. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320069  
816
 Coffee (2004) (note 779, supra), at p. 10. See also Gilson et al who state: ―…third party verifiers 
such as certified public accountants also function as reputational intermediaries. Central to this function 
is the accountant‘s reputation for independence; only if the accountant can be expected to treat the 
client at arm‘s length is its message of verification believable.‖ See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. 
Kraakman (1984) ‗The Mechanics of Market Efficiency‘, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
817
 Coffee notes that ―the gatekeeper receives a far smaller benefit or payoff for its role, as an agent, in 
approving, certifying, or verifying information than does the principle from the transaction that the 
gatekeeper facilitates or enables. Thus because of this lesser benefit, the gatekeeper is easier to deter.‖ 
Coffee (2004) (note 779, supra) at p. 10.  
818
 Public Accountants and Auditors Act (Chap 27:12). Only those that have passed prescribed 
examinations, are persons of good standing, have not been declared insolvent or subject to an 
assignment or arrangement with creditors, and are either members of the Chartered Accountants of 
Zimbabwe established under the Chartered Accountants Act (Chap 27:02) or the Zimbabwe branch of 
the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants incorporated by Royal Charter in the UK may be 
registered to practice as public accountants and auditors in Zimbabwe, and be issued with a practicing 
certificate.  
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affairs of public accountants and auditors. The PAAB‘s functions include the creation 
of codes of ethics, conduct and standards, the granting and termination of practicing 
certificates and the disciplining of its members.
819
 The PAAB regulates the conduct of 
registered auditors and accountants (public auditors hereafter) under the Public 
Accountants and Auditors (Professional Conduct) By-laws.
820
 Only public auditors 
holding current practicing certificates may perform audit services, which are defined 
as the ―the verification or certification of financial statements, financial transactions, 
books, accounts or records.‖821  
It is notable that financial institutions regulated by the RBZ, which engage in 
securitization transactions, are obliged to produce annual audit reports produced by 
external auditors that confirm that in their dealings, they complied with the RBZ-
promulgated securitization guidelines.
822
 In the event of non-compliance, the financial 
institution responsible will be obliged to hold capital against full exposures to related 
securitization SPVs.  
 
10.4.2.1. Fraud  
Section 97 of the Securities Act, which criminalizes the fraudulent inducement to 
trade or deal in securities, also applies to auditors. An auditor who, in an audit report: 
(i) makes a false or misleading statement; (ii) dishonestly conceals material facts; or 
(iii) recklessly or dishonestly makes a statement that is false or misleading can be 
charged with securities fraud under section 97(1) of the Securities Act.
823
 In practice 
                                                 
819
 Section 5 of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act (Chap 27:12) 
820
 Public Accountants and Auditors (Professional Conduct) By-laws Statutory Instrument No. 144 of 
1997 
821
 Section 2 of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act (Chap 27:12). See also the case of Chirombo 
v Public Accountants and Auditors Board HH-3-2008, which illustrates the seriousness with which the 
PAAB takes against those that practice without practising certificates.  
822
 RBZ (2007) (note 3, supra) at paragraph 2.22 – 2.23.   
823
 Section 97(1) (a) of the Securities Act, as read with subsection 2.  
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an auditor is retained by an issuer and/or arranger to provide an audit report. Although 
an audit report is essential in securitization transactions, it is but one of several third-
party deal-closing opinions produced as part of an issuer‘s due diligence. For this 
reason, it is unlikely that an auditor would be charged with securities fraud as a 
principal, unless if there is evidence of collusion between the auditor and the issuer.  
If a public auditor does however commit securities fraud in contravention of 
section 97 occasioning pecuniary loss to an investor who relied on a misleading audit 
certificate, the audit client and the public auditor can be sued - the former vicariously 
- for the loss per section 98 of the Securities Act, or in tort. The formula for 
computing the amount of damages recoverable is determined in part by section 98(3) 
of the Securities Act.
824
  If sued in tort, the tortfeasor is liable to pay damages for 
actual and consequential loss. The complexity of most structured finance transactions 
makes it difficult, although not impossible, to establish fraud. Forensic auditing 
maybe required to establish liability. 
 
10.4.2.2. Negligence misrepresentation 
Investors that rely on a misleading audit report can sue the auditor and the audit 
firm for negligent misrepresentation. If liability is established, the damages awarded 
will be apportioned between the auditing firm, the audit client and aggrieved investor 
based on the degree of fault of each of the parties.
825
 However, as noted above, it is 
difficult to establish liability, and forensic auditing may be required to establish that a 
particular audit fell below the standard expected of a qualified auditor exercising due 
care and skill. In addition, auditors who issue an audit certificate that fraudulently or 
                                                 
824
 Ibid., at section 98(3). 
825
 Through the Damages (Apportionment and Assessment) Act [Chap 8:06], Zimbabwe abolished the 
common law defence of contributory negligence and provides for the apportionment of liability and 
damages between the parties based on the degree of fault, as determined by the Court.  
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negligently misrepresents the true nature of an audit client‘s financial affairs can be 
subjected to disciplinary proceedings under the Public Accountants and Auditors 
(Professional Conduct) By-laws, resulting in the imposition of a fine, suspension for a 
defined period of time, or de-registration 
 
10.4.3. Enhanced risk management framework 
The SC is yet to establish a framework which regulates: (i) the registration and 
practice of public auditors that audit financial reports of listed companies; and (ii) 
audit firms‘ corporate governance rules and practices. This makes Zimbabwe‘s public 
auditor regulatory framework rudimentary. Consideration should be given to adopting 
some of the risk mitigation measures adopted in the U.S., where the audit profession 
is now government-regulated with the objective of protecting investors and ensuring 
efficient capital markets.
826
  
With a view to managing conflicts of interest, U.S. audit firms are now prohibited 
from providing certain non-audit consultancy services to their audit clients.
827
 This 
proscription seeks to mitigate the lure of non-audit fees generated by audit firms from 
their audit clients compromising their independence. Audit partners are prohibited 
from serving on audit engagement teams for more than seven consecutive years; 
                                                 
826
 In response to the collapse of Enron and others; and through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditing 
profession in the U.S. is now subject to a new regulatory framework. It is no longer self-regulating. 
Instead, it is regulated by a quasi-governmental body called the Public Company Oversight Board. 
Refer to Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
827
 Section 202 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified in Exchange Act section 10A (h), 15 U.S.C.  78j-I 
(g) (Supp. II 2002). Auditors are now prohibited from providing eight categories of non-audit services: 
bookkeeping, actuarial, investment, and legal services to their audit client. The view that consultancy 
services provided by audit firms to their audit clients were compromising their independence is 
reflected in literature that came up following the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. See for instance, 
Frankel, Richard (2002) The relation between auditor‘s fees for non-audit services and earnings 
management, 77 The ACCT. Rev. 71 (Supp. 2002). See also James D. Cox who states: ―the prime 
suspect for the accounting profession‘s recent sorrowful performance as a gatekeeper against financial 
frauds is the rising importance of non-audit services in overall operations of the major accounting 
firms. Non-audit fees now dominate the income statement of the large accounting firms.‖ James D. Cox 
(2006), ‗The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting Profession‘, Duke Law School Working 
Paper Series, at p. 279. Available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/duke/fs/papers/58  
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arguably to prevent the impairment of auditors‘ independence.828 There is now a new 
corporate governance stipulation requiring the reinforcement of the audit function in 
public companies.
829
 In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created an enhanced civil 
and criminal liability framework for auditors.
830
 Further, auditors are now required to 
assess and report on the integrity of their audit client‘s internal controls.831 Although 
some of these changes have elicited criticism - including allegations that they 
increased the cost of public company audits
832
 and that they have unfairly shifted 
liability onto auditors
833
 - this study recommends these legislative changes as they 
enhance auditors‘ gatekeeping framework.  
In summary, although there is in existence a basic auditor regulatory and 
gatekeeping framework, this should be enhanced. The SC must (i) clarify that public 
auditors engaged in providing audit reports on listed firms are regulated by the SC; 
(ii) establish a registration system and an enhanced auditor civil and criminal liability 
framework for gatekeeping and other failures; (iii) prescribe best practice rules 
regulating the audit process for listed firms; and (iv) prescribe corporate governance 
rules, aimed at reducing conflicts of interests.   
 
                                                 
828
 See Strengthening the Commission‘s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act 
Release No. 8183, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6038 (Feb. 5. 2003). 
829
 Sections 301 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The sections seek to strengthen the role, power 
and responsibilities of audit committees in public companies. They prescribe that audit committees in 
public companies must be composed solely of independent directors. They place legal responsibility on 
the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer to certify that certain financial transactions 
and processes have been carried out that there was nothing untoward as far as they were concerned. 
They also impose a due diligence obligation on the CFO and the CEO.   
830
 For instance, the Act increased the criminal penalties for altering or destroying documents (section 
802) and for securities fraud (section 807). It also created a protection framework for whistleblowers, 
providing that public companies may not ―discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any 
manner discriminate‖ against a whistleblower. Ibid., at section 806.  
831
 Ibid., at section 404. 
832
 See for instance L. Smitherman (2005) ‗Corporations Protest Cost to Comply with Law‘, The 
Baltimore Sun (March 15). See also Scott S. Powell (2005) ‗Cost of Sarbanes-Oxley are out of control‘, 
The Wall Street Journal (March 21): op ed.  
833
 Refer to a critique by A.C. Pritchad (2006) ‗The Irrational Auditor and the Irrational Liability‘, 
Lewis and Clarke Law Review, vol. 10:01, 19.   
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10.5. Credit rating agencies 
Zimbabwe has a small but vibrant rating industry. CRAs measure credit risk by 
providing opinions on the probability of timely interest and capital payments by 
issuers on their fixed-income securities. Although disputed, CRAs have historically 
been regarded as intermediaries that reduce informational asymmetries,
834
 enhance 
market efficiency and lower issuers‘ cost of capital.835 In practice, they process public 
and non-public corporate information, use financial modelling techniques and other 
subjective considerations to analyse and express opinions on the creditworthiness of 
an entity or its debt securities. World-wide, investors and other market participants 
now require, almost as a matter of course, and sometimes in private contractual 
agreements that rating opinions be obtained, or utilised as reference points.
836
  
CRAs typically provide both unsolicited and solicited ratings; the latter for a fee 
and pursuant to a contractual agreement between a CRA and the issuer. CRAs denote 
their rating opinions using alphabetical and/or alphanumerical scales, which differ 
                                                 
834
Stephane Rousseau (2005) ‗Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a 
Disclosure-Based Approach. Credit Rating Agencies: Need For Reform in Canada?‘, 51 McGill L.J. 
617, at p. 620. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=797325  Refer also to the Bank of International 
Settlements: Committee on the Global Financial System (2005) ‗The Role of Ratings in Structured 
Finance: Issues and Implication‘, (January 2005). BUT see Frank Partnoy who disputes the 
informational value of ratings arguing that their primary role is in the granting of favourable regulatory 
treatment to issuers. He argues that once ascribed, ratings often lag behind market determined prices. 
Frank Partnoy (1999) ‗The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit 
Rating Agencies‘, Washington University Law Quarterly, 1999 vol. 77, 619, at pp. 651-653.  
835
 Christopher C. Nicholls (2005) ‗Public and Private Uses of Credit Ratings‘, Capital Markets 
Institute, at p. 6. Available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/CRA_Study_Nicholls.pdf  
836
 Rating triggers are sometimes utilised in private contractual agreements. For example, some 
contracts may stipulate that if an issuer‘s credit rating is downgraded the lender becomes entitled to 
exercise certain contractual options such as raising interest rates, calling of the outstanding debt, 
payment acceleration, etc. See Pamela Stumpp and Monica Coppola (2002), ‗Moody‘s Analysis of U.S. 
Corporate Rating Triggers Heightens Need for Increased Disclosure‘ (Moody‘s, July 2002).  As noted 
by the U.S. SEC ―Credit ratings are used for regulatory purposes around the world, primarily in the 
context of financial regulations.‖ Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) ‗Report on the Role and 
Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets‘, at p. 28. Available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf 
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from one credit rating firm to another. However, investment-grade ratings typically 
range from AAA to BBB- while non-investment ratings range from BB+ to D.
837
  
John Moody established the first CRA agency in the U.S. in 1909,
838
 spawning a 
new financial intermediary phenomenon in the U.S., which in later years spread 
internationally. Three of the world‘s largest CRAs are Moody‘s Investors Service, 
Standard and Poor‘s and Fitch Ratings; although the first two effectively constitute a 
duopoly. There are many factors that have influenced the successful propagation of 
CRAs in international financial markets. Chief among these is arguably the practice 
internationally, requiring regulated institutions to invest only in investment-grade 
securities, the proliferation of modern financial engineering technologies such as 
securitization and derivatives, the globalization of financial markets, the increasing 
use of credit ratings in financial regulation and contracting and the increase in the 
number of capital market issuers.
839
  
In Zimbabwe, as in most countries, prudential regulatory prescriptions have led to 
the increasing use and reliance upon credit ratings, but their use is limited largely to 
the financial services sector. Banking institutions, money market funds, insurance 
firms and pension funds are required to be rated by an accredited CRA with the 
institutions permitted to invest only in investment-grade securities.
840
 The Basle II 
Accord, which require central banks to use ratings to determine risk and liquidity 
                                                 
837
 In the U.S. the SEC noted: ―rating agencies generally designate ratings of long-term debt through 
some variation of an alphabetical combination of lower and upper case letters. Fitch and S&P use the 
same ranking designators: AAA, AA, A, and BBB are investment grade categories; BB, B, CC, C, and 
D are considered speculative grade rankings. Moody‘s long-term rating designators are: investment 
grade: Aaa, Aa, Baa, speculative grade Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and C.‖ Securities and Exchange Commission 
Report (2003), (note 836, supra) at p. 25. at p. 25. See also Amy K. Rhodes for a detailed description of 
credit risk categories, rating scales and symbols used by CRAs. Amy K. Rhodes (1996) ‗The Role of 
the SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?‘, 
20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 293 (1996). 
838
 For a synopsis of the history of CRAs refer to Richard Sylla (2002) in ‗Ratings, Rating Agencies 
and the Global Financial System‘ 19 (Richard M. Levich et al, ed., 2002). 
839
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) (note 836, supra) at p. 28.  
840
 See generally the RBZ (2004) (note 652, supra).  
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requirements for some regulated institutions, have only served to underscore CRAs‘ 
gatekeeping function; including in Zimbabwe, as noted in the RBZ guidelines.
841
 
CRAs have been both credited and criticised for the growth and capital markets 
acceptance of innovative structured finance technologies and derivative products.
842
 
CRAs have been criticised for issuing misleading ratings and for their failure to 
timeously downgrade securities‘ ratings. There is general consensus that the loss of 
confidence in credit ratings on U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities exacerbated 
the 2007 global financial crisis.
843
 It is within this context, including the increased 
international scrutiny of the financial intermediary role played by CRAs and the 
adequacy of the extant regulatory framework that that this section evaluates, and 
makes recommendations regarding, CRAs‘ gatekeeping function in Zimbabwe. 
 
10.5.1. CRAs as gatekeepers  
Although disputed by some, CRAs are arguably the archetypical gatekeeper.
844
 
CRAs wield enormous power over capital market transactions and participants.
845
 
                                                 
841
 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Guidelines state: ―No person, other than an accredited credit rating 
agency, shall conduct or assign a credit rating to a banking institution conducting banking business in 
Zimbabwe. The value investors place on a given credit rating agency‘s opinion depends on the 
reputation of the agency. The credibility of credit rating agencies can be significantly enhanced by the 
accuracy of ratings or default predictions; quality and integrity of the rating process; transparency and 
objectivity; independence and avoidance of conflict of interest; and appropriate use of confidential 
information.‖ [Emphasis added]. Ibid., at paragraph 1.6.  
842
 The European Parliamentary Financial Services for instance states: ―…credit ratings have played a 
key role enabling new market instruments to develop (e.g. securitization) and are systematically 
requested by professional investors as an important factor in determining credit risk.‖ European 
Parlimentary Financial Services Briefing (2006) ‗Credit Rating Agencies‘, at p. 1. Available at 
www.epfsf.org Authorite des Marches Financiers makes the point: ―Rating is an integral part of 
structuring securitization products. The agency is involved at an early stage, and the rating is not an 
outcome but a target for the arranger, with the agency indicating the factors that need to be addressed to 
obtain the desired rating. In particular, the agency has an indirect influence on how the tranches are 
configured to ensure that the senior issue obtains the highest possible rating.‖ Authorite des Marches 
Financiers (note 80, supra) at p. 6. 
843
 Emilios Avgouleas (2008) ‗Financial Regulation, Behavioural Finance, and the Global Credit Crisis: 
In Search of a New Regulatory Model‘, at p. 27. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132665  
844
 According to Schwarcz, ―the significance of a rating depends entirely on the reputation among 
investors of the particular rating agency.‖ Schwarcz, L., Steven (2001) ‗Private Ordering of Public 
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox‘, University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 2002, No. 2, February 
2002 at p. 6.  
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They play a verification, certification and signalling role in the financial markets. 
Ratings can determine: (i) debt issuers capital market access;
 846
 (ii) the liquidity of 
issued securities; (iii) the cost of capital; (iv) whether a prudentially regulated firms‘ 
assets can be regarded as regulatory capital; (v) and can influence investment 
decisions.
847
 This notwithstanding, CRAs prefer, notably in the US context, to 
downplay their financial markets intermediary function. Some CRAs argued that they: 
(i) are financial journalists publishing opinions;
848
 (ii) do not have gatekeeping 
responsibilities; (iii) do not owe financial market participants a duty of care; and that 
(iv) they should not be made liable for issuing rating opinions which turn out to be 
inaccurate and misleading.
849
 Arguably, some of these assertions are in the minority, 
as internationally, market participants and regulators alike regard and treat CRAs as 
important financial market gatekeepers.
850
 The challenge, given systemic implications 
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 Kerwer, D (2004) ‗Holding Global Regulators Accountable – The Case of Credit Rating Agencies‘, 
Working Paper 11, School of Public Policy, University College of London, 2004, at p. 15.  
846
 Partnoy, Frank (2005) ‗How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are not Like Other Gatekeepers‘, at p. 
59. Available at http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20050928_Frank_Partnoy.pdf  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
(2001) ‗Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox‘, University of Illinois Law 
Review, vol. 2002, No. 2, 2002, at p. 2.  
847
 According to the Bank of International Settlements: ―rating agency ‗approval‘ still appears to 
determine the marketability of a given structure to a wider market.‖ Bank of International Settlements 
(2005) The Role of Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implication, (January 2005). Committee 
on the Global Financial System, at p. 3. See also Joseph Liberman‘s statement before the US Congress. 
He reportedly stated: ―The credit raters hold the key to capital and liquidity, the lifeblood of corporate 
America and of our capitalist economy. The rating affects a company‘s ability to borrow money; it 
affects whether a pension fund or a money market fund can invest in a company‘s bonds; and it affects 
stock price.‖ SEC (2002) Hearing Before the Senate Commission on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Congress, 116 (2002). Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies. See also the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (2003) (note 836, supra) at p. 27. See also Pinto, R. (2006) ‗Control and 
Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States‘, 54 AM. J. COMP L. 341, 2006, at p. 
341-342. 
848
 In the case of County Orange case the Court held: ―ratings are speech and absent special 
circumstances, are protected by the First Amendment...‖ County Orange v McGraw Hill Cos., Inc., 245 
B.R. 151, 156, (1999). Frank Partnoy makes the point that: ―Although Moody‘s might say that it is in 
the financial publishing business, market participants do not believe it.‖ Partnoy, Frank (2005) (note 
834, supra), at p. 66.  
849
 The argument put forward by CRAs that they are financial journalists and hence their opinions are 
protected by the first amendment (the free speech constitutional provision) is yet to be decided upon by 
the US Supreme Court. It should be noted however that the jurisprudence coming out of the US courts 
is not entirely consistent on the issue of CRA civil liability for misleading ratings. For a synopsis of the 
disparate case law on this issue refer to Partnoy. Ibid, at pp. 84-88.  
850
 There are several reasons for arguing that the CRA industry‘s position, particularly as articulated in 
the US context, is in the minority. These include, among others, financial markets participants‘ demand 
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of CRA gatekeeping failures is to design an appropriate, efficient and cost-effective 
CRA gatekeeping and regulatory framework. 
 
10.5.2. Existing risk management framework 
As noted above, CRAs are regulated by the SC. Before the promulgation of the 
Securities Act, the RBZ was the only regulatory authority to have promulgated 
guidelines to regulate the registration of CRAs that intended to rate financial 
institutions.
851
 But these guidelines are only binding on RBZ-regulated financial 
institutions
852
 and in no way constitute a CRA regulatory or supervisory framework. 
No doubt these guidelines, which require all financial institutions conducting banking 
business in Zimbabwe to be rated once every year by an accredited CRA
853
 were 
promulgated because of the need to comply with the requirements of Basle II 
                                                                                                                                            
for, and reliance upon, rating opinions, and prudential regulators‘ insistence that regulated entities 
invest only in securities rated investment-grade by a recognised/accredited CRA and the fact that CRAs 
have been instrumental in the growth and market acceptance of structured finance technologies. 
Bottinni for instance argues: ―The rating agencies frequently downplay their ratings as mere opinions. 
The extreme importance of these ratings and the reliance upon them by consumer and professional 
financial analyst alike, however, precludes disregarding ratings as insignificant opinions.‖ Francis A. 
Bottinni (1993) ‗An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited 
Oversight of Such Agencies‘, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 579, at p. 6.  Internationally, in recognition of the 
importance of CRAs the International Organisation of Securities Commissions came up with an 
IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals in December 2004. That U.S. law makers clearly regard credit 
rating agencies as financial gatekeepers is borne by section 2 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
which states: ―Congress finds that credit rating agencies are of national importance, in that, among 
other things-- (1) their ratings, publications, writings, analyses, and reports are furnished and 
distributed, and their contracts, subscription agreements, and other arrangements with clients are 
negotiated and performed, by the use of the mails and other means and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce; (2) their ratings, publications, writings, analyses, and reports customarily relate to the 
purchase and sale of securities traded on securities exchanges and in interstate over-the-counter 
markets, securities issued by companies engaged in business in interstate commerce, and securities 
issued by national banks and member banks of the Federal Reserve System; (3) the foregoing 
transactions occur in such volume as substantially to affect interstate commerce, the securities markets, 
the national banking system, and the national economy; (4) the oversight of such credit rating agencies 
serves the compelling interest of investor protection; (5) the 2 largest credit rating agencies serve the 
vast majority of the market, and additional competition is in the public interest; and (6) the 
Commission has indicated that it needs statutory authority to oversee the credit rating industry.‖ 
851
 RBZ (2006) (note 652, supra).  
852
 Fixed-income securities issued in Zimbabwe by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, municipalities and 
other firms are usually rated by an accredited rating agency 
853
 RBZ (2006) (note 652, supra) at paragraph 2.3.   
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Accords
854
 and due to the then absence in Zimbabwe of any other CRA regulatory 
system. As noted above, the SC is yet to establish a CRA regulatory and supervisory 
framework, notwithstanding the provisions of the Securities Act. This is an anomaly 
which should be rectified.  
 
10.5.2.1. Fraud 
A CRA will, per section 97 of the Securities Act, be criminally liable for 
fraudulently inducing another person to trade or deal in securities if it: (i) produces a 
misleading ―statement‖ or ―forecast‖ in the knowledge that it is misleading; (ii) 
dishonestly conceals a material fact; or (iii) recklessly or dishonestly makes a 
statement that is false or misleading. If convicted, the punishment is a fine and/or a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding two years.
855
 As argued above, section 97(1) is 
ambiguous and its deterrent effect doubtful. The SC should issue guidance notes to 
clarify the ambiguity inherent in section 97(1) and state what - in its opinion - 
amounts to fraudulent inducement to trade or deal in securities. Such guidance will 
assist in establishing the type of misleading information whose dissemination 
constitutes a securities law violation.  
It is trite that a forecast issued by a CRA is not false or misleading simply because 
it is different from that ascribed by another or is inconsistent with the price at which 
relevant securities actually trade in the market. In this context, section 97(1) may in 
fact not apply to ratings issued by CRAs. It may however apply if there is evidence 
that a CRA and an issuer colluded to use misleading ratings with the objective of 
fraudulently inducing investors to trade in securities.  
                                                 
854
 Basle II has been gradually introduced in Zimbabwe since 2004. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2007) 
‗Annual Report 2007‘, at p. 49. Available at http://www.rbz.co.zw/pdfs/annual_2007/blss.pdf   
855
 Section 97(2) of the Securities Act.  
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In defence to a charge under section 97(1) of the Securities Act, a CRA can argue 
that a report constitutes an expression of opinion and is therefore protected speech 
under section 20 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which guarantees freedom of 
expression.
856
 In addition, a CRA may contend that an express disclaimer in a 
recommendation precludes a finding of criminal intent. In rebuttal, it is arguable that 
freedom of expression is not absolute. It can be restricted by law in the ―economic 
interests of the State.‖857 Should the publication of misleading information about a 
listed company by a CRA that knows that the information is materially misleading 
and will be relied upon by investors to their and the financial system‘s detriment, be 
constitutionally protected? There is merit in the argument that it is in the economic 
interests of the State to promote efficient and fair markets by penalising the fraudulent 
manipulation of listed securities through the fraudulent communication of misleading 
information.  
Where there is evidence of fraudulent intent, the defence that a rating constitutes 
protected speech or that it was accompanied by a disclaimer will not absolve the CRA 
from criminal liability.
858
 The protected speech defence will not suffice where there is 
evidence of fraud because: (i) rating opinions are arguably not ordinary speech, but 
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 Section 20(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution defines freedom of expression as: ―[the] freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and from 
interference with correspondence.‖ In the case of Capital Radio (Private) Limited v The Broadcasting 
Authority of Zimbabwe and Others, the Court held: ―…the freedom of expression conferred by section 
20 of the Constitution has to be interpreted to include freedom of the press and is also enjoyed by 
corporate persons.‖ Capital Radio (Private) Limited v The Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe and 2 
Others SC-128-2002, at p. 17.   
857
 Ibid., at section 20(2).  
858
 For instance Global Credit Rating Company‘s disclaimer notice, which is typical of most issued by 
other credit rating agencies in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere states: ―This document is confidential and 
issued for the information of clients only. It is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole 
or in part without the written permission of Global Credit Rating Co. (‖GCR‖). The credit ratings and 
other opinions contained herein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not 
statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. No warranty, express or 
implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability or fitness for any particular 
purpose of any such rating or other opinion or information is given or made by GCR in any form or 
manner.‖ See also Moody‘s disclaimer notice at 
www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=rdef&subtopic=moodys%20
credit%20ratings&title=Introduction.htm 
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commercial opinions which in many cases are sourced and paid for by issuers; (ii) 
ratings are relied upon by most financial markets participants, including regulators 
and investors; (iii) in many countries, including Zimbabwe, CRAs play a quasi-
regulatory function; (iv) and CRAs‘ gatekeeping failures can contribute to systemic 
risk, as illustrated by the 2007 global financial crisis. 
Section 98(1) of the Securities Act enables an aggrieved party, including a 
securities investor to sue for pecuniary loss if it relies to its financial detriment on a 
statement or forecast issued to the public by a CRA in violation of section 97(1). The 
formula for calculating the amount of damages is contained, as stated above, in 
section 98(3) (a) and (b) of the Securities Act.  
 
10.5.2.2. Negligent misrepresentation 
In theory a CRA that issues a materially misleading rating can be sued in tort by 
any party that relies on it and suffers financial loss. However, this cause of action may 
be illusory in practice.
859
 A CRA will be found liable only if a court accepts that it has 
a duty of care towards the aggrieved claimant. This is a moot question in Zimbabwe. 
In defence CRAs are likely to argue that they do not have a duty of care towards 
securities investors; an argument bolstered by reference to ratings disclaimer notices. 
In jurisprudence likely to find resonance in Zimbabwe, a U.S. a court stated that it 
was unreasonable for investors to rely on rating opinions as if they were some kind of 
guarantee.
860
  
                                                 
859
 See for instance in Canada a country where CRAs are also not regulated. Through the Allen 
Committee the Toronto Stock Exchange produced a report in which it is stated: ―the remedies available 
to investors…who are injured by misleading disclosure are so difficult to pursue and to establish, that 
they are as a practical matter largely academic.‖ Toronto Stock Exchange (1997) ‗Final Report of the 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure - Responsible Corporate Disclosure - A Search for Balance‘, 
Toronto, 1997. In the US, CRA benefit from the defence of free speech.  
860
 Quinn v McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3f 331 (7
th
 Cir.1999) at p. 336. This case was decided before the 
failures of CRAs in relation to Enron and the 2007 global financial crisis came to the fore. The 
apparent complicity of CRAs in what is the world‘s biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression 
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CRAs can validly argue that they should not be held responsible for 
inaccurate/misleading rating opinions because: (i) they rely on issuers and other 
sources to provide them with accurate and complete information;
861
 and (ii) for this 
reason, ratings are only as good and accurate as the information provided to, and the 
subjective evaluation of the information employed by, the CRAs.
862
 In addition, 
CRAs will argue that they do not audit or have the power to subpoena issuer 
information.
863
 Some ratings are unsolicited and are therefore based on incomplete 
information. CRAs will also point out that because of these and other reasons, rating 
opinions are not recommendations to buy, hold, or sell securities, as typically spelt out 
in their disclaimer notices. Rather, their ratings are a point-of-time opinion of 
creditworthiness
864
 and do not assess the economic appeal of investments.
865
 They 
carry no predictive information and are only one, albeit an important, factor that an 
investor can opt to take into account when making investment decisions.
866
 
On the other hand, the role that CRAs played in structured finance transactions 
arguably renders them civilly liable for issuing misleading rating opinions that 
occasion loss to investors. As noted above, structured finance transactions are ratings 
driven.
867
 CRAs are vulnerable because of their active participation in the structuring 
process of securitizations and derivative transactions. In structured finance 
transactions CRAs actively control the security architecture and determine product 
                                                                                                                                            
may well change the jurisprudence. Arguably, the likelihood of CRAs being held accountable for 
gatekeeping failures has increased exponentially since the 2007 global financial crisis. 
861
 Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) (note, 836, supra) at p. 32.  
862
 Arguably, issuer self-interest and the absence of a compulsion framework impacts the quality of 
information proffered by issuers to CRAs. 
863
 Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) (note 836, supra) at p. 32.  
864
 Put differently: ―ratings are probabilistic statements of the likelihood of issuer default.‖ Rousseau 
(2005) (note 834, supra) at p. 631. 
865
 Amy K. Rhodes (1996) ‗The Role of The SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-
Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?‘, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 293, 1996, 315-316. 
866
 Jaimini Bhagwati (2006) ‗Tighten regulation of rating agencies‘, at p. 1. Available at 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=297840    
867
 John Coffee states: ―Structured finance is ratings driven. Absent a rating, the debt of a special 
purpose entity (SPE) is unmarketable.‖ Coffee (2005) (note 806, supra) at p. 63.  
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design standards.
868
 It is not improbable that such active participation by a CRA in the 
structuring process and the inherently conflicted CRA/issuer relationship can, if 
sufficient incentives exist, result in the reckless issuance of misleading rating 
opinions.
869
 The phenomenal growth in the structured finance market was fuelled by 
CRAs‘ willingness to extend investment-grade ratings to securities backed by 
untested U.S. sub-prime mortgages. It has also been contended that ratings on 
structured finance transactions generated significant revenue flows for some U.S. 
CRAs, especially Moody‘s and Standard and Poor‘s until the market seized.870 The 
accusation: because of the conflicted CRA/issuer relationship and search for profits, 
CRAs wrongly - deliberately or negligently - mispriced some structured finance 
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 Timothy J. Riddiough and Risharng Chiang (2003) ‗Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: An 
Exploration into Agency, Innovation, Information and Learning in Financial Markets‘, at p. 1. 
Available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&q=cache:tgPHB82FijQJ:www.nchu.edu.tw/~F
in/03_research/fin2003/Commercial%2520Mortgage-Backed+Securities See also Mason and Rosner 
who state that: ―The need for rating agencies to objectively assess and verify information rises in 
structured transactions, since, unlike the traditional rating process in which an enterprise can do little to 
change the risk characteristics in anticipation of an issuance, in structured finance, the rating agency is 
an active part of the structuring of the deal. In practice, arrangers will routinely use the rating agencies 
publicly available models to pre-structure deals and subsequently engage in a process that is ‗iterative 
and interactive‘ informing the issuer of the requirements to attain desired ratings in different tranches 
and largely defining the requirements of the structures to achieve target ratings.‖ Joseph R. Mason and 
Joshua Rosner (2007) ‗Where did the Risk go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed 
Securities and Collateralised Debt Obligations Market Disruptions‘, at p. 13. Available at: 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Hudson_Mortgage_Paper5_3_07.pdf  See also the article 
Autorite Des Marches Financiers, stating that: ―The rating agency usually becomes involved at the 
request of an arranger, acting on behalf of its customer, the seller. The issuer is allowed to halt the 
process at any time. The agency never initiates the rating process. There are no unsolicited ratings 
because the agencies are involved early in the structuring process and recommend the entities contact 
them as soon as possible to present proposed structures.‖ Autorite Des Marches Financiers (2006) 
‗Ratings in the Securitization Industry- January 2006‘, at p. 7.  
869
 After an analysis of the disparate judgements on CRA liability, Frank Partnoy notes: ―the most that 
can be said is that to the extent that a credit rating agency played only the role of information gatherer 
and was not involved in structuring a transaction that it rated, courts have become more sympathetic to 
the claim that the agency is entitled to qualified protection. However the courts have been more 
sceptical of free speech claims when the rating agency played a significant role in structuring a 
transaction that it rated.‖ Partnoy (2005) (note 846, supra), at p. 88.   
870
 Partnoy stated: ―Credit rating agencies increasingly focus on structured finance and new complex 
debt products, particularly credit derivatives, which now generate a substantial share of credit ratings 
agencies‘ revenues and profits. With respect to these new instruments, the agencies have become more 
like ―gate-openers‖ than gatekeepers; in particular, their rating methodologies for collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) have created and sustained that multi-trillion dollar market.‖ Ibid., at p. 60. 
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securities.
871
 CRAs have however disputed that they play an integral role in structured 
finance transactions.
872
 They argue that their pre-execution/pre-deal opinions are 
hypothetical, and should not therefore give rise to liability. It is difficult therefore to 
state with any certainty whether CRAs can be found liable for negligent 
misrepresentation.   
 
10.5.2.3. Market manipulation 
Section 96 of the Securities Act prohibits market manipulation. Section 96(2) 
states: ―No person shall, by means of any false statement or fictitious or artificial 
transaction or device, maintain, inflate or depress, or cause fluctuations in, the price of 
any securities on a registered securities exchange.‖ [Emphasis added]. To what extent 
does this section affect CRAs that issue misleading rating opinions on listed 
securities? The proscription in section 96(2) is expansive. But what amounts to the 
issuance of a false statement which maintains, inflates, depresses or causes 
fluctuations in the price of a security on a registered securities exchange? This 
question should be clarified by the SC, with the objective of giving guidance to 
market participants as well as prosecutors. It is doubtful whether section 96(2) applies 
to ratings issued by CRAs. CRAs are expected to play a role of issuing forecasts in the 
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 US Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd is reported to have stated – in the aftermath of 
the 2007 global credit crisis that: ―…rating companies may have understated the risks of the securities 
to win fees for rating debt. [CRAs] also help financial institutions package debt in a way that will 
receive certain ratings.‖  
872
 These contra-arguments indicate that the nature and extent of involvement of, and liability for, any 
CRA involved in a structured finance transaction are factors to be determined by the available 
evidence. It is reported that in testimony before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Moody‘s 
and S & P executives disputed that their organisations ―structure debt transactions.‖ Vickie Tillman, 
executive vice president of Credit-market services for S&P is reported to have stated that: ―there isn‘t 
any collaboration between S&P and debt issuers on constructing mortgage-backed securities.‖ In the 
same article it is reported that Michael Kanef, group managing director, asset finance group of 
Moody‘s stated that: ―Moody‘s does not structure, create, design or market securitization products.‖ He 
is also reported to have said: ―We do not have the expertise to recommend one proposed structure over 
another and we do not do so.‖ Jesse Westbrook and James Tyson (2007) ‗SEC Probes Whether Issuers 
Pressured S&P, Moody‘s‘, Bloomberg, (26 September 2007) Available at 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=a3N1qOU    
332 
capital markets. This means any deviation between their forecasts and the rate at 
which a given security trades in the market cannot and should not qualify as a 
securities law violation.  
 
10.5.3. Enhanced risk management framework 
Since the collapse of Enron through to the 2007 global financial crisis, CRAs have 
been subjected to withering criticism and calls for greater regulation. There have been 
calls to increase competition in the CRA industry
873
 as well as ―increasing 
accountability, consistency, quality and transparency in the rating process.‖874 What 
remains unclear is whether stricter government oversight is the preferred regulatory 
choice, or whether it is further and stricter statutory self-regulation.  
In Zimbabwe, the SC should create a framework for the regulation of CRAs. 
Although there does not exist a standard international CRA regulatory framework, 
Zimbabwe policymakers should consider, inter alia: (i) the CRAR Act; (ii) proposals 
for CRA reform made in the U.S. in 2008; and (iii) proposals advanced by the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions.
875
 Given the nascent nature of 
the CRA industry in Zimbabwe, policy-makers should seek to create a regulatory 
framework that fosters rather than stifles the operations of CRAs. This study 
recommends the strengthening of the Zimbabwe CRA-framework; primarily to 
mitigate the types of systemic risks exposed by the 2007 global financial crisis. 
                                                 
873
 In the U.S. calls to increase competition in the CRA industry led to the enactment of the CRAR Act.  
874
 International Herald Tribune (2007) ‗Credit Crisis Hurts Rating Agencies‘, 13 August 2007.  
875
 Zimbabwean policymakers should consider the following: (i) SEC Proposed Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, June 16, 2008, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf (ii) CESR (2008) Second Report to the 
European Commission on the Compliance of Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code and the 
Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance (CCESR/08-277, May 2008) (iii) IOSCO‘s 
Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO [2003b]) and the 
IOSCO‘s report on code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs (IOSCO [2004a; 2004b]); (iv) the IOSCO 
Technical Committee (2008) ‗The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets‘; (v) 
the April 2008 Financial Stability Forum report on Enhancing market and Institutional Resilience. The 
Forum is a task force of the Group of Seven finance ministers.  
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Currently, CRAs intending to rate institutions regulated by the RBZ are required 
to obtain a registration certificate from the RBZ. At the same time, the Securities Act 
provides that CRAs should obtain licences from the SC. This is an unnecessary 
duplication of regulatory jurisdictions. There should be one regulatory authority: and 
that should be the SC, or preferably - as argued in chapter 8 - a consolidated regulator. 
The regulator should promulgate peremptory CRA rules of conduct which can borrow 
from, but enhance upon, the current RBZ-imposed code of conduct for Credit Rating 
Agencies.
876
 The new code of conduct for CRAs must regulate: (i) conflicts of 
interests; (ii) the rating process, including disclosures of rating methodologies; and 
(iii) behaviour of rating personnel and communication between CRAs, issuers and the 
financial market on rating decisions. Violations of the code of conduct should attract 
administrative, civil and criminal penalties. The rating framework must ensure 
transparency of the rating process; foster competition, and ensure that it does not 
create, as in the U.S., high entry barriers, which have resulted in the creation of a 
duopoly.
877
  
Critics argue that the current CRA ―issuer-pays‖ business model and the provision 
of consultancy services by CRAs give rise to conflicts of interests. Until the 1970s, 
CRAs derived their revenue from subscribers to their ratings publications. CRAs now 
derive the bulk of their revenue from fees paid by issuers of debt securities.
878
 CRAs‘ 
activist structuring role in securitization transactions and their perceived gatekeeping 
failures have accentuated the adverse perception of a highly conflicted relationship. 
Although CRAs argued - after the collapse of Enron - that they effectively managed 
conflicts of interest and that there was no empirical evidence establishing they had 
                                                 
876
 RBZ (2004) (note 652, supra) at paragraph 7.  
877
 The CRA industry in the US is dominated by Moody‘s and Standard and Poor‘s.  
878
 According to Frank Partnoy, ―…approximately 90% of rating agency revenues comes from issuers 
who pay for ratings. Partnoy (2005) (note 846, supra) at p. 69.  
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failed to do so;
879
 subsequent events leading to the 2007 global financial crisis 
disproved their assertions.
880
 In Zimbabwe, the SC-promulgated CRA code of conduct 
should anticipate and enable the efficient resolution of such conflict of interest 
situations 
There have been calls to modify the CRAs‘ business model.881 Some have called 
for securities exchanges to pay for ratings to reduce incentives for ratings-inflation 
and for ratings-shopping; both of which, it has been argued, resulted in the publication 
of unreliable ratings and contributed to the 2007 global financial crisis.
882
 The 
proposal to statutorily alter the CRA business model is controversial because it 
threatens CRAs‘ profitability. It is arguable that the problem lies, not with the CRA 
business model per se, but with the near total absence of CRA accountability and 
almost non-existence regulation. Arguably, if CRAs were made liable for issuing 
misleading rating opinions tainted by fraud, recklessness or that were compromised 
due to internal conflicts of interest, they would be incentivised to exercise greater due 
diligence when issuing rating opinions. The proposal to prohibit ratings-shopping is 
also controversial. It can only work if the current CRA business model is modified, 
which appears unlikely. 
                                                 
879
 In 2003, the CRA industry representatives that appeared before the U.S. Congress were unanimous 
that there was no empirical evidence to conclude that they had failed to address conflicts of interests 
that arise from this particular business model. It emerged that CRAs were managing conflicts of 
interest arising from their business model and that this was mostly due to CRAs desire to conserve their 
reputational capital. See Securities and Exchange Commission report (2003) (note 836, supra) at p. 23 
and p. 41. 
880
 Frank Raiter and Richard Gugliada, former senior executives at Moodys and S&P pilloried the 
institutions, the rating process, methodologies and alleging that some credit ratings were guesses. See 
Credit and Creditability, NOW ON PBS, (Maria Hinajosa, November 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/446/transcript.html   
881
 See for instance Buiter who calls for the modification of the issuer pays business model. Willem H. 
Buiter (2007) ‗Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis‘, Centre for Economic Policy Research: Policy 
Insight No. 18, December 2007), at p. 4. Available at  
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight18.pdf 
882
 See for instance Jerome Mathis., James Mc Andrews., and Jean-Charles Rochet (2008) ‗Rating the 
Raters: Are Reputation Concerns Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?‘, Available at: 
http://www.carnegie-rochester.rochester.edu/nov08-pdfs/rochet.pdf  
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Critics have argued that the provision of ancillary and risk management 
consultancy services by CRAs to issuers gives rise to conflicts of interest because a: 
―CRA‘s rating decision could be influenced by whether or not an issuer purchased 
additional services provided by the CRA.‖883 Some CRAs provide pre-rating 
assessments, ―public and private firm credit scoring models, international rating 
systems services, and empirical data on default incidence, loss severity, default 
correlations, and rating transitions.‖884 This study proposes, not the proscription of the 
provision of such consultancy services, but the introduction - through a code of 
conduct - of peremptory rules to resolve consequential inefficiency-inducing conflicts 
of interests. These can include corporate governance style measures, such as the 
requirement that the rating and consulting functions should be separate.
885
 The CRA 
regulations should in addition, require the disclosure of material information in rating 
opinions, including a requirement that CRAs disclose ancillary services provided to 
rating clients. 
Critics also argue that CRAs typically receive material corporate information 
about rated entities or debt securities that is not in the public domain. Such 
information can enable CRA analysts to either trade on or pass such information to 
subscribers of their publications and other services. In other words, it is argued that 
CRA analysts can either engage in or facilitate insider trading, compromising market 
efficiency.
886
 This concern is addressed in Part X of the Securities Act, which outlaws 
                                                 
883
 International Organisation of Securities Commission (2003) ‗Report on the Activities of Credit 
Rating Agencies‘, at p. 11, Available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD153.pdf  
See also Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) (note 875, supra) at pp. 43-44. 
884
 Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) (note 836, supra) at p. 42.  
885
 However, contrast this recommendation with the SEC findings that in the U.S. CRAs policies and 
practices requiring the separation of consultancy and rating services were not implemented in practice. 
Ibid., at p. 43. 
886
 Stephanie Rousseau notes: ―credit rating agencies may provide their subscribers with non-public 
material information, including information about pending rating changes, which threatens to 
destabilise the level playing field upon which investors should trade.‖ Stephanie Rousseau (2005) (note 
834, supra) at p. 630.  
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the improper use of insider information. The CRA code of conduct must also prohibit 
CRA staff from transmitting to their firm‘s subscribers such material information, and 
must require CRAs to create internal governance structures that prevent unlawful 
transfer of such information. Equally, CRA staff must be prohibited from engaging in 
financial activities, including securities trading, when they are in possession of 
material information which is not in the public domain. In addition, anti-insider 
trading provisions of the CRA code of conduct must envisage and prohibit the passing 
on of non-public information by CRAs, including their staff, to subscribers of their 
materials. 
CRAs, in the U.S. context, have been accused of engaging in abusive and coercive 
practices, such as the abusive use of unsolicited ratings. It is recommended that the 
CRA code of conduct must envisage and provide adequate remedies to mitigate 
abusive and coercive practices. CRAs routinely issue unsolicited ratings.
887
 In the 
U.S., CRAs were accused of issuing low unsolicited ratings with the purpose of 
increasing market share and coercing issuers to engage their services. Some issuers 
reportedly complained that CRAs sent them bills after issuing unsolicited ratings and 
in some cases implied that if their services were engaged - for a fee - a higher rating 
could be obtained.
888
  
The practice of unsolicited ratings is controversial for several reasons. Critics 
argue that such ratings are inherently inaccurate - contributing to market inefficiencies 
                                                 
887
 Partnoy (2005) (note 846, supra) at p. 71.  
888
 International Organisation of Securities Commission (2003) (note 875, supra), at p. 15. In 1993 
Moody‘s was sued in the U.S. by Jefferson County (Colorado) school district because it had issued a 
negative outlook on bonds issued by the latter after it had opted to use S&P and Fitch to rate its bond 
issuance. The negative outlook issued by Moody‘s forced Jefferson Country School to re-price its 
bonds and pay a higher interest rate. Although Jefferson County School‘s suit was dismissed on 
freedom of speech grounds, it served to illustrate the perception that CRAs sometimes abuse their 
market position. See Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v Moody‘s Investor‘s Services, Inc., 
175 F.3d 848 (10
th
 Cir 1999). 
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- because they are based on incomplete information.
889
 In rebuttal, proponents argue 
that unsolicited ratings help avoid rate shopping and that in any event, there is little 
evidence to indicate that unsolicited ratings contribute to market inefficiencies, and 
that the prohibition of the practice would violate their freedom of speech in addition 
to raising entry barriers for new CRAs.
890
 In Zimbabwe, this study proposes, not the 
prohibition of unsolicited ratings, but the imposition of a legal requirement obliging 
CRAs to disclose that a rating opinion is unsolicited. This would act as a signal to 
market participants. In addition, the CRA code of conduct must define as abusive 
conduct the sending of bills for unsolicited ratings.  
The 2007 global financial crisis has raised questions over statistical rating 
methodologies employed by CRAs in pricing structured finance securities‘ credit risk. 
CRAs have been accused of credit risk mispricing and ratings inflation, and of due-
diligence failures.
891
 Despite initial denials, it is now clear that different triple-A rated 
securities carry different levels of risk.
892
 These disparities have brought into question 
the integrity and value-add of ratings. Indeed, some critics have called for the quasi-
regulatory role played by CRAs in the financial markets to be removed.
893
 In 
recognition of this problem, Moody‘s and Standard and Poor have apparently 
suggested changing their rating scales for structured finance products.
894
 Rules 
                                                 
889
 Partnoy states: ―it is interesting that credit rating agencies believe that they are capable of publishing 
unsolicited ratings even if they do have no access to management or inside information and are merely 
making judgments based on publicly available information.‖ And in a footnote he adds that: ―there is 
an argument that unsolicited ratings are a sign of market failure in the credit rating business, because 
they indicate that some agencies, particularly Moody‘s believe that they can extract fees from issuers 
by threatening to publish unduly unfavourable ratings.‖ Partnoy (2005) (note 837, supra) at p. 73.  
890
 IOSCO for instance notes that: ―although unsolicited ratings may pose issues for securities 
regulators contemplating regulation in this area, regulators should also be aware that new entrants 
frequently rely on unsolicited ratings to build their reputations. Blanket prohibitions on the activity 
effectively may constitute a barrier to new entrants.‖ International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (2004) (note 875, supra) at p. 15. 
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 International Monetary Fund (2008) (note 106, supra), at p. 61.  
892
 For an excellent critique see, Nomura (2006) ‗Bond Rating Confusion‘. Available at 
http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Bond_Rating_Confusion.pdf  
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 Roubini (2008) (note 143, supra) at p. 6. See also Calomiris (2008) (note 22, supra), at p.78.  
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 International Monetary Fund (2008) (note 106, supra) at p. 55.  
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imposed by the SC or consolidated regulator would need to capture and mitigate these 
concerns. Ideally, CRAs should be obliged to undertake some minimum levels of due 
diligence and should state in their ratings if insufficient information was used in 
compiling same. In addition, CRA should provide more analytical information with 
their ratings.
895
 
Other issues that should be considered include the disclosure by CRAs of their 
rating formulae, the standardization of rating criteria and opinions to facilitate easier 
understanding by investors, regulatory authorities and other market participants of the 
levels of risk attendant to fixed-income market securities. In rebuttal it is arguable that 
such stipulations may stifle innovation, and that standardization is difficult given the 
mathematical formulas utilised, and the subjectivity of opinions. While the 
publication of formulae utilised may be of interest and use to sophisticated investors, 
such disclosure maybe of limited value to ordinary investors. It could be argued in 
response that the structured finance market is largely institutional anyway, and such 
disclosure will generate efficiencies. 
In summary, although Zimbabwe has a CRA regulatory and gatekeeping 
framework, it is basic in nature. The SC should establish a comprehensive CRA 
regulatory framework, providing for: (i) the registration of CRAs; the regulation of 
the ratings process; (iii) corporate governance rules for CRAs; and (iv) an enhanced 
civil and criminal law liability framework. This extant rudimentary framework leaves 
the financial services system vulnerable to systemic risks that can arise from financial 
information failure occasioned by CRAs failing in their gatekeeping responsibilities.  
 
 
                                                 
895
 See the recommendations proposed by the IMF in its 2008 Global Stability Report. Ibid., at pp. 82-
83.  
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10.6. Summary  
This chapter established that Zimbabwe‘s capital markets gatekeeping framework 
is basic, and that it should be reformed and enhanced to enable it to contribute to the 
mitigation of risks that can arise from securitization. In its present under-developed 
state, the extant capital markets gatekeeping framework does not enable lawyers, 
auditors and CRAs to fully discharge their capital markets gatekeeping functions. 
Because of its nascent state, this component of Zimbabwe‘s risk mitigation 
framework would not be able to efficiently and robustly mitigate risks such as those 
which contributed to the collapse of Enron and the 2007 global financial crisis. The 
SC should, as envisaged under the Securities Act, prescribe regulations that establish 
a registration and regulatory framework for, among others, structured finance lawyers, 
public auditors and CRAs. The SC should prescribe binding rules that regulate third-
party opinions which are critical due diligence components of securitization 
transactions true-sale and non-consolidation opinions, and audit reports and ratings. 
To reduce financial information failure risks that can be spawned by conflicts of 
interests, the SC should ensure that it prescribes corporate governance codes of 
conduct for capital markets gatekeepers. And in the process, it must clearly stipulate 
civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance.  
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           CHAPTER 11 
             CONCLUSION 
 
 
11.1. Concluding observations 
This study assessed (i) the extent to which Zimbabwe‘s legal system enables 
financial and other entities to engage in the numerous legal arrangements that 
constitute a basic securitization transaction; and (ii) the legal reforms which need to 
be implemented to create an effective and risk-managing securitization-enabling 
financial infrastructure in Zimbabwe. The study analysed: (a) laws regulating 
financial firms and statutory bodies which, internationally, have participated in 
securitization transactions, as originating firms, providers of securitization-related 
services, and as institutional investors; (b) Zimbabwe‘s trust and corporate law with 
the objective of identifying legal structures that can be used as SPVs; (c) Zimbabwe‘s 
law of sale and the various legal risks, including re-characterization, substantive 
consolidation, veil-piercing, foreclosure, insolvency and tax that may impinge a 
securitization asset transfer; (d) Zimbabwe‘s financial markets regulatory system as 
well as the extant gatekeeping liability and regulation framework; and (e)  the extant 
dispute resolution framework.  
This study concludes that on the whole, i.e. with a few notable areas of exception, 
Zimbabwe‘s financial infrastructure as it is currently constituted does in actual fact 
permit most of the various arrangements that constitute a basic securitization 
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transaction. This is perhaps unsurprising given that in South Africa, which shares with 
Zimbabwe the unique Roman-Dutch common law legal system; firms were able to 
harness securitization with minimal legal reform – relating to prudentially regulated 
financial institutions - having been put in place. However this study found – as 
summarised below - numerous issues that should be clarified or rectified through legal 
reform. In addition, although Zimbabwe‘s financial stability framework can be used to 
mitigate risk that can be spawned by financial firms engaging in securitization 
transactions, as originators, service providers or as investors, it is insufficiently 
developed to prevent or manage risks of the nature that were exposed by the 2007 
global financial crisis, some of which emanate from the securitization process. This 
study argues that Zimbabwe‘s financial services regulatory and supervisory 
framework and the gatekeeping liability and regulatory framework should be 
extensively reformed; first by creating a consolidated financial services regulatory 
agency – accompanied by a comprehensive and modern regulatory and supervisory 
framework; and secondly by creating a comprehensive gatekeeper liability and 
regulatory framework. In a nutshell, this study finds that although there are a few 
legal impediments to firms in Zimbabwe engaging in securitization transactions, the 
extant financial services regulatory and gatekeeping framework is ill-suited to the task 
of preventing and managing risk that may arise from firms‘ involvement in 
securitization.  
 
11.2. Originating firms 
This study establishes that as a general rule, Zimbabwe‘s legal framework permits 
financial institutions, statutory bodies and other income generating enterprises to 
refinance using securitization, economic and other factors permitting. However a 
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weakness with the extant framework is legal uncertainty. The RBZ securitization 
guidelines indicate that as far as the central bank is concerned, banking institutions 
and building societies operating in Zimbabwe may engage in securitization 
transactions as originators, service providers and investors. But this is not 
unambiguously supported by the wording used in the Banking Act or the Building 
Societies Act. This study recommends the amendment of the Banking Act, the 
Building Societies Act and the Councils Act to ensure that each enactment refers 
either to securitization in particular or structured finance transactions in general, as 
permissible refinancing methods.  
The research also concludes that financial institutions are permitted to provide 
securitization transaction-related services, such as credit and liquidity enhancement, 
the provision of SPV management services, et al. Although there are no legal 
restrictions on the ability of most financial institutions investing in securitization 
issuances, this study recommended that consideration should be given to removing or 
amending the prescribed assets regime, which compels local government authorities, 
and insurance firms and pension and provident funds among others from investing in 
securities of their choice without Ministerial approval.  
 
11.3. SPVs 
The study establishes that trusts and public limited-liability companies are the 
only two legal structures that can be used as securitization SPVs. Both legal entities 
are relatively easy and cost-effective to establish, have limited liability status (or 
limited liability-like status in the case of trusts) – can be made subject to effective 
corporate governance prescriptions, enjoy a measure of bankruptcy-remoteness – 
subject obviously to the intentions of the structurers, and are permitted to issue 
343 
securities to members of the public. Because trusts are not subject to entity-level tax 
liability, they are arguably better securitization vehicles compared to public 
companies. The study recommends that the Moneylending and Rates of Interest Act 
should be amended to ensure that SPVs that engage in non true-sale securitization 
transactions are exempted from registration as moneylenders under the Act.  
 
11.4. Asset transfer 
This study establishes that Zimbabwe‘s Roman-Dutch law provides an effective 
medium for the transfer of financial assets in true-sale and non true-sale securitization 
transactions. An out-and-out cession and a cession in securitatem debiti effect a true-
sale and a non-true sale securitization transaction, respectively. Apart from cession, 
assignment and novation (which also involves cession where financial assets are 
involved) are asset transfer methods that can be used in transferring rights of action in 
a securitization transaction. It establishes that the true-sale concept is envisaged in 
Zimbabwe‘s commercial laws. There is nothing in Zimbabwe‘s legal system that 
precludes the description of a contract, in which ownership over financial assets is 
effectively transferred from an SPV to an originating firm, as a true-sale. For purposes 
of transactional counsel‘s true-sale opinions or dispute resolution, the study identified 
true-sale indicia used by common law jurisdictions, which would be regarded as 
persuasive authority in Zimbabwe. The study concludes however that under Roman-
Dutch law, it is not possible to effect a true-sale of future-flow financial receivables. 
Ownership over the sold future-flow assets only passes once the assets come into 
existence. In practice therefore, appropriate credit enhancement strategies would have 
to be employed to mitigate this added risk inherent in the securitization of future-flow 
receivables.  
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This study established that the Insolvency Act and Companies Act anti-asset 
disposal provisions carry insolvency-inducing risks to non true-sale or re-
characterized securitization transactions; but have minimal, if any, effect on true-sale 
transactions.  This study argued against the promulgation of a statutory safe-harbour 
in the Insolvency Act for non true-sale securitization transactions. Non true-sale 
securitization transactions are but one species of secured finance transactions. There is 
no reason in principle why such transactions should be granted special insolvency 
risk-free status as compared to other secured transactions.  
The study also establishes that in Zimbabwe, creditors of an originating firm do 
not have a cause of action to apply for, and courts do not have jurisdiction to issue, 
orders for the substantive consolidation of the assets of an SPV with those of an 
originating firm. However, what cannot be achieved through an application for 
substantive consolidation may be achieved through an application for the piercing of 
the corporate veil of an SPV. This research argued that the veil-piercing doctrine does 
not apply to trust structures. Further, in practice the veil-piercing risk has minimal 
impact on bona fide, arms length, for fair value securitization transactions; and can be 
structured out of most transactions. The judiciary in Zimbabwe should however 
clarify the ambit of the veil-piercing doctrine. Further, the study found that in 
Zimbabwe, foreclosure risk is generally manageable, and does not impinge on 
securitization transactions. The country has a well developed foreclosure 
infrastructure framework, which enables judgment creditors to cost-effectively and 
expeditiously foreclose in satisfaction of judgment debts.  In summary, this study 
concludes that Zimbabwe‘s legal infrastructure permits the effective management of 
re-characterization, insolvency, substantive consolidation, veil-piercing and 
foreclosure risks.  
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11.5. Taxation 
This study established that Zimbabwe‘s tax regime presents some legal 
impediments to securitization structuring. A critical flaw with the framework is legal 
uncertainty about whether, and if so, which of the various cash-flows between an 
originating firm and an SPV are subject to income tax, VAT and stamp duty 
liabilities. ZIMRA should issue guidelines on the likely treatment of the various 
income flows in securitization transactions. This will facilitate transaction certainty 
and reduce compliance costs.  
The Income Tax Act should be amended to enable all types of securitization SPVs 
and not just trust structures – as is currently the case – to be entity-level income tax-
exempt. The VAT Act should be amended and exempt from VAT-liability the cession 
of financial receivables from an originating firm to an SPV, as well as the issuance of 
securities by an SPV. To reduce securitization transaction costs, this study also 
recommends that services provided by a Servicer to an SPV and/or an originating firm 
pursuant to a securitization transaction should be exempt from VAT. Regarding stamp 
duty liability, this study recommends that the Stamp Duty Act should be amended to 
clearly and unambiguously stipulate that cessions of mortgage and notarial bonds used 
for securitization transactions are stamp duty-exempt. Although possessing an 
adequate tax dispute resolution system, this research recommended the creation of a 
single and initial-jurisdiction tax court in place of the Special Court, the Fiscal 
Appeals Court and the High Court. 
 
11.6. Financial markets regulatory framework 
Zimbabwe has an underdeveloped financial market regulatory and supervisory 
framework, which should be overhauled if the country is to create a financial 
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infrastructure that is capable of effectively preventing and managing risk that may 
arise from securitization. In its present state, the financial stability framework would 
not be capable of effectively preventing and managing securitization transaction risks. 
The financial services regulatory system is fragmented, which creates risks of 
regulatory arbitrage and failure. This study recommends the establishment of a 
consolidated regulator in place of the RBZ, the IPC and the SC, which would regulate 
all financial services institutions in Zimbabwe. In addition, the consolidated regulator 
should establish a comprehensive prudential regulatory framework, which covers all 
financial institutions - banking, insurance, pension funds, securities firms, broker 
dealer, hedge funds, etc - their subsidiaries and holding companies.  
If the current financial services regulatory system is retained, this study 
recommends its wholesale enhancement. The RBZ‘s regulatory and supervisory 
authority should be extended over all banking, building society and micro-finance 
institutions. The IPC regulatory and supervisory framework needs to be overhauled 
and complemented by a modern prudential framework that inter alia, creates a risk-
sensitive capital and liquidity reserves regime. The SC‘s regulatory and supervisory 
authority should be extended to cover more key capital markets gatekeepers. In 
addition, it should create a comprehensive framework for the regulation and 
supervision of structured finance lawyers, CRAs, public auditors, among others. 
Further, it should promulgate rules that regulate securities-related disclosures, 
corporate governance stipulations for public companies, as well as some of the key 
gatekeepers.  
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11.7. Capital markets gatekeeping framework 
The study concludes that Zimbabwe‘s capital markets gatekeeping framework – 
comprising its civil, criminal, and administrative law components – is basic and 
would not be an effective tool to mitigate risks that can arise from securitization. It 
can however to be used to mitigate typical and basic causes of capital markets 
financial information failure risks, such as fraud, inadequate disclosure, false-trading 
and market manipulation, and insider trading. But, the extant framework should be 
enhanced through, among others, the promulgation of peremptory codes of conduct, 
especially for capital markets gatekeepers, such as structured finance lawyers, public 
auditors and CRAs.  
 
11.8. Dispute resolution framework 
This study concludes that Zimbabwe has a generally adequate dispute resolution 
system. The High court has jurisdiction over most typical securitization transaction 
disputes. In addition, the country has a functioning and established arbitration 
framework, which is complemented and reinforced by the formal justice system. The 
study also concluded that Zimbabwe‘s judicial system permits parties to a 
securitization transaction to choose the forum and law which they wish to govern any 
arising disputes. However, as noted above, the country currently suffers from an 
adverse image problem, over its commitment to the rule of law. This is a political risk 
problem which, this thesis has argued is transient, and is one that in all likelihood will 
dissipate with the evolution of the country‘s political situation.  
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11.9. Summary 
In summary, this study concludes that although needing reform in a few areas, 
Zimbabwe‘s legal system, to a large extent, enables income generating enterprises to 
engage in the numerous legal arrangements that constitute a basic securitization 
transaction. However, it needs to overhaul its financial stability framework to ensure 
that the financial services regulatory and corporate gatekeeping system can effectively 
prevent and manage risks that may arise with securitization. In its present state, it 
would be inadvisable for a full blown securitization market to blossom. This is 
because the financial services regulatory and gatekeeping frame is rudimentary and 
would not be capable of effectively preventing and managing securitization 
transaction risks.  
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